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This opening chapter is concerned to define a concept of 'rational freedom' within a philosophical tradition which emphasises that the well being of the individual is achieved only in relation with other individuals. One of the most important aspects of this 'rational’ tradition is its attempt to secure a non-authoritarian basis for authority so as to ensure the unity of the freedom of each with the freedom of all.
The purpose of the first section is to identify the 'radical' and 'Utopian' character of philosophy's 'ought-to-be' when opposed to the 'is', relating a conception of philosophy as the 'rational Utopia' to the emancipatory and democratic possibilities that the chapter proceeds to identify in the tradition of 'rational freedom'. This introductory section relates the philosophical 'ought-to-be' to 'radical' and 'Utopian' themes in contemporary 'postmodern' political culture in order to underline the POSTmodern character of the way Marx recasts the terms of 'rational freedom'.

A crucial issue here is the predicament of reason within a rationalised modern society. This section highlights the breakdown within modernity of the intrinsic connection between reason and freedom, something which undermines notions of the 'good' society. The general argument is that, by realising the democratic and emancipatory themes of 'rational freedom', Marx resolved the modern impasse of reason within capitalist rationalisation. The section concludes by identifying the 'Utopian' character of 'rational' philosophy in the way it envisages morality progressively eliminating coercion in human affairs. This establishes the basis for reading Marx as radicalising the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' as against its historical and institutional realisation.

The second section of this chapter offers a general definition of 'rational freedom', making its key characteristics clear. Critical issues will emerge later as the specific focus falls upon Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant. These 'rational' thinkers are preliminary yet crucial figures for the analysis of the Hegel-Marx confrontation over 'rational freedom' in chapters 4 and 5.

In general, Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel are approached with a view to identifying the emancipatory and democratic possibilities of their 'rational' perspectives, showing how these possibilities were systematically undermined by a series of dualisms - reason/nature and public/private - which, in turn, constituted the 'rational' social order of modernity.
Marx's communism is explicated in relation to a philosophical tradition which demonstrates a normative concern for the appropriate regimen for human self- realisation. Marx critically appropriated and reworked 'rational' principles and themes, putting them on a materialist basis which stresses principles of interaction and reciprocity within relationships in the everyday life world.
In taking this approach to Marx, as reworking a 'rational' tradition of political philosophy, Levy's term 'anarcho-Aristotelianism' is appropriate (Levy 1993:109). For the intention is to recover an Aristotelian sense of 'the political' as an art and mode of life based upon a creative human essence as against the modern definition of 'the political' as a field of power/force which is institutionalised in the impersonal state and which authorizes the use of force over recalcitrant individuals.
The reconstruction of a 'rational' tradition on the basis of the Aristotelian concern with creative human self-realisation enables a definition of Marx's communism as an attempt to replace the coercive coordination of human affairs via external power with a moral and social coordination through the internal conception of power.
For, in attempting to realise a non-authoritarian definition of authority by ensuring an active and consensual connection of individuals with political institutions, the 'rational' tradition makes it possible to conceive of a transformation of 'the political' so that reason/morality progressively eliminates coercion in human affairs. Though Rousseau, Kant and Hegel did not believe morality could be pushed this far in the empirical world of politics, their 'rational' perspectives do raise the possibility of an internal coordination of human affairs.

This takes two forms. Firstly, all individuals equally are considered to be rational beings capable of apprehending the moral law, of appreciating 'true' morality. Secondly, the attempt to define authority in terms of the principle of self-assumed obligation affirms the principle of democratic self-government.

Historically, the democratic implications of 'rational freedom' came to be undermined by a couple of dualisms. The reason-nature dualism involved the devaluation of the real nature of human beings in favour of their 'higher' rational selves. The public-private dualism institutionalised reason as this 'higher' morality in the state in abstraction from the reality of civil society, from the world of experience. As a result, the normative and political aspects of fundamental areas of human activity, essential to the creative realisation of human nature, were systematically suppressed. These antinomies and dualisms were left unresolved by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and were to reappear as an explicitly life-denying rationalisation in Weber.
Only by overcoming these dualisms could the 'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion be realised. The argument is that, in dealing with the unresolved problems and antinomies of the 'rational' tradition, Marx implicitly pursued the realisation of the 'rational' ideal of a 'true' public life, embodying the principles of self-assumed obligation and of the unity of each and all under the moral law in material life. This chapter deals with this moral project in terms of its status as an ideal community of ends in the perspectives of 'rational' thinkers but also in terms of its flawed historical realisation as a lawful-institutional freedom.

Having discussed Kant's realm of ends and Hegel's Sittlichkeit as the most advanced form taken by 'rational freedom’ (chapters 3 and 4), the rest of the thesis focuses upon Marx's development of a communal context in which reason and freedom coincide in a genuine moral and political life.

During the last ten to fifteen years there has been an increasing number of attempts to 'regain', 'reinvent' and 'reconstruct' marxism (Post 1996; Sherman 1995; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992; McCarney 1990). Whilst these projects have had the merit of undermining the old certainties and categories within marxism, their concentration upon methodological questions to the neglect of substantive questions of politics and morality has meant that much that is essential to Marx's communism has been neglected. For this reason, the attempt to recover Marx and marxism falls short of its stated objective. No less than these theoretical works, this thesis seeks to distance Marx from much of the marxism of the twentieth century, but it does so by revaluing the normative and political themes of Marx's communism in relation to a specific philosophical background. Marx's communism is rooted in a complex and sophisticated philosophical tradition which, in one form or another, combines the political, ethical and anthropological to establish that individual freedom is something formed only in relation to other individuals. Agreeing that the philosophical defence of Marx's substantive theses has been 'relatively underdeveloped' (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:189), this thesis shows how Marx realises the emancipatory themes of a 'Greco-Germanic’ tradition of 'rational freedom', defining his politics in the ancient sense of creative self-realisation. This thesis proposes 'to reflect normatively on post-capitalist social and political arrangements' (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:100) in the sense of politics as inherently social and ethical, a task which has become all the more important given the historical impasse of marxism.

Rather than concentrate narrowly upon Marx's specific political writings, in the manner of Thomas (1980 1994), Hunt (1984), Maguire (1978), Miliband (1977), Sanderson (1969), Avineri (1968) and Draper (1977 1978 1986 1990), this thesis approaches 'Marx's politics' from its 'rational' origins in ancient Greek thought. Stated briefly, ‘rational freedom’ affirms a socio-relational and ethical conception of freedom in which individual liberty depends upon and is constituted by the quality of relations with other individuals. The human individual, as Aristotle argues, is a zoon politikon, a social animal, requiring a politikon bion, or political/public life to realise purposes of individuation. Marx is shown to explain how the emancipatory promise of 'rational freedom' turns into its opposite through the rationalising processes of capitalist modernity and the way that these issue in the general differentiating out of human experience. He is shown to realise unity at a higher, more differentiated, level of human existence.

To investigate these issues, this thesis constructs a concept of 'rational freedom', proceeding to examine Marx's reworking of that concept in order to realise its core principles. Integral to this ‘rational’ concept is the relation between reason and freedom. As the thesis develops, the focus will fall upon Marx's attempt to establish that relation more satisfactorily at the level of social relationships than had been achieved. Whereas 'rational’ philosophers could never quite manage to locate morality in the empirical world, having instead to invest it in a 'higher' abstract realm regulating individuals – the state and the law, Marx finds a way of incorporating morality in everyday human relations. Marx is thus presented in this thesis as being both in and against the tradition of 'rational freedom', realising its emancipatory and democratic ideals whilst being careful to repudiate its potentially authoritarian tendency as an institutional-legal form raised above real individuals which purports to embody the greater good. Hume famously argued that reason is the slave of the passions. This may or may not be the case with respect to human experience. The point of the rational tradition deriving from Plato is that, for a full and genuine freedom which encompasses the whole of human potentiality, reason needs to rule. The problem with Hume’s formulation is that human freedom remains at its lowest level, human potentiality subsumed under desire and appetite and chained to empirical necessity. The rational approach can risk an overvaluation of reason at the expense of much else that forms the human character. A brittle, abstracted rationalism is vulnerable to criticisms drawn from the British empirical tradition. In this reading of the Enlightenment, Continental thinkers are condemned for employing ‘reason’ as a critical tool against feudal ignorance and superstition whilst failing to appreciate that much in human social life is not and can never be ‘rational’ in this critical, scientific sense. The reasoning is fairly simple, the French Enlightenment of Condorcet, Diderot, Voltaire et al overvalued reason, led to the French Revolution and ‘totalitarian democracy’ (to employ Talmon’s rather tendentious concept). At this point, Adam Smith, David Hume and Edmund Burke are cited to emphasise the point that reason, pushed beyond its fairly limited province, turns into its opposite. 

The antithesis between the wild eyed Continental rationalist and the sane and sober British empiricists works only as caricature. 'Reason has always existed', Marx observed, 'but not always in a rational form' (Marx to Ruge EW 1975:208). Marx will be presented as establishing the social forms and conditions necessary if reason is to become rational. Reason, for Marx, is not abstracted from the social and ethical matrix of human relations.

The opposition between the rationalists of the French Enlightenment and the sober judges of the British Enlightenment can make no sense of the likes of Montesquieu and Rousseau, who were well aware of what Adorno and Horkheimer came later to call the dialectic of Enlightenment. Further, the rationalist conception as stated by Plato explicitly does not argue for the rule of reason to the exclusion of all other human attributes but for the correct ordering of these attributes. Appetite, desire, ambition etc have their place and it is plain caricature to argue that rationalist thinkers argue for a concept of reason that suppresses other human attributes. Rather, they argue that reason serves to canalise these attributes positively to achieve the full and complete human being. The rationalist tradition challenges Hume’s dictum. Whilst reason is the slave of the passions, actual human freedom is much less than its potential; the passions ought to be the slave of reason. The reasons are those given by Kant. The rule of the passions over against reason chains human beings to natural necessity, to want and inclination, appetite and desire; it means that human beings are much less than they could be.

A couple of points are worth making here about this tendency to set up the opposition between British empiricism and Continental rationalism. The ‘passions’ favoured by the British tradition refer to individual self-interest which, only indirectly, are purported to issue in the public goods. The ‘rational’ conception denies that what Mandeville called ‘private vices’ produce the public good. Marx refers to the personal independence as a result of competition as the ‘illusion’ of freedom: ‘an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and is more correctly called indifference’. Individuals being ‘free’ merely ‘to collide with one another’ (Marx Gr 1973:163). 
And this brings us to another point concerning the British Enlightenment as supposedly more in tune with human nature than brittle Continental rationalism – Hegel. Hegel may well be a rationalist but his system of Sittlichkeit – the ethical life – is designed to offer a structured system of roles and purposes which enable the social embodiment of reason. 

The increasing tendency to counterpose the British Enlightenment to the brittle and abstracted rationalism of the French Enlightenment is thoroughly rejected in this thesis. It is not that much of what the likes of Hume and Burke say is wrong, but that it is incomplete, referring to human nature in a largely underdeveloped condition, reduced to its most immediate empirical condition. The dangers of inflating reason beyond human predispositions and activities is acknowledged is something known to French thinkers like Montesquieu and Rousseau. Indeed, David Cameron argues at length that Rousseau and Burke share more in common than is appreciated on precisely this point (1973). In fine, the errors of an abstracted rationalism committed by French revolutionaries are not to be read back into French Enlightenment thinkers, which is simply a crude intellectual determinism.

There is something else at work in this tendency to denigrate Continental rationalism in light of the British Enlightenment. The rejection of the claimed superiority, on rational grounds, for the universalist secular ethic of the French Enlightenment, implies that there are multiple intellectual and cultural sources of such ideas. This means that no matter how deep the passions may be embedded in within a given cultural-ideological background, involving all kinds of hierarchy and forms of obedience which deny individual liberty, the ‘rational’ tradition affirms a moral universalism based on equality, democracy, and personal liberty which is ultimately superior to social and cultural differences. The main point is that this rational concept is not opposed to the social context from the outside but can be rendered compatible with this context via the universal element intrinsic to human nature, societies being transformed in light of these universal values. What Bernard Williams refers to as the 'intellectual irreversibility of the Enlightenment' refers precisely to the universal relevance of ‘rational’ values, common to all humanity, bringing intellectual cohesion and cogency to moral and social ideals (Williams 2002:254). 
The strength of the contemporary reaction against the universal values of the ‘rational’ Enlightenment in the form of Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, nationalism, or individualism is not in itself proof of the moral or political ‘failure of the Enlightenment project', as Maclntyre puts it (1983:62). On the contrary, the crisis of morality within capitalist modernity derives from opposition to Enlightenment values, a continuing and quite deliberate resistance to the equality as well as to the democracy of the ‘Rational’ Enlightenment’s universal ethic and common good, an opposition which began in the late seventeenth century in the reaction against Leibniz, Descartes and Spinoza. However ‘common sensical’ the idea of reason being slave to the passions may sound, the price of such ‘sober’ empiricism against wild eyed rationalism is paid by broad sections of humanity suffering unjust and iniquitous and exploitative relations. The bitter irony is that Postmodernist thinkers insisting on the moral and political 'failure of the Enlightenment project', equating reason with a totalitarian politics (Laclau 1990), engage in a species of Counter-Enlightenment which is little different from the reactionary critics of Enlightenment. Without the universal standard of reason there is merely an irreducible subjectivism with no possibility of adjudicating between different values. If all values are equally valid in these post-Enlightenment times, then there is no reason to argue against injustice in favour of justice. Without reason and its universal component, politics and ethics have nothing to offer the poor, the excluded, the oppressed and the exploited. That is the price of rendering reason the slave of the passions. This is precisely what Plato understood when he came to order human nature, putting appetite and desire in their appropriate place beneath reason. The subtitle of Plato’s Republic is ‘Concerning Justice’. The passions do not and can never deliver justice. Reason, with its ethical component and universal reach, should rule.

Habermas has been alive to this Counter-Enlightenment from the first, calling the French poststructuralists ‘young conservatives’. The problem with poststructuralism and postmodernism is not just the view that all values are equally valid – whether equally true or untrue doesn’t matter since adjudication is not possible – but that it easily becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy'. The democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian aspirations of the Rational Enlightenment were resisted from the start. The charges made against an abstracted reason detached from society and history were made then. Which is why there is a need to be clear from the first that any criticism of the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’ is motivated not by a rejection of Enlightenment values but by a criticism of those institutions and processes which block their realisation and of those approaches – yes, too abstract – which make it impossible to embody those values. The ‘failure’ in the modern world is not that of the Enlightenment or of Enlightenment thinkers but of contemporary thought and politics in occluding the foundation of 'modern' ideas of individual freedom, democracy, equality, and the universalist morality based on justice. Far from ‘the passions’ being the foundation of modern freedom, they are the forces blocking its true and full realisation, vices of avarice, egoism, competition, jealousy, anger being encouraged and inflated within the institutions of market society.

This thesis addresses this split within the Enlightenment between British empiricism and Continental rationalism only indirectly. The principal focus falls upon the universalism of reason with respect to its ancient Greek origins and how these were appropriate and reapplied on the modern terrain by ‘Germanic’ thinkers. There is some ambiguity here in that Rousseau is conventionally considered to be a part of the French Enlightenment. However, it is significant that Rousseau criticised the Enlightenment from within. Rousseau’s critique of abstracted rationalism caused Voltaire to sneer that Rousseau wanted us back in nature crawling on all fours. Rousseau quite explicitly argued for the greater freedom resulting from leaving the natural state for the civil state. His concern, however, was to avoid denaturing human beings in the process. Rousseau is difficult to place. Those who consider him to be a unique and isolated figure are probably correct (Riley 1982:122/3). Rousseau considered himself to be one of those few ‘moderns who had an ancient soul’ (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jugement sur la polysynodie, in Rousseau:Political Writings, 1:421). The fact is that Rousseau is not a French thinker but Swiss; he is from Geneva and this shows in his work. His writings place him within a Germanic tradition and this is how this thesis reads him (Riley 1982 ch 4).

This thesis addresses these questions by reading Karl Marx in a Greco-Germanic tradition of rational freedom. Marx used the term ‘rational freedom’ just the once. In his first contributions to the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx wrote in a very Hegelian manner. Far from being an uncritical, ideological rationalisation of the actual state, however, Marx well understood – as did Hegel - that there was considerable tension between this philosophical principle of the modern state and its actual political function. Marx adhered to the principle of the Hegelian state and used it as a critical yardstick with which to evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of particular states: ‘A state which is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state’ (Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 247). There is a need to establish clearly what this principle of the state as ‘rational freedom’ entails. Put simply, it refers to freedom as a collective rather than an individual project, the idea that human beings as social beings need each other in order to be themselves. This ‘rational’ principle entails mutuality, solidarity and reciprocity in affirming that the freedom of all individuals is conditional upon the freedom of each individual. So long as two or more human beings exist there will be interaction, relationship, inter-subjectivity, a social context and milieu. Any genuine freedom has to recognise the fact that the social world is supra-individual and rests on the quality of social relationships. This is what Hegel’s state as ‘rational freedom’ recognises. Sittlichkeit enables human beings to embody and embed their individual freedom in relation to other individuals in a positive sum game that enhances the freedom of all, as opposed to individuals asserting freedom against all other individuals in a zero-sum game that inhibits the freedom of all. 

Though Marx only used the term 'rational freedom' the once, in his early journalism, he does so in a clearly Hegelian sense. Moreover, the concept remains implicit in Marx’s critical perspectives throughout his later work. The argument of this thesis is that Marx both transforms and incorporates the 'rational' themes and values developed by Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Such a view does not deny that 'Marx's philosophical development arose as much from his experience of political and social struggles as it did from any intellectual evolution' (Callinicos 1985:8). But it does reject the notion of a sharp separation between communism and historical materialism on the one hand and philosophy on the other (Callinicos 1985:1). Much depends upon how Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality is handled. Certainly, Marx rejected speculative philosophy for 'empirical science' and its premises of 'real individuals' (Callinicos 1985:1). Nevertheless, this thesis will argue that Marx's abandonment of philosophy represents a realisation of its 'rational' themes (chapter 6 section 3).
Whereas the contemporary trend is to go 'beyond marxism' (Schecter 1994), the approach that this thesis takes is to go before Marx in order to locate communism as a 'true' public within a normative philosophical concern with the appropriate regimen for the human good. This reconstructs a tradition and a concept of 'rational freedom' around principles of reciprocity, mutual respect, communication, communality, solidarity. The 'rational' here comprehends subjectivity as an intersubjectivity which secures the unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. This tradition rejects the atomistic model of freedom as self-cancelling in equating freedom with unrestricted individual choice and the unregulated pursuit of self-interest (Marx Gr 1973:163/6). The 'rational ‘ conception defines freedom as conceivable only by locating individual interactions within a network of relationships. The failure of marxism to generate a true public life is part of a wider problematic - the failure to actualise 'rational freedom'. This failure is considered not to be a problem of the universal values and ideals – which traditional conservative and contemporary postmodern thought target – but existing relations, institutions and practices. Historically, 'rational freedom' has been institutionalised as a lawful freedom within the state as securing the optimum amount of freedom of each compatible with the freedom of all through universally applied impersonal rules (Unger 1984:66/7). Marx very much began as a 'rational' thinker in this sense, looking upon the state as an institution of freedom, writing in the Rheinische Zeitung that 'recent philosophy ... looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural law of his own reason, of human reason’ (CW 1:202). For Callinicos, Marx's belief in the 'rational' state didn't survive his experiences as a political journalist, making clear to him the connection between the state and class property (Callinicos 1985:32).
Marx certainly realised that the automatic connection between reason and freedom under law could no longer be assumed in class society. But this led him less to abandon the 'rational' conception than to seek its material foundation in a classless society which has dissolved the abstracted legal-institutional form of reason into a self-organising democratic society. This thesis argues that Marx radicalised the 'rational' principle of collective and reciprocal freedom beyond the state in a new associational public. In transcending the legalistic and moralistic framework of the 'rational' tradition, Marx will be shown to realise rational unity within the social world of everyday exchange, reciprocity and solidarity.

For Forbes, Marx believed that human self-realisation could become powerful enough to ensure 'the destruction of social organisations which restricted the full realisation of human capacities and abilities' (Forbes 1990:xix). This aspect of Marx's view has been rejected as Utopian (Heller 1983:369; Polanyi 1957:257). For Heller, the search for 'regulative principles' was an endeavour 'specifically rejected by Marx' since it entails ‘the acceptance of certain external authorities in order to regulate human life’ (Heller 1982:362; Brown 1988:66/7). For Dunn, the view that social, economic and political relations can be brought and kept perfectly into conformity with individuals' moral intuitions 'is excessively optimistic as a practical expectation' (Dunn 1984:88). Feher too rejects as Utopian the idea of the individual as having 'internalised norms to such an extent that there is no need for independently existing, external, alien moral demands' (Feher 1983:85).

The contention of this thesis is that Marx's realisation of the 'rational' unity of each individual and all individuals within social relationships is compatible with the existence of 'regulative principles' of both socio-institutional and moral kinds. In realising 'rational freedom', that is, Marx's internalisation of moral principles does not imply the dissolution of organisation into a pure, atomistic, spontaneity. Rather, authority and mediation continue, but are no longer external to the individual, coming to rest upon participatory structures and institutions. Marx is therefore shown to develop the 'rational' conception into a democratic notion of freedom in which individuals subject themselves to authority. Such a view implies the internal moral and social coordination of human affairs as against the artificial institutional-systemic coordination of a coercive society. Communism will therefore be shown to rest upon the social control exercised by individuals as against the alien control of the state and capital. Kant defined rational freedom’s ideal as a morally coordinated union which replaces the pathologically enforced social union of contemporary society (Kant UH 1991:44/5). This takes shape in Marx as an internally regulated social union which replaces capital’s externally imposed social union.
This thesis presents Marx's ‘rational freedom’ as akin to an 'anarcho-Aristotelianism', recovering politics as creative self-realisation beyond the institutionalisation of reason in the abstract state. Radicalising the 'rational' attempt to combine autonomy and authority to realise a reciprocal freedom under communism answers what for Gramsci was the fundamental question of politics: 'is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled, or is the objective to create the conditions in which this division is no longer necessary?' (Gramsci 1971:144).

Michael Taylor's identification of the core attributes of community as the basis of an alternate social order to the state and the market is pertinent here. Taylor specifies that 'relations between members of a community be direct and many-sided and that they practise certain forms of reciprocity' (Taylor 1982:2/3) without the mediation of representatives, leaders, bureaucrats, codes, and institutions like the state (Taylor 1982:27/8 28). He emphasises the danger of reifying communal bonds so that 'an abstract idea of the community’, i.e. the state, mediates the relations between individual members: 'they relate to it, rather than directly to each other', blocking autonomy (Taylor 1982:162/3).

This thesis demonstrates the precise way in which Marx developed these themes - the community of many sided relations, reciprocity, communal liberty, self-mediation and self-representation, the dissolution of reified (institutional) communal bonds and of the parasitism of the state and capital - out of the tradition of 'rational freedom’. 
Revaluing the normative and political dimension of Marx's communism through rendering explicit Marx's relation to the 'rational’ tradition, the specific focus will be upon Marx's early writings where Marx's reworking of 'rational' themes is at its most direct, developing their potentials and insights beyond the flawed realisation of reason in the liberal capitalist institutional order. It is in the early writings that Marx's preoccupation with political themes of democracy, community, citizenship, rights and communication is at its most intense. In particular, the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction and the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State establish the social democratic orientation of Marx's politics; On the Jewish Question and James Mill establish the moral aspect of democratic community; the Paris Manuscripts develop the key ontological elements; the Theses on Feuerbach defines praxis as a democratisation of philosophy, politics and power; The German Ideology and The Holy Family adumbrate the framework of associative control. 
The framework for the emancipatory rational model of communism, as opposed to an economistic model, is established in the early writings. Here, Marx identified the alien control of the state and capital as constraining and distorting the emancipatory potentials of the 'rational' tradition of political philosophy, i.e. as denying public life as the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation. The 'mature' Marx's focus upon the critique of political economy had the unintentional result within later marxism of devaluing the 'rational' themes of the early texts.

This thesis, therefore, places the greater emphasis upon Marx's early writings as setting the framework for his later writing. Schmidt possibly overstates the case when arguing that Marx's sensuous materialism is 'restrained by the dictates of moral self-realisation’, but his view that Marx's thought belongs to German Idealism, to Kantian ethics (Schmidt 1971:152), has the merit of underlining the extent to which 'rational' themes and values entered Marx's communism and gave it an implicitly political-normative dimension. This is something which economistic readings not only overlook but positively devalue, to the detriment of the moral and political status of Marx’s emancipatory project.
Revaluing the ‘rational’ dimension is therefore a critical issue in resolving the contemporary 'crisis of marxism'. The tendency to consider morality and politics as secondary to economics - capitalism, exploitation, class - has left marxism without a language of freedom with which to engage 'bourgeois' liberalism on the moral and political terrain. There is a need to challenge the views that Marx had no moral position (Althusser 1969:227; Wood in Cohen, Nagel and Scanlon 1980:40), identified morality with the rationalisation of the existing order (Davis 1990; Hartsock 1991; Hodges 1964:232 234-5), and is beyond morality in advocating a transparent society of perfectly intelligible relationships (Heller 1989:105/110). Whilst Marx certainly rejected moralistic appeals in favour of real movement (Norman 1983:180; McCarney 1990:93 111; Skillen 1977:129/30), this does not imply that Marx lacked a moral position. On the contrary, this thesis argues that Marx does possess a moral position, one that is rooted in a conception of the human ontology and its realisation in a truly human social form. Marx thus makes morality an aspect of social life. Through the creation of a certain social identity, uniting public and private, individual and community, Marx succeeds in bringing morality to bear in social practices, bringing morality into the empirical world in a way that ‘rational’ philosophers never quite could.
This thesis takes the view that the political and moral conceptions of Marx's early writings defined the framework and direction of his subsequent thought. Whilst Marx's own involvement in political activity, the altered political climate after 1848, and his critique of political economy entailed a greater emphasis upon class struggle and the contradictory dynamics internal to capitalism, the early vision of communism as a true moral association remained fundamentally unaltered. Marx did not subordinate his early themes to a 'scientific’ study of the objective structures and relations of capitalism. Quite the contrary. Marx's critique of political economy emerges as a critique of capitalist determinism for constraining and distorting the emancipatory potentials of the 'rational' tradition of political philosophy. Marx's later concentration upon the critique of political economy deepened and enriched his early vision of communism.

The need to revalue the ethico-political themes and values that Marx incorporated from the 'rational’ tradition stems from an awareness that 'the various mechanisms [class, crisis, proletarian self-activity] on which Marxists . . have relied for the replacement of capitalism by socialism are not working' (Hobsbawm 1977:15/6). Since, as Hobsbawm suggests, the objective grounds of marxist goals have disappeared (Hobsbawm 1994:498 584), communism can no longer be presented as immanent in the historical process but must be projected as a moral ideal.
 This amounts to a need to rework the relation of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in a manner that acknowledges the importance of Kant in relation to Hegel. This necessity of moral praxis is something which Marx, consistent with Hegelian historicism, rejected: 'the communists do not preach morality at all’ (GI 1999:104). For Marx, communism is not a 'state of affairs' to be established, 'an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself but 'the real movement which abolishes the present state of things', resulting from 'premises now in existence' (GI 1999:56/7). The real movement of the historical process, for Marx, leaves no creative role for moral praxis. The crisis and collapse of capitalism is the product of non-moral factors, collective self-interest in reaction to the crisis and dehumanisation of capitalist production. The view of this thesis is that Marx has here revealed the necessary but not sufficient condition of revolutionary transformation. Morality has a creative role to play. There is such a thing as creative moral praxis, however much it works in line with immanent lines of development. Without a moral ideal inspiring effort and commitment and obligating actors, those lines of development remain passive potential. Marx ended the Manifesto of the Communist Party by urging ‘working men of all countries, unite!’ This is a moral injunction. If class, sectional or materialist interest alone were enough, then the working class would not need the moral appeal at the end of the Manifesto.

Buchanan establishes this point by showing that 'even if revolution is in the best interest of the proletariat and even if every member of the proletariat realizes that this is so, so far as its members act rationally, this class will not achieve concerted revolutionary action' (1982:88). Undermining proletarian revolution is the free-rider problem. Even collective self-interest does not necessarily bind together those who put self-interest first. Something more than self-interest – individual or sectional - is required to bind individuals together. This is morality. The motivation and obligation of individuals by a vision of a moral ideal produces activity and cooperation in conditions where individual self-interest would prevail.





A communist critique cannot be founded upon an exclusively scientific critique of society, its 'objective' structures, relations and contradictions. Marx's criticisms of capitalism are of an ethico-political character: 'the alienated character of work, the competitive and individualistic nature of social relationships, the division between mental and manual labour, the absence of genuine democratic forms of control..' (Keat 1979:22). Communism cannot be reduced to social science without impoverishing its essential character: 'any position which restricts socialist critique in this way, and dubs non-scientific ‘moralistic’ critiques as (in pejorative senses) ‘ethical’, ‘Utopian’, or ‘reformist’, may easily obliterate essential areas of moral and political discourse in the name of socialist science' (Keat 1979:23). This thesis grounds this necessary and creative role of moral and political values in the project of communism in a philosophical tradition of 'rational freedom'. Communism is presented as a vision of the good life, a desirable society that individuals ought to achieve.
Marx's critical and emancipatory project is still valuable, but only if suppressed 'rational' elements are recovered from his philosophical background and foregrounded. The point is that to initiate and sustain praxis requires moral vision - an ideal.

The 'ethicisation' of Marx's materialism with respect to Marx's philosophical background is all the more necessary given the apparent retreat of marxism within the contemporary political and intellectual landscape.

This thesis does more than show the existence of an ideal of the stateless community in the 'rational' tradition of political philosophy, in the manner of Levine's End of the State (1987). More space is given to the material embodiment of ethico-political themes of democracy, community, citizenship, freedom and communication, showing how Marx socialises the 'rational' principles of interaction, reciprocity and intersubjectivity within the terrain of everyday life. With the socialisation of 'rational freedom', 'the political’ ceases to be narrowly concerned with institutions, rules and procedures and is set in the context of everyday social activity. The end of the state is thus a repoliticisation. This develops the political implications of Marx's definition of human emancipation as the return of all human relationships to human beings (OJQ 1975:234). This key demand for the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to the state and capital is developed in this thesis with respect to the need to subject relations to conscious common control (chapter 7). This achieved, the future direction of the thought of the mature Marx, leading to a cooperative mode of production and a commune system of democracy is established.
The thesis begins with the philosophical tradition of 'rational freedom'. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel are preliminary but foundational figures in the presentation of Marx's 'true' public. The conception of the modern polis democracy that emerges from the reconstruction of Marx's relation to ancient Greek philosophy achieves ' a reconciliation of classical communality and modern individuality. Marx's classicism is evident in his awareness that modern individualism stresses a one-sided freedom identified with the separation of individuals from social bonds, a negative freedom which neglects the moral, cultural and affective ties that enrich individuality.
In rejecting the equation of freedom with private self-centredness to reconstruct autonomy from the standpoint of a common life, Marx recovers the classical centre-staging of the polis and of the good life as achieved through participation in public life. A good term for 'rational freedom' would be inter-relationism, entailing a reciprocal notion of the good life as an essential complement to the pursuit of individual freedom.
Marx's reworking of 'rational’ conceptions concerning the character and constitution of modernity and the human condition assumes its most direct form in relation to his critique of Hegel. The problem is that, although Hegel's Sittlichkeit, the ethical life comprising family, civil society and state, grounds freedom more adequately than Rousseau and Kant, its democratic possibilities are undermined by the way that the state and its bureaucracy abstracts commonality and universality from civil society. The argument is not, as with much of the marxist literature (Colletti 1972; Arthur 1986; Clarke 1991; Draper I 1977; Fine 1984), that Marx's 'true democracy’ supersedes Hegel's ethical state in any simple sense. There is an attempt to identify the possibility of an associative public in Hegel's Sittlichkeit.

The post-bourgeois conception of sociality which emerges from Marx's socialisation of Hegel's ethico-institutional framework is employed to challenge individualist liberal conceptions. The moral priority liberalism assigns to the individual needs to be made an integral part of a positive vision of the good society, demanding the transformation of alienated social conditions to realise this positive vision rather than accepting the abstract substitute for such a vision in the form of the state. Marx is shown to identify the communal-political character of the discourse of rights and justice - opposing the rights of the citizen to the rights of man - as implying a future sociality, a community of free individuals interacting in a condition of reciprocal freedom. With morality embedded in relationships and becoming an everyday practice, the discourse of rights and justice could conceivably be dispensed with.
In contrast with 'rational choice' marxism, which values those aspects of Marx's theory which seem consistent with neo-classical economics and methodological individualism (Elster 1985:ch 1), this thesis explores Marx's richer, life affirming materialism. Marx is read as subverting the rationalist vision of modernity which, in defining, legislating and imposing the good externally via the state and law, has meant marginalising, excluding and devaluing the diversity and intensity of the full range of human activities.
By showing how Marx revalued the normative and political aspects of everyday social experience, this thesis addresses the perceived absence of a theory of materiality in marxism (Stauth and Turner 1988:10 20). Marx's materialism is presented as giving centrality to embodiment, experience and engagement in sensuous reality.
In overcoming the dualism between (prioritised) rational will and (devalued) natural inclination, Marx grounds politics and morality not in a sphere abstracted from the world of experience but in the real world as a dynamic, sensuous terrain capable of embodying interaction and reciprocity within communal relationships. It is in this sense that Marx is able to mediate between reason and the passions, avoiding those conceptions which set them as antithetical.
Targeting the public-private and reason-nature dualisms central to 'rational freedom’ and capitalist modernity opens up space to think seriously about the nature of public life. The argument is organised around Marx's defence of the 'true community' of 'life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature' as being 'of quite different reality and scope than the political community', i.e., than the state as an abstracted public (CN 1975:418/9). In achieving a genuine universality, Marx affirms that 'the man is greater than the citizen and human life than political life' (CN 1975:419). Rational freedom's ideal intersubjective community of ends is thus developed as a democratic community of everyday life in Marx.
Marx's 'true state', embedding a genuinely universal citizenship in society (Marx CHDS 1975:112), is understood in this thesis to be a new public defined in terms of its three constituent elements - 'true democracy', 'true community' and ‘true individuality' (references to these terms are to be found throughout Marx's texts, e.g. CHDS 1975:87/8; OJQ 1975:223; JM 1975:265/7 277; EPM 1975:347 348 351; CN 1975:418; GI 1999:117/8).
In the Foucaultian or postmodernist critique, however, this notion of the 'true' betrays a totalitarian impulse (Connolly 1989:86/115 127/8 129/31; Lyotard 1984). There is a need, then, to distinguish Marx's critical appropriation of the terms of 'rational freedom' from a moral rationalism which possesses 'connotations of excessive social control' (McLennan 1989:123). Crucial here is Marx's democratic conception of ontology as challenging the terms of 'rational’ modernity. In reinstating the most intimate aspects of everyday material and individual life as sources of politics and morality, Marx integrates universality and rationality with particularity and nature to overcome the hierarchical division between reason and nature. Unlike the other 'rational' thinkers, Marx has no need to denature individuals in order to realise freedom and therefore can dispense with the 'rational' institutional framework designed to connect individuals with their 'higher' selves and constrain them to the good. His notion of the 'true', as an integral notion, is quite distinct from the opposition of a 'higher' to a 'lower' self inherent in rational freedom's - and liberal modernity's - dualisms of reason-nature and public-private.
Foucault is introduced to clarify Marx's break from all forms of moralizing doctrine which conceive virtue as passive obedience to a codified set of ethical injunctions. The argument affirms the 'rational' emphasis upon the socio-institutional and ethical environment connecting individuals with more expansive communal possibilities as integral to individual self-identity. The Foucaultian critique, in contrast, risks restating, in different terminology, the individualistic liberalism which the 'rational' tradition superseded as capable of only a limited, subjective freedom.

The problem is that the supra-individual 'rational' architecture is unavailable in a disenchanted 'Weberian' world. This undermines attempts to develop a conception of the good implicit in liberalism (Galston 1980 1982). These liberal attempts to conceive autonomy not as a personal creation but as something which flourishes in a community beg the question of how an 'autonomy-supporting environment’ (Raz 1986:391) can be created. That is precisely the end this thesis pursues through Marx's attempt to embed the 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and all within appropriate social forms. The attempts to define a liberal conception of the good have the merit of underlining the need to identify rights as 'fundamental components in the way of life of a community’ committed to human flourishing (Finnis 1980:222). Nevertheless, this thesis shows that public-private/reason-nature dualisms structure social forms in such a way as to block the interrelationships within community which autonomy requires.
There are two possibilities given modern rationalisation. Either one can embrace a neutralised, demoralised liberalism that is silent on the good, offering instead a neutral framework which leaves individuals to pursue the good in a personal sense. This is the 'procedural' path taken by deontological liberalism. Or one can retain the 'substantive' view that individuality requires a supportive environment based upon a notion of a collective good uniting each and all and set about challenging the dualistic framework of capitalist modernity which blocks this conception.

This thesis develops this second alternative by relating Marx to Weber's rationalisation thesis. In delineating the transition from the emancipatory promise of reason to the repressive rationalisation of the 'iron cage' of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organised administration (Murphy 1993:66 75), Weber is important in registering the exhaustion of the 'rational' categories of idealism. The most important question this raises relates to the availability or otherwise of the 'rational' community of ends in the modern world. For Weber, it is impossible to conceive the 'good' in anything other than subjective terms (Weber SV 1991:153). The problem is that Weber's neo-Kantian individualism, emphasising a personal commitment to self-chosen values in relation to real possibilities, reproduces the same fractured self-identity and external morality of duty which is shown to exist in Kant. This view commits 'rational' thinkers, following the Kantian or Weberian route into modernity, to a monadic freedom within a coercive social order regulated by external law and authoritarian politics.
In contrast, Marx is able to recover the 'Greco-Germanic' framework by relating the 'rational' dualisms of reason-nature and public-private to the alienating separations of the liberal capitalist order. And there is common ground here with Max Weber. Weber plays a crucial role in identifying 'separation' as the key figure in the incarnation of a potentially emancipatory reason as a repressive rationalisation. For Weber is explicit that the separation of human agents from their means of control is the most salient characteristic of modern rationalisation (Weber 1968:39; Weber PV 1991:82). The 'rational' dualisms of public-private and reason-nature identified in the first five chapters come to be located precisely in the rationalising separations of capitalist modernity.

Though Weber could be said to have generalised Marx's conception of 'separation' as the separation of all individuals from their material means of control (Weber 1991:78 81; Bowles and Gintis 1987:223/4), Marx himself employed the category in both political and economic aspects, proceeding from the separation of the demos from the state in his critique of Hegel's political philosophy to the expropriation of the proletariat from the means of production in his later writings. Nevertheless, as Jameson notes, despite the fact that the figure of separation runs through Marx's texts as an 'unbroken line’, there has never been a marxism based upon this 'fundamental notion' (Jameson 1991:398/9). By relating the dualisms of 'rational' philosophy to the institutionalised separations of the liberal capitalist order, the approach of this thesis is timely. In the opinion of Jameson, the category of 'separation' has 'become even more relevant for our own period' (Jameson 1991:399). This thesis takes a particular approach to this question of 'separation’, identifying the dualisms which work to undermine the emancipatory and democratic possibilities contained in the philosophical tradition of 'rational freedom' and tracing the institutionalisation of these dualisms within a capitalist process of rationalisation.
Though Walzer criticises that ‘the art of separation has never been highly regarded on the left, especially the Marxist left' (1984:317), liberalism's 'series of complex dualities' (Frug 1980:1075) emerge as alienating separations blocking democracy (Marx EW 1975:80 85/90 106 137 143/4). Marx is shown to resolve the dualistic nature of 'rational freedom' into a critique of capitalism as an alienated system of production.
Marx is thus able to redeem the emancipatory possibilities of the 'rational’ project by restoring the forces and relationships constituting capitalist modernity to human control. The thesis proceeds to develop Marx's historical analysis of the process of capitalist development as an emancipatory alternative to Weber's rationalisation thesis. The way Marx delineates the nature of relations, control and community - analysing whether the bonds connecting individuals are real or abstract, how they are mediated - is shown to be crucial to Marx's 'true' conceptions of democracy, individuality and community.
Though liberals criticise community as a vague concept (Rawls 1971:264), Marx's critique of 'separation' is developed to show that the problem with community is less one of its clarity than of its unavailability in other than the abstract forms of capital, money, the state, bureaucracy. Though Femia accuses Marx of attempting 'to foist an artificial unity on a reluctant humanity' (1993:172), Marx is specifically concerned to uproot all 'illusory' forms of communal life imposed upon the individual (Marx GI 1999:53). Marx is thus shown to attack the way that the state and capital disempower and subvert real community, displacing self-mediated activities by various forms of abstracted, externally imposed mediation. Marx supplies community with a full range of conditions and clauses to support a conception of individual autonomy far richer than that available in the liberal tradition.
Marx's public emerges as an alternative mode of societal integration to the alien 'publics' of the state and capital as non-discursive, non-interactive modes of external coordination, i.e. as modes which proceed systemically, without genuine reciprocity and communication between individuals. The state and capital offer no intrinsic possibility to express rational freedom's identification of reason and will, exhibiting instead tendencies to domination and reification.
Establishing the possibility of a communist public coordinated by citizen-producer discourse, association and interaction - which the 'mature' Marx developed further in terms of communism as the cooperative mode of production based upon associated labour (Marx 1973:171/2; Cl 1976:171 173; Preface 1975:426; Inaugural Address 1974:79/80 90; C3 1981:959) and the commune system of democracy based on self-representation (Marx CWF FD 1974:208/9 210 211 251 252 261) - responds to the criticisms that Marx argues for the 'end' of politics (Polan 1984), leaves the status of 'the political' unclear (Held 1987:151/4; Pierson 1986:7 16/9 24/5 27/30), or opts for spontaneous self-organisation (McLennan 1989:125/6; Habermas 1991:24/46). As developed in the critique of Hegel's political doctrine, 'the political' for Marx is not so much to be abolished as become co-extensive with everyday life.
Whereas socialism, identified with the subjection of the private economy to the state, has been realised as an authoritarian-statist form, this thesis recovers Marx's participatory-democratic form through his early writings.
The early conception of the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class conceives the constitution of the public sphere through an organic process of self-organisation and self-socialisation (Marx CWF 1974:59 82 84 86 250; Address 1973:323 324 326 327 330; CM REV 1973:76 94/7; London Conference, 1974:270; Instructions FI 1974:91 92; Marx to Schweitzer FI 1974:147 156; AS 1974:299; CL FI 1974:369/70 372/3 374/5).
Rupturing the connection between rationalisation and bureaucratisation which both Hegel and Weber make a desirable and inevitable feature of modernity, Marx's communist public embodies the historically novel object of overcoming the dualism between rulers and ruled to realise a new inclusive politics. This challenges both the assertion of the institutional separation of the state from civil society as a condition of democracy and the reduction of democracy to a formal method and mechanism for checking external power (Held 1987:283; Heller 1988:129/131 142; Keane 1991:9).
Reading Marx through a concept of 'rational freedom' to argue for the necessity of moral praxis, the final chapter critically evaluates Jurgen Habermas' attempt to 'ethicize' marxism. Habermas's ideal speech situation emerges as an ambitious attempt to found 'rational freedom' on a linguistic basis (Habermas 1971:314). The critical argument is that Habermas does not question the subordination of human nature, of wants, desires, and needs to reason deeply enough. Whereas Marx's appreciation of the normative aspects of the diverse forms of human activity ruptures the logic of alien rationalisation, Habermas's communicative rationality defines a narrow sphere of morality within it. 
Marx rests the possibility of recovering morality upon the convergence between human fulfilment and social life so that moral demands are affirmed as demands of human nature rather than as external constraints institutionalising a 'higher’ self at the level of the state. If reason is not the slave of the passions, if reason ought to rule, it does not follow that it rules over against and at the expense of ‘the passions’. Arguing that 'human nature is the true community of men’ (CN EW 1975:418/9), the repressive potentialities of the reason-nature dualism are avoided. The thesis, therefore, concludes by defining Marx's realisation of the 'rational' community of ends - the ideal moral order of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel - as a self-enforcing, self-regulating order able to dissolve the institutional-legal apparatus required to constrain individuals to the good.
In sum, proceeding from the problems and potentialities of 'rational freedom', this thesis defines Marx's communism as the 'true' public life. This realises the coincidence of the freedom of each and all - the intersubjective and interactive principle of 'rational freedom' - in the associative activity of lived experience rather than in an ideal or noumenal world. This supports the claim that Marx is the author of a new public sphere, repoliticising the associative space of civil society. Marx locates the problem of 'rational freedom', as a repressive rationalisation, in its dualistic framework separating reason and nature, public and private. This issues in a general 'separation', blocking democracy, preventing community and dissolving the socio-ethical framework required for individuality. This thesis shows how Marx, in overcoming this dualism, is able to combine all three objectives of democracy, autonomy and community in an integral project which re-unifies the totality of human experience.

1-1 Philosophy - The Rational Utopia
The object of this introductory section is to locate Marx's communism in a philosophical conception of politics as concerned with the good life. Having established a relation between philosophy as a radical 'ought-to-be' concerned with human self-realisation and 'utopian' themes in contemporary 'postmodern' political culture in this section, later sections focus more specifically upon the way that ‘rational’ philosophers have established the connection between reason and freedom.

The approach taken develops Marx's emancipatory concern with an alternative sociality as a POSTmodernity beyond modernity's repressive rationalisation (Herman 1983; Tucker 1970:ch4 106 107). The failure to realise the Enlightenment promise of a rational society does not justify the postmodern rejection of the project of modernity as a 'lost cause' (Habermas 1981:9 11). Rather, what is required is a greater sensitivity to the ambiguous content of 'rational' modernity (Habermas 1990:338; Giddens 1990:7; Bauman 1991:6/7 244; Heller 1990:6).
Marx's reworking of the 'rational’ project is compatible with the key themes of postmodernity as identified by Giddens - a post-scarcity society; active participation in a multilayered democracy; the humanisation of technology (Giddens 1990:164) the recovery of damaged solidarities; individuals and groups acting rather than being acted upon; dialogic democracy (Giddens 1994:12/20). In making radicalised democracy, not class interest, the 'absolute precondition' of socialism (Heller and Feher 1988:3 117), postmodernist modes of thought and practice are actually catching up with Marx's projection of the tendencies of modern society to transcend itself, not superseding it.

Back in 1959, long before Lyotard (1984) declared the end of 'grand narratives', C Wright Mills announced the beginning of a 'post-modern period' as ending the intrinsic connection of reason and freedom (1970:184 185/6 186). [1] The sense of 'a social, political and cultural configuration' (Boyne and Rattansi 1990:9), an 'epochal shift or break from modernity involving the emergence of a new social totality with its own distinct organising principles' (Featherstone 1988:198), is pervasive. And given the extent to which socialist thought and politics came to be arrested within the Weberian process of rationalisation, this crisis of modernity is also a crisis of socialism (Bauman 1991:263f; Sayer 1987:154/5).
One may as well ask whether Marx has an answer to Weber. For whilst both questioned the way that reason and freedom were related, Marx did so to establish a more secure basis for emancipation, Weber to abandon it altogether (Murphy 1993:66). But rather than abandoning notions of the 'good society’ as 'embarrassingly unreal and naive’ (Bauman 1987:194), this thesis argues that Marx formulates this end more adequately than has been done. Unlike Weber, Marx, through his conception of alienation, could distinguish between the emancipatory-reconciling and repressive-alienating aspects of rationalisation (Habermas 1990:338) and hence realise the values of liberty, diversity, and solidarity which offer 'a chance of a better society' (Bauman 1991:276).
This thesis argues that Marx recovers the politics of the good by employing the normative concern with human self-realisation in the 'rational’ tradition against the repressive realisation of reason within capitalist modernity. Such an approach responds to Pierre Bourdieu's call for a critical, reasoned utopianism to challenge the 'economic fatalism’ of neo-conservative capitalism (Bourdieu 1998:126 128). Philosophy is crucial in challenging the determinism of technological progress (Bahro 1978:253; Bonefeld et al ed I 1992:ix). This determinism is not so much the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992) as the end of the future 'as a new place that might be visited' (Therborn 1991:24). With this determinism, the future becomes no more than the present enlarged (Bookchin 1982:333), threatening to destroy the capacity for imagining any future society beyond the present (Eley 1998:97).
Addressing the need to 'envision other technological possibilities and alternative futures' (Noble 1984:351) through a politics and philosophy of 'the good' suggests a reconsideration of the relation between Marx's realisation of the philosophical ideal and Utopian modes of thought. A Utopian interpretation would seem to be precluded by the radically immanentist nature of Marx's thought, with communism as the vision of an alternative society inherent in present society (Suchting 1983:173 174/5 175/6; Parekh 1982:177; West 1991:87). Marx did indeed ground the philosophical ideal deep in reality (Hyppolite 1969:122). [2] But whilst Marx condemned the Utopians for their idealism, elitism, blueprintism and for their detachment from the democratic force of the proletariat, he also distinguished the original Utopians from their followers who persisted in pursuing a rationalist and abstract method detached from history (Marx CM 1973:94/97; Draper 1990:2/3 6 17 18/9; McCarney 1990:94). In locating the philosophical ideal in the real, overcoming the dualism of the 'is' and the 'ought-to-be' (West 1991:15/9 21 36/7), Marx could be said to have democratised rather than abolished utopia, realising its values through existent or emerging forces (Harrington 1993:37/44; Ricoeur 1986:16 61). For Kumar, Marx's vision is 'more dazzling in its utopianism than that of even the most Utopian of Utopian socialists' (Kumar 1987:53). Marx's communism thus emerges as the future society in which there will no longer be private property and class division, labour will be life's prime want, and the whole coercive and institutional apparatus of state and law will have given way to the self-regulating community in which many sided, free and fully developed individuals work cooperatively and harmoniously for the good (Kamenka in Kamenka ed. 1982:12). These principles can all be found in the writings of the Utopian socialists.
Emphasising Marx's 'utopianism' in affirming values and possibilities beyond the institutional horizons of the present challenges those who would narrow the socialist vision to the question begging notion of the 'feasible' (Nove 1983:11 197). Joshua Cohen may rule out 'wild assumptions' concerning human nature and social possibilities, assume the continued existence of the state and hence switch the focus of socialism to the need to address the institutional aspects of the abuse of power (Cohen 1989:26). But realisable human potentialities grounded in human nature are not ‘wild assumptions’. It all depends on where one places the boundaries of the possible, with the human ontology or within the ontology-impairing and denying structures, institutions and imperatives of a given, historical, alterable social reality. In ruling out the emancipatory impulse, socialism is reduced to liberal democracy, dealing with the problems of power, resources, scarcity and pluralism – whilst carefully ignoring capitalism as the elephant in the room.

Many contemporary thinkers have recognised that a rigid division between realistic and Utopian thought is untenable, particularly with respect to the 'radicalisation of democracy' as central to a possible and preferable postmodern order beyond modernity (Heller and Feher 1988:35; Giddens 1990:155; Williams 1985:14). Marx's 'utopianism' (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:162) is firmly grounded not in the writings of the Utopian socialists but in the radical 'ought-to-be’ of a normative political philosophy concerned with the 'good society' (Heller 1984:10/1 11 12/3 20; Strauss 1988:106). This recognises that for Marx the abolition of philosophy is also its actualisation (Draper 1977:140/1).

The intention of this argument is to emphasise that Marx’s communism is structured by a rich set of normative themes which hold out the possibility of a truly moral world beyond the present. The libertarian utopianism at the margins of Marxism (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:77; McCarney 1990:39) [3] materializes the vision of 'the good life' implicit in ‘rational’ political philosophy (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:16), in Aristotle's Politics as the 'projection of an ideal order' (Edel 1982:323ff), in Plato's Laws and his Republic 'which describes a society incarnating absolute justice' (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:41), in Rousseau's ideal democracy (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:43) and in Kant's republic of ends as a 'noumenological civil society' (Krieger 1972:102).

Set in this context, the conflict between communism and capitalism emerges as a conflict between an ethico-political concept of freedom as conscious human self-determination and economics as a systemic determinism. Politics is recovered as the true language of communism, affirming values of freedom, equality and democracy against the economistic defence of capitalism in terms of efficiency, utility, optimality (Lomasky 1989:112). Such an approach distinguishes between pragmatic 'economic' socialism and the 'utopian' form which taps the rich vein of classical politics (Lomasky 1989:136).

Leo Strauss's definition of political philosophy in terms of the pursuit of 'the complete political good', the comprehensive goal organising society, makes explicit the normative-Utopian strain of political philosophy (Strauss 1988:10 34 35 89). This concern with the good has radical implications since all existing regimes may be criticised as inferior in principle to the best regime (Miller 1975:69 71 81). 'Utopianism’, in this sense, upholds the classical sense of politics as an integral part of the quest for the good life, opposing a potentially real, morally desirable future reality to present reality: 'to dispense with utopianism would be to renounce a large part of what it is to be a political animal' (Goodwin and Taylor 1982:253). With good reason, then, Plato and Aristotle are the first of the 'rational' thinkers discussed in this chapter, since, for both Plato and Aristotle, politics is integral to human self-realisation and is the science of the good for human beings (Aristotle NE I.iii I.iv 1980:2/6).

Though Marx's project of abolishing the state is identified by some with the end of politics (Huntington 1968:336/42; Pierson 1986:26 30), this view is to be explained by the modern identification of the political with the state (Quinton in Quinton ed 1967:6; Raphael 1970:27/32). From the perspective taken in this thesis, however, Marx's end of the state actually amounts to a recovery of the political as concerned with the good life of human beings, a repoliticisation which challenges the state monopolisation of 'the political' (Thomas 1994: xi/xii 16/7).
Arguing that Marx incorporated the philosophical ideal within the real rather than extirpated it has a clear affinity with Heller's definition of philosophy as the 'rational Utopia’, as the unity of the true and the good (Heller 1984:8 13), the 'ought to be' which challenges the 'is' (Heller 1984:10 20), 'the Utopia of a form of life’, concerning how individuals should act, live and think (Heller 1984:20). From the perspective of the rational Utopia of the highest good, the facticity of the existing world is to be abolished as untrue, ungood and inauthentic (Heller 1984:22). Marx's communism - entailing democracy, classlessness, liberty and self-realisation -emerges in this sense as the end of a normative quest for philosophy as a 'rational Utopia' beyond class relationships of subordination and superordination which systematically violate 'rational' values (Heller 1984:142; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:188).
The 'rational Utopia’ of the good society implicit in political philosophy is given a more precise shape when related to a tradition of 'rational freedom'. This pays particular attention to the normative themes and possibilities of this tradition. [4] As against the atomistic model of freedom in which individuals are related only instrumentally in the pursuit of private ends, the 'rational' tradition affirms freedom as something collective and reciprocal, as expanding through relationships. This thesis reads Marx as identifying in this tradition the possibility of a politics in which reason/morality progressively eliminates coercion in human affairs.
This 'Utopian' possibility in the philosophical tradition of 'rational freedom’ is identified by Gramsci in his argument for civil society coming to encompass political society (Gramsci 1971:382; Golding 1992:118). This realises the ethical principle of the state whilst eliminating the class-coercive element.





Conceiving a politics in which reason/morality progressively eliminates coercion in human affairs, Marx sets about realising an earthly kingdom - or 'true' democracy - of ends beyond the state (Levine 1987:179; Berki 1988:43). Yet although communism incorporates the normative and political dimension of 'rational freedom', the status of both politics and morality has been considered to be at best ambiguous in Marx. Levy explains the renewed interest in the Aristotelian conception of politics as largely a reaction against the failures of socialism and liberalism as 'anti-political' ideologies (Levy 1993:108). Levy thus argues in favour of the 'need to recover an appreciation of the essentially political, as opposed to the economic, facet of human life – to revive a sense of politics as a creative dimension of human self-realisation, the art of life par excellence' (Levy 1993:109).
This is precisely how this thesis attempts to recover the Aristotelian sense of 'the political' in Marx, as human auto-genesis, with self-realisation as integral to the good life (Gilbert 1984:154/83; Wood 1981:22). Developing this normative dimension, showing how Marx conceived the realisation of morality, challenges Levy's further identification of politics as 'a field of power and force: a domain of ever potential violence' which requires 'an effective sovereign prepared, where necessary, to authorize the use of force' (Levy 1993:103 219/20). This identification of the political function with the necessity of force raises the question of how far morality can be pushed into political affairs so as to dissolve coercion. In this respect, Hoffman makes an important distinction between the state, monopolising legitimate force, and government, coordinating activities without the need for force (Hoffman 1995:4). In arguing for a social order that regulates its affairs governmentally, without the state (Hoffman 1995:7), Hoffman identifies democracy not as a form of the state but as an anti-statist concept of government premised upon the empowerment of the demos (Hoffman 1995:13).
The point is that this conception of the peaceful regulation of affairs connects with the way this thesis reads Marx as reworking the terms of the 'Greco-Germanic' tradition of political philosophy. This has its origins in Aristotle's question as to what the good life for human beings is, what architectural plan should the self that individuals make adhere to (Clark 1975:145). Marx combines the architectonic character of classical political life, upholding the common good as the proper object of politics (Wheeler 1971:8), with the modern concern for individual autonomy to produce a conception that is beyond both classical and modernist conceptions.
Marx was greatly aided in his task by Hegel's doctrine of Sittlichkeit (ethical life). As the synthesis of the 'is' and the 'ought to be', Sittlichkeit grasped existence in terms of its becoming, i.e. the process in which what 'ought to be' becomes what 'is' (Hegel PR 1942:12/3; Taylor 1975:376). Hegel's 'actuality' (Wirklichkeit) does not refer to all that 'is' but is a technical term distinguished from mere existence (Existenz) to apply only to those aspects of reality which conform with reason (Hegel 1975:9; Smith 1991:223/4; McCarney 1990:112). Such a notion shows the 'utopian' character of 'rational' philosophy in being future oriented and in implying that reality be made to conform to its own character as rational. [5] But it also makes the point that the ideal which this thesis extracts from 'rational freedom' and identifies in Marx's communism builds upon Hegel's historically embodied philosophy. Any 'rational Utopia' in Marx transcends the pure abstract reason of Kantian morality in favour of an immanentist position (Norman and Sayers 1980:135).
Hegel's normative conception of politics as an agency for community, unity and the common good shows 'rational freedom' as the antithesis of the loss of individual identity and enforced uniformity under the totalitarian state. 'Rational freedom’ looks to realise the voluntary mutual subordination of each individual to all others in a common framework enhancing the liberty of all.

Institutions establish the concrete forms of the ethical life within which individual powers and capacities flourish. There is an inbuilt principle of individual freedom in the stress upon the voluntary agreement of participants as opposed to an externally imposed solution backed by coercion (Levine 1987:139).

For Habermas, the liberality of any society can be measured by the extent to which its institutions, political culture, identity-securing traditions and everyday practices in general, 'embody a non-compulsive, non-authoritarian form of Sittlichkeit, into which an autonomous morality can be incorporated, and can take on concrete form' (Habermas 1992:266). Marx's development of the 'rational' tradition into communism achieves the 'free' society in precisely these terms, showing how the 'rational' community of ends is no mere regulative ideal but is an historical possibility (Levine 1987:45; Berki 1988:43). Marx is able to argue that individuals are capable of acting as moral agents themselves in a democracy of ends, without the need to be institutionally constrained to the good.
To conclude, the purpose of this section has been twofold, to introduce the genuinely 'postmodern' implications of any recovery of the politics and philosophy of 'the good' on the modern terrain and, more specifically, to identify radical, democratic and emancipatory 'Utopian' possibilities inherent in 'rational' political philosophy.
Whilst realists would sympathize with Meister's call for marxists to finally exorcise the ghost of Rousseauan communitarian democracy (Meister argues that Marx himself did just that after the revolutions of 1848 1990:104/7), it will be argued in this thesis that, for all of Marx's own 'realism' in terms of a materialist analysis of class, social interests and group conflicts, an 'ideal' nevertheless remained, providing an overarching moral framework which served to orient Marx's political and intellectual activity.

1-2 The Principle Of Rational Freedom
Having established the approach taken to 'rational freedom’, the purpose of this section is to define generally the principle which this thesis seeks to extract from the tradition of 'rational freedom' - the notion that the freedom of each and all is interdependent, entailing notions of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity.
This places Marx's communism in a philosophical context which conceptualises freedom differently from the individualist liberal tradition. The 'rational' concept views freedom as something relational and communal, emerging through the interactions between individuals. Habermas defines this 'rational' concept concisely. Freedom, even personal freedom, is conceivable only in 'internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships', in the context of the communicative structures of a community, so that 'the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others'. There is a need, then, to ‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom' so as to remove the 'potential for Social-Darwinist menace' inherent in individualist conceptions of freedom. 'The individual cannot be free unless all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions' (Habermas 1992:146). From Aristotle to Marx, this conception holds that freedom is achieved through the unity of individuals as against their separation. As Clark summarised Aristotle's philosophy: 'Man's being lies in community, in the unity of man with man’ (Clark 1975:107/8). This principle is consistently affirmed throughout Marx's texts (e.g. CM REV 1973:87; GI 1999:85).
The modern liberal-individualist or Anglo-American appropriation of freedom as a personal liberty detached from the social and institutional fabric may be challenged from an historical perspective. That freedom is not the discovery of the modern world but originates in ancient Greece, continuing within a corporate matrix throughout the Middle Ages, is something which tends to be overlooked (Patterson 1991:ix/xvi chs 3 4). Further, the modern location of freedom in a private realm dominated by private property departs markedly from the pre-modern concern with constructing a civic order (Wheeler 1971:75/6 80/2 82/4; Arendt 1973:217 218 221/2), from the conception of politics as pertaining to determining the appropriate means to the end of the common good of the community or state (Bigongiari on Aquinas 1975:x/xi xii xv xxiv xxvi).
Historically, Locke is the dominant figure in the individualist liberal tradition. Locke’s 'atomistic social freedom' has become as 'instinctive to the American mind' as the Polis was to Platonic Athens and as the church was to the middle ages (Hartz 1955:62). This Anglo-American tradition may be described as 'empiricist' on account of its attempt to derive human rights from the natural needs and desires human beings possess in a state of nature. For Hobbes, the most basic of these needs is self-preservation (Hobbes 1962:chl4). Locke believes that this need can be modified by reason, even arguing that 'individuals act so strongly to this end, that they sometimes neglect their own private good for if (Locke 1960: section 56). Nevertheless, despite this apparent rationale for rational intervention in private affairs, Locke, in the Second Treatise of Government, limits the purpose of government to securing natural freedom in civil society within a framework of 'mutual security' and safety which protects person and property (Locke 1960:118 120 121 179/82 187). This idea that the state exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of private individuals who are the best judges of their interests and should therefore be strictly limited in scope and constrained in practice became the central tenet of Anglo-American individualist liberalism (Held 1987:54). The Anglo-American tradition tends to conceive freedom in essentially 'protective' terms, as concerned less with the relations between individuals than with the power the individual possesses to pursue and realise private ends (Berlin 1969:131 128). This results in a narrow conception of freedom, as the removal of external hindrances to satisfying personal wants. [6]
And it results in a 'negative' conception of the state as an instrument for imposing the civil peace (Levine 1987:26). In the liberal-individualist view, the legitimacy of state power derives from the fact that, without it, society would revert to a condition of the bellum omnium contra omnes - Hobbes's 'natural' state of unrestrained appetitive desire. The state is merely a form of protection and has no business in realising the common good. But whereas the Anglo-American emphasis upon the private pursuit of power is basically atomistic and asocial and generates the 'negative' conception of the state, the 'rational’ tradition upholds a definition of freedom as intrinsically interactive, society being the collective embodiment of reason, the identity of a people (Pusey 1987:15/6 16/7). This generates a 'positive' conception of the state, something which possesses actively democratic possibilities in conceiving power as internal to the demos as against the liberal individualist identification of the state, even the democratic state, as an external force whose power has to be delimited to protect individual liberty. Since, in the 'rational' tradition, the laws of a properly constituted state are expressions of the general will, far from extinguishing individual liberty, the state realises it. It was left to Marx to realise the democratic implications of this definition beyond the institution of the state, reclaiming ‘the political’ as integral to creative human self-realisation.

Hegel - with Marx - has been the particular target of the individualist liberal criticism that the 'German' conception of freedom deifies the state at the expense of individual freedom (Popper 1966:ch2; Cassirer 1946:273; Plamenatz 1963:268; Peters 1969:138; Femia 1993:44; Thomas 1991:222). There is a need from the start to repudiate such views as 'simply wrong' (Wood 1992:ix; Houlgate 1991:77/9; Harrington 1977:55). The problem is that this individualist liberal prejudice finds its way into marxist literature, with Thomas criticising the 'statist view of politics' permeating German political discourse (Thomas 1994:30). Thomas's critique of alien politics defends Marx's 'ascending' democratic theory of politics against what he refers to as Hegel's 'descending' conception (Thomas 1994:30 31). By characterising the Germanic concept of freedom as 'statist’, Thomas succeeds in establishing Marx’s socialism ‘from below’ credentials at the expense of destroying his Germanic roots. Such an approach isn’t sufficiently alive to the extent to which the tradition of 'rational freedom' establishes the normative framework for Marx's communism in attempting to secure the unity of the freedom of each and of all. One may argue over the precise location of this 'rational' unity, which is the subject of Marx's critique of Hegel's state, but the principle of the state as embodying rational unity is one that Marx shared with the German political discourse. To criticise this German tradition as upholding a descending ‘statist’ conception of power and government concedes far too much to the individualist liberal conception, cutting the intellectual and moral ground from under Marx in the process.

This thesis therefore reads Hegel as more an ally than an enemy of Marx's conception of freedom. And it clears Hegel - and 'rational’ conceptions of freedom generally - of the accusation of ‘statism’. What the individualist liberal tradition condemns as 'statism' is more accurately called the common purpose structuring -and expanding - individual autonomy. Far from being divorced from empirical individuals, Hegel's state is grounded on the fact that the individual will is actualised through participating in the state, recognising it as a universal end (PR para 258R). The state is only an 'end in itself’ (PR para 258) because it is the highest stage of individual self-actualisation, providing individuals with a satisfying mode of life (Wood 1990:21 206 210). The rationality of the state, for Hegel, consists in the 'thoroughgoing unity of universality and individuality' (PR para 258R). The modern state is rational only if it provides for the subjective freedom of the individuals composing its universal life. The modern state has 'strength and depth' only in letting 'the principle of subjectivity complete itself in the independent extreme of personal particularity' whilst simultaneously bringing it back to 'substantial unity' (PR para 260). Hegel's ethical life therefore specifies the institutions which enable self-actualisation (Wood 1990:237), the principle of the state being subjective freedom (PR paras 185R 206R 260 262A 273A 299R 316A). Even a brief outline is sufficient to expose liberal criticisms of Hegel’s statism and totalitarianism as caricature. In The Idea of History, Collingwood argued that ‘no competent thinker or writer wastes his time attacking a man of straw’ (Collingwood 1966:22). Plato, Aristotle, and the ‘rational’ tradition generally as ‘totalitarian’ enemies of the ‘open society’ is an example of setting up a straw man to knock down. Raymond Plant has written well here with respect to Karl Popper's interpretation of Hegel in The Open Society and Its Enemies. ‘Conceived in ignorance of Hegel's philosophical achievements, Popper's discussion of Hegel is a conjecture which has had in the past, and also receives in the present work, a firm refutation. The refutation supplied in this book is, however, implicit – to have explicitly challenged Popper at each point in his interpretation would have credited his work with more importance than it deserves’ (Plant 1973 Preface). Scholars have drawn the same conclusions with respect to Popper’s fast and loose interpretations of Plato and Aristotle. With respect to Marx, Popper’s whole knowledge derives from one single Stalinist publication. Rather than waste too much time to point out the obvious – that the individualist liberal view is ‘simply wrong’ in Allen Wood’s concise phrase – it is more profitable to defend the ‘rational’ tradition through stating its position positively, emphasising the extent to which individual freedom is built into its universal ethic.
Hegel's criticisms of individualistic conceptions of freedom do not, then, imply any prejudice in favour of state authority against the individual – the liberal straw man - but derive from the awareness that freedom possesses much deeper, socio-relational, levels than individualist liberal conceptions appreciate. For Hegel, 'personal, subjective and civil freedom are valuable because they serve determinate purposes in the context of actualizing absolute freedom' 'within a larger, collective life’ in which particular ends 'pass over into the ends of the community' (Wood 1990:258). Hegel rejects the atomistic model of freedom as simplistic and reductive, entailing egoistic competition as the unconscious constraint of all. Freedom is neither an unfettered individualism nor the unregulated pursuit of personal satisfaction but living subject to law within a just political constitution (Houlgate 1991:79). Thus, 'too little social structuring of individual possibilities and expectations (too much of what liberals usually value under the name of freedom) might actually frustrate the whole aim of subjective freedom' (Wood 1990:258).
Historically, 'rational freedom' has been institutionalised as a lawful freedom, securing order through impersonal rules so that the liberty of no one is unjustifiably preferred or downgraded and hence that each has the largest amount of liberty compatible with the liberty of all (Unger 1984:66/7). Hegel is liberal in adopting the assumption that the state power should be strictly delimited in relation to individuals (PR para 41, 185R, 262A, 299R), criticising Fichte for excessive state regulation of individual lives (PR Preface 25). Nevertheless, Hegel's non-liberal rationale of the institutional features of the liberal order provides the basis for going beyond liberalism, subverting the subjectivist, atomistic and moralistic foundations of liberal thought and politics (Wood 1990:258). This is the normative possibility which Marx sought to actualise.
Marx will be shown in this thesis to combine the classical stress upon the centrality of, and even the architectonic character of, public life with the modern principle of individual autonomy. Splitting liberalism between its political and economic aspects, Marx revalues the classical dimensions of the former as a positive conception of freedom - citizen rights, democracy, equality - against the privatism of the latter as a negative conception of freedom. Marx recovers the conditions of polis democracy in the modern world by transcending the characteristic features of liberal modernity, the rule of law and the separation of civil and political life. Marx's communism, then, is conceived as the reappropriation of Aristotelian politics and ethics on the terrain of liberal modernity by means prepared by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel.

In conclusion, this section has distinguished the principle of 'rational freedom' from the individualist-empiricist conception of freedom in terms of its 'positive' - democratic, communal, and interactive character. Whereas the individualist-empiricist conception, equating freedom with the absence of interference, identifies all forms of collective purpose as external to the self and hence as inimical to individual freedom, even as a necessary protective device, 'rational' freedom is a 'positive' conception which individuals obtain through a relation with each other. Hence Hegel distinguishes 'political freedom' obtained through participation in the state from 'civil freedom' as the protection of individuals through the administration of the legal system (PR para 301R). This conception affirms a principle of communality which expands rather than inhibits individual freedom. The 'protective' or 'negative' liberal view cannot conceive of rational constraints - forms of collective enlightened self-interest - which not only counteract divisive or diremptive forces but which may be enhanced to dissolve the coercive apparatus of law and state by strengthening social bonds.

Having introduced the conception of 'rational freedom', the chapter now takes a closer look at the different ways in which individual thinkers developed the 'rational' concept through history.





This section traces the history of the concept of 'rational freedom’ from Plato’s connection of reason in politics with social justice and Aristotle's definition of freedom as creative self-realisation within the polis. The term 'Greco-Germanic' acknowledges the importance of the German recovery of Greek thought from the late eighteenth century to the normative-political themes that shaped the character of Marx's communism (Mewes 1992; Kedourie 1995:30; Plant 1973:16/7 20/4 38/9 52). De Golyer has drawn attention to the 'Greek accent of the marxian matrix' (1992). [7] From the earliest, Marx demanded repoliticisation in 'classical' terms, arguing for society to 'again become a community of men that can fulfil their highest needs, a democratic state' (EW 1975:201). Throughout his life, Marx remained strongly influenced by the polis as a model of political thought and practice (Gilbert 1981:31). The question is what conception of freedom lay behind this model of polis democracy.
Marx explores classical unity in order to gain insight into the possibility for a form of life which incorporates the seemingly exclusive prerogatives of individual freedom within a communal framework. The process of individual emancipation, subverting traditions which integrate individuals within a common good, need not privatise and atomise social life. To the extent that it lacked a conception of subjectivity, the classical experience offered no guidelines as to how modern autonomy could be preserved. Yet the polis ideal of a self-identity fostered with regard to a shared ethical orientation offered Marx a model for resolving the key challenge of modern political philosophy. Marx 'transfigured' the classical polis (Depew 1992).
Though Marx was aware that the polis was insufficiently differentiated to accommodate modern individual emancipation and moral autonomy, he also appreciated that modern individualism was one-sided in emphasising only the emancipation of individuals from traditional ties of personal dependence - negative freedom - whilst neglecting the moral and cultural advantages of participation in a political community and the ongoing pursuit of the good life (Marx CHDS 1975:91 201). Removing the dualism between the public and the private, as the expression of social alienation, Marx's communism sought to 'reconcile the Greek ideal of civic participation with the modern concern for individuality and economic well-being' (Ryan in Miller ed 1991:74). Which makes the point that any 'restored classicism' on Marx's part (Lomasky 1989:115/6) is not nostalgic. Incorporating the modern process of individual emancipation, Marx's communism realises a genuinely novel form. Its roots, however, are still in Aristotle's positive conception of politics. The purpose of this section, then, is to establish the Aristotelian origins of a politics conceived as creative self-activity within a mode of life which counts as 'good' in realising human nature.
Scott Meikle, has shown the fundamental place of Aristotelian categories of essentialism and organicism possesses in Marx's thought (Meikle 1985). This thesis adopts Meikle's conception of an Aristotelian Marx, affirming a conception of human beings adapting society to the realisation of potentials contained in a developing human nature, rather than human beings having to adapt to the systemic imperatives of society (Meikle 1985:33/4). The main themes of Marx's Aristotelian teleology which will be developed throughout are that social labour is the essence of all socio-historical forms, that these forms cohere as social organisms that have necessary lines of development, that the telos of the unfolding of this fundamental essence in the historical process is communism, the society of freely associated producers. This communism is also the telos of the development of human beings as social beings whose nature can only be realised in the development of society (Meikle 1985:52 54).
Marx, this thesis will show, realises this Aristotelian conception against external and coercive institutional and systemic forms of alien control in order to embed an integral rational control within the everyday world of reciprocity, interaction and solidary communication.

This section examines both Plato and Aristotle as 'rational' philosophers of freedom within political community.

2-1 Plato’s Republic
For good reason, Plato and Aristotle are the first philosophers discussed in this reconstruction of the concept of ‘rational freedom’. Plato and Aristotle defined the key concepts of ‘rational freedom’ and sought to show how these could be embodied in the polity. The most important question discussed by Plato and Aristotle concerns the nature of the relation of the individual to the political community. The human being as a zoon politikon or social animal is not an isolated, autonomous entity but a part of society, living in a social context. It follows that the flourishing of the individual required a social context that is devoted to realising the good life. Individuals as social beings realise their essential human potentialities in and through the political community, in relation to rather than as against each other. The principal concern of Plato and Aristotle was to discover the norms and rules that govern the life of the political community as the good life enabling the flourishing of the human individual.

Plato is the fountainhead of the ‘rational’ tradition. Today he is more denigrated than read, his trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful being held to somehow contain a repressive and totalitarian intent inimical to human freedom whereas, in fact, the concern was to canalise human growth to its true potential. In a modern world characterised by the cacophony of pluralist voices and identities, an irreducible subjectivity, Plato is a timely figure. For Plato was concerned with the problem of developing the overarching moral framework of the common good in a fractious or pluralist society: ‘the more closely I studied the politicians and the laws and customs of the day .. the more difficult it seemed to me to govern rightly .. in an age which had abandoned its traditional moral code but found it impossibly difficult to create a new one’. The remedy for political ills was found in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato The Seventh Letter 1987:xvi). Good government is to be realised through the integration of politics and philosophy. Reason was to rule over ‘the passions’, over the empirical world of desire, appetite and ambition. This is the central theme of rational freedom in affirming the unity of the freedom of each and all. Human beings can only fully realise their human purposes when nous reigns over doxa, reason over opinion. And this can only be achieved in unison, individuals working together with each other rather than apart against each other.

Plato is easily portrayed in bad light. For Hall, ‘Plato .. was a reactionary, harking back to the solidarity of the old polis. His ideal city .. is an utterly joyless place in which the individual submits totally to the demands of a rigid society: everyone must undergo rigorous mental, ethical and physical conditioning.. The terrifying objective was to produce a society of one mind, run by a handful of superior legislators’ (Hall 1998:27). For liberals, Plato is a ‘totalitarian’ thinker. Karl Popper charges that for Plato ‘morality is nothing but political hygiene’ (Popper I 1962:107; Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 87.) R H S Crossman argues that ‘Plato’s philosophy is the most savage and most profound attack upon liberal ideas which history can show. It denies every axiom of “progressive” thought and challenges all its fondest ideals. Equality, freedom, self-government – all are condemned as illusions which can be held only by idealists whose sympathies are stronger than their sense’ (Crossman 1959:92). R. H. S. Crossman, Plato Today (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), 92. A strong defence of Plato comes from R. B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Guthrie, History, vol. 4: esp. 312-321; 560-561). 

This would appear to be very unfertile ground on which to build a conception of freedom. However, even a brief perusal of Plato’s is sufficient to reveal a profound attempt to grapple with the crucial issues of politics. Plato did more than condemn democracy, freedom, equality as illusions, he gave strong and cogent arguments to show that certain conceptions of democracy, freedom and equality are illusions and it is these arguments that are what matter. Plato exposed illusions and supported his own distinctive conception of justice with a towering intellectual edifice. The criticisms of Plato as a totalitarian thinker come from a very particular – individualist-empiricist – tradition of liberalism. This tradition emphasises the self-contained, self-moving private individual and conceives any collective purpose as an infringement upon liberty. These charges can be turned around since, in the ‘rational’ tradition founded by Plato and Aristotle, the relationships that each individual has with others are considered to enhance rather than inhibit individual liberty. The crucial question concerns the nature of those relationships.
Plato cannot be simply presented as an enemy of liberty and democracy. His target is not individual liberty as such but the selfishness and egoism that characterises individualism. Plato is concerned to show how individual liberty degenerates into the licence of an unconstrained society of self-activating atoms, which is experienced as a universal constraint upon all. Against the individualist liberal tradition, Plato is able to show how the maximum of individual freedom is also the maximum of unfreedom.

The liberal assault on Plato is important in establishing the dividing lines between alternate and contrasting conceptions of freedom. Plato does not deny freedom as such but the liberal conception of freedom as something individualist, empiricist, arbitrary. 

The most important aspect of Plato’s approach is his underlying essentialist epistemology. Plato’s immediate target is the idea that morality and norms are conventional, arbitrary, rather being eternal and immutable, grounded in objectivity. Having witnessed the extremes to which morality as convention could go in the Athens of his day, Plato sought firmer foundations. Whilst Hall condemns Plato as a reactionary, the truth is that Plato was seeking a firm, objective foundation of morality precisely in order to avoid the reactionary inegalitarianism that the Sophist position entailed, identifying freedom with differentials in power, resting government upon the doctrine of might is right and asserting that justice is the interest of the strongest. Rebutting the charges of the likes of Hall and Crossman directly, it is these Sophist positions that are reactionary and which contradict every axiom of progressive liberal democratic thought and which Plato’s philosophy is designed to refute. Putting the point this way means forcing liberal critics to answer the question whether liberal democracy has issued in an egalitarian social order free from relations of exploitation and domination or is merely a formal shell for substantive inequality and unfreedom? A loaded question which is appropriate for a social order loaded with asymmetries in power and resources. Plato poses the disturbing question as to whether accepted values and conventions are no more than illusions, giving the appearance of freedom and democracy but not the substance. Plato is after the substance, not the surface. One can understand why, within prevailing capitalist social relations, any philosophy equipped with the critical intellectual tools to expose illusions in government and culture may be subjected to a certain amount of opprobrium.

Plato’s central purpose is revealed by the subtitle of The Republic, ‘Concerning Justice’. Plato is concerned to delineate the form that justice takes in the ideal state. Plato’s Republic seeks to discern the fundamental principles and ideals of human association and action rather than the specific details (Plato 1987:201 358). The expansive nature of Plato’s ideal is clear once one understands that the term ‘Republic’ refers to ‘constitution’, ‘state’ or ‘society’ in the Greek, encompassing the political and the social, the formal and the substantive. It is in The Laws that Plato attempts to embed these principles and ideals in a realistic frame (Guthrie History 4 ch 3). In the process he exposes the extent to which the unchecked pursuit of individual self-interest continually issues in the ruination of public life to the detriment of all individuals. Individual freedom results in a collective unfreedom. The solution is to make justice is the founding principle of the political community. 

The most important aspect of Plato’s argument is the extent to which he emphasises that social justice is a desirable goal to be pursued in the city, over and against material affluence and economic growth. In Part One, Book One of The Republic, Plato is concerned to show that the just are happier than the unjust. Plato proceeds from the idea of function to argue that the individual needs justice so that he is able to perform a particular function and hence achieve happiness. Human beings conforming to their nature as active beings achieve happiness. The just man is happy and the unjust is miserable, therefore, ‘injustice never pays better than justice’ (Bk I 1987:41/2). Plato argues against the view that, since it is natural for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others, justice is simply a question of convenience. In this view, the purpose of morality is to regulate an amoral society of self-seeking individuals. If the sanctions of morality were removed, individual behaviour would be as self-interested as ever, suggesting that injustice pays more than justice (Bk ii 1987:49/55).
In countering these assertions, Plato identifies two underlying principles at the heart of society. In the first place, there is mutual need. Since individuals are not self-sufficient beings, they need to combine in society. Justice in Plato’s ‘rational’ conception possesses a fundamentally social dimension (Bk ii 1987:58). The origin of society stems from the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient but has many needs that require many relations to others for their satisfaction. The individualism that characterises the liberal conception of liberty is untenable from this perspective. In the second place, there is difference of aptitude. Each individual specialises in those things for which they have a particular aptitude. There is a need for the individual to specialise ‘on a single job for which he is naturally fitted’ (Bk ii 1987:59 60). Specialisation implies necessary interrelation. Since each is fitted to one type of work, individuals need to associate together so as to supply all with what each lacks. 




In beginning The Republic with the question as to what justice is, Plato is enquiring into the basis of socio-political and moral obligation. The question is both a moral and a political one, pertaining both to the individual and the community. Rejecting the conventional view of giving each individual his due as inadequate, Plato argues that the problem must be studied ‘in larger letters’ in society as a whole.
Plato’s ‘rational’ conception of freedom emerges as he establishes the basic principle of inquiry early on in The Republic. To discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected
Dialogues, 368e-369a). Such an approach seeks an objective foundation for freedom. If god is not the measure of all things, as the Sophists claimed, then neither is man. Plato’s principle of inquiry holds that abstractions or forms are the measure of things human and that these determine an intellectual progression from the forms to their collective approximations and then to real individual. This approach entails an explicit repudiation of individualism as capable of only a limited, narrow freedom, emphasising that freedom is a collective project. It does not require individualist liberals in the modern age to point out the obvious danger that Plato’s holistic approach could elevates pure forms and abstractions over empirical individuals. This was a criticism that Aristotle would come to make. However, the criticism misunderstands Plato’s approach. Plato’s point is that whilst his argument concentrates upon justice in the individual, the question is best studied on the large scale. Plato thus proceeds to discuss justice in the community as a whole, going on to apply his conclusions to the individual. Justice is not what this or that individual thinks. Since individuals will argue different things, this denies justice an objective foundation and instead reduces it to relativism. This was the point that Plato made against Protagoras’ view that ‘man is the measure of all things’. If so, Plato reasoned, then two men could taste the same drink, one declaring it sweet, the other bitter. The drink, objectively, is what it is, what is at variance is subjective tastes. Justice is more than subjective taste and preference. 

 In the individual, justice consists in maintaining the proper balance between the three elements of the mind so as to ensure that each is ‘doing its own job’ (1987:145). Intellect, desire and ambition must all receive their due and proper fulfilment, being given their proper place in the good life. True morality depends upon each of the different elements being given due satisfaction, with no one coming to dominate at the expense of the others.

 In society, justice consists in everyone fulfilling his or her proper function in the social order. This principle checks social disintegration, the evil that most concerned Plato. Social justice is achieved by each class in society coming to fulfil its proper function, not encroaching on the functions of the others. 

Plato’s definition of justice is the origin of the ‘rational’ conception of freedom, integrating short and long-range interests, the immediate and the long term, the individual good and the collective good in the service of the common good. Self-discipline is ‘a kind of order’ in which the better, rational element controls the weaker element, stretched beyond the individual ‘across the whole scale’ of the city-state (Plato Bk iv 1987:142 143). ‘It produces harmony between the strongest and the weakest and middle elements, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or of strength, or of numbers or money or the like’ (Bk iv 1987:143).


In the Republic, Plato defines a conception of social order which is based on what may be called an organic or naturalistic functionalism. Justice is the result of society being properly ordered. Plato thus conceives society as a structured form of organic functionalism, ordering society according to a hierarchical division of functions – leadership, protection and labour – each belonging to their corresponding collectivities: rulers, guardians and auxiliaries. 
This functional specialisation entails a conception of functional representation. It entails that functional purpose prevails over the democracy of opinion and desire. Plato thus divides society into three classes according to an ascending hierarchy of functional purposes. The first class is the class of rulers, the Guardians, a governing elite whose function is to govern (Bk iii 412d). The Guardians ‘must always do what is best for the community’ and a close watch is kept upon them to ensure that this principle is adhered to (Bk iii 1987:119). The function of ruling is restricted to the wise. The second class is the class of auxiliaries, whose function it is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’ (1987:121). The auxiliaries combine the functions of the civil service, the police and the army. The third class comprise all those engaging in economic activities, the farmers, manufacturers and traders. The function of this class is to secure the material needs of the community. The third class is kept under strict control and has no involvement in matters of government. Nevertheless, the Guardian class serves the interest of this third class and governs with the willing consent of the governed (1987:123 143). The knowledge of the Guardians ‘is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole’. This benefits the state ‘both in its internal and external relations’ (Bk iv 1987:139).
The members of each group are selected for each class according to their natural capacities with respect to the three basic functions. Placing each individual according to their natural capacity will result in the thoroughly harmonious and fully integrated state, a state which exhibits the four cardinal virtues or ‘qualities’ of wisdom, courage, discipline and justice (Bk iv 1987:138). Wisdom is the product of the knowledge of the Rulers; courage comes from the Auxiliaries. Discipline is the self-discipline that issues from the harmonious relationship between the three classes and their common agreement over ‘who ought to rule’. Justice is the realisation of the principle of functional specialisation with individuals doing jobs for which they are fitted according to their natural aptitude, not interfering in areas for which they are not fitted.
Plato’s argument concerns good government. The public good comes before all else, whether sectional interest or individual preference. The Rulers and Auxiliaries are to live an austere life without private property and the family. The purpose of these requirements was to check the tendency for the public good to be sacrificed to the pursuit of personal interests. The end to be served is the happiness of the ‘whole community’ rather than ‘the particular happiness of a single class’ (Bk iv 1987:126). Plato makes no attempt to rest his argument upon the value of freedom or to make freedom the central point at issue in debates with other conceptions. Freedom follows as a consequence of right principles and reasoning. Plato is establishing the foundations for his ideal state, his functional naturalism emerging as the organically free state of truly free human beings.

The Guardians take care to secure the conditions for social unity. The Guardians must ensure that extremes of wealth and poverty in the Third Class are avoided and that the state does not grow to become too large. Plato’s argument here is pertinent today, in an age characterised by overscale cities characterised by increasing polarities. The Guardians ‘must at all costs’ prevent ‘wealth and poverty’ from ‘slipping unobserved into the state’. ‘One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and a desire for revolution as well’ (Bk iv 1987:129).

The state should .. be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible with unity, but no further. So we can add to the instructions we shall give our Guardians one to the effect that they are to avoid at all costs either making the state too small or relying on apparent size, but keep it adequate in scale and a unity.

Plato Bk iv 1987:131

The Guardians must ensure that individuals may pass between classes according to merit and aptitude so that ‘the integrity and unity both of the individual and of the state will be preserved’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:131).

Plato’s ideal city is founded upon justice defined in terms of ‘giving to each his due’. From this perspective, justice ‘consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people’, each individual doing ‘the job he was naturally most suited for’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:145).

I think that the quality left over, now that we have discussed discipline, courage and wisdom, must be what makes it possible for them to come into being in our state and preserves them by its continued presence when they have done so. And we agreed that it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three.

Plato Bk iv 1987:145

With these arguments Plato has been concerned to repudiate a number of political positions, all of which can still be found in the governance of contemporary states and cities: the idea that justice is merely the interest of the stronger; the idea that justice is merely the result of legal contract; the idea that justice is merely a virtue practised by a few since it is an unprofitable activity. The repudiation of an overarching moral framework, of the meta-narrative of the good city, is not the product of ‘postmodern’ times but rests upon arguments that the ‘rational’ tradition in philosophy, founded by Plato, was developed to contest.

Plato establishes a parallel between the state (society) and the individual since the qualities expressed by the community are those of the individuals composing it. This implies that there are three elements of each soul:

1)	reason – the faculty that calculates and decides;
2)	desire or appetite – instinctive craving;
3)	ambition, indignation, pugnacity.

Plato argues that the rational element of human nature controls the instinctive element so that human beings realise themselves fully as human beings (Bk iv 1987:149/55). Human beings are easily manipulated and managed at the level of desire and appetite and are too prone to identify their liberty at this level of immediacy. To the extent that reason is the slave of the passions, human beings limit their liberty well within its potential, thus falling far short of human potential. Plato’s ‘rational’ argument holds that there is a need for an ethico-institutional framework that enables human beings to access their rational faculty, demonstrating a greater capacity for reflective action, conscious determination and moral choice. This enables individuals to attain a richer freedom by realising the full range of human capacities, well beyond desire and appetite.

In Plato’s account, justice in the individual forms the counterpart of justice in the state. The individual is wise on account of reason, courageous on account of spirit and disciplined in subordinating ‘spirit’ and appetite to reason. The individual is just on account of the harmony that results when all the three elements of the mind are fulfilled in performing their proper function. Since ‘the state was just when the three elements within it each minded their own business’, ‘each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function’ (Bk iv 1987:159). ‘So the reason ought to rule, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it’.

When these two elements have been so brought up, and trained and educated to their proper function, they must be put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater part of each man’s make up and is naturally insatiable. They must prevent its taking its fill of the so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will get too large and strong to mind its own business and will try to subject and control the other elements, which it has no right to do, and so wreck the life of all of them.

Plato Bk iv 1987:159

This argument repudiates the identification of freedom with individual subjective preference. Unrestrained, untutored individual liberty can keep human beings at the level of appetite and desire, chained to their immediate empirical wants rather than realising the greater range of human potentialities. The principles of the good city identified by Plato are scale, balance, form and proportion. Self-control or discipline in a city or in an individual results ‘when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war among them’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:160).

This results in justice in the city and in the individual. Justice prevents the three elements from trespassing upon each other, keeping all three in tune, binding these elements ‘into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:161). Once reason is in control and just rule ‘looks after the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other’, human beings can realise their potentiality for the good.

Plato therefore defines justice in the reciprocal terms of ‘rational freedom’, uniting the freedom, good and happiness of each with all and the freedom, good and happiness of all with each. Justice is social justice in that it possesses an ineliminable social component that acknowledges that individuals live in relation with each other. Some pursuing private interest at the expense of others harms the common good of all, including that of those pursuing their private interests. The private self-seekers harm their own good when they harm the good of all. Each is part of the society of all. The moral is clear: reason must control desire.

Then on this reckoning .. can it possibly pay anyone to make money by doing wrong, if the result of his so doing is to enslave the best part of himself to the worst? .. if one ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of oneself to the most godless and abominable, is it not a miserable piece of bribery?

Plato Bk ix 1987:355

Each individual should be under the control of wisdom. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Bk ix 1987:356). The argument is important and concerns whether the ‘rational freedom’ that secures the good of each and all is imposed externally by legal-institutional compulsion or whether human beings, as rational natural beings, can internalise reason and supply the internal moral coordination of common affairs. The latter is the ideal; the former a self-educative process that leads human beings to reason. The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best element within citizens so that they may be given their freedom (Bk ix 1987:356). This view envisages legal-institutional coercion giving way to rational self-regulation practised by each in reciprocal relation to all. The rational, ‘humaner’ part is to be set free so that individuals make the best of their natural gifts (Bk ix 1987:356/7). It cannot pay to be unjust if by acquiring more money and power the individual becomes a worse human being (Bk ix 1987:356/7).
For Plato, there are four types of imperfect society – Timarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy and Tyranny. Each type shares certain features with contemporary cities and states, failing as they do to conform to the standards of justice.
Oligarchy is a society in which wealth is the criterion of merit and ‘in which political power is in the hands of the rich and the poor have no share of it’ (Bk viii 1987:305). Oligarchy originates from Timarchy through ‘the accumulation of wealth in private hands’. ‘The men find ways to become extravagant, and for this reason, pervert the law and disobey it’ (Bk viii 1987:305). ‘The further they go in the process of accumulating wealth, the more they value it and the less they value goodness. For aren’t wealth and goodness related like two objects in a balance, so that when one rises the other must fail?’
The oligarchy is set up through the imposition of a property qualification of office (Bk viii 1987:306). This is an unsound principle since it gives office according to wealth, even if the poor may make better leaders according to merit (Bk viii 1987:306). Money-making is the principal objective in an oligarchy, something which ruins public authority (Bk viii 1987:310).

While reason and ambition squat in servitude at its feet, reason forbidden to make any calculation or inquiry but how to make more money, ambition forbidden to admire or value anything but wealth and the wealthy, or to compete for anything but the acquisition of wealth and whatever leads to it.

Plato Bk viii 1987:309

The type of character who rules in an oligarchy possesses ‘no moral conviction’, ‘only the compulsion of fear’ (Bk viii 1987:310). An oligarchic society, therefore, comes nowhere near the real goodness of an integrated and balanced character’ (Bk viii 1987:311). Democracy originates as a reaction against oligarchy as the poor triumph over their opponents and extend civil rights, opportunities of office, appointment by lot (Bk viii 1987:313/314). 

Plato identifies the inherent tendency of personal liberty to degenerate into personal license and selfishness, defining the ‘democratic man’ as one who has ‘no order and restraint in his life’ and who ‘reckons his way of living .. pleasant, free and happy’ (Plato, Republic, 561d. Trans. H. D. P. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955). In democracy, there is no compulsion to exercise or submit to authority (Bk viii 1987:314/5). This undermines the ‘good environment’ that trains individuals in ‘good habits’. Democracy ‘doesn’t mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people’s friends, they are duly honoured’ (Bk viii 1987:315).
 Tyranny describes the society which issues as a result of the struggle between the rich and the poor in a democracy: ‘an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny’ (Bk viii 1987:321). As liberty becomes licence ‘all discipline is swept away and madness usurps its place’ (Bk viii 1987:332).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy are heavily focused upon the lack of critical reflection upon the general and long term good that a system of active mass democracy implies, and which an extension of greater mediation by representative bodies could check. Popular control involved ‘committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude’ (Plato B ii). Against this, Plato affirms that politics is the ‘art of navigation’ requiring a captain (B vi 1987:222/3).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy refer to the need for sound judgement and leadership in navigating the ship of state. For Plato, the individuals composing the demos are bad judges on many important political matters, lacking the necessary experience or expert knowledge concerning such vital issues as finance and foreign policy. Describing the demos as ‘a large and powerful animal’, Plato states that philosophy is ‘quite impossible’ among ‘the common people’ (Bk vi 1987:228). Individuals will make judgements based on impulse, sentiment and prejudice rather than reason. The popular leader is dependent upon the ability to please the crowd, selling the people a package that conforms to their prejudices but which does not necessarily imply good policy (Plato 1987:222 228). This results in popular leaders who are as bereft of true knowledge as the people whom they lead.
In Book viii, Plato identifies the chief characteristic of democracy as liberty, the idea that ‘every individual is free to do as he likes’ (Plato 1987:314). Though this gives society a variety and diversity, its effects can be diremptive. There is a weakening of the bonds of political and moral authority so that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable’ (Plato 1987:322). Without this restraint, freedom ceases to be a common purpose and instead fractures into dissension. Society is no longer capable of generating the principle of cohesion from within itself.

This leaves the question as to whether good government is possible? whether politics and philosophy can be fused so that government is conducted in the universal interest? The key question for Plato is how can this ruinous cycle be broken?

Who Rules – People Or Philosophy?
The Philosopher Ruler

For Plato, the only hope for realising the ideal is for philosophers to become rulers exercising political power.





The question is how can reason be realised and extended when the world and the people in it fall short of rationality? To make good the deficit in reason, the gap between ideal and real, an educative model is required to inculcate reason. This has authoritarian-elitist implications in that only those few who have access to truth and knowledge may legitimately hold power. The danger is that the theoretico-elitist practice subverts the emancipatory-democratic promise and premise contained in the view that since all human beings are rational beings they are to be treated as equal and free. This paradox has blighted the ‘rational’ tradition and afforded individualist liberalism the opportunity to pose its limited and, to Plato, illusory conception of freedom as the one and only possible and desirable conception. It would be wrong, however, to accuse Plato – and later philosophers in the ‘rational’ tradition – of an authoritarian-elitist purpose here. The educative process has the end of extending reason to all so that the educative apparatus would no longer be required. What should be underlined in the above passage is Plato’s reference to humanity, more correctly translated as the human race or the human species. The point that Plato makes with regard to the rule of reason applies to all human beings, regardless of whatever or whoever they are. How to make good this claim is the crucial question.

Plato’s philosopher-ruler may be read less as an institution or person presiding over the ruled than the fusion of politics and philosophy. The end is the fusion of politics and philosophy so that reason is in control. Politics is to become philosophical and express ideals of truth and good. Philosophy is to become political, worldly, and lose its abstract nature. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. Plato sought to assert reason over instinct and desire, ranking physical pleasures low and seeking to restrain potentially unruly appetites and instincts.
Plato’s theory of forms is crucial to this vision of the rule of reason. These forms are ideals or patterns that have a real existence independent of human minds, a realm of reality beyond the sensible world (Bk v 1987:206/220). ‘The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power’ (Bk vi 1987:248). Plato makes use of the simile of the cave to portray a society of individuals who mistake appearance for reality. The prisoners of the cave, their necks fastened so that they cannot move their heads, see only the shadows that the fire behind them throws onto the wall. They naturally believe these shadows to be real (Bk vii 1987:256/61). Plato’s moral is that truth is the result of reflection, insight and experience that is beyond the immediacy of ordinary sensible life. Much of what most people accept as truth as given by their everyday experience is in fact false, mere illusion (Bk vii 1987:263). It is in this sense that Bertrand Russell denounced common sense as the metaphysics of barbarians. 
Whilst it would be easy to convict Plato of elitism in this argument, since the claim is that there is a deeper reality which, at first, is accessible only by a few, it should be pointed out that the end that Plato has in view is that truth is to be made available so that all can see reality as it is. Plato is not arguing that truth is the preserve of the few, giving the few the power to rule over the many. Quite the contrary, in fact. Truth rather than power and wealth is the end that Plato pursues. And he is pursuing that end those who would reduce human beings to prisoners managed and manipulated by means of shadows and illusions cast by an elite.





The philosopher-ruler is the culmination of Plato’s central theme, the integration of politics and philosophy. The aim of education is to produce the philosopher-ruler. They are identified as possessing the highest talent, receive the highest training and are put in the service of the state. They are fitted to rule by their education. They have been trained to be a dedicated elite committed to governing in the interests of all.
The most obvious objection here is that the concept of the philosopher-ruler is an elitist and anti-democratic notion. Plato’s defence is that such a ruling class is meritocratic, comprises the highest talent, and is devoted to serving the common good. Plato rejects that form of democratic government in which public policy is determined by popular will in favour of competent government in which public policy is the product of professional expertise. Plato’s overriding concern is the public interest, which is the interest of each and all. This is precisely the reason why Plato abolishes private property and family among the Guardian class, since both entail private interests and motivations that get in the way of serving the common good of the whole community. Plato is concerned to check the desire for wealth which is generated by private property and which is a force for social disintegration and political corruption. Any elitism on Plato’s part is an elitism designed to serve the public good of the political community, not the private good of the ruling class.

The most damaging criticism is that Plato invests too much faith in the Guardian class. Like Hegel’s state bureaucracy as the universal class, public bonds are abstracted from real society and invested in a minority class devoted to serving the universal interest. This demands a public spiritedness that is unlikely to be found or maintained since knowledge of a shifting reality is always limited and transitory. Plato attempts an ideal solution to a real problem. The key question is how public bonds can be forged so that everyday individual exchange and interaction proceeds in such a way as to ensure the common good of all. Plato opts for the rule of the wise, the embodiment of reason.
But who guards the guardians? There is the danger of the ruling class coming to appropriate the public interest to serve its own interests. Public bonds need to be diffused throughout the social fabric itself so that all individuals could develop a public consciousness in their everyday existence. Public bonds cannot but be illusory when located in a realm abstracted from the real lives of individuals composing the body politic. The task, then, is to diffuse the public interest throughout civil society so that public bonds are forged at the heart of social reality. With this, Plato’s fusion of politics and philosophy is no longer located in the ideal realm of the Guardian class but throughout social relationships as a whole.

The Statesman
In the Statesman, Plato expresses the view that the best state is one which is subject to the rule of the expert statesman as opposed to the rule of law: ‘the political ideal is not full authority for laws but rather full authority for a man who understands the art of kingship and has kingly ability’ (Plato, Statesman, trans. J. B. Skemp, in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected Dialogues, 294a. See Guthrie, History, vol. 4: 171). 
It is here rather than in the presentation of organically functional order that Plato exhibits his reactionary side. The rejection of law in favour of the skill, power, and vision of the natural-born leader is the argument of a reactionary Sophist. Where once, for Plato, the skilled statesman was the philosopher, wise in all things, now he is one who is wise in the art of politics, which is compared to weaving. The skilled statesman weaves together the basic characters of the ‘herds of free bipeds’ into the unity of a single cloth, creating the state as the embodiment of the one in the many and the many in the one. Plato’s presentation of the state subject to the rule of the statesman as opposed to the rule of the law is reactionary in its foundation upon the idea that some, an elite, are natural-born leaders. It is, however, interesting to explore Plato’s ideal of the best state as one without laws. Can Plato’s ideal be shorn of its elitist naturalism? Can democratic foundations of this best state be found in an essentialist epistemology? Are human beings as such, on account of a rational nature inherent in the human species, capable of ruling themselves beyond institutions, laws, conventions? Is not this the implication of the philosopher-ruler as a general designation? If all individuals are capable of being philosophers, in that all are rational beings, then are not all individuals capable of being rulers?
For there are limits to what training and education can accomplish. The good cannot simply be the result of an educative model but has to connect with principles operative within real society. The concept of the philosopher-ruler presumes the existence of the very quality that is missing in society. As a result, the rational ideal is projected upwards and outwards to an abstract level. A philosopher-ruler is an ideal, not a reality. The ruler would rarely be fit to fulfil the function of ‘ever dispensing perfect justice with intelligence and art’ (ii 297B). Which begs the question of how Plato’s ideal of rule for the common good of the whole citizen body could be actualised. How could the educator be educated so as to democratise reason and rationalise democracy? This question would be taken up with the democratic revolutions of the modern age. The best state without laws is Plato’s – reactionary or revolutionary? – ideal. Plato is realistic enough to understand that a second best arrangement might be necessary.

The Laws
In the later period of his philosophy, Plato is concerned to develop his ideas on freedom in a more sociologically realistic context. Whereas The Republic is abstract and utopian, establishing principles rather than practices, The Laws represent a statement of political possibilities in relation to social reality. Plato’s concessions to practice, however, do not imply a value-free pragmatism. On the contrary, Plato affirms reason as operative within the realm of politics, with increasing spheres of human affairs coming to be subject to rational principles. In fundamental principles, The Laws is in conformity with The Republic.

In the Laws, there is a retreat from the ideal forms of the Republic, and from the skilled ruler of the Statesman. Plato accepts the rule of law and shows a greater openness to the idea of freedom in other than its aristocratic meaning. ‘A community should be at once free, sane, and at amity with itself, and … these are the ends a legislator must keep in view in his enactments’ (Plato, Laws, 693b). All the different kinds of constitution partake of the two basic kinds: monarchy and democracy. The Laws is a full exposition of the second best state, blending liberty, amity and wisdom, showing how this state requires elements of both monarchy and democracy (Plato, Laws, 693e). 

Plato continues his attack upon democracy as based upon individual licence. Athens, as the most advanced example of democracy, declined as a result of ‘extravagant liberty of living’, particularly amongst the masses. This had created a lack of respect for their betters amongst the mass of people. The masses had grown impudent through ‘a reckless excess of liberty’ (Plato, Laws, 701b). To check such growing impudence there was need for a willing submission on the part of the people to virtuous laws. Plato’s solution is autocracy based upon a mixed constitution. In this ideal state for the real world, the virtuous autocrat is aided by wise elders and educated guardians in ruling the masses, whose role is restricted to passive ‘conformity to the traditions embodied in the laws’ (Plato, Laws, 963-66).

One of the most important features of Plato’s argument in The Laws is the concern he demonstrates with scale. Plato seeks to fix the limits in order to retain human scale. One should remember the context here. Classical political communities were limited in size and contained no more than half a million people at the largest. It was a frequent practice for city-states to be limited to a fixed number. Beyond this number the city-state would be a mere aggregation and no longer a political community. 
This notion of limits is important. Since the end of the polis was the good and happy life, success was not measured in terms of increasing numerical strength but in terms of proportion. The character of the city-state was to be measured in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. And this measure could only be achieved by proper scale ensuring the close connection of the parts. Every individual is to be closely affected by the community. Communal ties would be close and access in all areas would be crucial. For a city-state to be a cohesive, comprehensible unit, quantity was to be limited to the right number. Plato’s argument concerning the right ordering of society is premised upon scale. For Plato, the city-state is scaled to human dimensions in that its boundaries are within the scope of a good day’s walk from the centre. For Plato, this is the only community in which a good life can be lived. 
Plato’s comments on the monarchies of the Eastern empires are critical of the way that overscale cities deny the good life. Plato identifies Persia as representing the most advanced example of a monarchy, explaining its degeneration since the days of Cyrus in terms of a too ‘excessive curtailment of the liberty of the commons’ (Laws 701b). (In contrast, Athens, as the most advanced example of democracy, declined as a result of ‘extravagant liberty of living’, particularly amongst the masses. This had created a lack of respect for their betters amongst the mass of people. The masses had grown impudent through ‘a reckless excess of liberty’ (Laws 701b). Plato made similar criticisms of the sprawling empire of Egypt. Persia and Egypt were tyrannies of unconstitutional monarchies in which the ruler could not possibly know what the good would amount to for the over-numerous subject population. The monarch rules according to personal interest since it is impossible in overscale cities to determine the common good. Overscale removes public affairs from the life of the people and concentrates them at the centre. The population cannot take part in public life. They are not citizens determining public affairs but subjects obeying imperial edicts. As a result, rulers cannot determine the good and the people cannot live it.

This situation contrasts with the classical city-state where public affairs were the business of every citizen and where proper scale made it possible for rulers – even tyrants – to discern and promote the good of the whole community. Of course, citizenship was an exclusive category, applying to free male adults aged over twenty, about one in nine people. Classical democracy did not imply universal suffrage. That said, the conduct of political life on the part of the citizen body was remarkably democratic, realising a participatory mode of government that contrasts markedly with the ‘slack non-participatory democracy’ of modern society (Patterson 1991). Members of the citizen body would vote in assemblies, elect officials, serve on juries and act in an official capacity in a most extensive system of popular control. Merit was assumed on account of the citizen identity, so selection by lot was a widespread practice. The citizen body thus comprised free and equal individuals.

The principle of scale was central to Plato’s argument for the realisation of the good city. The crucial feature of a humanly scaled and largely self-sufficing community is that in critical respects the conditions of its material life and governance are fixed. Quality predominates over quantity; quantity is not allowed to overwhelm quality. For this reason, the size of the city was to be fixed. In The Laws, Plato fixes the number of free families in the city-states at 5040 in order to achieve self-sufficiency (ii 738A). In this context, each person is able to know or know of all other citizens.

With the size of the city-state fixed according to human scale, Plato proceeds to discuss the constitution most appropriate to good government. 

In the Laws, Plato designs the ideal community with a view to reducing social friction to a minimum. Plato argues that disruptive enmities will be diminished if each person is able to live a moderate life. To achieve this requires a rough equality in the distribution of land, the economic base for a citizen’s support. A degree of cultural uniformity will also diminish social friction and foster social harmony. Plato details essential cultural requirements in terms of a ‘community of race and language and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship’. 
The commitment of citizens is therefore fostered and sustained through having a stake in property and a stake in culture. By such mechanisms can the legislator persuade citizens to virtue. Plato’s ideal state is therefore a culturally homogeneous, agrarian citizenry living lives of modest comfort. It is a communitarian conception in that it is belonging in the sense of place rather than of property that confers citizenship. In this community, it is membership in a hearth rather than possession of land that counts. Plato was concerned more with social origins than with material interests. 
Plato’s argument for the ideal state is an explicit repudiation of the position that identifies freedom with personal liberty. Plato rejects democracy in its connection with personal freedom and presents instead an organic or naturalistic conception of freedom. Plato argues that the individualism of each generates excess and issues in an unconscious collective constraint upon all and is the very antithesis of freedom. Plato is not an enemy of personal liberty. Rather, he seeks to incorporate it within a more structured, collectivist conception of freedom. Harmony issues from a combination of external constraint and internal self-control so that each is taught to define their personal freedom as a freedom that is attained in relation to other individuals. Ingrained in the soul of each will be ‘the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one’s fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all’ (Laws 942c). 
The individualist liberals who condemn Plato as a totalitarian thinker need to answer these questions: does personal liberty really issue in the maximum of freedom, not just at the level of each but also at the level of all? If the individual is conceived as a sovereign autonomous being, does this not ignore the fact that the individual lives in relation to other individuals? And if individuals do live in relation with other individuals, does this not make freedom a collectivist project? And does it not then follow that the nature of these relations within a community is the crucial issue in realising freedom?
The ‘rational’ argument points to the fact that without the communal and relational context, the maximum of personal freedom can coexist with the maximum of collective unfreedom. Freedom is a collective project that establishes the connection of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. Where freedom is stressed in only one of these aspects, liberty (emphasising each) becomes corrosive of community (emphasising all) or community becomes oppressive of liberty. The essential task is to unify individual and community.

Plato shows that there is no guarantee that the just social order committed to the universal interest and securing the freedom of each and all follows the personal liberty that individualist liberals advocate and the periodic elections that democrats advocate. Plato gives good reasons for believing that the just public could actually be destroyed as a result of liberal individualism and democratic sectionalism. Plato was therefore concerned to emphasise good government based upon justice in the universal interest.

Plato’s ideal state is an organic, harmonious social order. He identifies the crucial problem undermining the state to be anarchy, which ‘we should expel root and branch from the lives of mankind’. The question is whether, in repudiating the anarchy of excessive liberty, Plato goes too far in the opposite extreme, embracing the peace and order of totalitarianism. 




The 'rational' character of Aristotle's freedom has made him a target for liberal accusations of 'totalitarianism'. This criticism underlines the differences between the 'rational’ position - with its positive conception of government - and the individualist liberal position - with its negative conception of politics. Barnes thus criticises Aristotle's 'state' for being 'highly authoritarian' in its concern to 'regulate' and 'determine’ individual lives in the most intricate detail (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23). Barnes objects to Aristotle's argument that 'in matters that belong to the public, training must be the public concern1, all citizens being regarded 'as belonging to the state, for each is a part of the state' (Aristotle P VIII.i 1981:452). For Barnes, Aristotle's view that individuals are political animals comes with the corollary that private interests may be subordinated to the public good (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23/4). Aristotle's error lies in assigning 'a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life' whereas 'lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it rather as a defence and a protection against Evil' (Barnes 1982:82/3).

Oxford professor he may be, but Barnes is another example of the liberal ‘straw man’ approach to ‘rational’ philosophy. This thesis takes a contrary view to Barnes' individualist and neutralist liberalism in being concerned to defend Aristotle's positive conception of politics as creative self-realisation as the basis of the tradition of 'rational freedom'. It does nevertheless agree that the 'rational’ tradition does exhibit tendencies towards an educational dictatorship which, as Aristotle puts it, 'trains' individuals to a good they do not naturally or spontaneously see. This does not justify abandoning the positive conception of politics for the negative conception. Such ‘training’ involves culture and law to enhance human potentialities in order to realise a greater range of purposes than is possible within an individualist approach chained to given empirical necessity. However, it does mean being careful to avoid its repressive tendencies.

Relating the individual to supra-individual organisms may seem dangerous from an individualist perspective but, properly understood – and proper understanding is one of the legitimate functions of political philosophy - Aristotle's theory is neither as 'abhorrent' nor as 'bizarre' as Barnes suggests (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:24). Rather, Aristotle's view recognises the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom (Clark 1975:103/4). There are two conceptions of freedom in opposition here. From the individualist liberal perspective, Barnes defends 'the democratic ideal' of 'doing whatever you want' whereas Aristotle identifies such individualism with the universal constraint of licence (P 1981:59/60 332 373/5). Barnes’ view presupposes a separation of the state from civil society which does not apply in Aristotle. Liberal critics fail to properly distinguish the 'polis' from the 'state'. Unlike the modern concept of the state, Aristotle's concept of the polis is not identical to political organisation but denotes the organised community in all its aspects, comprising the smaller associations as necessary to human well-being. Aristotle's 'state’ is no abstract entity but the supreme natural association rooted in the smaller natural associations, each formed 'with a view to some good purpose’. The 'state', for Aristotle, is, therefore, the supreme association of all associations and 'will aim the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods' (P I.i 1981:54; Edel 1982:319). [8]
True, in opposing an individualism which fails to acknowledge the primary role played by the polis in securing the good life, Aristotle is in agreement with Plato. But Aristotle explicitly repudiates Plato's view of society as a super-individual organic unit for ignoring the necessary role played by the various groupings in human well-being. Against Plato's 'extreme unity', Aristotle argues that there must be diversity in membership and functions (P 1981:103/126). Aristotle's account of how individuals group together in different kinds of association within the polis, from household to village to city or state, is aimed at demonstrating how smaller groupings promote the natural aims of the participating individuals and generate an appreciation of wider relations within the polis as a whole (P 1981 I.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20). The privileging of the individual against social units, the autonomous liberal self distinct from the larger social units, is incomprehensible in Aristotle's account of freedom.
But Aristotle's society is not a super-individual organism. The free individual is at once self-determining and social. 'Man is by nature a political animal', a politikon zoon, who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (P I.ii 1981:59). 'Common interest' brings individuals together in a political association 'in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually' (P Ill.vi 1981:187). In the best society, freedom and sociality are reconciled. Community is natural for individuals (Clark 1975:110 101/2).
Aristotle is a crucial figure in conceiving a politics of the good as an alternative to the assertion of the priority of right in contemporary liberal theories of justice (e.g. Rawls 1988). From an Aristotelian perspective, right is justifiable only in relation to the moral importance of the ends it serves. As Aristotle argues: 'If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life; for if we do not know that, the best constitution is also bound to elude us' (P VII.i 1981:391). Aristotle thus attempts to discover 'the most desirable life for all men', 'both as individuals and in the mass' (P VII.i 1981:391). This is more than linking the good to prevailing values within an existing community, making individuals products of convention, and possesses a radical and critical edge in connecting the good to the human ontology and its creative self- realisation. It upholds a positive as against a negative and neutralist conception of politics. Right is justifiable only on account of the moral worth of the ends it serves - self-realisation within a human modus vivendi.
For Aristotle, the polis is created naturally by individuals 'to secure the good life' (I.ii 1981:59). The polis is good in that it was made by human beings acting in accordance with their nature (Ryan in Miller ed 1991:74). Since the end of human beings is to live well or happily (Norman 1983:38/9; Clark 1975:145; Evans 1987:142; Edel 1982:266ff), happiness is the aim of the constitution. Aristotle defines happiness (eudaemonia) as an activity and the 'complete utilization' of the human faculties under the guidance of virtue (P Vll.xiii 1981:427/30; NE 1980:1.vii). Happiness is a form of activity, the realisation of human faculties (P Vll.ii Vll.iii 1981:394/401). There is a moral imperative to use the human faculties since the individual cannot be good unless the faculties are being exercised (P 1981:178).
And this 'positive’ conception of politics has implications as regards an institutional framework as expanding rather than inhibiting individual freedom. Aristotle's concept of the polis as 'expressing the needs of the individual on a high plane' (Edel 1982:319) leads him to a view of the polis as rationally constraining self-seeking individuals so as to secure the common good. Aristotle thus rejects democratic freedom as leading to the licence of individualism 'divorced from law and justice' (I.ii 1981:59/60). He also rejects another definition of freedom in democracy, the principle that each citizen possesses the opportunity to rule so as to ensure that the polis will act according to the wishes of the citizens (P V.ix 1981:329/32 VI.ii 1981:363/4). Both conceptions lead to irresponsibility and anarchy in practice. Aristotle's argument here betrays a liberal-protective character deriving from the dualism of reason and nature. For the view assumes that the evil inherent in human nature requires the constraint of an undemocratic constitution embodying reason (1981:179/183). Since, Aristotle reasons, democrats deny this principle of political coercion, democratic government necessarily produces evil (1981:332).
One can reformulate the argument by targeting ‘the passions’, the egoistic and avaricious inclinations of individuals which confine human beings within an empirical immediacy, far short of the complete human good. Aristotle's criticisms apply specifically to the atomistic model of democracy in which politics comes to be governed by majorities of self-seeking individuals. This is precisely the flaw in suffrage based conceptions of democratic government that Hegel sought to correct with his corporate representation within the ethical life (Hegel in Pelczynski ed 1964:317/20). [9]

Aristotle is concerned to properly define liberty so that it is distinguished from licence. In reconciling the freedom of each and all so as to enhance overall freedom, Aristotle rejects the two definitions of democracy - the 'sovereignty of the majority’ and 'liberty' as 'doing what one wants' - as 'bad'. Living according to the constitution is not 'slavery' but 'self-preservation' (P V.ix 1981:332) or 'salvation' (Politics trans Barker 1958:1310a). Aristotle follows Plato in identifying excessive personal liberty with license, claiming that such liberty ensures a large body of support for demagogues (1981:373/5).
Personal freedom as the freedom of the individual against the state - the 'negative' liberal conception - is not the peculiar product of the modern world. Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the existence of such a conception - 'to live as you like' - and argues against it: 'from it has come the ideal of 'not being ruled', not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alternation. This [to be ruled by alternation] is a contribution towards that liberty which is based on equality' (VI.ii 1981:362/3).
Aristotle has identified here a more libertarian conception of democracy than mere rule of the people. This is isonomy or no-rule, freedom as beyond the dualism of rulers and ruled, realising equality between unequal individuals as citizens of the political realm. The view is that no-one could be free without this equality. Equality amongst peers - neither rulers nor ruled - in a political community is crucial to this notion of freedom (Arendt 1973:30/1). As will be argued, Marx's new politics goes beyond the dualism of rulers and ruled to realise the democratic implications of the 'rational' tradition, not as majority rule but as no-rule in a community of equals. The end of the rational community is self-rule.

Aristotle does not argue in favour of either democracy or isonomy, but he does discuss citizenship as something to be valued highly in terms of the 'participation in giving judgement and in holding office (P Ill.i 1981:169). This definition of a citizen as an individual 'entitled to participate in office' 'is best applied in a democracy' (Ill.i 1981:170). Aristotle's statesman is not a modern politician but a ruler of equals, persons of the same status. The polity is essentially a companionship of free individuals who take it in turns to be ruler and ruled (Clark 1975:105; Edel 1982:309ff). The statesman (politikos i.e. a citizen) takes a 'turn at ruling and at being ruled’ (P I.i 1981:54).

Aristotle's 'state' thus emerges as 'an association of free men' as against those constitutions which are based upon the dualism of rulers and ruled (P Ill.vi 1981:189). By this definition, modern representative democracy is a denial rather than a realisation of the principle of citizenship. This principle hits directly at the way that the liberal state confines 'the political' to specialised functions removed from the demos.

An ideal of polis democracy is, however, not easily extracted from Aristotle. For Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority of the population, even though the egalitarianism that Aristotle defines in terms of civic friendship is something that carries over into Marx's notion of a classless society (Miller 1989:203 204). For Aristotle, citizenship, as active participation in the state, should be restricted to those who are superior in goodness and wealth (P IV.xii 1981:270/2). Exclusion rather than inclusion is thus at the heart of Aristotle's ideal polity (Patterson 1991:163/4). For Aristotle, the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled is found most in the 'middle people' (P IH.iv 1981:181 180/83). The 'best partnership' in a state 'is the one which operates through the middle people'. Those states in which the middle element is large, compared to upper and lower elements, 'have every chance of having a well-run constitution' (P IV.xi 1981:267).
Aristotle is not to be identified with a protective 'bourgeois’ conception however. For Aristotle's principle of the state as a natural entity concerned with the common good also serves as a critical tool to condemn the reduction of politics to private, material advantage (P IH.vii 1981:189/90). His case for the ‘middle people’ is that they lack the obsession with material interest and gain that consumes the extremes of rich and poor.
 In contrast to Aristotle's naturalism, Sophists like Thrasymachus and Lycophron make the state and the law artificial products of convention imposed by the strong or self-imposed to afford protection against injury. The modern comparison here is with contractarian liberalism and the state as policeman. As Erik A Havelock observed, 'liberalism was in the field first' (Havelock 1957:400). This may well be true, but it doesn’t make liberalism right or good. For Aristotle, 'a state's purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good'. The state is not neutral and provides something more than 'a military pact of protection against injustice' in a society concerned with the 'exchange of goods' but is concerned with 'the virtue and vice of the citizens'. Without the conception of the good 'the association is a mere military alliance .. and law .. a mere agreement', 'a mutual guarantor of justice' which is 'unable to make citizens good and just' (Ill.ix 1981:196). The ethical significance Aristotle assigns to politics distinguishes the 'rational' from the individualist-protective tradition which effectively reduces politics to a legalistic concern with order in the context of exchange relations.
Aristotle's criticisms of the Sophists are open to the charge of distortion. Patterson emphasises the radical egalitarian aspect of the Sophist movement as going further than reconciling personal fulfilment with the needs of the polis. Patterson refers to the outright egalitarianism of individuals like Hippias, who considered all his fellow citizens equal by nature rather than by convention, and whose radical individualism repudiated convention as 'the tyrant of mankind' which 'does much violence to nature' (Plato in Patterson 1991:152).
Aristotle rejected this view as ignoring the extent to which social bonds enrich rather than inhibit individual freedom. Nevertheless it begs the question as to the nature of the relation of the individual to authority, community and convention, the nature of constraint in human relations. The question concerns the way 'rational' freedom is formulated in terms of a dualism between reason identified with the political realm - and nature -identified with the 'evil’ inclinations of individuals.
 This dualism - which the 'rational' thinkers express in various forms - is crucial in determining whether ‘reason’ works to suppress or enhance possibilities for democratic and individual freedom.
Marx, like Aristotle, rejects the extreme libertarian position as an abstract individualism which ignores the necessary constraint implicit in social relations. [10] But there is also a sense in which Marx is looking to push individual freedom beyond a ‘rational’ institutional-legal constraint. Like the Sophists, Marx pursues a libertarian aim which challenges the reason-nature dualism.
There are, in sum, limits to the democratic and ‘utopian’ reading of Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle's ideal reads as an attempt to make the polity safe from the demos in all its multiplicity. Athens may have become the model of civic and democratic freedom but it was actually celebrated by reactionary elite thinkers opposed to democracy (Patterson 1991:94). For Ranciere, Aristotle's ideal political order is an attempt to put an end to politics 'in its primary spontaneous and democratic state, as the anarchic self-regulation of the many by majority decision' (Ranciere 1995:12). Ranciere exposes an original duplicity animating Aristotle's Politics in the relationship between philosophy and the political, where 'the apparently simple objective of submitting the many to the law of One is in fact split by a never entirely closed gap between two ways of conceiving the art of politics, of confronting the question of many: politics as the organisation of the human community in accordance with the telos of the reasonable being, and as a remedy for the sheer fact of social division' (Ranciere 1995:12/3). This duplicity emerges within other 'rational' perspectives, splitting 'rational freedom' between repressive/totalitarian aspects regulating recalcitrant individuals according to an abstract notion of the general interest and emancipatory/democratic possibilities with respect to the realisation of a genuine common good. In this context, the 'rational' functions within the ideological project of the state to conceal the fact of division. This split was precisely the point at which Marx took his leave of Hegel's rational state.
Ranciere's argument underlines the need to exercise caution in the attempts to extract an ideal of the democratic community from Aristotle. Much of what Aristotle writes justifies the curtailment of democracy in favour of the well governed polity. Whereas a bad democracy for Aristotle is defined as the demos actually coming to exercise power, a good democracy comes as close as possible to the ideal regime of the politeia by contriving to distance the demos from power (P IV VI, especially VI.iv 1981:368/70).
The tradition of 'rational freedom' thus originates as an attempt to curb the power of the demos and constrain it within political order. There are two interacting histories of freedom here, freedom as individuals in everyday life have understood it, and freedom as rationalised and moralised by those seeking its 'true' definition or essence (Patterson 1991:147). Indeed, freedom as formulated by the philosophers was 'the very opposite of what any sane, ordinary person on the streets of classical Athens, or in the market, assembly, or palaestra, would have imagined it to be' (Patterson 1991:2).
By relating Marx to the tradition of 'rational freedom' the intention is not to argue for a 'philosophical' definition of freedom as a 'higher' morality raised above real individuals in their everyday life but to show how Marx located 'rational' bonds in the lived experience of individuals. By showing how Marx located this 'higher’ reason in the empirical world of real individuals, in the real natures of these individuals, this thesis argues that Marx avoids subjecting individuals to the abstract political obligation of the state as a 'higher' morality whilst nevertheless realising the communality of the 'rational' argument as expansive of the liberty of each and all.

And Hardie discerns some such possibility in Aristotle's doctrine of the good as making morality ultimately 'selfish', taking 'little or no account of the notion of moral obligation’ (Hardie 1968:320). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle insists that the good individual, exhibiting 'moral virtue', must be autonomous in choosing his/her own actions and acting on his/her own choices, possessing knowledge of the circumstances and not being subject to compulsion (NE Ill.i/iii 1980:48/58). Barnes is simply unable to reconcile this 'generous notion' with 'the authoritarianism of the Politics' (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:24). But the two notions can be reconciled. Aristotle's individual is not the plaything of circumstance and of his/her own irrational nature but can become the responsible planner of his/her own life. And the polis is the natural context for this freedom. In Aristotle's teleological view of the polis as subserving the good life, the various parts comprising the polis are defined in terms of the contribution they make to the 'fulfilment' of the individual's natural desire for a sufficient life. Since the polis is defined in terms of securing the good life (P I.ii 1981:59), which in turn is defined in terms of a moral imperative to realise and exercise the human faculties (P Vll.xiii 1981:427/30 VII.ii VII.iii 1981:394/401; NE 1980:1.vii), individuals may reject moral obligations which cannot be subsumed under the primary obligation to pursue their own happiness.
There are, however, problems with the way that Aristotle elevates the rational element in human nature, making the human good an 'activity of soul' in the sense either of being obedient to a rational principle or of apprehending such a principle (NE I.vii 1980:13/4). Of the three things which make the individual 'sound and good' - nature, habit and reason (logos) - only the latter is the distinctively human faculty for Aristotle (P Vll.xiii 1981:430). All three are subject to modification according to the educational programme worked out by a legislator. 'Reason causes men to do many things contrary to habit and to nature, whenever they are convinced that this is the better course' (Vll.xiii 1981:430). And this elevation of reason over nature and habit means that it is possible to prescribe 'what men's nature should be if they are to respond easily to handling by the legislator' (VII xiii 1981:430; VII.vii 1981:409/10). Realising the good life becomes a 'task of education’ (Vll.xiii 1981:430). One can interpret this idea in both a positive and a negative sense. Marx would later reject the theoretico-elitist model by insisting that the educator must also be educated. The idea of an educational dictatorship recurs at the heart of 'rational freedom' whenever there are problems in realising the 'rational' order. Its origins lie here in Plato and Aristotle, in this elevation of the rational element of human nature as the 'true' or higher good. That said, the criticism cannot be pushed too far without thereby abandoning the ‘rational’ tradition for the empirical tradition, rejecting the Platonic notion that reason should rule for Hume’s recognition that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. Education is culture and law and politics, what the Greeks called paideia and what the Germans came to call Bildung, training the citizen into a wider range of civic freedoms beyond the limited egoistic freedoms in the natural state. How to establish that educative purpose via a moral and cognitive praxis emerges as the key issue.
This section has sought to underline the extent to which, in Aristotle's definition, politics is integral to the realisation of the good, political community having the goal of ensuring the rational and moral good of individuals. But whilst this conception of the positive role of the state challenges individualist conceptions of freedom, there are problems which lead to the flawed realisation of 'rational freedom'. Aristotle explicitly attempts to subordinate the demos to the ideal polity, upholding a reason-nature dualism which affirms a 'higher’ morality over the empirical world. Individuals, without the institutional constraint of the state, are incapable of realising the good and need to be connected with their 'true' interest at a higher, institutional level. Such a view devalues the real natures of individuals and possesses anti-democratic implications in subjecting the demos to the ideal, moral state as a higher realm. The challenge is to retain the politics of the good and of creative self-realisation without having recourse to an external, institutional constraint. In different ways, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel undertook precisely this task. These thinkers made explicit not only the democratic and emancipatory possibilities of 'rational freedom' but also the series of dualisms blocking those possibilities historically (specifically public-private and reason-nature but citoyen-bourgeois, noumenal-phenomenal, ideal-real, rulers-ruled are all aspects of the two fundamental dualisms).
This section closes with a brief discussion of the 'Germanic' idea of freedom to demonstrate the potentials of democracy, as the active involvement of individuals in government, to embody the politics of the good without having to impose an abstract institutional structure.
The principle of functional representation which existed in medieval and early modern Europe entailed a 'socialised' conception of government which enabled individual participation through guild and associative organisation (Black 1984:29 67 ch 6 116). If democracy refers to participating in the election and running of the unit of political authority which affects one's daily existence -village, parish, town - then these societies merit being called democratic (Patterson 1991:373/4). The medieval legal charters upheld a conception of freedom as 'the power to act in the affairs of the community and to exert influence on one's fellows, free from the interference of the sovereign government' (Harding 1980:423). 
This historical experience sheds modern notions of freedom and democracy in sharp relief. One soon learns to be careful of taking the self-image of liberalism and modernism at face value. In both theory and practice, liberalism and modernism in its dominant English and French formulations attacked this rich fabric of guild life (Patterson 1991:363). Hegel was one of the few to have 'acknowledged that solidarity and exchange - the poles around which the values of guild and civil society, respectively, rotate - are not opposites but complementary and attempted to weave these together into a texture as tough and complex as that of urban society itself (Black 1984:202). Whereas the central preoccupation of contemporary political thought is the winning and retaining of rule itself, rooted ultimately in the Weberian state monopoly of the means of violence, Hegel's state is rooted in corporate bodies within society, not within its own potestas publica alone as with the French republic.
Indeed, the most salient characteristic of the Germanic tradition was to view the state as comprised of social groupings, investing them with a moral significance (Black 1984 chapters 17 & 18). Aristotle's view that the self and the social are two aspects of the same human nature is evident in the Germanic conception of freedom as a 'reciprocal concept' (Fichte in Wood 1990:82). The German tradition, in retaining a conception of freedom as requiring a social constellation, upholds a positive view of the state as involved in the promotion of a 'rational' and 'moral' way of life, connected functionally and organically with individual life (Krieger 1972:52/9 68 79/80 147/55 239/40). This principle, making individual and general freedom consistent with and dependent upon each other, invests 'common will' in the state as representing the 'true' interest of individuals.
As will be argued, Marx leaves this tradition by retaining the notion of the 'common will' but taking it back into the society from which it originated. Whilst Marx criticised the institutional character of the 'Germanic' idea of freedom, he nevertheless realised socially the principle of the state as 'true moral association’ (Berki 1988:141). In connecting individuals with their essential humanity, their rational interest with their real natures, Marx identified the normative ideal as operative in actual social agencies. The unity of morality and reality in the rational community is thus located in organs emerging in the historical process.
Of course, one should recall Marx's reference to medieval society's 'democracy of unfreedom’ in order to emphasise that Marx's democracy lay beyond rather than before modernity. Rejecting both the 'real dualism' of the Middle Ages and the 'abstract dualism' of the modern world (CHDS EW 1975:90), Marx sought a new solidarity in an alternative future. Medieval freedom itself was a privilege, a power, granted to persons, normally landowners, and hardly democratic in an egalitarian or inclusive sense (Patterson 1991:364).
Nevertheless, the 'Germanic' conception indicates alternative possibilities for redefining the scope and meaning of 'the political' (Maier ed 1987). Whereas modern politics is confined to the activity of career politicians concerned with the maximisation and prolongation of power (Patterson 1991:366), Greco-Germanic 'rational freedom' offers a way of challenging the state monopolisation of 'the political', rethinking the polity, its boundaries, its constituent parts, its participants and its spaces for participation.
Weber's attitude that these older solidarities cannot be restored (Schroeder 1992:100/2 109/10; Sayer 1991:143) was shared by Marx. But whereas Weber locks the individual up in the 'iron cage' of a rationalised world, Marx offers the promise of a liberatory community of ends created by new solidarities. If the 'moral' and public character of corporate groups is separated from a nostalgic tendency and evaluated in terms of the logic of collective action for groups possessing strategic capacity for exercising control, this notion can buttress the case for democratic freedom.
The precise meaning of this normative community, and Marx's realisation of it at the level of everyday life, can only be established through detailed discussions of the way that Rousseau, Kant and Hegel define interaction and reciprocity in their versions of 'rational freedom’. From here, the thesis proceeds to develop Marx's critical engagement with and appropriation of 'rational freedom’.

2-3 Rousseau: Democratic Authority

The classical synthesis of politics and morality within community dissolved in the modern world through an expansion of subjectivity characterised by the diremption of reason from the natural and sensible world. Any restored unity would have to incorporate reflective consciousness as the greatest achievement of modernity (Taylor 1979:7/8). Rousseau was the first of the 'rational' philosophers to address this problem of integrating classical community and modern individualism, profoundly influencing Kant, Hegel and Marx in the process.
Rousseau is a key figure in developing 'rational freedom' beyond juridical and protective conceptions in favour of more associative and participatory conceptions. As such, Rousseau prefigures Marx's realisation of rational 'unity' on an associative basis. Rousseau makes clear the greater freedom which the individual obtains in cooperative relationships with others, this unity being put on a 'rational' basis within the political community of the civil state beyond the state of nature. Rousseau is presented here not as a Romantic revolting against reason but as a rationalist who believed that freedom was produced by reason through law. Rousseau was concerned with the question of how reason was to be used well. He is a rationalist who is concerned with the relation of potential to actual reason, the possibility of the free society through education to rationality, the relation of reason to freedom (Cassirer 1963:26). Rousseau's combination of authority and autonomy in a civil or lawful freedom establishes a reciprocal relation between rulers and ruled. The implications of this are important in developing Aristotelian politics in a democratic direction. As a theorist of popular sovereignty and participation (Jennings 1994:115; Pateman 1970:22), Rousseau is all the more suggestive in that he is not theorising the grounds of political obligation in an actual state but projecting an ideal state which seeks to reconcile freedom and authority (Raphael 1970:97; Plamenatz 1963:391ff). The radical implications of Rousseau's position, in developing the 'ought-to-be', the 'utopia', of 'rational' political philosophy, as the ideal of the peaceful, internal coordination of human affairs, will be examined in this section.
How far Rousseau succeeds in affirming a 'rational' as against an individualist freedom has been questioned. Hoffman is critical of Rousseau's idea of the social contract as something forged by rational individuals possessing no relationship to each another. To Hoffman, Rousseau shares an abstract individualism with liberalism, with the result that force is placed outside freedom, obligations outside rights, and the state outside individuals as autonomous agents (Hoffman 1995:86). For Hoffman, this whole construct is the ideological expression of market relationships in which individuals appear to live outside of society (Hoffman 1995:86). Rousseau's concept of the general will leaves the problem of legitimacy 'painfully unresolved' (Hoffman 1995:87).
Accepting that Rousseau does not quite succeed in extricating himself from liberal conceptions, compelling him to have recourse to educational dictatorship, this section takes a contrary view to Hoffman, distinguishing Rousseau from individualist liberalism and its limitations by arguing that Rousseau's actively democratic version of 'rational freedom' recasts the basis of liberal politics and philosophy. In conceiving the moral transformation of the state and of the individuals composing it to be coincidental, and in giving consent a more active and continuous expression, Rousseau is valued in this argument for showing the democratic means of realising the emancipatory potential of reason.
Rousseau appears to be an ambiguous figure, an advocate both of an unconditional authority which requires that individuals alienate all their natural rights, and of a democratic authority under which individuals retain and actively exercise their sovereign power. This section demonstrates the coherence of this position. For the alienation of rights not only creates political authority, but also recreates the contracting parties so that, in becoming morally incorporated into the sovereign, individual wills are merged into the general will (Rousseau SC I.i/iv 1973:182/89).

By predicating authority upon moral transformation, Rousseau points towards the resolution of the 'rational’ dualisms - state-civil society, citoyen-bourgeois, reason-nature, individual-community - behind the problem of political obligation. For whilst still obligated to the state, the will of the individual, as a rational being, is identical with the general will and any obligations are to her/himself. The fundamental problem is no longer that of determining where the line is drawn between the claims of the individual in relation to political authority but that of determining the conditions under which the individual may achieve true self-determination by merging his/her own will with the general will.

As a critic of the abstract egalitarian device of the 'fraudulent liberal social contract’ (Pateman 1985:142-62), Rousseau argues for a democratic social contract in which obligated individuals are actively engaged in the making of the laws they subject themselves to. Liberty is 'obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves' (I.VIII 1973:178). This self-assumed obligation provides 'an actual foundation for a participatory political order of the future' (Pateman 1985:150).
However, Rousseau's development of the 'rational' perspective has moral as well as political implications. The fundamental problem faced by thinkers in the 'rational' tradition is that of locating morality in the world of experience. Rousseau's significance, his 'truly revolutionary act', lies in assigning an ethical task to politics, subordinating politics to an ethical imperative (Cassirer 1963:65/6). Rousseau is explicitly concerned in the Social Contract to resolve the dichotomy between the ideal and the real, bringing justice and utility together in an administration that is both legitimate and effective (Rousseau 1973:165). His social contract, subjecting individuals to the general will, establishes the 'rational' point that individuals are in relation to and dependent upon each other (Rousseau II.iv 1973:186). What Rousseau extracts from contract theory is the need to justify the existence of the state morally through the will of individuals. Force in itself possesses no moral significance (Rousseau I.Ill 1973:168). Moral justification is thus obtained only through redefining Locke's tacit consent (Hoffman 1995:104) as the active and continuous participation in the political society.

And crucial in this resolution of the ideal and the real is the notion of the state becoming the free creation of reason, realising the common good having been the product of necessity on the part of self-interested individuals (Rousseau I.vi viii 1973:173/5 177/8). The state is to be built freely as an order appropriate to 'rational' human nature rather than as an instrument designed to satisfy need. With Rousseau, state and society are integrated in mutual interaction, unfolding together in a common growth (Cassirer 1963:65).
Consistent with the 'rational' as against the individualist tradition of freedom, Rousseau's state is more than an association of individuals concerned with the satisfaction of private interests but a form which embodies the ethical will of all individuals. Law is the constituent principle which confirms and justifies individual wills ethically, educating individuals into citizens (Cassirer 1963:63). For Rousseau, this end is achieved by the establishment of a political society of citizens who administer the law universally to themselves, the social contract achieving an internally perfect constitution. Rousseau's de jure state is legitimate in that its commands rest upon the rational will of the citizens whereas the actual state is illegitimate in having to impose its commands through coercion. The people remain sovereign in putting themselves under collective authority as their own authority. The will of the sovereign, then, is the true will of each individual in so far as reason rules. In combining authority and autonomy in a lawful freedom, Rousseau establishes a reciprocal relation between rulers and ruled (I.v 1973:172/3).
For Rousseau, far from being the enemy of freedom, law gives and guarantees freedom: 'It is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty. It is this salutary organ of the will of all which establishes, in civil right, the natural equality between men. It is this celestial voice which dictates to each citizen the precepts of public reason, and teaches him to act according to the rules of his own judgement, and not to behave inconsistently with himself’. Rousseau establishes legally the grounds for the social dependence of all which expands the freedom of each. 'At bottom, as all social engagements are mutual in nature, it is impossible for any one to set himself above the law, without renouncing its advantages; for nobody is bound by any obligations to one who claims that he is under no obligations to others' (Rousseau 1973:124/5).
Though Rousseau acknowledges that the state as a coercive apparatus will remain in the absence of an internally and morally coordinated society (Ill.iv 1973:218), his argument nevertheless implies that were reason to be in control and hence were individuals able to transcend their natural, selfish inclinations, the state would disappear. There is, in short, an ideal of the internal government of society in Rousseau's argument, something which is explicit in Rousseau's search for the form of state which embodies within itself the pure rule of law but which Rousseau ultimately denies as a real possibility (II.vi 1973:191/3).
Crucial in defining this internal moral coordination is the democratic notion of an active sovereignty. For anthropological as well as political reasons, Rousseau refuses to accept sovereignty as only the temporary possession of the demos, something given to authority and rarely, if ever, being reclaimed (Jennings 1994:117). Sovereignty, as the exercise of the general will, 'can never be alienated', and the sovereign, as collective being, 'cannot be represented' by anything other than itself (II.i 1973:182 III.xv 1973:239/242). To alienate liberty is to renounce moral and human status (I. IV 1973:170; Jennings 1994:119).
Such a view commits Rousseau to a democratic community of active citizens (Thomson 1969:98; Plamenatz 1963:433/7; Broome 1963:56/60; Colletti 1972:183/5), affirming a developmental and educative conception of politics in which the individual learns to take into account the public concerns of others (Rousseau II.iv 1973:186; Pateman 1970:24/5). Rousseau can thus propose a solution to the problem of political alienation. Rousseau confronts the objection that within any political community the laws decided upon will bind those who have not consented to such laws (Rousseau IV.II 1973:250). The 'question is wrongly put', he states. Constraint and authority need not be 'external', implying the permanence of political alienation and coercion. 'When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point, and the general will is found by counting votes' (IV.II 1973:250).
A political community in which individuals participate as members makes it easier to accept collective decisions. What emerges is an 'internal’, actively democratic, conception of authority based upon freedom as self-determination. Participation in decision making gives individuals a degree of control over social existence (Pateman 1970:26 27). As a result, disaffection does not necessarily issue from decisions going against particular individuals since the common force of politics rests upon popular sovereignty as something active, continuous, and employed for the common good.
With Rousseau, then, the rational ideal of internal moral coordination, is associated with possibilities of democratic coordination on the part of a self-governing civil society. In arguing that individuals participate in the organisation and governance of the associations comprising the social order, Rousseau takes decisive steps away from the abstract individualism of liberalism. For Rousseau, the legitimacy of political authority depends upon individuals preserving and expanding their liberty by joining with others in association. In moving from the primitive state to the social state, individuals must associate so as to organise their supra-individual forces through an arrangement which secures both the self-interest and the freedom of each individual. Individuals





Rousseau's view of individual freedom is less individualist and abstract than associative and social, connecting the 'rational’ project with common control securing individual freedom. Rousseau here defines the associative aspect of 'rational freedom' that Marx was to develop beyond the political community to establish rationality in the practical life of society.

Rousseau is concerned that political association should 'defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate', so that 'each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before' (I.VI 1973:174). This does not imply subjecting the individual to a 'totalitarian' authority, as critics allege (Talmon 1986:ch 3). This 'common force' is revocable. The 'slightest modification' in the 'clauses of this contract' render them 'vain and ineffective'. On 'the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it' (I. VI 1973:174).
Importantly, this definition of freedom is beyond the external and protective conceptions of rights based, individualist liberalism, beyond the contractarian form which Rousseau used (Broome 1963:53/5 63). Rousseau argues that the freedom of each and all can be made consistent through the conventional surrender of all to all (I.VI 1973:174). This, being total and equal, guarantees justice and removes all causes for which the individual would seek to hold rights independent of and against the political community. Association is an increase in the force of all strengthening the liberty of each (I.VI 1973:175). This relationship entails the continuous, active and expansive participation of each individual associate in a body that is conceived as embodying the good of all the associates. Rousseau's association is no mere legal body created by contracting parties for mutual protection and benefit but is a corporate and collective body which embodies communality, a sense of the common good as something organic and growing. The individual is part of an organism and hence can achieve the free and full development of moral personality, the human potential, only in association with other individuals, participating in the common life.

This is the associative foundation for the general will. All are required to submit to this general will as members of society, but it is their will, not an alien will imposed upon them. The sovereign, 'being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs’ and need give no guarantee to its subjects since 'it is impossible for the body wish to hurt all its members' (I.VII 1973:176/7). Rousseau thus justifies lawful freedom as the constraint which human beings impose upon themselves for their best interests. The connection of real individuals with the general will, as their will, 'alone legitimises civil undertakings' and without which it would be 'liable to the most frightful abuses' (I.VII 1973:177).

But there are limits to reading Rousseau as an advocate of an associative freedom. That his associationalism applies at the level of the state is apparent in the distinction he makes between the will of all and the general will. Whereas the former 'considers only the common interest', the latter concerns private interest and 'is no more than a sum of particular wills' (Rousseau II.ill 1973:185). Rousseau is therefore led to defend the 'great association' of citizens in the state, where deliberation and decision making ‘would always be good', against partial associations whose particular interests obstruct an appreciation of the general will (Il.iii 1973:185). 'It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to make itself known, that there should be no partial society in the State and that each citizen should express only his own opinion' (Il.iii 1973:185).
Rousseau, therefore, identifies the principle of legitimate associationalism, i.e. as concerning the common good, at the level of the state rather than as something individuals generate for themselves from within their social interaction. His individual freedom is abstract rather than genuinely associational.

Rousseau expresses both the libertarian and the communal purpose at the core of 'rational freedom'. The common element in 'different interests' 'forms the social tie'; 'and, were there no point of agreement between them all, no society could exist. It is solely on the basis of this common interest that every society should be governed' (II.i 1973:182). But the claims Rousseau makes for the community are those of the individuals composing it. The life of the state as a 'moral person’ lies 'in the union of its members', its own preservation being 'most advantageous to the whole’ (Il.iv 1973:186). Alongside the public person of the state, Rousseau recognises also the claims of the 'private persons composing it, whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it' (Il.iv 1973:186). The problem is that he fails to give these claims a public or political form. Associationalism is a principle which applies solely to the state.
The criticism is not that Rousseau's state is some metaphysical body, a moral entity in its own right, independent of and superior to individual citizens in embodying the general will over the will of all. Rousseau gives an anti-authoritarian justification of collective authority. Critics nevertheless highlight the totalitarian and homogenising potential of Rousseau's politics of the common good based upon the universal identity of citizens under the state (Taylor 1992:6). The attempt to achieve universality on the part of all as abstract citizens does possess totalitarian and homogenising implications in so far as individuals are socially and politically disciplined through the state separated from civil society. What is required, therefore, is an approach that integrates the claims of both universality and particularity, an approach that recognises that human identity is created reciprocally or dialogically through relations with others (Taylor 1992:7).
Rousseau makes great progress towards this ideal. Rousseau reaches his conclusion from premises which respect the freedom of each individual member of the 'great association' (Broome 1963:64/5). The citizen and the sovereign are not abstracted from each other: 'the Sovereign .. cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause' (Il.iv 1973:186). Political obligation is secured through the reciprocal act and relation upon which political society is based. Rousseau achieves the 'rational' unity of each and all in arguing that 'the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves'. As a result, 'there is not a man who does not think of ‘each’ as meaning him, and consider him in voting for all' (Il.iv 1973:187).
Rousseau makes decisive progress towards the integral conception by resting collective authority upon the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals. He thus unites each with all and all with each.





The problem is that Rousseau's associationalism fits the contours of the public-private dualism characterising liberal modernity. The principle of reciprocity uniting the freedom of each and all is asserted at the level of the political community of the state, vitiating Rousseau's attempt to realise an associative freedom which embeds a genuine reciprocity. Individuals interact within the sphere of the common good only at the level of the state.
There is, moreover, an ambiguity in Rousseau's justification of the 'rational' unity of the state. For if citizens act in an enlightened manner then they could live in peace with each other, managing their mutual interaction according to reason. A truly human community would rest upon the common subjection to a law that all recognise as binding and necessary, thus replacing the present coercive form of society with the ethico-political community - 'a community in which everyone obeys only the general will, which he recognises .. as his own will, rather than be subjected to the wilfulness of others' (Cassirer 1963:76). Force would not be needed to keep order. Rousseau's ideal is to substitute morality as an act of will for force as 'an act of necessity'. Since 'force does not create right', individuals 'are obliged to obey only legitimate powers' (I.iii 1973:168).
Such a view makes it possible to conceive the democratisation of the state's purpose to promote the common good. The individualist liberal conception had always objected to state compulsion securing moral ends as a denial of the essence of morality that ends be freely chosen by private individuals (Raphael 1970:135). Advocates of the 'rational' state uphold the view that individual liberty requires that private ends be integrated within a common purpose as expansive of the freedom of each and all. A path beyond the centrality of the state in the 'rational' tradition, and particularly the notion of a common good legislated in abstraction from individuals in the empirical world, however, is opened up through conceiving individuals as moral agents able to apprehend the common purpose directly, without the need for a legal compulsion forcing them to be free.
Rousseau's view points in both directions, though there is a consistency in his purpose. His argument that individuals are forced to be free may have provoked liberal accusations of totalitarianism but means no more than that liberty, as distinguished from licence, is secured by law for the mutual benefit of all. Rousseau's 'force', here, is an educative, lawful and moral purpose constituted by popular participation (Pateman 1985:156). As such, Rousseau's view of the essential character of human beings as inwardly governed moral beings, retaining and exercising sovereignty (Forsyth 1994:40), is subversive of all social and political institutions abstracted from real individuals. It entails a demand for the internal coordination of society beyond the state through self-mediating forms, a very different notion from an abstract public sphere (Levine 1987:134).
That lawful 'force' is consistent with 'rational' principles emerges in the way that Rousseau argues that independence and liberty 'reciprocally exclude each other’.

When every one does what he pleases, he will, of course, often do things displeasing to others; and this is not properly called a free state. Liberty consists less in acting according to one's own pleasure than in not being subject to the will and pleasure of other people. It consists also in our not subjecting the wills of other people to our own. Whoever is the master over others is not himself free, and even to reign is to obey.

Rousseau quoted in Keane 1984:255

Evident in Rousseau's formulation of 'rational' versus individualist freedom is the dualism of reason and nature. This ultimately devalues democratic possibilities by raising a 'higher' moral sphere over the real natures of individuals. As Rousseau argues, in passing from the state of nature to the civil state, justice is substituted for instinct in human conduct, giving individual actions 'the morality they had formerly lacked'. The 'voice of duty' 'takes the place of physical impulses'; the individual comes 'to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations' (I.VIII 1973:177/8).

Rousseau thus distinguishes moral/civil liberty, as something subject to the general will, from natural liberty as something immediate and individualistic (I.VIII 1973:178). The idea is crucial to the distinction of the 'rational' concept of freedom, as embracing a common purpose in the social structuring of individual freedom, from the individualist liberal conception, which restricts morality to individuals as best judges of their private ends. Though it makes available a richer, more expansive conception of freedom, the reason/nature dualism implicit in the 'rational' formulation also fractures the self by imposing a hierarchy of 'higher' and 'lower' human activities. Since this invites the autonomy and externality of politics, law and morality over real individuals, the task is to engender common purpose by respecting individuals as moral agents able to legislate the good for themselves through their everyday relationships. As will be argued, Marx resolves this political-legal problem of 'force' into a social problem, dissolving a whole range of dualisms forming the institutional core of liberal society to realise an associative conception of freedom within the bonds of society.
Rousseau's failure to fully discard liberal assumptions leads him to doubt that individuals will ever fully put reason in control, making an apparatus administering force necessary and permanent (Rousseau 1973:218; Hoffman 1995:111; Lukes 1973:77). 'All justice comes from God ... but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither government nor laws. Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone' and this 'must be mutual'. Nevertheless, 'humanly speaking .. the laws of justice are ineffective among men' (Rousseau II.vi 1973:191). The people may be 'incorruptible' but it may also be mistaken as regards its true interest in the community. 'Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it' (Rousseau II.vi 1973:193). The general will may be always 'upright' but 'the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened'. The 'blind multitude’ which does not always see what it wills 'must be shown’ and 'taught to see' the 'good road’ (Rousseau II.vi 1973:193). The authoritarian image which is the counterpart of the reason-nature dualism is evident: 'individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what he wills... This makes a legislator necessary’ (Rousseau 1973:193 194/7).
Though Rousseau's ethical theory demands it, reason will never manage to be so fully in control as to permit the discarding of the state as an apparatus for forcing people to be free (Levine 1987:33/36). Rousseau fails to locate the ideal within the real. The democratic potential of his thought is undermined by the recourse he has to the figure of the legislator to secure the people 'from the seductive influences of individual wills' (Rousseau 1973:193). Failing to overcome the dualism of ideal and real, Rousseau has no alternative but to resort to an institutional device educating citizens to the good. The figure of the legislator is a philosophical necessity in Rousseau's thought. His inability to conceive individuals as supplying the good for themselves means that, ultimately, Rousseau cannot effect the transition from ideal moral principles to concrete reality.

Does this, then, vindicate the individualist liberal accusations of totalitarianism and ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon, Popper, Barnes, Femia etc)? It all depends how far, in political practice, the ideal figure of ‘the legislator’ is pushed to make good the deficiencies of individuals and overcome the gap between the real and ideal by institutional, legal and political force. Of course, there is ‘totalitarian’ potential in imposing a priori principles of political rationality on a recalcitrant reality. But before the point is conceded to the individualist or empiricist liberal tradition, there is a need to remember that the real problem with which ‘rational’ thinkers like Rousseau attempt to deal remains – the ‘seductive influence of individual wills’ constraining human beings to empirical inclinations – wants and desires – confining them and their potentialities within natural necessity.

Rousseau’s inability to bridge the gap between real and ideal has political implications. Tellingly, Rousseau does not force reason to extremes. To read the errors of the French Revolution into Rousseau is to make some plainly invalid inferences. Despite Rousseau’s apparent philosophical preference for the democratic state, he justifies an 'elective' aristocracy as the best possible form of government. By confining magistracy to the few, choosing them by election, 'wise government' is ensured: 'it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own' (Rousseau III.v 1973:219). The people could never quite see the good clearly enough for democracy to be a realistic option (Rousseau Ill.iv 1973:216/8). Quite a moderate recommendation, really, a view with which Burke would have wholeheartedly concurred (Cameron 1973).

Rousseau's failure to ground democracy in the real world justifies a continued search for that form of social identity which is able to connect real individuals in their empirical lives to public authority. Rousseau's activist and participatory conception goes some way to this conclusion. Nevertheless, split between reason and nature, individuals will never quite embrace the democratic-dialogic procedure. This is why Rousseau's other 'rational' model, constraining individuals to freedom by legal-institutional means, dominates. The space for democratic associationalism and discourse are much diminished in favour of obedience to the general will as the collective internal conscience and authority, an alienated conscience, what Heller calls the categorical imperative externalised (Heller 1989:86).
In fine, Colletti's view that ‘revolutionary political theory is already foreshadowed and contained in The Social Contract' needs to be qualified (Colletti 1972:185). Marx was most directly influenced by Hegel and the way that he transcended the antinomies of Rousseau and Kant, pushing beyond the abstract individualism at the heart of liberalism and which ultimately vitiated Rousseau's perspective (Lukes 1973:77).

This section has located Rousseau in the tradition of 'rational freedom’ by showing how he developed the politics of the common good as a demand for the internal democratic coordination of human affairs. The argument has, however, shown that this democratic potential is undermined by problems concerning the kind of reason Rousseau puts in control. The opposition of duty as a higher interest to the real inclinations of individuals means that Rousseau cannot, ultimately, choose the democratic model of rational freedom over institutional constraint, however much his ethical position points in the direction of associative democratic freedom. Rousseau's associative principle comes to be invested in an abstracted political community over against the real associational activity of civil society. As a result of this public-private dualism, 'rational' principles of interaction and reciprocity, uniting the freedom of each and all, take shape as a lawful freedom regulating the empirical world.

3 KANT'S COMMUNITY OF ENDS 

If communism can no longer be presented as immanent in the necessary unfolding of history, then it needs to be defended morally as an ideal. The purpose of this chapter is to show the importance of Kant's philosophy to Marx's communism as a 'rational’ project. Though Kant is considered an ancestor of deontological liberalism (see Rawls' ‘procedural’ interpretation of Kant 1980), Kant is a 'rational' philosopher defining the good life in terms of a conception of the capacity for universal human potentialities to flourish (Boucher and Kelly 1994:7/8; Kant CF 1991:187; Korner 1969:128/32). Just as the search for the human essence was one of Rousseau's main concerns, so Kant was acutely interested in philosophical anthropology (Cassirer 1963:23). As will be argued, Kant is distinguished from individualist liberalism in assigning the legal state a moral-preparatory function in the realisation of the ethical order, setting liberal ends such as the protection of private property and the individual pursuit of happiness within the overarching purpose of realising moral community.

Kant continues Rousseau's project. Although Rousseau has been interpreted as a philosopher of freedom against the law, Kant's merit was to understand Rousseau's inherent rationalism in developing a conception of freedom under law. Kant's 'Rousseauan' influence is apparent in many respects: in coming to respect the dignity of the 'common man’, in arguing that there is no value to human existence without the triumph of justice, in defining the greatest task for humankind as that of establishing a society of citizens administering the law universally, and in conceiving human history as the fulfilment of a hidden plan of nature bringing about an internally and externally perfect civil constitution (Cassirer 1963:21 70 82).
This chapter will explore the democratic implications of Kant's ethics. In affirming that each individual is deserving of respect as a rational agent (Taylor 1992:41; Norman 1983:120), Kant affirms every person as competent to make universally legislative decisions. Each member treating all others as moral beings requires liberty (each individual is able to decide for themselves); equality (each individual equally has the power to make choices and decisions); and fraternity (each individual is a member of a moral community) (Raphael 1981:57; Norman 1983:102/3). Ideally, once reason is in control and dehumanising social forms are abolished, the legal-institutional framework constraining individuals to the good will be replaced by a conscious identification of the individual with the good.
Kant's ideal of a noumenal community is undermined by a failure to synthesize morality and politics. The problem relates to the way Kant resolves the tensions in Rousseau's notion of freedom, embedded in the general will, through a distinction between culture, as constituted in the sphere of reason apart from the empirical world, and nature. Reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world (Rundell 1989:14). As a result, rather than transforming politics, morality remains outside the temporal sphere.

This chapter divides into four sections, the first three on Kant's morality and his politics respectively, the fourth on critical issues concerning Kantian rationalism, the final section forming a conclusion.

3-1 The Morality Of Ends

The argument in this chapter establishes the moral requirement to transform society to realise the highest good as the core of Kant's project: 'The moral law .. determines for us . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). Human beings 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304).
Though Marx saw Kant's highest good a religious ideal rather than a political project, accusing Kant of transferring 'good will' - and 'the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals' - to 'the world beyond’ (GI 1999:97), this chapter shows that this criticism applies only if the highest good - 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295; cf Prac 1956:114/5) - is detached from Kant's moral order of colegislators who seek to enhance one another's ends. Kant's categorical imperative does yield the 'result' Marx seeks in demanding that individuals pursue the moral kingdom in which each individual enhances the ends of all individuals, obeying the moral law and cooperating in the promotion of universal happiness (Van Der Linden 1988:77/8).
Marx's comment thus serves to underline the need to ground Kant's highest good in the categorical imperative as a social ethics and moral praxis. For whilst chapter 4 will argue the case for the superiority of Hegel's socially embodied morality arising from social ties and functions, Kant's end of the highest good as a moral society in which human beings promote the happiness of each other also affirms a social ethics, seeking to regulate individual actions through a harmony of free and rational wills.





Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's moral law grounds a social duty to pursue the perfect constitution and international peace, leading to the highest good of the moral co-legislative community in which individuals treat each other as ends (Van Der Linden 1988:4/5). The second section deals with Kant's politics. This first section focuses upon Kant's morality.
Kant's morality is formal or transcendental in the sense that it seeks a ground for right not by means of an extrapolation from the empirical properties of human beings but in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations (1965 B.473-480). For Kant, this is the will. Only in relation to a supersensible 'noumenal’ realm could individuals become moral beings and can empirical actions be judged (1965 B.370ff B.384/6 B.390-396 B.498ff 1956 50ff).

Freedom for Kant is the capacity of reason to initiate action, individuals acting independently of natural causality and against 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects (1965 B.46 50 B.561f B.566ff B.826f; 1956:72 95 118f 161). Kantian autonomy is thus defined as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law, a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (1965 B.476 585f 1956:21-29 32). The general moral law is the 'categorical imperative', the objective principle of morality, categorically enjoining individuals to act in accordance with morality.
As distinct from an hypothetical imperative, which indicates the means which must be willed or employed relative to the realisation of some further end (GMM 1991:79), an imperative is categorical when expressed as an unconditional demand that possesses its own validity. This yields a universal principle for all rational beings and valid and necessary principles for every volition. This is The Formula of Universal Law: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (GMM 1991:84).

This formula is not to be limited to defining a procedure for the pursuit of private ends, achieving happiness only indirectly, since it applies to all so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws (Van Der Linden 1988:20). Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality in this manner the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict but in a harmony of free and rational wills.
The obligation to obey the moral law implies that humanity is charged with the duty to promote the highest good. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents are creating a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222). Not only the individual alone but all make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted.
This universal practical law derives from the objective principle of the will formed out of the conception of 'rational nature’ as an 'end in itself (GMM 1991:91). 'Man in the system of nature' 'has an ordinary value' but as the 'subject of a morally practical reason' he is 'exalted above all price'. As homo noumenon 'he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself (Kant 1964:96/7). Beings dependent on nature rather than on will have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 'things'. Rational beings are 'persons' since their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves. The individual as a rational being 'exists as an end in himself, not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will', but 'must in all his actions .. always be viewed at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:90).
The concept of rational being, legislating universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective, leads directly to the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91).
Kant's reference to 'humanity' rather than 'persons' is significant. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social rather than private. Duties to oneself are duties to all. 'Humanity' is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied to transform the human condition: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one's person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation' (DV 1964:85).
Thus, whilst the realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. The Formula of Autonomy establishes that 'the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)' (GMM 1991:93). In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as legislative selves (noumenal selves) and as colegislators in a moral order of universal cooperation (GMM 1991:98/9; Van Der Linden 1988:30). To treat others as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other's ends. Thus the formulation demands that the moral agent act always so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (GMM 1991:94).
This is a conception of a community of rational beings constituting their selfhood and self-worth in relation with the moral individuality of all other individuals (Cassirer 1981:248/9). This achieves 'a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws . . Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal)' (GMM 1991:95). This 'systematic union of different rational beings' (GMM 1991:95) exists as an ideal of humanity as it ought to be, an ideal realm in which moral agents respect each other as legislators and as ends in themselves: 





 In the realm of ends each upholds and promotes the conditions of autonomy.
By making the moral law their own end, moreover, individual agents make their end the moral community in which each furthers the ends of the other, realising the highest good (Van Der Linden 1988:32/3 38). This realm, then, is composed not merely of monadic legislators lacking relation and interaction, but of co-legislators in a reciprocal community: 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100).
Kant has been taken by both neo-Kantians (Rawls) and anti-Kantians (Sandel Maclntyre) to be indifferent to ends in arguing that only actions done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 85 37/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25) since to act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). Though the unmoral ground may produce lawful actions, it more often brings forth unlawful ones (GMM 1991:63ff). The view that the moral worth of an action resides in its consequences reduces the good will to being an efficient cause of good actions rather than as an end in itself. It is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, exercising their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (1956:89/90).
For Hegel, the pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from the desires, interests, and needs that real individuals have. Hegel's demand that the good be made an integral part of the everyday empirical life of individuals follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons through feeling pleasure or pain at certain things (PR para 150R; Aristotle NE 1980:35/9). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. 





Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire what it should want, for Kant a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle could make public life crucial to individual self-realisation as the essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. Hegel thus charges Kantian ethics with being an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake’ providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R).
In concentrating upon the form of moral judgment, Kant is open to the criticism that he neglected the content, being more concerned with how something is willed than with what is willed. Kant limits his comments to the statement that whatever is done must be in accord with duty (GMM 1991:101). For Hegel, Kant cannot prescribe the content of the moral law without violating his canon of universality, that the essence of pure will and pure practical reason is to be abstracted from all content. 'Thus it is a self-contradiction to seek in this absolute practical reason a moral legislation which would have to have a content, since the essence of this reason is to have none' (Hegel NL 1975:76).

However, Hegel's criticism is valid only if the categorical imperative is identified with the Formula of Universal Law, emphasising the universality of its form. Kant's morality may be formal, it is not empty. Kant is not indifferent to ends. The imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means puts some 'nonheteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality’ (Riley 1982:49), tying the standard of universalisation to an ethic which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This has practical implications, ruling out institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends.

The basis of the conflict between Kant and Hegel lies in their different conceptions of objective ends. Hegel's more Aristotelian teleology makes the ends of moral action a condition in the world, making actions instrumental to some good yet to be achieved in the objective world of political and legal institutions (PR para 75A). For Kant, this denies the moral status of action since the end is not extrinsic to action but is part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, as ends capable of shaping and pursuing ends (DV 1971:45/6 51).

Set alongside Aristotelian notions of the richly endowed happy individual, the Kantian self appears to be socially, culturally and historically deracinated, 'thin as a needle’ (Murdoch 1985:53). But Kant was as interested as Aristotle in developing the right kind of moral personality. Kant's ethic taught respect for the rational moral element in each individual and is 'built to preserve its own self-respect and that of others, neither demanding nor enduring servility' (Shklar 1984:233). It is not true that the Kantian self lacks moral and affective ties to others and is subjected to the empty ethic of duty for duty's sake. Kant realises that universal principle alone, at a formal level, cannot ensure morality and therefore ties it to an ethic of ends treating all individuals as beings endowed with dignity by virtue of their humanity, their capacity for moral action. The apparently thin conception of rational agency in the Universal Formula is thus developed into an intersubjective ethic of objective ends and a moral community. The capacity to universalise the principles of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the morality of these actions. Principles are only moral when tied to objective ends, specifically the injunction to treat human beings as ends rather than means.

Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has severed the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the Aristotelian conception. The notion of the good is subjectivised, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. To deal with this situation, Kant's ethics demote happiness from being the first principle of practical philosophy: 'it is the moral disposition which conditions and makes possible the participation in happiness’ (1965 B.841).
For Kant, the task of moral philosophy is not to prescribe the ends individuals ought to pursue in order to achieve happiness but to ensure that this pursuit meets the universality test and respects the external freedom of others (DV 1964:47). At the most basic level, Kant identifies happiness with the 'maximum' of well being of a finite rational being, its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations (GMM 1991:59 61 64 79 Prac 1956:20; Pure 1965: B.834). But this hedonistic view is subordinate to 'contentment in fulfilling a purpose .. determined by reason alone, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). The rational value of happiness - the 'complete good' - now depends upon the possession of moral virtue, moral conduct or good will being the condition of the worthiness to be happy (GMM 1991:59; 1965 B.837-838 B.841). Happiness is more than self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure, being free and rational activity through knowledge, insight and creativity (Van Der Linden 1988:70/1). The actions of a being having will have to be determined by reason rather than instinct (GMM 1991:60/111). To this end, natural inclinations are to be 'tamed': 'instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness’ (R 1960:51). Happiness is the unification of 'all the ends which are prescribed by our desires' (1965:632), a harmony of ends. ‘Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the commands of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (1965 B.842). The systematic unity of ends in the intelligible - hence moral - world (1965 B.842) leads to 'the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature' (1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1965 B.844).

This section concludes with an examination of the realm of ends as a possible world in which all individuals really are the pure moral agents following the moral law which reason asserts they ought to be (GMM 1991:95/6). Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and always obeying it, the realm of ends is an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a concept and goal of future society (1965: B.836f). The realm of ends is an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (1965 B.372). In the sensible realm, its counterpart is progress towards communal autonomy, the 'real object of our willing’ (1956:121f).
Though its purpose is to authorize the application of coercion against those who violate freedom, the realm of ends has radical possibilities as an ideal civil constitution in which coercion has been replaced by moral reason. Discussing Plato's idea of the perfect city, Kant envisages





Kant affirms a conception of human potentiality. Against the conservative thesis which makes corrupt human nature responsible for imperfect political institutions, Kant makes 'the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws' the cause of imperfection (Pure 1965:312).
Imperfect institutions corrupting human nature ought to be transformed and placed on a moral basis. The ideal constitution is thus 'a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws'. Kant raises the possibility that the 'more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishment become', making it 'quite rational to maintain .. that in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required'. The fact that this perfect state may never be achieved does not alter 'the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype' (1965 B.373-374).
This perfect constitution is a 'state’ that has lost its coercive character. This ideal, Kant goes on to argue, cannot be criticised for its alleged impracticality: 'For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specific limit' (1965 B.374). Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics concerning the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (1965 B.7 394n; 1956:3).
The implications are radical. Since heteronomy - determination by external laws (natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others) - is the norm, autonomy - being governed rationally by self-legislated laws - remains a goal to be achieved (Van Der Linden 1988:32). Existing political and social institutions deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals and may be criticised from the perspective of the ideal.
Marx's critique - aiming at the 'association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (CM 1973:87) - exposes the heteronomous character of capitalist society, in which the ends of some are favoured over others, in favour of communism as a moral community embodying the autonomy of each and all.
However, whilst the concept of the republic of ends can critically expose the failings of actual society, it is not able to show how this society can be brought into accordance with the ideal. Undermining Kant's ideal is the contradiction between the realm of ends and the empirical world, the way reason is raised over nature. Kant formulates his ideal constitution in abstraction from certain 'hindrances' (1965 B.374). Firstly, sensory nature as external to the individual and which cannot be altered by even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law (Kant 1956:15 21). Secondly, internal nature as the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality (1956:20ff 83f). Though, as morally free, the individual has the capacity to act independently of natural inclinations, individuals need to be taught how to act against the inclinations aroused by external objects through the 'respect' aroused by the moral law (1956:84f 117 160f).
This educational process gives Kant's philosophy an intersubjective dimension. The attainment of autonomy through the 'culture of reason' (1956:162f) is not the result of legislative reason on the part of an isolated individual but requires the development by society as a whole of individual reason (1965 B.845 1956:64f). The role Kant assigns the 'culture of reason' makes apparent, however, the extent to which the realm of ends is divorced from the empirical world. Human society has a history whereas the realm of ends, as the rational idea of a nonempirical, perfect community rather than an appearance, is not (cf CJ 444).
The problem is how the ideal can be realised through human action on Kant's premises. The capacity for moral action, noumenally part of the a priori capacities of the rational human mind, is a different notion from Aristotelian empirical self-actualisation. As Hegel came to argue, although moral action always occurs in a context, Kant's morality is unsituated in that freedom as the a priori causality of reason pays no regard to empirical givens and thus offers no guidance with respect to material moral action. If freedom remains this unsituated concept, it cannot be pursued let alone realised in the empirical or sensible realm. Freedom is confined in an impotent noumenal sphere.
Though the realm of ends can reveal how existing society is deficient in comparison with the ideal it is unable to show how society can be improved so as to increase the accordance. This requires the use of 'hypothetical' maxims relating empirical givens to ends. Though these are empirical and not moral maxims (GMM 1991:78/9 1956:20), they are not lacking in moral significance when it comes to realising desired ends. There is a need to go beyond the purely moral realm of ends to explain materially what this significance is.
And this also requires a more material conception of interaction than Kant makes available. Each member of the realm of ends treats all others as ends so that all respect the moral legislation of the other. However, in abstracting from the 'empirically conditioned' purposes which agents set for themselves so that only purposes 'posited through freedom' remain, there is nothing to interact about. Since all maxims present in the realm of ends are derived from the moral law that inheres in every member of the realm, so that each, as legislator, is able to prescribe maxims for her/himself on its basis, interaction takes the form of mutual noninterference. The fact that the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world are present within any meaningful interaction shows the extent to which the realm of ends diverges from the empirical world. Only with a material account of the ideal does reason become truly interactive, situated and social.
Can Kant's nonempirical ideal become an empirical world of free personalities freely accepting the law, a realm of self-sufficient subjects in rational union? The task that the ideal of the realm of ends sets for each individual, as a member of a group of rational beings, is to establish society according to the moral law. The final end of humanity will be realised when 'the authority, not of governments but of conscience within us, will .. rule the world' (LE 1980). It is the idea of the 'moral world' (B.836), the world as it 'ought to be', as revealed by the 'necessary laws of morality'. This is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience is lacking. Nevertheless, it is at the same time 'a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea' (1965 B.836). The idea of a moral world has, therefore, 'objective reality', not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition 'but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment’ (B.836). This achieves the idea of a 'corpus mysticum of rational beings' 'so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other' (B.836).
The ethical state is thus based on the moral purpose that the moral law engenders. This association uniting rational individuals would be possible if pure morality was expanded so that it were freely accepted by all.

Kant will be shown to identify the perfect constitution as the republican state, the rule of law realising the social as against unsocial character of human beings. In assuring each that all will follow the concept of law, government facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law, representing a 'great step' 'towards morality .. towards a state where the concept of duty is recognised for its own sake, irrespective of any possible gain in return' (PP Reiss 1991:121n). The rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is thus preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion. With internal discipline replacing external discipline, political peace is spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings.





Kant's political philosophy identifies the goal of human history as the empirical political fulfilment of the idea of 'rational freedom' (Cassirer 1981:407). This affirms that the 'sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (R 1949:404). It follows from this that ‘the species of rational beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest good as a social good’ (R 1949:407).
Kant's conception is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom is not the absence of constraint but the moral recognition of constraint in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Constraint is put on a moral basis since human beings do not just obey law but make it. Kant thus establishes the principles ensuring the greatest possible freedom of each and all under a collectively universal will. A legal order ensures an eternal peace by limiting individual freedom so that it is consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good (1965 B.779/80). The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all (Saner 1973:30/1 215). This image of freedom achieved through the reciprocity of legal obligations pervades the Critique of Pure Reason and is central to Kant's 'architectonic’ (1965 B.860).

The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', converting chaos, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 4). The 'rational' ideal of the state, as the republican constitution in accord with natural rights, with the very nature of individuals, makes the dream of 'perpetual peace’ a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114). In Universal History, Kant grounds hope for progressive political ends in the historical process, seeking further to inspire moral action towards the realisation of the perfect state and peace.

Kant endows the individual with an ‘unsocial sociability' in which drives towards associationalism - the inclination to 'live in society' - and individualisation - the tendency to 'live as an individual' - conflict (UH 1991:44). The political problem is to accommodate both factors rather than suppress either. Arguing that 'the development of all natural capacities' is the 'highest purpose of nature', Kant predicates human growth and development upon the interplay between natural inclinations of asociability and moral inclinations of sociability (UH 1991:45). The individual seeks a form of association which has 'the greatest freedom' which has specific limits so that 'it can coexist with the freedom of others' (UH 1991:45). The cunning of nature, operating through mechanisms of self-interest, compels human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44), a 'civil society which can administer justice universally’ (UH 1991:45).
To guarantee 'freedom under external laws' requires an 'irresistible force' since members of this 'perfectly just civil constitution' are related to each other in antagonistic fashion (UH 1991:46). Kant proceeds from the 'rational' argument both Aristotle and Rousseau made in differentiating liberty from license. Though the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law' and 'abuses his freedom in relation to others' and therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (UH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution in a society composed of particular citizen wills 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved' (UH 1991:46).

The end is not unrealistic since, rather than base peace upon the assumption of 'the moral improvement of man', Kant accommodates the 'selfish inclinations' of individuals politically (PP 1991:113). Kant thus proceeds from the worst case, individuals as a 'nation of devils' who, in possessing understanding, may solve the political problem (PP 1991:112).
Unity can, therefore, be achieved out of antagonistic forces, these forces cancelling each other out in a republican arrangement achieved by nature, by prudence or by reason (PP Saner 1973:38 46 41/2 41/53 109/114). This is a step in the direction of the moral order. With the replacement of a natural order of conflicting particular wills for the universal will of a legal order 'a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles' (UH 1991:44/5). This requires 'a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience (UH 1991:47). This indicates that Kant's 'master' is not an externally imposed agency but the rational nature within human beings. This is a self-mastery achieved through the moral law, through the autonomous citizen obeying a law that is self-made and self-imposed under the perfect constitution.
Kant's plan of nature subverts the need for an external master by guiding human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution', the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). Kant refers to the realisation in the historical process of a 'hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' (UH 1991:50). Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason as capable of being fully realised only in the latter (UH 1991:42), proceeds to re-unite them by reconciling moral freedom and nature. In achieving this rational natural end, the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The external coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.
Kant's argument that the union of states is the 'halfway mark' in human development (UH 1991:49) makes the point that the political commonwealth is a precondition for the emergence of the ethical commonwealth. Since citizens cannot be forced into the ethical commonwealth without violating the premise of freedom, the hope is that the citizens, united under moral laws, freely enter the ethical commonwealth: 'for then, when its methods of compulsion do not avail (for the human judge cannot penetrate into the depths of other men) their dispositions to virtue would bring about what was required' (R 1960:87).
Although this suggests a noumenological civil society beyond the state (Krieger 1972:102), Kant's formulation is lacking in transformatory and social content. Kant's purposes are theoretic. The natural plan is prescribed as a regulative ideal of reason applicable to the sphere of knowledge rather than to political action resting upon morality (UH 1991:41).
That said, Kant's argument that the role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own' (UH 1991:42), aims to stimulate moral action to realise the perfect state. Philosophy can thus have its belief in a millennium, revealing how nature pushes humanity towards the good (UH 1991:50). The philosophical formulation of a universal history 'in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civic union' is capable of 'furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51). The intelligent action of human beings may hasten the fulfilment of human destiny (UH 1991:52/3).
Kant's philosophy is therefore praxis and future oriented, his primacy of pure practical reason asserting that the world is created by human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Thus '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1988:13). This aspect of Kant, indicating how the ideal may be realised, requires further comment.
Kant's praxis, grounding a rational hope for progress, affirms that the future is something to be created: 'Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason' (UH 1991:43). The things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are not given by nature but exist as potentialities for human beings to actualise, transforming their environment and themselves (Van Der Linden 1988:102/3). Kant, therefore, affirms history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society. Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his praxis moral as well as technical.
The end of moral community is rooted in the development of the rational predispositions of the species. The ‘technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power to organize and employ human beings to realize specific purposes and accustom human beings to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition’ to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress in the moral disposition implies that human agents fulfil the duty to promote the highest good, coming to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183).
The culture of discipline increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming increasingly to consult the voice of duty. Duty loses its compulsory character as it comes to be internalised (Van Der Linden 1988:173). The culture of skill refers to the increasing capacity to manipulate the natural and social environment and involves conflict and inequality associated with material factors such as class, exploitation and division of labour (CJ 1951:282). Marx would explore the rational capacity to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and the autonomy of social mechanisms from rational control. For Kant, the purpose of the mastery of nature is culture, and the purpose of culture, in turn, is to realise the highest political good as a preparatory stage leading to the moral community (Van Der Linden 1988:141).
Behind Kant's moral praxis is the view that human beings have a duty to change the world to realise a moral ideal. Though Kant believed it 'foolhardy’ and even 'punishable' to oppose an existing constitution with 'political constitutions which meet the requirements of reason’ (CF 1991:188), he nevertheless appraised the enthusiasm that the French Revolution aroused within 'all spectators' as indicating 'a moral disposition within the human race’ (CF 1991:182). Kant affirms the human 'disposition and capacity’ to effect social change autonomously, 'to be the cause of its own advance toward the better' (1963:142). The prospect of the evolution of a condition of natural right in the relation of the individual to the state and of individual states to each other is founded upon this moral disposition. As the enthusiasm of the spectators, 'true enthusiasm' is objective in being directed exclusively towards a moral ideal rather than deriving from selfish interests (CF 1991:183). Advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions shows that voluntary cooperation and reciprocity is more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1988:60 61 64). Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity for the better in human nature and society which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things, and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). In precisely this same manner, the Paris Commune revealed to Marx a possible ideal future. Marx's moral enthusiasm as a spectator outweighed his practical reservations as regards the Commune.

3-3 The Republican Constitution

The struggle to convert lawless conflict into a moral ideal of peace (Saner 1973:310 313) is a struggle for the rule of law and persists until the realisation of the republican state. This ensures that individuals remain free to pursue private ends within the constraint of external freedom as defined by the 'Universal Principle of Right': 





Kant thus applies his universal principle of morality, the categorical imperative, to politics, arguing that political philosophy must begin from the a priori awareness of the moral law as opposed to principles of (empirical) advantage (PP 1991:93ff). This establishes a possible republican constitution structuring a civil society. The realm of ends becomes a 'respublica noumenon' (CF 1991:187) appropriate to a 'race of angels' (PP 1991:112), whereas civil society is a 'respublica phenomenon' applying to a world of experience, to, in the worst possible case, a 'nation of devils' (PP 1991:112).

If reason is the slave of the passions, as Hume argues, then it ought not to be. The moral law cannot be derived from or reduced to natural inclination, human beings acting on the level of empirical immediacy. The problem is that Kant doesn’t actually bridge the gap between noumenon and phenomenon and this separation works to prevent the integration of morality and politics. In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with this is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion, forcing individuals prudentially to do what they ought to do morally (PP 1991:112/3 117). And it means that Kant’s morality is brittle and fragile, wide open to the subversion of the passions. This is why coercion is required. Coercion is inherent in the constitutional framework of civil society, nature compelling individuals to subordinate natural inclinations to legally instituted motives (PP 1991:97n 98n 99n 108/114 120/ln). Freedom as the capacity to legislate for oneself remains a predicate of the individual as noumenon. Empirically, it can only appear as a form of natural causality which, applicable to the individual as phenomenon, is coercion. This necessity of coercion shows the extent to which Kant's politics diverge from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the perfect constitution.
Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not provide a solution to the problem of order. In conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest (Hume’s ‘passions’), Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state. The 'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society.
Kant's 'lawful state' thus assumes a restrictive character in which the freedom of each and all is harmonized through law as general coercive rule (TP 1991:73). Kant's principles of freedom do not enter into the political world. The original contract is not an actual fact but 'merely an idea of reason' by which to judge existing laws (TP 1991:79). Hence the inalienable rights which people possess against the head of state cannot be coercive (TP 1991:79/80). With the establishment of the civil constitution, the autonomous right of citizens to legislate the laws to themselves is transformed into a hypothetical ‘as if’ and turned into the rational norm according to which the head of the state adjusts the laws (TP 1991:79). The 'people can never possess a right of coercion against the head of state, or be entitled to oppose him in word or deed' (TP 1991:83).
In failing to synthesize politics and morality, Kant is left with two states confronting each other. Ideally, there is the ethical state in which the sovereign law of reason raises the individual to the universal moral level, the individual attaining what was truly human in himself or herself. Empirically, there is the juridical state in which the sovereign law of reason integrates the individual at the level of civil society.
Of all the 'rational’ thinkers, Kant expresses most clearly the dualistic character of law as rational and as positive (Norrie 1991:ch3; Wood 1990:70/1), of law as right in embodying the rational will of individuals and of law as regulation in controlling the egoistic will of individuals. Law is split between a possible freedom and an actual necessity. [16] The next chapter shows how Hegel attempts to achieve a synthesis by the rational elucidation of the universal within the particular. Law thus emerges as a moment in the movement of the rational within the social (Norrie 1991:ch4).
Though what Kant calls 'lawful freedom' is based on the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent' (MM 1991:139), this 'state of lawful dependence' created by the legislative will of its members does not imply democracy. Individuals must demonstrate a 'fitness to vote' by being a property owning member of the commonwealth (MM 1991:139; Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). Whereas the original social contract establishes the legitimacy of the state and political obligation through a democratic act of consent, Kant sacrifices reason to the existing order. Since all 'are not equally qualified within this constitution to possess the right to vote', not all 'have a right to influence or organise the state itself as active members, or to co-operate in introducing particular laws' (MM 1991:140). Kant does at least allow the equality of all 'to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one' (MM 1991:140) through 'talent, industry and luck' (Saw 1974:60).
Kant's equality of opportunity within a formal equality is, nevertheless, 'consistent with the greatest inequality’ in social life. Kant, moreover, accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). The argument has radical implications. If the labourer, dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour, is to acquire the attribute of citizenship, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so that social dependence is abolished. This extends popular participation in equipping the individual to 'influence’ and 'organise' the state.
Kant, nevertheless, rejects democracy since, under it, everyone wants to be a ruler. Democracy is necessarily a despotism in that it creates an executive power through which all citizens may make decisions about and even against individuals without their consent, meaning that the general will is in contradiction with itself and with freedom (PP 1991:101). Kant identifies a real problem here. Marx himself focuses upon the notion of the general interest becoming separated from individuals, both in the sense of opposing self-representation to abstract representation and of the autonomy of relations from human control.
Lacking a solution, Kant argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Kant's republic, defined as the separation of the executive from the legislative power (PP 1991:101) embodies the rights of the people without thereby challenging 'irresistible' monarchical power (PP 1991:112).
Kant is concerned less with the form of the state than that the sovereign, even a monarch, represent the will of the people (Van Der Linden 1988:36). With his republic as a constitutional monarchy (Krieger 1972:121), Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm' for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). The ‘republican constitution' is the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The separation of powers at the heart of Kant's republicanism mediates between the ideal sovereignty of the people and the real sovereignty of the ruler. But Kant's morality is confined within empirical political possibility. Obedience to the ruler is justified not simply as a fact but as an a priori concept of practical reason (PP 1991:99).
Kant's constitutional monarchy is provisional, Kant projecting a possible future in which the sovereign people would actually be the co-legislators of their freedom. Thus monarchs must govern in a 'republican (not a democratic) manner', 'in the spirit of republicanism and by analogy with it' (CF 1991:184). The monarch should govern according to 'laws of freedom' that people of 'mature rational powers' would prescribe for itself (CF 1991:187). For Kant, it is less the form than the mode of government that it important, valuing the possibility that the state may 'come to be like the idea of the republican state' (Saner 1973:311).
But whereas Kant repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives (Saw 1974:64), Marx affirmed the unity of democratic form and content. Marx's critique of abstract political representation showed that representatives do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even when legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. Only with an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies, is the public sphere invested with democratic and material content to ensure that legislation genuinely reflects the universal will of all. In showing the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism, capitalism privatising and depoliticising the public realm by making common affairs a private domain (Levine 1984:133/4), Kant's claims that the republican state guarantees the most extensive liberty for each and all, establishes the conditions of autonomy, and prepares the grounds for the moral community are shown by Marx to be problematical. The abolition of capitalism is imperative.

Kant himself offers a path beyond the contradiction between the ethical state of the moral world and an alienated juridical state of the real world. For Kant did not regard the free will of the moral agent as being irrelevant to politics. His argument that 'a true system of politics' must pay 'tribute to morality' (PP 1991:125) presses against the boundary separating the political from the moral, overcoming the distinction between the politically possible and the morally right (Riley 1982). Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (in Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).
True, Kant distinguished between moral and legal motives, maintaining that the one can never be merged with the other without requiring 'a kind of new creation or super-natural creation’ (CF 1991:188), a possibility which Kant denied. But Kant's ethic of ends bridges the moral to the political-legal realm as the two sides of freedom. A realm of ends as a regime of pure morality may be unrealisable but Kant does entertain possibilities for a legal order which corresponds to morality more closely than existing arrangements. Morality and legality must be related in such a way that morality shapes politics (PP 1991:93/130). The Categorical Imperative, universalising only those maxims of action which respect all individuals as ends in themselves, has political implications. Though 'man' 'is a mere trifle' in relation to the 'inaccessible highest cause' of nature, 'it is not just a trifle but a reversal of the ultimate purpose of creation' 'if the rulers of man's own species regard him as such and treat him accordingly', 'using him as a mere instrument of their ends' (CF 1991:185). Politics is thus the partial, legal, realisation of an ideal realm in which individuals respected each other as ends.




Levine's claim that Marx would govern society through 'the internalized compulsion of reason' (Levine 1987:14) has Rousseauan and Kantian undertones but is insufficiently alive to the repressive implications of replacing external obligations with internalised compulsion (Keane 1988:25; Walzer 1970:122-36). [1] In Connolly's Foucaultian critique, the 'rational' project encloses the individual within an inclusive community (Connolly 1989:127/8 129/31). To be free in this sense requires that the particular will is 'domesticated' to will the universal law (Connolly 1989:57).
Both Marx and Hegel address this problem of internal and external constraint. Hegel distinguished between the victim of positive religion and the Kantian self: 'the former carries his master outside himself, while the latter carries his master within himself and is in bondage to himself’ (Hegel ETW 1971:211). Marx made this point with respect to the way that Luther replaced servitude based on devotion with servitude based on conviction. This abolished 'external religiosity' 'only by making religiosity the inner man'. The layman no longer struggled with 'the priest outside himself but with 'his own inner priest' (CHPR:I 1975:251/2).

Max Weber referred to modern society as the iron cage. This steel hard cage is not so much a physical as a psychic prison, embracing not just the bodies but the subjectivities of its members. The bars on the cage are not visible, they are internal rather than external – what William Blake called ‘mind forged manacles’. Weber here identifies the inner constraint that characterises capitalist modernity.

Foucault argues that madness was originally seen as a manifestation of animality rather than an illness. This shows the potentially repressive aspect of the attempt to tame and curtail natural inclinations. The imposition of culture over nature is not just a denaturalisation but also a dehumanisation. In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault comments that: 'the animality that rages in madness dispossesses man of what is specifically human in him; not in order to deliver him over to other powers, but simply to establish him at the zero degree of his own nature' (Foucault 1999: 74). Madness as the epitome of animality can be cured only by regulation. For Foucault power is not strict violence or pure coercion, but the interplay of techniques of discipline and less obvious technologies of the self. This amounts to the external and self-suppression of the body. Forming oneself as an ethical subject requires practices of the self (1987b: 26-8). It is 'the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi . .. which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions' (1984b: 352). 

The history of rationalization can be seen in terms of a growing regulation of nature, inclinations and the body through dietary management, scientific exercise, gastronomy and the technology of medicine, bringing human beings and human nature under the detailed control of the state and other institutions, curtailing possibilities of primitive experience, spontaneity and unrestrained pleasures. These developments are the culmination of the spirit of internal restraint in obedience to the moral law within. A parallel development is the increasing external regulation of the autonomous individual within the rationalizing process of the iron cage. Modern society thus emerges as a network of disciplines which police the individual from the cradle to the grave. 

Freud refers to civilisation as a social coercion which requires the sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction. As Erich Fromm puts it, there is a social character, a type, which is specific to every society. To put it simply, society needs men who want to do what they have to do’ (Fromm 1966:7/8). Human beings are trained to do and to want what the system has them do and want. Instead of freedom we have rationalisation as the growing regulation of the body and institutionalisation of the individual.

The existence of 'religiosity' in both internal and external forms exposes Kant's freedom as problematical. Kant's dualism of duty and inclination contrasts with Aristotelian notions of self-fulfilment and bears a strong relation to Christianity's dualism of flesh and spirit (Norman 1983:94/7; Krieger 1972:87). [2] Kant's freedom as the capacity to discern and submit to the dictates of the moral law, existing independently of experience (Kant GMM 1991:62/6; 1956:81/4), overcomes external bondage only by internalising it. The law that the empirical self obeys is not its own law but that of the supernatural self (Kant GMM 1991:62/6; 1956:81/4). There is, therefore, an ‘indestructible positivity’ in Kant's morality of reason which, though presented as self-legislation, is actually the legislation of a rational will external to the empirical self, to which the empirical self must submit as a second nature (Hegel ETW 1971:211/12; Seidler 1994:41).

By placing empirical phenomena outside reason, Kant's framework is dualistic. As the product of pure reason, emancipating individuals from natural inclinations, Kant's freedom under law possesses an external character apart from the world of experience, treating individuals as rational beings as distinct from natural beings (Krieger 1972:101/2; Taylor 1975:368/9). As Hegel argued, 'although practical reason postulates the identity of idea and reality, the latter remains strictly opposed and external to reason' (NL 1975:59/60 72). For Kant, the individual is moral only in being able to abstract from the contingent influences and determinations of the natural and social world, coming to act according to a moral law established by pure practical reason in a noumenal realm. 





Since Kant identifies the 'true' moral nature of human beings with a self distinct from the empirical self, individuals have to deny that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality.

Basing morality on 'sensuous motives' is the greatest vice (GMM 1991:103). The human 'creature' can never attain such a level of moral disposition as holiness since 'he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source' (Prac 1956:86). Individuals enter the noumenal realm only if they 'abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends' (GMM 1991:95). Individuals are required to detach themselves from everything that constitutes self-identity. Kant secures a basis for morality only by defining a realm that has little in common with real society. It is difficult to understand how moral legislation produced in this noumenal realm could apply in the phenomenal realm. Kant himself realises that denying the situational character of the world of experience reduces the force of his argument. Though a kingdom of ends could exist if the maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes for all were universally followed, 'even if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground' (Kant GMM 1991:100).
Legal force must intervene, individuals learning to identify happiness with the subordination of their real nature to the necessity of law. Kant's view thus imposes a dualism between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the subordination of the individual as an empirical being to an external authority (Norman 1983:96 98).
Kant's division between the phenomenal world of natural determination and the noumenal world of moral freedom fragments human experience and subjects the individual to a ceaseless struggle between the command of duty and natural inclinations (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2). Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, to the 'higher', i.e. rational self, reflecting a categorical distinction between reason and nature which underpins the autonomy of law, morality and politics from the human ontology within liberal society (Murphy 1970; Arendt 1982). As chapter 7 argues with respect to Weber's rationalisation thesis, this distinction fits a capitalist modernity in which individuals are made instrumental to external purposes.




With Rousseau, Kant is a key figure in bringing an ethical imperative into the world of politics, defining the task before humanity as that of creating a free society of self-legislating citizens administering the moral law universally. In this ideal, the coercive form of society is replaced by a true community of ends in which all obey the general will as their own true will. Ultimately, however, neither Rousseau nor Kant could overcome the basic coercion rooted in civil society, having thus to envisage the expansion of reason through legality.
This chapter has sought to project possibilities out of Kant's philosophy for a reciprocal community uniting each and all within a mutual interaction. More specifically, the centrality of praxis and human self-creation, the conception of moral autonomy and the ideal of moral community of colegislative freedom would infuse Marx's critique of capitalism as an autonomy-denying order and define communism as beyond the state and the capitalist division of labour.
Marx would show, however, that Kant's ideal of the moral community of colegislators, each promoting the ends of all others (Van Der Linden 1988:205), can be realised only through social transformation abolishing private property.
Kant's premises permit such a transformation since the only natural right that Kant allows is not private property but 'freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with universal law' (CJ 1951:43/4). Socialisation ensures that the moral ideal is operative in the mechanisms of socio-economic reality.
Socialisation also overcomes the limitations of Kant's legalistic conception of reciprocity. Though Kantian reciprocity must prevail in form, it need not necessarily prevail in substance. A formal equality under law could coexist with substantive inequality issuing in an unequal power to command and rule. The only equality Kant concedes is the guarantee of an equal chance for all. Developing Kantian ethics as socialist, then, necessitates distinguishing Kant's formal reciprocity from the material reciprocity which Marx pursued.
Only with substantive equality can the perfect state realise its ultimate end, the autonomy of all citizens preparing the stage for the moral community of ends (Van Der Linden 1988:162). This requires that individuals engage in collective actions and hence cease to be atomistic, unorganised moral individuals. Since the individual is situated in social groups, morality is a cooperative and collective endeavour (Goldmann 1971:172 178). Though Kant's own conception of the individual as a social being implies that moral agency would be expressed through a multiplicity of universal institutions, Kant is weak on morality as a collective praxis. This reflects Kant's tendency to conceive the moral ideal in terms of an 'inner' unification of individual good wills as against regulation through collective 'outer' rules.
But since morality is socially as well as individually expressed, taking place in a socio-relational context, an institutional framework is required. Kant seems to have believed that any such collective endeavour contains an inherent tendency to alienation. In contrast, Hegel roots the state within a multi-layered social fabric comprising a diversity of associations and communities, a socio-institutional framework that has the promotion of universal happiness as its end, recovering the Aristotelian notion of political life as having the purpose of realising the good. Marx's originality here - building upon the associative conceptions of Rousseau and Hegel - is to have conceived the possibility of individual participation within a supra-individual framework that avoids such institutional alienation. Kant's own conception of colegislative freedom also points in this direction.
Marx builds upon the radical possibilities in Kant's thought. Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!' (WE 1991:54) delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Yack goes so far as to refer to a 'Left Kantianism' as a revolutionary morality preaching liberation from all contexts or situations which deny the essential humanity of individuals (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). In this spirit, Marx affirms the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (CHPR:I 1975:251).
The chapters on Marx will therefore argue that, through social transformation restoring all human relations to conscious common control, Marx establishes the material conditions of Kant's moral ideal of universal human autonomy. Marx's critique of Hegel's institutional embodiment of the 'ought-to-be' within the 'is' recovers Kant's 'inner' orientation within a socio-relational political morality. Though this still has institutional implications, Marx's democracy, as more than voting and election, resembles nothing more than Kant's moral community of colegislators, a 'true' democracy of ends in which producers and citizens actively exercise their sovereign power, developing their capacities in all round fashion.
Democratisation ensures that the supra-individual framework regulating social existence has the needs and the happiness of all individuals as its end. Marx thus materially and democratically strengthens the process of transition from Kant's highest political good to his highest moral good, dissolving the distinction between the two through a conception of communism as the moral community of ends.
Overall, the first two chapters have argued that in making reason the sole source of freedom and morality 'rational freedom' is democratic in the sense of affirming all individuals to be rational beings, capable of apprehending the moral law, anti-democratic in its distrust of the natures of real individuals. Reason comes to be legislated in abstraction from real individuals and invested in an ideal institutional realm which alone gives access to that 'higher' morality individuals need to realise their 'true' selves. This leads to the idea that individuals could be constrained, educated, even disciplined, to the externally legislated, collective good. Reason comes to be canalised into repressive institutional channels more concerned with the regulation of individuals rather than their true fulfilment.

4 HEGEL'S EMBODIED FREEDOM

Since Marx's reworking of 'rational freedom' proceeds directly from the critique of Hegel, Hegel's own version of 'rational freedom’ - Sittlichkeit - merits extensive treatment. Particularly important is the way that Hegel transcends Rousseau and Kant in embodying morality within the political world. The problem with 'rational freedom’ becomes the nature of this embodiment in Hegel, the question of whether or not the rational state is the appropriate location of freedom.
Hegel's Sittlichkeit is the most advanced form taken by 'rational freedom' in establishing the point that institutions develop and sustain the desire of each individual for mutual respect and freedom. Hegel situates individualism within a structured system of social roles and institutions as the necessary categorical framework through which individual powers and capacities flourish and concrete freedom is actualised (Smith 1991:129/31). Hegel affirms a complex self-actualising conception of human nature which is culturally and historically specific.
Hegel located the impasse in the tradition of 'rational freedom' in the way neither Kant nor Rousseau, offering absolute freedom and radical autonomy, could not give their communal goals a content. Further, by making the radical autonomy of the moral agent wholly dependent on human will, the common good takes the form of an arbitrary aggregate of 'particularised wills'. For Hegel, this aggregate would constitute not a genuine common good but an abstract majority based only on the proxy of representation, an abstract 'general will' of particularised wills posed as if singular, universal and true (Hegel 1977:358/60). Such a view implies an homogenisation which cannot conceive of any articulated differentiation of society (Taylor 1975:403/8 406 430).
This chapter argues that Hegel rejects Kantian individualism and Rousseauan egalitarianism not on account of their radical implications but on account of their failure to appreciate the extent to which freedom requires a supporting institutional and social environment. Hegel's state is designed to express the nature of its individual members by being the embodiment of the various ties that bind these individuals to the community, a framework of shared ethical understanding which affirms a sense of common civic identity (Haddock 1994:148). Hegel thus actualises 'rational freedom' by recovering the classic dignity and status of politics as having a positive role in promoting a way of life according to a conception of the good.
The first two sections of this chapter concentrate upon how Hegel superseded Kant and Rousseau in being able to ground freedom in the empirical world, uniting moral and political spheres. The third section pays specific attention to the way Hegel portrays the state as ethical agency, integrating the universal and the particular within a conception of Sittlichkeit or ethical life. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the potentials for a new public sphere centred upon the associative space of civil society in Hegel's system of differentiated representation.

4-1 Hegel Beyond Kant

This section shows how, both politically and philosophically, Hegel overcomes Kant's antinomies, reinstating the conception of an organic totality against Kant's rational individualism and uniting politics and morality within an ethical life in a way that Kant never could.
Hegel consciously identified his task as the closure of Kant's gap between the 'noumenal' world of spirit/reason and the 'phenomenal' world of flesh/nature/experience, integrating logic, history and ontology into one philosophical system based upon spirit coming to know itself through the realisation of its process in the existing world (HL paras 1-4 5 7 12 23 24; SL 1969:45). What is most important with respect to the argument of this thesis is the way Hegel develops Aristotelian categories in applying the rational spirit to the political and social world. Necessity resides in the line of development in which a nature realise its potential (Meikle 1985:31/2). Central to this application is Hegel's conception of the process of spirit as a process of freedom. History has an end: 'that freedom of spirit (which) is the very essence of man's nature'; and a telos: 'the actualisation of this freedom' as 'the final purpose of the world' (Hegel 1953:24). This concept of spirit is closely connected with the definition of the 'ethical life' as the unity of objective and subjective, 'substance' becoming 'subject' (PS para 18; PR para 152).

Through its action and its comprehension of its object as its own work (PS para 351), spirit becomes objective, taking form within a people or a nation (PR para 156)
Hegel's spirit is not, then, a power independent of individuals, reducing individuals to its external purpose. Rather, only individuals make conscious and actual the powers of spirit (PR para 145). For Hegel, spirit's self-awareness, 'subjective spirit' (PM para 385), is nothing independent of or above the individual consciousness of spirit's activity. The individual giving spirit's striving after self-actualisation external form identifies the social order as 'objective spirit' (PM para 385 483; PR para 27).
The point is that Hegel, in contrast with Kant, could locate freedom in the temporal world of politics. Freedom performs the crucial mediation in bringing ideal and real aspects together in a progressive conjunction. Thus metaphysical freedom refers to the spirit's recognition of its universal self in particular facts. Moral freedom refers to the finite human will consciously recognising the universal spirit in its own particular acts. And this philosophical resolution of Kant's antinomies has political implications in that the 'concrete mean and union’ of the 'merely general and abstract' idea of spirit and 'the activity of man’ is 'Liberty, under the conditions of Morality in a State' (PH 1956:22/3). Freedom, for Hegel, was neither two distinct spheres nor above the world of experience but represented the synthesis of two principles in experience. Hegel could, therefore, locate the idea of freedom in the intermediate ground, composing both moral ideas and natural necessity, as the true sphere of politics. Hegel thus superseded Kant. Morality had now entered the sphere of politics as something more than a regulative ideal or a subordinate partner.
Kant's radical separation of the moral absolute from reality had resulted in an inadequate moral formalism, issuing in false distinctions between individual and general freedom, morality and legality, the individual and the state. Kant's radical separations reduced these concepts to polar abstractions without the possibility of mediation between the individual basis of action and the universal ends of action.
Hegel criticises this as a situation in which politics remains a sphere of coercion and necessity, reduced to administering a law lacking in ethical content and possessing only a negative form. The result is either the oppressive action of the state in the name of the general freedom on the one hand or destructive revolution in the name of the freedom of all individuals on the other (Krieger 1972:128).
Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit emerges as an attempt to create an organic totality which transcends this situation in which individual and general freedom have become polar abstractions, achieving a mediation in which politics and law are invested with ethical content. Freedom is attained under conditions of morality within the ethical, as against the coercive, state (PR para 258). Whereas in the individualist liberal tradition, the common good is merely the sum of individuals pursuing their private good, for Hegel this takes shape in the form of an institutional structure that is a universal end in itself, not simply a means to the good of individuals. Hegel's theory thus culminates in ethical life as a system of social institutions as a description of the rational social order. In the process, Hegel transcends the formal and abstract character of morality in Kant.
The ethical state, as the highest stage of individual self-actualisation, goes beyond what Hegel calls 'Abstract Right' and 'Morality' as merely 'abstract moments' to deal with the concreteness of individuals within Ethical Life (PR paras 33 141R 207 209). Hegel's conception transcends individualist liberalism to ground individual liberty more deeply. 'Abstract Right' is premised upon the individual as capable of arbitrary free choice (PR para 35R) requiring an external sphere in which to exercise it (PR para 41) as a property owner (PR paras 44 47/8). This individual is the subject of 'rights' (PR para 36), recognising the need for protection against the encroachment of others. The individual becomes an 'abstract individual' as distinct from 'its life or its fulfilled individuality' (PH 1956:317). This idea is associated with the rise of the notion of the moral subject as the 'reflection of the [free] will into itself and its identity for itself over against being in itself and immediacy' (PR para 105). Moral will is a striving for the subject to express itself in the objective world (PR paras 8/9 109 115/20). Though Hegel is critical of Kant's expression of this principle, he incorporates 'the freedom of each individual' into the world spirit's end, affirming 'the freedom of the subject to have its own conscience and morality, to have its own universal ends for itself and to make them valid' (WH 1975:55).
Hegel is searching for a less abstract, more embodied conception of morality. He notes how the self as moral subject characterises Christian modernity and is associated with the alienation of the individual from the common life (PR para 62R; WH 1975:54). The spiritual life of individuals turns inward as social essence is externalised in the form of the supreme person or emperor (PS para 207/10 481 483/4 751/2; PH 1956:195/8 314-318 320; PR paras 138R 358; ETW 1971:205). In attempting to overcome this external character, Hegel is concerned to realise the free and unified ethical society against the formalistic moral individualism of modern society.
'Morality', best articulated by Kant, is 'the formal positing, in mutual indifference, of the specific terms of the relation' (NL 1975:114). This abstracts the individual from the whole, making individuality and being for itself into a principle (NL 1975:112). 'Morality' takes the standpoint of the abstract individual, a 'one sided' view which cannot be 'the absolute standpoint' (NL 1975:74/5). 'Morality' can conceive relationships only as external and constraining. 'Morality' is 'the ethical life of the bourgeois or private individual for whom the difference of relations is fixed and who depends on them and is in them' (NL 1975:114). The bourgeoisie participates in a 'universal private life’, is devoted to private self-seeking and is therefore not 'free' (NL 1975:102-3).

Though Hegel's criticism that Kant's morality is an 'empty formalism' is, as has been argued, a half-truth, it is still half true. Hegel's main charge is that Kant's purely formal standard of universality cannot generate substantive social and political prescriptions (Smith 1991:74 75) and is unable to provide an 'immanent doctrine of duties'. This 'Morality' alienates reason from sense, abstracts individuals from relationships and relationships from social life, and is thus incapable of realising the 'ought-to-be' within the 'is' (PR para 135R). In contrast, the 'Ethical Life' Hegel affirms is the 'living shape of organic totality’ of a community (NL 1975:108). It is the 'essence of the individual'. Thus 'the nature of absolute ethical life' includes 'the relation of the individual's ethical life to real absolute ethical life' (NL 1975:112).

This absorption of ethics into social and political philosophy has led to the view that Hegel lacks an ethical position (Walsh 1984:11 55; Marcuse 1968:200). The truth is that Hegel's outward, worldly orientation embodies ethics actively in the world of experience. The aim of Hegel's speculative metaphysics is to overcome alienation from thought, society and nature. Thus, practical philosophy is considered as a stage in spirit's self-knowledge (PM paras 469/552). Hegel explains the purpose of the Philosophy of Right as providing a rational theodicy of the modern world insofar as it shows the actuality of divine reason and the rationality of the world it has created (PR Preface 24/8). And far from rationalising the status quo, Hegel's view implies criticism of the existing world insofar as it fails to be wholly rational (PR para 258A). Hegel's philosophical 'ought-to-be' is the most radical of all before Marx. Hegel makes space for practical attempts to transform the existing state by actualizing its rational concept or essence (HL para 6; PR Preface), criticising the existent, as appearance or phenomenon (HL para 131), for being an imperfect expression of the 'actual' as corresponding to essence (HL paras 6 131A 142; SL 1969:394).

Hegel criticises the abstract and impotent nature of Kant's 'ought-to-be' (PS 1979 para 249 425 619 SL 1969:820 HL 1975: para 6 234), castigating those who want to 'teach the world how it ought to be' (PR Preface 27). For Hegel, the 'true ideal is not what ought to be actual but what is actual, and the only actuality. If an ideal is held to be too good to exist, there must be some fault in the ideal itself, since actuality is too good for it’ (HP 2 1969:95). An ideal has to be grounded in the rational essence of that to which it is applied. Hegel argues in Aristotelian fashion that where this ground exists, there will be an essential tendency in the existence to actualize it. Hegel's criticism of the disembodied 'ought' rejects the view that the only true rational order is an ideal one, abstracted from and opposing the ‘is’.
In affirming that 'what is actual is rational', Hegel thus makes a radical distinction between 'appearance and actuality’ (HP 2 1969:95/6). The distinction between the rational 'essence’, adequately expressed in the 'actual', and the 'transitory, contingent, superficial exterior' (SL 1969:44/50) resolves Kant's antinomies. [1] For if reality is constituted by human thought, and if thought proceeds by contrasting aspects or moments of this reality, then reality must necessarily embody the same problems. Hegel's philosophical system locates all determinations of thought in their proper sphere. The Idea, thought's tendency to go beyond itself to actualize itself in the objective world, is the pinnacle of this system (HL paras 64 244).
Hegel's outward, social orientation differs from the Kantian identification of the self with pure reason over against the empirical desires and natural inclinations of individuals. Against Kant, Hegel's true autonomy is attained in relationship with others in an empirical rather than noumenal world: 'The freedom of spirit is an independence from the other that is won not merely outside the other but in the other. It comes to actuality not by fleeing before the other but by overcoming it' (PM para 482A; HL para 38A). The Hegelian self, realised in a concrete universal, is not, therefore, formal like the Kantian self, but exists in the context of an organised social life which recognises that the individual is not an isolated particular but, as a social being, is defined through relations to other selves.

Hegel's morality is an embodied one, an ethics of social relations (Norman 1983:145), as against the abstract or external Kantian morality of duty, formalised as a morality of rules and codes. Hegel's ethical life is more than a set of formal practices and procedures, being rooted in the very fabric of the community, in its way of life (Wood 1990:206). Social relationships and institutions are fundamental in grounding Hegel's ethics in a theory of self-actualisation of spirit's freedom. Whereas Kant's morality rests upon universal reason, Hegel's ethical duties and principles must be the principles of an actual social order (Norman 1983:151; Kolb 1987). Thus Hegel's ethics possess a social orientation which identifies the good life in activity and its results, not in will and its intentions. A free society is one in which individuals realise themselves in their institutions (Wood 1990:257). Hegel's distinctive claim in this respect is that the duties of the individual as part of the rational social order are not constraining but liberating (PR para 149), achieving freedom not from, but through the institutional fabric of human life. This fabric 'is my own objectivity, in the true sense, which I fulfil in doing my duty: in doing my duty, I am with myself and free' (PR para 133A).
Hegel's conception of freedom is richer and deeper than Kant's in being both positive and social. Hegel refers to 'formal freedom' in terms of freedom as possibility, the capacity to 'abstract' from all desires, drives, wishes etc and act contrary to them (PR para 5R). This formal freedom is the 'foundation of spirit' (PM para 382A) but is not spirit's freedom. Spirit's freedom is 'absolute freedom', the basis of Hegel's ethical system, and is quite distinct from the mere capacity for freedom (PR paras 22R 21/24). Hegel contrasts 'substantive' with 'formal freedom' (PR paras 123 145A 149 187 257), 'concrete' with 'abstract freedom' (PR paras 7A 123 149A 260), 'freedom for itself with 'freedom in itself (PR para 10A), the former forms being superior to the latter, more limited, arbitrary or immature forms of freedom. Hegel's is a 'positive' or 'affirmative' freedom (WH 1975:50; PR 149A).
Hegel's 'absolute freedom’ both compares and contrasts with Kant's autonomy. For Kant, human beings are autonomous when will is determined solely through pure reason or through respect for the moral law. But this autonomy is not the same as freedom for Kant. Kant's freedom relates to autonomy as capacity to act effectively, 'independently of determination by alien causes' (Kant GMM 1991:107), 'the power of pure reason to be of itself practical' (Kant 1964:124). For Hegel, 'absolute freedom' is not the same thing as a possibility or a capacity but is a determinate way of acting: 'the human being is free only insofar as he possesses it [Kant's capacity] and avails himself of it in action' (HL para 54A). Hegel's thought points reason in the direction of happiness as self-determination in the world.
Whereas for Kant happiness and freedom are only indirectly related, they are internally related by Hegel. For Kant, autonomy consists in the will subjecting itself to an a priori supernatural legislation in abstraction from natural or empirical desires. Hegel criticises this view for separating freedom and nature, reason and sense. For Hegel, freedom is to be conceived as actualizing nature and reason as fulfilling itself through sense. ‘Absolute freedom' realises the idea of happiness as the idea of a rational system of desires in which the will is with itself or free. In achieving happiness, the will actualizes itself in the external world, comes to be with itself within the world. Freedom is not to be equated with happiness, though. Happiness is one aspect of freedom, satisfaction relating to desires arising from our immediate natural drives and belonging to the will's 'particularity’ (PR para 122-125).
For Hegel, the end of morality is the good, 'freedom realised, the absolute final end of the world' (PR para 129). Since the actuality and self-determination of the free will are found in their particularisation in the moral sphere, Hegel locates the good in the moral sphere (SL 1969:819). The universal is united with the particular in the moral agent, achieving individuality (PR para 7). This means that it is only in and through the acts of self-conscious individual subjects that the self-actualisation of reason in the world occurs (cf WH 1975:93). Certainly, Hegel argues that the individual most fully actualizes individuality when devoted to higher ends than particular satisfaction - the state (PR para 258). Yet these ends are 'higher’, belonging to the good, only in being set as rational ends by the moral subjects who actualise themselves realising the good. The substance of these higher ends consists in the right and the well-being of individuals (PR para 265A).
Whereas Kant makes good will the condition for the worth of happiness, Hegel argues that happiness is good in being consistent with abstract right (PR para 126), which is itself independent of well being. The good will is the will whose insight and intention accord with the good (PR para 131).
Hegel criticised Kant's morality for its 'abstract’ or antihistorical character. Kant made abstraction from all contingent empirical circumstances the condition of morality. Kantian Moralitat inhabits a realm outside other dimensions of human thought and action. If morality was made a feature of social life, its commands would no longer be binding categorically. Morality would be merely a set of prudential maxims followed for reasons of self-interest or utility. Kant does not allow, then, the basic structure of morality to be open to social modification.
In response, Hegel argues that moral duty has a history in relation to social and political circumstances, condemning as 'anti-socialistic' Kant's absoluteness of the subject as something prior to and independent of the ends or purposes s/he pursues (NL 1975:70). Similarly, Maclntyre criticises the view that moral concepts are 'a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept, necessarily having the same features throughout their history', arguing that 'moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive of forms of social life'. Thus, 'to understand a [moral] concept, to grasp the meaning of the words which express it, is always at least to learn what the rules are which govern the use of such words and so to grasp the role of the concept in language and social life' (Maclntyre 1976:1 2).

Hegel emphasises the point that morality is embedded in the customs and habits of a people by alluding to the Greek word for ethics, ethos, contrasting it with 'the newer system of ethics [which] in making independence and individuality into a principle, cannot fail to expose the relation of these words. This inner allusion proves so powerful that these systems, to define their subject-matter, could not misuse these words and so adopted the word ‘morality’' (NL 1975:112).
For Hegel, morality is internally connected to social life, no part of which can be abstracted out and made the cause of the others. The whole is viewed as an 'expressive totality', 'the absolute ethical totality is nothing other than a people' (NL 1975:92). Hegel thus recovers the Aristotelian conception of community as a structure of relations within which the moral powers of individuals develop, situating moral conduct within the living structure of communal norms, laws and customs of the people (WH 1975:80).
Hegel affirms in Kantian fashion: 'Be a person and respect others as persons' (PR para 36). But, going beyond Kant's moral formalism, Hegel states this principle only at the most abstract level, where it is incomplete and possesses only a negative content (PR paras 37/8). Hegel proceeds beyond Kant's conception of autonomous will and the way it acts purely out of respect for a self-given law as against natural inclinations, retaining the sense of the rational self as self-dependent and 'self-determining', 'being with itself (HL para 24A; WH 1975:48; PR para 23 27). Hegel's ethical life is the concrete form of Kant's republic of ends, going beyond Kant's impotent 'ought-to-be':





The good is not, as with Kant, transcendent but substance rising to self-consciousness in individuals (PR para 346). Contemporary deontological liberalism betrays the Kantian tendency to assign priority to the self over communal ends and purposes. But Kantian liberalism's deontologically 'unencumbered' self – as distinct from Kant's actual self - is what Murdoch calls a 'denuded self (Murdoch 1985:47/8), inhabiting a moral vacuum, a world empty of meaning beyond the deracinated self's own solipsism. Hegel, in contrast, shows how the state can engender community as not merely a condition of freedom but as a dimension of it. Hegel's state is more than a neutral framework holding the ring between competing, private, notions of the good but is itself an ethical network of a common life and culture based upon a sense of civic identity. The state is thus assigned the positive function of promoting a common life which merits the designation 'good'. But, in overcoming the Kantian dualism between 'is' and 'ought to be', Sein and Sollen, this 'good' is already immanent in existence. In contrast to Kant's morality, in which individuals have an obligation to realise what does not exist empirically, Hegel's Sittlichkeit obligation enjoins individuals to realise what already is. Whereas Kant's obligation derives from an individual rational will, with Hegel obligation holds on account of being part of a larger community life (Taylor 1975:376).
The end of Hegel's ethical life is the common good: 'freedom realised, the absolute final end of the world' (PR para 129). It is a 'living good' in promoting the well-being of individuals as free beings (PR paras 153 154). Hegel holds that individuals most fully actualize their individual freedom when devoted to higher ends over above particular satisfaction, the highest end being the state (PR para 258). But these ends count as 'higher' only to the extent that they are determined as rational ends by individuals as free moral agents actualizing themselves in pursuit of the good. The substance of these 'higher' ends is thus the right and well being of the individuals themselves (PR para 265A). Ethical life aims at the well being of individuals as the good, realising this end through the actions of individuals who, in turn, pursue this end as their own end (PR paras 142 152).
One can contrast Hegel's attempt to locate freedom within a socio-institutional context with Schelling's attempt to liberate individuals from 'the terrors of the objective world' (Schelling 1980:67/8). Schelling's is not a civil or political freedom but the freedom of the ego to abstract itself from all objects in experience as limitations and restrictions. Schelling's view remains trapped within Kant's dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal, having to oppose the freedom of the former as an impotent 'ought to be' to the causality of the latter as the real world of experience. As a result, Schelling's freedom of the ego can be realised only by withdrawing from the world. Hegel, in contrast, realises freedom in a social and political context.
In sum, Sittlichkeit realises the philosophical 'ought-to-be', closing the gap between philosophy and the world (Dallmayr 1993:49 50/1 88/9 91). It is 'the Idea of freedom, as the living good', actualized in the objective world (PR para 142). The good takes concrete form according to the Idea in a rational institutional structure (HL para 213). Hegel thus takes the decisive steps in making it possible to actualize freedom in an ethico-rational social order, no longer having to locate morality in a noumenal realm abstracted from the world of experience.

4-2 Hegel Beyond Rousseau

Having established the philosophical foundations of Hegel's resolution of the problems of 'rational freedom', this section addresses its political aspects. Identifying Hegel as open to democratic appropriation, this section concentrates upon the way that Rousseau's general will as a democratic doctrine finds its way into Hegel's ethical state as resting upon reason rather than force, a state which postulates 'an ethical community' (Pelczynski 1971:1/29; Kedourie 1995:145). The influence of Kant, however, is also important, to the extent that Kant's 'republicanism', in which each individual has some share in the formulation of the laws, demanding the maximum degree of participation in the shaping of public decisions, is not an ancient conception but anticipates future movement theoretically and influences it practically (Koselleck 1985:287).
Hegel himself proceeded from the attempt to recover the classical character of political community (Lukacs 1975:part 1; Cullen 1979:4/7), praising Rousseau's 'general will' for affirming 'the right to legislate for one's self, to be responsible to one's self alone for administering one's own law' (ETW 105). Hegel develops this principle of self-legislation as implying a form of self-government. Identifying the 'free man' as 'one who lived by his own laws', Hegel praises the situation in which each individual had 'the picture of the state as a product of his own energies' for its 'democratic spirit' giving 'an individual a greater measure of independence' (Hegel in Avineri 1972:20/1). Hegel expresses a democratic impulse which is continuous with, rather than antithetical to, Rousseau in seeking to embody the 'real general will, the will of all individuals as such' (PS 1979:357). Hegel thus affirms that each individual should 'share in deliberating and deciding on political matters' as members of the state. Since the concerns of the state are their concerns, 'it is their right that what is done should be done with their knowledge and volition' (PR para 308R).
Hegel celebrates the practical power of the concept of popular sovereignty in the real world, the French Revolution affording 'the prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great actual state' and its 'complete reconstruction' on the basis of 'pure thought alone' (PR para 258R). Hegel praises the 'glorious mental dawn' in which 'the idea of Right asserted its authority' (PH 1956:447). However, Hegel sought to apply Rousseauian principles in light of the degeneration of the Revolution into tyranny (Smith 1991:49; Hyppolite 1969:ch3; Haddock 1994:151). In doing this, Hegel was not so much repudiating the idea of freedom as seeking a more secure foundation for it in the modern world, combining modern subjectivity with the democratic unity of the Greek world (Hegel 1989:120; PH 1956:254/5).
As for Rousseau, the dissolution of the classical synthesis was an issue for Hegel. The modern principle of subjectivity has positive and negative features. For Rousseau, the atomisation of civil society and the subjection of individuals to the egoistic and antagonistic conditions of private property destroyed the coincidence between the 'will of all' as an aggregate of particular interests and the 'general will' as pertaining to the good of the whole. The 'will of all' could only will the 'general will', according to Rousseau, through a citizen assembly deliberating under rules of communicative rationality (Rousseau 1973:184/6 237 245 246 250). Hegel is in accord with Rousseau in attempting to define 'the state' in terms of human self-determination. But he profoundly disagrees with Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of all, with the way Rousseau exalts the former over and against the partial associations of civil society. Rousseau’s attempt to realise classical politics on a modern terrain fails for this reason. Though Rousseau sought to define 'laws as they might be' by taking 'men' 'as they are' (Rousseau SC 1973:165), dealing with the conflict between the ought and the is, the former harked back to Greece whilst the latter presupposed the modern principle of subjectivity. Given this discrepancy, a solution could only be forced by artificial means. This explains the role of the Legislator in Rousseau's thought.

Hegel's version of 'democratic' rational freedom sought a genuine unity of classical and modern by penetrating to a much deeper level than 'the mere idea of self-given laws' and 'being represented in law-making': 'In the case where the self is merely represented and ideally presented, there it is not actual; where it is by proxy, it is not' (Hegel PS 1979:359). Hegel was seeking a system of representation which avoided the modern tendency to abstract from the complex fabric of differences and mediating institutions and the way that this generates the twin evils of social atomism and political totalitarianism (Taylor 1979:131). Hegel's project of finding a way of reconciling the Greek idea of citizen participation in political life with modern civil society develops an alternative to the individualistic and protective liberal forms of the state in which individuals have only a legal existence as bearers of rights. [2]

Hegel set himself against political abstraction in this project. For him, French Revolutionary 'terror' was inevitable since 'only abstractions were used, the idea was lacking'. The experiment therefore ended in the maximum of f rightfulness and terror' (PR para 258; PS 1979:355). Rousseau's 'general will' is an abstraction lacking the idea of the real freedom of real individuals. Without mediation between the abstraction of the general will and the reality of individual experience the relation between the two became one of 'unmediated negation' (PS 1979:360). Since the general will was opposed to all particular wills, it could not realise itself positively through 'institutions of conscious freedom' but only express itself through 'the fury of destruction' (PS 1979:356).

The real antagonism between the general will and the individuals composing it and subject to it was resolved in illusory fashion by Rousseau in holding that 'each individual .. always does everything' according to the general will and that 'what appears as done by the whole is the direct and conscious deed of each' (PS 1979:356/7). But the identification of individuals with the general will in Rousseau is not self-conscious.

Rather, individuals are subjected to an external instruction which compels them to identify their only purpose as 'the general purpose'. This denies the modern principle of subjectivity, the condition of any genuine general will. As a result, government does not express the 'individuality' of the general will but, rather, stands in antithetical relation to it as a particular will of its own. In suppressing all partial societies within the state (Rousseau 1973:185), government emerges as a victorious party appropriating the general interest for its own interest and imposing this upon all individuals. Rousseau did not make the relation between individual and general will clear enough, especially how the general will 'becomes necessarily real in individual subjects'. His main failure was mediation, the interconnection of public and private life (Dallmayr 1993:47).

For Hegel, Rousseau's doctrine failed to give his radicalism a secure foundation in the modern world, working to deny individual personality and lacking a firm grounding for freedom. Rousseau could liberate from tyranny but could not ground freedom. Grounding freedom was the task Hegel set himself. The essence of the modern state, for Hegel, is that the universal is bound up 'with the complete freedom of its particular members, with private well-being' (PR para 260A). Hegel's state is composed of its citizens as constituted through social institutions. The individual will obtains 'an objective embodiment' and attains its 'truth' and 'actualisation' through the state as 'the one and only prerequisite of the attainment of particular ends and welfare' (PR para 261A). For Hegel, 'the state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own self-hood' and is 'stable' 'only when public and private ends are identical' (PR para 265A).

Hegel rejected not so much Rousseau's purpose as the form of his conclusion. The transition Rousseau proposed from the 'will of all' to the 'general will' was destined to fail since it reduced the union of individuals within the state 'to something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinions and their capriciously given consent' (PR para 258R). A genuine general interest cannot emerge within a civil society that has become 'a battleground where everyone's private interest meets everyone else's'
(PR para 289). Rousseau's error was to consider the general will not as the 'absolutely rational element in the will but only as a general will which proceeds out of this individual will' (PR para 258R).
If Kant's transcendental subject grounds a communal ethicality only formally, Rousseau's risks a levelling 'equality' which 'reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract' based on arbitrary wills. Hegel, therefore, transcends the abstract individualism identified in Rousseau - and which Rousseau shares with the liberal tradition. [3]
For Ranciere, democracy resides in its mobility, its capacity to shift the sites and forms of participation (Ranciere 1995:60/1). The problem that Hegel has with this Rousseauan view is not that it is radical but that it isn't radical enough. It condemns democracy to an unmediated and spontaneous existence. However mobile its sites and forms of participation, democracy needs to be grounded. The question is whether Hegel's differentiated system of mediation does indeed ground democracy or whether it works to curtail democracy.
The next section defines Hegel's Sittlichkeit before examining this question more deeply in the rest of this chapter and in the next chapter.

4-3 Hegel's Philosophy Of Right

Hegel assimilated the full import of Rousseau's general will. The modern state no longer rested upon traditional authority but upon the recognition of individual freedom as the self-conscious aim of political institutions: 'So far as the authority of any existing state has anything to do with reasons, these reasons are culled from the forms of law authoritative within it' (PR para 258). The authoritative derives not from force but from 'insight and argument' (PR para 258). This 'rational', non-authoritarian, definition of authority has implications which Hegel explores beyond where Kant and Rousseau had left it.
In arguing that only through being a member of the state, as the embodiment of individual freedom, can the individual lead a 'universal life' (PR para 258), Hegel exposes the deficiencies of the conception of representation which leaves an unmediated relationship between the isolated individual and the central state (Hegel in Avineri 1972:52; Fine 1995:88; Avineri 1972:76). For Fine, Hegel revealed, against Kant, the authoritarian tendencies inherent in modern representative government (Fine 1995:96), breaking decisively from classical liberalism to examine the hidden sphere of power relations (Fine 1993:56). This section shows how Hegel's Sittlichkeit embodies 'rational freedom' socially, superseding the abstract individualism of Kant and the abstract democracy of Rousseau.
Hegel's organic conception overcomes the reduction of the individual and the general to being polar abstractions antithetical to each other by integrating the individual in a social and political existence grounded upon principles of a common life and morality. The freedom of the individual as a real person, rather than as an abstraction, is manifested only in organised relationships with other individuals.
Hegel transcends individualism. Though the individual is the necessary basis of the ethical order, this principle is conceived as a particular determination of the universal as opposed to being absolute in itself. Moreover, the individual must also be conceived as a negative determination in relation to freedom's positive determination in natural law. Hegel thus denied that the constitution was the product of individual consent (PH 1956:43/46). The constitution should not be regarded as something made but 'as something simply existent in and by itself, a way of life for citizens (PR paras 273R 274). Hegel proceeded not from the inherent rights of individuals but, rather, viewed natural law as the direct manifestation of the universality of the absolute ethical order as embodied in a system of legality. The absolute ethic, then, manifested itself in the form of law as part of the process of giving moral organisation to nature. The 'system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature' (PR para 151).
In the 'rational' tradition, natural freedom, in which isolated individuals are dependent upon an immediate need, is exchanged for a greater social and civil freedom through association. In Hegel, this principle takes the form of Sittlichkeit, a rational reconstruction of what institutions are necessary for the actualisation of 'rational freedom' (Smith 1991:130/1; Avineri 1972:139). Superseding Rousseau and Kant, neither of whom could ground the normative dimension of 'rational' freedom in the world of experience, Hegel grounds freedom in the state, recognising the unity of the universal and the particular in their appropriate spheres. As the universal end for the rational nature of individuals, the state is rational (PR para 258). 'Abstractly considered, rationality in general consists in the interpenetrating unity of universality and individuality; in content here concretely it consists in the unity of objective freedom and subjective freedom' (PR para 258R).
Like Aristotle, Hegel connects politics in its narrow institutional sense with the organised mode of life of the people in its entirety (PR para 267), since it is only through the political state that social life becomes an object of rational human choice (PR para 270). Sittlichkeit affirms a communal ethic which embeds individuals in a shared fabric of common life. What is 'universally recognised and valid' is available to all (PR Preface 15). The individual 'has and enjoys his freedom' in the state 'on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the whole' (PH 1956:43). Hegel thus rejects concepts of 'person’ and 'subject' as abstractions from the concrete individuals of ethical life (PR para 33).
Hegel conceives the state not as a 'protective' device safeguarding the property and person of the individual, something which conflates the state with civil society, but as an ethical agency transcending this private sphere of self-interest. Against individualist liberalism, Hegel recovers the Aristotelian sense of politikon bion as necessary for individual moral well being and self-development. Hegel's state achieves the unity of individuals not out of self-interest but out of a solidaristic sense of community (Avineri 1972:134). In contrast to the Kantian self-determination of the will, Hegel relates the will to the proper objects of its activity (Smith 1991:122). Sittlichkeit comprises the overlapping spheres of family, civil society and the state within a common culture, structuring individual life so as to expand the powers of all individuals. For Hegel, the institutions of the ethical life provide a concrete foundation for the assertion of human rights - personal and property rights - associated with 'Abstract Right' and 'Morality' (PR paras 71 217 117 120 132R). They are actual rights only to the extent that they exist in a community that recognises such rights and makes them a part of the functioning of its social institutions embedding 'the moment of recognition' (PR para 71). Such a view has a bearing upon Marx's critique of rights (chapter 5) in the sense that individual rights need to be located within a positive conception of the good life.
Reciprocity, the core principle of 'rational freedom', is integral to this position: 'Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of oneself in another self so that each 'has real universality as reciprocity, in such a way that it knows itself as recognised in the free other, and knows this other insofar as it recognizes it and knows it as free' (PM para 436). Recognition is at the core of Hegel's concept of the ethical life and the structure of the virtues (Williams 1997).
This universal self-consciousness refers to more than the mutual relations between individuals as having abstract rights, forming the substance of ethical life generally (PM para 436A). It is the foundation of reason, mind's highest capacity (PM para 437). Human beings achieve a truly ethical condition (PR para 57A) within a community of minds in which individuals mutually recognize each other's rationality (HS 1983:112/118).

Ethical life embodies a concern for others and the recognition of claims larger than personal interest. Hegel defines the superiority of the rational over the individualist, rights-based, conception of freedom. The 'rational' principle is not merely that 'the individual, in his relation to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation - the mutual constraint of all - might secure a small space of liberty for each' but, in a richer, more expansive sense, that 'Law, Morality, Government' are 'the positive reality and completion of Freedom' (PH 1956:43). The 'mutual constraint’ of all is converted into the mutual benefit of each through rational association. Since the actualisation of freedom is something that exceeds the capacity of the individual alone, the collective agency of the state is required, organising 'an individual totality' based upon the universal values of reason (PR 1942:279). A purely individual freedom is limited. It is only as a member of the state, 'mind objectified', that 'the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life' (PR para 258R). The true fulfilment of individual freedom must be universal, requiring the state as the actuality of 'the ethical Idea' (PR para 257), of 'concrete freedom' (PR para 260), of 'substantial will', as the particular self-consciousness raised to universality, 'rational in and for itself (PR para 258). In the state, 'the rational freedom of the will explicates itself (FA 1975:1:137). The state is 'the power of reason actualising itself as will' (PR 1942:279).

Hegel overcomes the abstract individualism which afflicts Rousseau and Kant - and, anticipating the argument, rights-based liberalism - by locating the individual within the 'objective ethical order' (PR para 144), the 'ethical substance' to which particular individuals relate as 'accidents' (PR para 145). Ethical life incorporates Morality's principle of subjectivity but is more concrete in situating the self in a living social order.
For Hegel, 'the essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being' (PR 1942:280): 'its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals' (PR 1942:161). The relation between the particular and the universal in Hegel's logic takes shape as the unity of the individual and the state through a whole range of intermediary bodies. This is Hegel's 'rational’ unity between each and all as a mediated relationship. The family and civil society are crucial institutions since it is only as a member of such 'particular groups' that the individual enters into the state in an 'objective way' (PR paras 308R 158 166 182 207 209/229 242). Empty in abstraction from ethical life, the individual only acquires 'a content and a living actuality’ when 'filled with particularity', attaining universality only in becoming 'a member of a corporation, a society etc' (PR para 308). Citizens 'know the state as their substance' in maintaining the 'title, authority and welfare' of 'their particular spheres of interest' (PR para 289R). The participation of the individual in affairs of common concern in civil society, as a member of corporations, associations etc., offers an ethical integration and practical education (Bildung) which goes beyond 'selfish' interests (PR para 253R) and passes naturally into the universal life of the state (PR paras 197 201 256).
These social institutions are 'the pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realised and rational'; they furnish the foundations of 'the citizens trust in .. and sentiment towards’ the state (PR 1942:281 163). Hegel thus proposes an organised interaction between individual freedom and universally valid authority through collective bodies.
Modern civil society, as the sphere of subjective freedom, can realise only a limited freedom in which the individual is estranged from the true universal self and hence from his or her own self. Though Hegel affirms subjective freedom as the basis of the state (PR paras 273A 185R 206R 260 262A 299R 316A), this is distinct from the identification of the end of the state with the maximisation of individual freedom subject to the law. Hegel criticises this view with respect to Rousseau as limited to 'personal freedom and the protection of property, or the interest of the individual as such' (PR para 258R). This is to conflate the state with civil society, the 'necessity state' (Nostaat) (PR para 183).
Hegel thus looks to transcend subjective freedom through the objective freedom of the state. As the particular is incorporated into the universal, the negative 'freedom from', which locates freedom in the private sphere, is converted into the positive 'freedom to'. Hegel incorporates individual emancipation and rights within a 'rational' political and moral framework which connects each with all, in conformity with the universal moral order under law.
Keane criticises Hegel's vision of the state as containing a 'weakened sensitivity to political power and its authoritarian potential' (Keane 1988:50). This criticism fails to recognise that Hegel explicitly defines an ethical life which makes room both for free individual initiative (on the level of civil society) and for shared moral bonds (on the level of the ethical state) (Dallmayr 1993:5). Hegel does not envisage the uniformity or standardisation of social or public life. His conception of the state combines a limited central power with decentralised and diversified modes of life with a broad scale of local and individual freedom so that, in accord with subjective freedom, individuals are free to choose their own way of life (PR paras 121 185R,A 206R; Meister 1990:165). The task of the modern state, therefore, was to restore the balance between public authority and local autonomy 'to permit and protect the free activity of the citizens' (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:41). This preserves personal and civil freedom within civil society as an external sphere in which free choice can be actualised (PR paras 41 189). Hegel's point is that a structured context is not a constraint upon the individual but is crucial to the development of individuality beyond personal choice. True individuality is achieved by assuming, rather than abstracting from, a social identity. To be an individual is to 'belong to a determinate estate (Stand)'. The individual without such status 'is a mere private person, not an actualised universality' (PR para 207A). We are back to the ancient Greek derivation of the word politics, from polites, meaning those interested in public affairs. The antonym is idiotes, those interested only in private affairs. Idiotes are capable only of an incomplete, private freedom. A full and complete good is universal, requiring a public life. 
The unity of individuals as members of the state (PR paras 258R 261R), as the 'universal and conscious object’ (PR para 263A), contrasts with civil society as based on the differentiation of individuals (PR paras 181 184 186 263R) and also from the family as based on immediate, unconscious feeling (PR para 257R). This unity in the state is genuine, not coercive, in that both the individual and the state are subject to the absolute ethical order and are to justify themselves in those terms. Whenever the state separates itself from the conscious recognition of its individual subjects, i.e. the conscious recognition by individuals of a universal ethical standard, it loses its moral authority.
For Hegel, the state is an 'absolute unmoved end in itself (PR paras 257 258). 'Unification as such is itself the [state's] true content and end, and the individual's vocation is to lead a universal life' (PR para 257R). Individuals actualize their freedom to the full only when they participate in the state as the sphere of objective freedom (PR para 258). Participation in the state gives individuals a universal end above, but not against, their particular ends. The state's 'rationality' consists in the 'thoroughgoing unity of universality and individuality' (PR para 257R), letting the principle of subjectivity 'complete itself in the independent extreme of personal particularity, and simultaneously brings it back to substantial unity’ (PR para 260). It is not force which holds the state together but 'the fundamental sense of order’ (PR para 268A) in which unity is achieved 'in and through particular ends', not their suppression (PR para 270A).
Hegel's state is an organic unity of the individual and collective so that no member is an end or a means (WH 1975:112/95), achieving the unity of the universal and the subjective will in the 'actually existing realised moral life' (PH 1956:38). Unlike Kant's republic of ends or other normative constructions of the 'rational' community, Hegel's ethical state, the highest actualisation of individual freedom (PR para 257), is an actual institution. Hegel's Sittlichkeit actualises the 'ideal' community implicit in the 'rational' tradition.
Most important is the way Hegel structures the 'rational' unity between each and all by locating the 'rational' order in the heart of social reality. What an individualist conception would condemn as external constraints upon the individual is understood by Hegel as the socio-institutional framework for the moral and political life essential to individuality. The individual comes to be free within the social institutions of the 'rational' state (PR para 268). The duties falling upon the individual as a member of the rational social order do not constrain but liberate the individual (PR para 149). Hegel recognises that an 'ethical theory of duties' requires 'the development of the relationships that are necessary through the idea of freedom, and hence in their whole range are actual only in the state’ (PR para 148R). Ethical duties are 'duties of relationships' (PR para 150), recognising that individual freedom in its fullest sense occurs only reciprocally, in a rational system of cooperation connecting individuals with each other and with their universal essence. The ethical living together of individuals is their liberation (PR paras 133A 207).
Hegel is not arguing that individuals are 'liberated' when compelled to undertake duties assigned to them by the state. Individuals have to be with themselves and realise themselves in their duties through rational knowledge (PR para 132R). Further, subjective freedom and particular self-satisfaction are the foundation of morality, duties being liberating to the extent that individuals fulfil their particularity through them (PR paras 121-124 152-154 162R 185-189 260). Ethical duties are 'the substance of my own being’ (PR para 148), 'drives [whose] content belongs to my immediate will' (PR paras 150R 207 255).
Hegel thus sought to discern the holistic bond absent in the individualist natural right doctrines and found in the living spirit of a people and a political community (Dallmayr 1993:5 47). Lacking this bond, society dissolves into an aggregate of atoms (PR para 256R) and individuals become abstract private persons whose rights do not confer dignity (PS para 480; PR para 35A; Dallmayr 1993:124 125).
Hegel's structured system of social roles and civil associations invests patterns of social interaction with moral significance (Avineri 1972:84). Individuals are socially integrated in an organised dynamic which expands individual freedom by making the ethical life available to all (Hegel PS 1979:256/212; Wood 1990:25/30 200 201/2 219; Houlgate 1991:100/5 116/22). True individuality requires that the individual possesses a genuine social identity (PR paras 207 253) and fulfils a determinate social function (PR para 252R). And this is possible only by being socially structured within a functioning social order (PR para 253R). The democratic potentialities of attaching individuals to politics via their functional purpose in the operation of the rational social order, the individual becoming an active part of society through his/her own industry, skill, will be addressed in the next section.
In conclusion, this section has defined Sittlichkeit as Hegel's version of 'rational freedom’ transcending Kant and Rousseau. Hegel was shown to develop the communal, reciprocal and associative conception of 'rational freedom' as an organised intermediation. In discovering a form in which the normative aspect of 'rational freedom' could be actualised in the empirical realm of politics, Hegel not only secured the 'rational’ alternative to liberal individualist conceptions of freedom but opened up the path to more radical formulations of the ideal community of ends. The next section examines the possibility for an associative democratic public in Hegel before going on to develop Marx's incorporation of 'rational freedom' beyond the ethical state and into the bonds and relations of society.

4-4 Hegel And The Associative Public

Having shown how Hegel's demand for the regeneration of civic virtue took the form of Sittlichkeit, this section explores the potentials for an associative democratic conception of 'rational freedom' contained in this system of the ethical life. In allowing for 'organic' participation in the lawmaking function of government through civil associations and communities, Hegel's mediated system of representation implies legislative co-determination on the part of individual members. In providing individuals with a form of public activity above their self-interested existence, Hegel's corporate system roots the functions of political representation and socialisation in the real identities of individuals (Meister 1990:161 176 177). Marx's denial that the state represents citizens directly (CHDS 1975) is consistent with Hegel's view that an atomistic, suffrage based citizenship, detached from social roles and group identities, is arbitrary.
Though Avineri argues that Hegel's recognition of the need for mediating institutions has become the cornerstone of the liberal state as against 'the undifferentiated and unmediated democracy of Rousseau' (Avineri in Miller ed 1991:199/200), Hegel's organised intermediation as a mode of participation actually goes further than abstract and passive systems of representation within the liberal state (Kainz 1996:148). Hegel abolishes the split between the state and civil society, reproduced by direct elections, through the mediation of corporate blocs.

The circles of association in civil society are already communities. To picture these communities as once more breaking up into a mere conglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the field of the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso to hold civil and political life apart from one another and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be the abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded on chance, and not what is .. stable and justified.

PR paras 258 303
Hegel's state as 'an organism’ (PR 1942:282) proceeds through intermediary bodies to the universal level, transcending the particularistic, self-seeking interests of the system of needs in civil society. The conception of representation that this entails possesses an actively democratic potential, replacing the passive and indirect system of representation of the abstract (individualist liberal) state with a system of functional representation as an organised pattern of interaction between individuals in society. Deputies are chosen not by an agglomeration 'dispersed into atomic units' but through an 'articulated system' comprising civil associations. The right to choose deputies is not 'a single, recurrent action for the electors' but is entrusted to 'local communities .. and other duly constituted associations'. The close connection between the estates and the constitution of the whole means that a 'free attitude' on the part of both electors and deputies is only possible if the rights of individuals and particular local communities and interests are 'safeguarded by the free establishment of civic authorities and self-administering bodies' (NL para 153-PR para 308).
Whereas Hegel achieves reciprocity between rulers and ruled, the 'atomistic spirit' of the undifferentiated suffrage divides politics into an active elite in the state on the one hand and a passive mass concerned only with private interests in civil society on the other (NL para 121). Hegel's critique of democracy is, therefore, a critique of the undifferentiated suffrage as feeding the divorce between private and public life (Avineri 1972:162; Dallmayr 1993:152). Thus Hegel frankly repudiated the idea that the representative body should represent individuals as individuals (PR 308R; Smith 1991:129). Hegel's emphasis upon estates and their legislative role counters the 'prevalent idea' that members of society participate in this function 'as individuals, either by electing representatives or delegates or else by directly casting their vote' (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:152). This 'atomistic and abstract point of view' disappears at the level of the family and civil society in which individuals are members of general groups. Since the state is also a general group, 'no one of its elements should appear as an unorganised multitude', as a 'formless mass' (PR 1942:198; Dallmayr 1993:152).
Hegel's repudiation of the conception of the demos as an undifferentiated, amorphous and atomised mass makes it possible to envisage democracy as comprising a richly layered fabric of institutions and as exercised through a welter of intermediary powers (Dallmayr 1993:253; Meister 1990:120 177; Kedourie 1995:142/3). Hegel's mediated suffrage recognises the fact that the scale of modern life has rendered the ancient conception of democracy obsolete (Avineri 1972:105 107/8 161 162/3 164/8; Dallmayr 1993:133). But, articulated through the internal communities constituting the state, Hegel can still envisage an active democratic mobilisation from below, as against an organisation 'directed from above’: 'it is extremely important that the masses should be organised, because only then do they constitute a power or a force; otherwise they are merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms. Legitimate power is to be found only when the particular spheres are organised' (PR para 290A).
The achievement of Hegel's differentiated suffrage is to have extended the rights of civil liberty in civil society to rights of public participation, achieving a balance between direct and representative democracy. Hegel's multi-layered fabric of intermediary institutions thus appears less as an attempt to curtail the radical impulse of democracy than to ground it in the modern world. [4]
Through the conception of the 'democratic corporation' -comprising churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions - mediating between the citizen and the state (MacGregor 1998:132), Hegel's state does not impose universality from the outside but is internally related to civil society. Universality or communitas 'grows organically within civil society itself (Avineri 1988:171). Hegel's concern to integrate the intermediate institutions of civil society within a comprehensive legal framework embodying the universal offers the basis of an alternative public sphere to the monopoly of public life within the abstract liberal state.
Describing Hegel as 'the representative theorist of civil society' (Arato 1991:301), Arato argues that Hegel developed the notion of the public sphere beyond its classical republican origins. Instead of confining the public sphere to a single level, in Hegel's public 'a series of levels have key roles to play, including the public rights of private persons, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporation, and finally the interaction between public opinion and the public deliberation of the legislature' (Arato 1991:318). Similarly, Dallmayr argues that the way Hegel locates the public in civil associations issues in a conception broad enough to embrace social movements in an 'open ended public space' forged by a 'democratic social bond' (Dallmayr 1991).
There are, however, fundamental problems with these interpretations. Far from being the theorist of an associational public sphere, Hegel actually argued that civil society, as a sphere of diremption in which 'particularity and universality have become separated', requires the higher surveillance of the state (PR para 185; Clarke 1991:52/3; Thomas 1994:56/7). The necessary principle of cohesion could only be supplied through 'the great edifice of the state' (PR 1952:288; Callinicos 1983:31/2; Walton and Gamble 1972:146). The advocates of an Hegelian associative Civil Society neglect the centrality of Hegel's state in realising the interest of the whole 'in and through particular ends' (PR 1952:283, A162). Hegel is clear that any attempt to build a public sphere upon civil society conflates the state with civil society with the result that 'the interest of individuals as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united' (PR para 258R). In denouncing the public of civil society as having the form of opinion rather than true knowledge, Hegel 'took the teeth out of the idea of the public sphere of civil society', denying that anarchic and antagonistic civil society could constitute the public sphere (Habermas 1989:122). Hegel is clear that the associations of civil society represent particular interests and cannot function as the institutional embodiment of the universal. Hegel's state bureaucracy, having the universal as the end of its activity, exists as a critique of the claims of civil society to absolute and public power (PR paras 205 277 303; Avineri 1972:160/1).
The conception of a new associational public sphere makes more sense as Marx's attempt to revalue civil society, exploring the democratic possibilities of the system of the ethical life by forging the bonds of universality and commonality within civil society. Marx's critique will be shown to expose a contradictory Hegel, a democratising Hegel who posits the autonomous generation of solidarity and identity through the associations of civil society (estates and corporations), their representatives in parliament (the estates assembly) and public opinion; and a bureaucratising Hegel who imposes order on civil society by means of police, executive, crown and other organs of the state.
As with Kant, this split stems from a failure to integrate politics and morality. Morally, Hegel subverts the individualistic, atomistic, and moralistic foundations of the liberal state (Wood 1990:258). By placing private life within a larger, living, common life, Hegel's ethical theory points beyond the liberal institutional order.
Politically, however, Hegel leaves the liberal state intact. In insisting, in liberal fashion, upon the inevitability and desirability of leaving civil society free to pursue its legitimate activities independently of the state (Avineri 1972:171/2; Smith 1991:236), Hegel undermines the normative and democratic possibilities of Sittlichkeit as an associational public. Institutional separation preserves civil society as a sphere of diremption intact.
Hegel's intention in preserving this liberal institutional separation was to transcend civil society at the higher level of the state without thereby suppressing its emancipatory activity. Civil society is both the problem but also the achievement of the modern world (PR para 126), facilitating the 'free play' of 'every talent' (PR para 182A). Hegel thus affirms civil society as a complex device for the satisfaction of human needs and enlargement of freedom (PR para 200R), developing 'a flexibility and rapidity of mind' and an ability to "grasp complex and general relations' (PR para 197). To the extent that individuals acquire and produce means of satisfaction 'by reference to others', 'everything private becomes something social' and takes 'the form of universality' (PR para 192A). Civil society's 'system of needs' thus extends cooperation so that individuals are related to each other in 'a system of complete interdependence' (PR para 183). Individuals are dependent upon and reciprocally related to each other in the satisfaction of needs so that 'subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else' (PR para 199).
Marx will be shown to develop what Hegel describes as the 'complex interdependence of each on all' (PR para 199) as an objective interdependence as furnishing the material basis for the rational unity of each and all (chapter 7). Marx's critique of capitalism as an alienated system of production, exposing this interdependence as the objective dependence of all upon capital (Marx 1973:l60ff), is anticipated in part by Hegel. Labouring involves a 'universal reciprocity and formation of mankind', a process leading to 'reciprocal recognition, entailing highest individuality as well as differentiation' (Dallmayr 1993:51). But whilst labour is an advance in consciousness and (reciprocal) self-realisation, economic exchange and commodity production impose an abstract mechanism that becomes estranged from and even opposed to labourers. The general framework of production uniting individuals in the satisfaction of needs achieves a purely formal universality (Dallmayr 1993:55). The system of economic interaction forms an 'immense system of communality and mutual dependence' but it is a mechanical and abstract dependence, 'an internally circulating life and death which, in this circulation, moves hither and thither in a blind and elemental way', requiring 'strong continual control and curbing' (Hegel SEL 1979:246/49). The expansion of needs produces a civil society which obtains an independent, determining power over individuals (PR para 234), generating a 'thoroughgoing dependence on caprice and external accident' (PR para 185). Hegel is aware that the chain of dependency in the activities of buying and selling becomes 'externalised' in the modern economy so that individuals do not determine their roles but are determined by them. Civil society is thus the 'external state' (PR para 157), the 'necessity state' (Nostaat) (PR para 183).
Hegel is aware of the corrosive and divisive forces within civil society (PR para 238). He criticises the way that a rootless, anomic mass (Pobel) confronts a centralised bureaucratic state with nothing between them (PR paras 241 243 244 245A); he criticises the way that the state becomes subject to the 'ethical degeneration' of a civil society split between 'extravagance and want' (PR para 185); and he criticises 'the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands' (PR para 244).
Hegel, in fine, is aware of 'class divisions', according to which 'individuals are assigned' into 'systems' (PR para 201). He condemns the dehumanising character of 'dead', 'machine labour' which subjects the worker to 'blind dependence' (Hegel in Avineri 1972:203 206), the way that 'the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs' 'results in the dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort' (PR para 243), the way that the system of needs turns upon individuals as an external force through the mediations of labour, tools, machinery and money (Fraser 1998:62).
Hegel believes that the state can transcend the diremptive forces of civil society whilst preserving its emancipatory aspects intact. On this basis he criticises the 'machine' state for reducing individuals to mere cogs (PR para 258R), rejecting the individualist liberal identification of the state with the protection of personal freedom and private property. Identifying the end of the state with the self-interest of individuals makes the state something instrumental rather than political, concerned with the particular rather than with the universal, personal interest rather than the common good.
The question Marx poses against Hegel is whether any other eventuality is a realistic possibility within capitalist relations (Marx CHDS 1975:99/107). Despite his attempt to distinguish the ethical from the protective state, Hegel's 'rational freedom' is unable to transcend (capitalist) civil society as the true reality of individuals and becomes a lawful freedom. This is apparent in the way that Hegel argues that the 'relatedness arising from the reciprocal bearing on one another of needs and work to satisfy these' (PR para 209) generates rights, of person, but most especially of property. The need to protect these rights issues in a system of laws requiring the administration of justice:





A market system requires a system of law and justice as external and impersonal, applicable without regard to persons: 'rational in principle and therefore absolutely necessary' (PR para 219R). 'Rational freedom' here assumes a formal character in the shape of legal force. The administration of justice is the fulfilment of duty on the part of the public authority. There is truth, then, in McCarney's conclusion that Hegel's state is 'a political and juridical order whose members encounter one another primarily as citizens and bearers of rights', coexisting with the institutions of market capitalism (McCarney 1991:33).
Hegel's achievement is to have theorised modernity's separation of the state from civil society as a contradiction demanding resolution and to have suggested a path towards reconciliation in an ethical totality. Nevertheless, though Hegel's philosophy cannot be dismissed as the rationalisation of private property and mystification of authority, as in much marxist literature (Clarke 1991:51/60), his attempt to check the divisive and corrosive tendencies of civil society through the ethical state, as against the revolutionary restructuring of relations of production, effectively sanctions civil society as a coercive and diremptive order rooted in private property (Houlgate 1991:79/84).
Hegel provides a plausible account of why civil society, left to its own devices, cannot resolve the antagonisms that arise in the system of needs and cannot be a self-regulating system. But Marx questioned whether such a divided and antagonistic capitalist society could be sublated in the positive universal of the state, as Hegel thought.
The separation of private property from political and communal regulation through capital rule and commodity exchange, sanctioned and protected by the centralised state, comes to be targeted by Marx for blocking the realisation of Hegel's principle of the state as ethical agency, as the 'true moral association' (Berki 1988:141).
Through capital, politics and economics have become two distinct but functionally interdependent systems of alien and subjectless control. The alien power of capital disempowers Hegel's attempt to embed 'rational freedom' in a rich social infrastructure. Marcuse accuses Hegel 'of betraying his highest philosophical ideals' by reflecting 'the destiny of the social order that falls, while in pursuit of its freedom, into a state of nature far below reason' (Marcuse 1968:218).
For Marx, Hegel's ethical state is based upon 'the illusion that it determines where it is in fact determined' (Marx CHDS 1975:168). In inverting the true relation between the state and civil society, Hegel's rational freedom emerges as the rule of private property over the state. The 'political constitution at its highest point is thus the constitution of private property. The loftiest political principles are the principles of private property'. Hegel 'makes the cause into effect and the effect into the cause, the determining factor into the determined and vice versa' (CHDS 1975:166 167). From the start, Marx identified the 'alien' state as the institutional expression of social alienation: 'Independent private capital, i.e. abstract private property and the private person corresponding to it, are the logical apex of the political state' (CHDS 1975:173).
Political 'independence' is interpreted to mean 'independent private property’. Marx sets out to achieve a genuine independence, arguing that the attempt to assert the superiority of the representative system over the Estates system 'expresses at the political level the distinction between the rule of man and the rule of private property' (Marx 1975:208). But Hegel could never quite realise this genuine representation, rooting his public in a coercive, class-divided civil society. Hegel's Estates are the 'organised political antagonism of civil society' (CHDS 1975:160). As against the 'total political state' which Hegel requires in the absence of a genuine mediation (CHDS 1975:160), Marx realises his 'rational freedom' within the bonds of a transformed civil society as the terrain upon which a general will could be obtained and continuously asserted as the determining force in human affairs. This implied a genuinely democratic politics against Hegel's system of representation.

In conclusion, whilst Hegel is to be valued for the way that his system of the ethical life energizes public life from below, the next chapter demonstrates that it was Marx who maintained, against Hegel, the optimistic thesis that civil society could constitute itself as the embodiment of the common good through its own resources. Hegel's state as ethical totality could only be realised as a self-organising society. Marx, that is, reveals that the state does not embed a diremptive society in an ethical life but is the institutional expression of the ruptured ethical dimension of civil society, fulfilling its functional requirements (Habermas 1990:62). Marx will be shown to recover within civil society the ethicality and rationality which Hegel believes possible only at the level of the state under law.





This thesis has explored the extent to which morality can alter the nature of politics so as to reduce or eliminate coercion in human affairs. This chapter has sought to develop the implicit ideal of the internal moral coordination of human affairs as an internal social coordination, morality entering the empirical sphere of politics. Hegel's Sittlichkeit has been presented as a solution to Kant's inability to ground morality in the political world and Rousseau's inability to ground democracy in the social world, integrating the universal and the particular within a conception of ethical life.

Nevertheless, though Sittlichkeit has been shown to offer a new mode of participation beyond abstract and atomistic liberal representation, Hegel's prioritisation of the state as a rational sphere over the diremptive sphere of civil society has been shown to be predicated upon a public-private dualism which works to reduce the 'rational' state to a coercive social order based upon private property. The next chapter will show how Hegel's differentiated system of mediation becomes a bureaucratic system separating universality and commonality from the real life of individuals in civil society.

The closing part of the final section introduced Marx's critique as targeting the way that Hegel's 'rational freedom' is curtailed within the alien institutional forms of a rationalised capitalist modernity. The full possibilities for a democratic associationalism are understood in the next chapter to have been developed by Marx in locating a new public sphere in civil society.

5 MARX'S NORMATIVE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY

This chapter is organised around Marx's identification of the institutional separation of the state and civil society, as he encounters it in Hegel, as the key figure subverting the emancipatory and democratic possibilities of 'rational freedom'. As a result of this dualism, Marx shows how Hegel's ethical state, promising a genuine universality and commonality, is subordinated to and rationalises a capitalistically structured civil society, extends bureaucracy over everyday life, and invests public bonds in an abstracted universal class. Public life is removed from associative civil society. Chapter 7 looks more closely at how capitalist relations subvert the emancipatory promise of reason through the category of 'separation' and the autonomisation of relations from individuals. This chapter is specifically concerned with Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy and how it developed into a critique of the 'bourgeois' state and social relations.

For Errol E Harris 'had Marx understood Hegel aright he would have found in him much that he was seeking, including a basis for socialism that would not have led his followers astray into totalitarian repression of human liberty' (Harris 1993:51). Interpreting Marx's communism as a democratised Sittlichkeit (Thomas 1994:7; Bonefeld et al 1995:5), however, this chapter argues that Marx develops rather than rejects Hegel, realising the democratic possibilities contained in the way Hegel creates spaces for citizen participation throughout the various levels of society, extending political activity beyond the state and its institutions. That is, publicity for Marx is located in the real civil sphere. Taking such an approach counters objections to the 'homogeneous' character of Marx's communism (MacGregor 1998:141) and addresses the criticism that marxism has neglected the fact that emancipation requires a 'strong civil society' which strengthens the public sphere against 'the Behemoth state' (Gouldner 1980:371/2).

The argument is that Marx's critique of Hegel was motivated by a concern to realise the democratic possibilities of an ethical life which had been confined within the 'liberal' institutional separation of the state and capitalistically structured civil society. This challenges the way that Colletti places Hegel and Marx in opposition to each other, the one as a theorist of representative government, the other as a theorist of direct democracy. For Colletti, whereas Hegel argues for the alienation of sovereignty to government, Rousseau and Marx argue for 'a direct resumption on the part of society of the power or sovereignty which .. was alienated to the separate and independent sphere of "polities'" (Colletti 1972:184). The problem with this argument is that it underestimates the extent to which Marx developed his views not simply against but beyond Hegel, thereby building upon Hegel's attempt to ground 'rational freedom' beyond Kant and Rousseau. By locating morality in the temporal world of politics, that is, Hegel opened the route to Marx's democratic transcendence of 'rational freedom' at the level of social reality. For Marx, the key issue here is the institutional separation of the state and civil society. He thus criticises both representative and participatory forms, the former expressed by Hegel and the latter by Rousseau, for being premised upon a conception of 'political man' as 'abstract, artificial man' (Marx OJQ 1975:234; Thomas 1994:64). Marx's new citizen identity combines both public and private designations.

What makes the point so important is the way that Hindess criticises marxist discussions of popular democracy for having 'barely advanced beyond Rousseau', suggesting marxist inadequacies on the question of scale and complexity (Hindess 1983:44). For whereas Rousseau was convinced that his ideas could only apply to small states (Jennings 1994:119), Rousseau thus failing to address the extent to which modern scale rendered democratic citizenship obsolete (Riesenberg 1992:264), Hegel's Sittlichkeit, as a mediated form of representation, pointed Marx in the direction of a public sphere rooted in the associative activity of modern civil society. This chapter shows how Marx's 'true democracy' dissolves modern scale and quantity through the practical reappropriation and reorganisation of the social power alienated to the state and capital. By building upon Hegel's attempts to ground democracy and morality after Rousseau and Kant, Marx took the 'rational' recasting of liberal politics and philosophy to its logical conclusion of a self-organising society.

For if Marx is criticised for not going far enough in his Hegelian exploration of the rational society (MacGregor 1998:xiv), then Hegel's bureaucratic curtailment of the democratic impulse behind the 'rational' conception can be confronted with Marx's attempt to push democratisation into all spheres of life. This means revaluing the governmental capacities and participatory structures of an associative civil society which is itself capable of constituting a public sphere, capable of embodying the universal interest through its activity.
This chapter develops Marx's critique of Hegel as a critique of the bourgeois state and society from the perspective of the 'rational' pursuit of the normative community. Specifically, Marx's critique of modern instrumental relations develops a socio-relational morality implying community beyond a rights based social order. Marx will be shown to have explored the political-communal implications of rights, instituted under the state's abstract community, in fostering a discourse promising real community. This chapter argues that Marx extracted the universal component of rights to morally ground community as a genuine public life based on the actualisation of needs and the exercise of capacities (Thomas 1994:114; Benton 1993:106/7). In being based upon an implicit conception of the good, Marx's 'true' community makes recourse to impersonal power and systems of rules unnecessary. The freedom of each and all - the core principle of 'rational freedom' - is realised so that the protection of a juridical apparatus of rights will not be required.

5-1 Marx's Critique Of Hegel's State

This opening section focuses upon Marx's critique of Hegel with a view to demonstrating how Marx relocated 'rational freedom' from the state to within social bonds. Particularly important in this respect is Marx's view that Hegel rationalised state authority through a restrictive and controlled form of representation. From representation, the critical focus moves on to Hegel's bureaucracy as a substitute rationality. Marx identified bureaucracy rather than the demos as the real power in Hegel's state. A 'true', that is, democratic, form of 'rational freedom’ is shown to presuppose social transformation so that rationality is forged within social bonds and relations.

Marx's critique of Hegel is Aristotelian in being concerned with real natures, real essences as against abstract concepts and categories. Marx claims that 'Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy of Right but logic' (1975:73), the necessity of various powers being determined not by 'their own nature' but by 'the nature of the concept’ (1975:70). Hegel inverts the relation of the universal to the particular because, unlike Aristotle, real natures are not his starting point. 'Hegel thus provides his logic with a political body; he does not provide us with a logic of the body politic' (1975:109). Starting from real society, the demos and the social forms they engender, Marx seeks to develop this 'logic of the body politic', exposing Hegel's inversions throughout the CHDS (e.g. 1975:61-2 64 65).
Marx appreciated Hegel's own Aristotelian organicism as an improvement upon the mechanistic materialism of the eighteenth century (CHDS 1975:64 70): 'It is a great step forward to have seen that the political state is an organism and that, therefore, its various powers are no longer to be seen as mechanical but as the product of living rational division of functions' (CHDS 1975:66). But, for Marx, Hegel's idealistic starting point needed to be replaced with real existing things with real natures: 'If Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the state he would not have found it necessary to subjectivize the state in a mystical way' (1975:80).
It is important at this stage to be clear that this thesis makes a distinction between the principles that Marx attempts to adumbrate via the critique of Hegel and the validity of those principles as valid criticisms of Hegel. Hegel did not subjectivize the state in a mystical way. Marx is as wrong on this and other such points as are liberal critics of Hegel. The point is important not only as a point of scholarship, but because the idea that Hegel ‘deifies’ the state is a loose accusation that is employed against the Germanic and indeed Continental tradition of freedom as such, including Marx. Further, Marx’s criticisms are to be read not simply against Hegel but against the abstraction of the modern state as such. Marx’s main target, then, is not so much Hegel’s state as the modern state as such. The defence of Hegel’s political philosophy against Marx’s critique can be found in the last chapter. This thesis takes the view that Marx assimilated Hegelian principles and sought the social and institutional conditions of their realisation. The target of Marx’s political critique is the modern state as such, not just Hegel’s state. The view taken in this thesis is that Marx’s vision of the future society is strong on ends and weak on institutional means. The fact that Marx’s concern was primarily critical and his approach historicist leaves little more than a broad principled outline for future society. This begs the question of how freedom is to be grounded and embodied – precisely Hegel’s concern in writing the Philosophy of Right in light of Rousseau and Kant. In fine, Hegel has plenty to offer once one reappropriates his political philosophy in light of Marx’s critique.

The argument in this section proceeds from Marx's classicism to examine the role of representation in Hegel's state. Marx criticises the view that 'matters of universal concern are now complete without having become the real concern of the people' as the illusion of representation (Marx CHDS EW 1975:125). In modern representative government 'the real interest of the people is present only formally', exposing 'the lie, legally sanctioned in constitutional states, that the state is in the interest of the people' (CHDS 1975:129). In truth, the people appear in the state only as 'idea, fantasy, illusion, representation' (CHDS 1975:134). And 'a constitution that has ceased to be the real expression of the will of the people has become a practical illusion' (CHDS 1975:120).

Hegel himself had sought to overcome the illusory character of representation. In describing the equation of freedom with the 'so-called representative constitution' as the 'hardened prejudice' of the modern world (Hegel 1989:121), Hegel challenges Kant's view that 'every true republic is and can be nothing else than a representative system of the people' and that representative government expresses the 'united will of all’ (Kant 1965:113). If the demos becomes an aggregate of individuals, the state becomes the only form of universal association, detached from the private bodies of civil society, generating an abstract rationality. Hegel, therefore, identifies the representative structure as only one part of the state, finding a place within an organic social order (MacGregor 1998:74).

Hegel repudiates the atomistic model of representative democracy. The question Marx's critique poses is whether Hegel's anti-individualism is also anti-democratic, whether by design or by implication. Hegel certainly rejects the extension of representation throughout the state since it starts from and generalises the 'private point of view' of isolated individuals and particular interests (PR para 317) whereas a genuinely universal interest has to be independent of public opinion as a 'hotch-pot of truth and endless error' (PR para 317R). Hegel denies that the 'free choice' of individuals is the basis of the state (Hegel 1989:123), locating the individual in the institutional structure of society (Haddock 1994:154/5; Meister 1990:179/80 182 199/200).

Though, as the last chapter argued, this implies an associative concept of 'the political' beyond atomistic conceptions, Hegel's differentiated system of representation contains institutional features which curtail as well as express the will of the people. Hegel’s corporate structure was designed to exclude direct and active forms of suffrage (Anderson 1992:292/3). Representation, in organising the 'formless mass' under public authority, possesses an explicit surveillance function (PR para 303R). Representatives are not treated as 'agents with a commission or special instructions' but enjoy a relation of 'trust' with their electors which allows them to take decisions on the basis of 'their own greater knowledge of public affairs' (PR para 301R).
Though the pursuit of universal ends becomes the property of all under representative government, this is not to be identified with democracy. In Hegel's state, the 'democratic element' is expressed only by being mediated. The representative body, as representing 'empirical' and 'subjective' judgments, wills and liberties, has a subordinate role in the constitution, and can legitimately deal 'not with the essential elements in the organism of the state' 'but only with rather specialised and trifling matters' (PR 1942:197). The real function of the representative body in the constitution is to operate as 'a mediating organ' so that 'the state enters the subjective consciousness of the people and .. the people begin to participate in the state' (PR 1942:292).
Hegel's differentiated system of representation, then, could operate to curtail democracy and incorporate social interests within the ideological project of the state. Marx's critique specifically focuses upon the role of mediation in Hegel's doctrine of the state, exposing its inconsistency as implying an accommodation to existing reality. If civil classes as such are political classes, then mediation is not needed; if mediation is needed, then civil classes cannot be political and 'hence cannot provide that mediation (Marx CHDS 1975:163).
Hegel's mediation is illusory on account of the nature of modern society. The Estates are the 'political illusion' and 'organised political antagonism of civil society' (CHDS 1975:126 160). They 'are the incarnation of contradiction between the state and civil society within the state. At the same time they symbolize the demand that this contradiction be resolved' (CHDS 1975:131/2). Far from being a solution to this antagonism, the state rests upon it and cannot abolish it without abolishing itself (Marx CN 1975:411/12). Marx rejects Hegel's synthesis as impossible (CHDS 1975:157/8 181 184 186ff; Hyppolite 1969:ch 6).
Though Marx praises Hegel for presenting the state-civil society separation as a contradiction, he criticises him for resting 'content with the semblance of a resolution which he declares to be the real thing' (CHDS 1975:141). The state can claim to represent universality only by neglecting all particular interests, divorcing itself from the social needs of real individuals, dissolving real community (CHDS 1975:145). Which emerges as a demand for the realisation of Hegelian principles. Marx thus began with an awareness of the imaginary character of political abstraction, criticising Hegel's 'state-like' approach to the individual 'as a being of the state' rather than as a real being (CHDS 1975:77). Marx reinstates the reality of society against the abstraction of the political state. The essence of the particular person is not some abstract nature defined by the state but a social quality. In so far as individuals are 'vehicles of the functions and powers of the state, it is their social and not their private capacity that should be taken into account' (CHDS 1975:78).
Since the social qualities of individuals cannot be expressed in bourgeois civil society they have to be expressed through the abstract community of the state (Clarke 1991:55/6). In reinstating these social qualities, Marx develops the tradition of 'rational freedom’ beyond its historical incarnation as a lawful freedom, beyond, as Marx puts it, 'the German philosophy of the state and of law, which received its most consistent, thorough and complete formulation from Hegel'. Marx's criticism is





Marx's language here is strong. Though a 'decisive negation' of the Germanic conception of freedom as a lawful-institutional concept, Marx's communism is also the realisation of the 'Germanic' principle to the extent that it locates 'rational' unity within the bonds and relationships of society. In revaluing society against the abstraction of the modern state, Marx socialises the concept of 'rational freedom' rather than rejects it.
Hegel had conceived the state as a form that organises a formless content. Without the state, civil society - empirical daily life with all its divergent interests - the formless content, would fall apart (CHDS 1975:86). Affirming civil society as the true reality of individuals, Marx accuses Hegel of subjectivising the state in a mystical way (CHDS 1975:80), ascribing 'living qualities' to the state as an abstraction, conceding 'the right of the concrete reality to a living entity such as sovereignty only with reluctance and with many reservations' (CHDS 1975:85/6). The universality of the state is purely formal and abstract, having no relation to the real content of society, real individuals and their needs. A genuine reconciliation of the universal and the particular - and hence of 'rational freedom' uniting each and all - required the dissolution of the state and of civil society. This would be achieved by converting the formal political principle, the constitution, into the material principle, embodying it in the empirical lives and relationships of the demos in society (CHDS 1975:88-9). Marx thus proceeds to demonstrate that 'all forms of state have democracy for their truth' (CHDS 1975:89).
Marx pursues Rousseau's democratic version of 'rational freedom' beyond tendencies to an homogenised citizenship. The legitimacy of government is established by a genuine identity between governmental authority as the general will and the will of the governed (CHDS 1975:87/8; Avineri 1968:35). Democracy is 'the generic constitution' (CHDS 1975:87), the solution to the riddle of every constitution, the constitution founded on its 'true ground' of real individuals, 'the people's own creation' (CHDS 1975:87). Marx proceeds from the demos as the true reality behind all political forms. The 'state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality' (CHDS 1975:85).

Marx's Aristotelianism affirms the demos and the forms it creates as the true reality (Meikle 1985:45 46), the real content of social categories and historical forms. Marx comes to relate the process of human self-creation and self-realisation in history to the concrete universal of labour (Meikle 1985:47/8).

The determining power of the demos is affirmed as central to politics, implying the dissolution of the state power into a legitimate governmental sphere (CHDS 1975:88; Draper 1977:87/90; Draper 1990:118). The dualism of state and civil society, entailing the alienation of political subjectivity, is abolished on the side of the social, breaking the restriction of reason to 'abstract state citizenship' (CHDS 1975:195; Thomas 1994:33 60). Marx's citizenship is based upon a social identity connecting public and private, reason and nature. Marx's is not a legal-institutional conception but one which roots 'rational freedom' in the reality of the demos, the real nature and associative activity of individuals. Democracy is 'human existence, whereas in other political systems man is a legal existence’ (CHDS 1975:88). Indeed, 'a constitution that has ceased to be the real expression of the will of the people has become a practical illusion' (CHDS 1975:120).

Marx proceeds beyond the reason-nature dualism to trace the state back and subordinate it to human needs. Overcoming the separation of the state from civil society abolishes the abstraction of political life from 'the earthly existence of its actual reality', reappropriating politics from the 'religious sphere' of the state: 'The sphere of politics has been the only [real] state-sphere in the state, the only sphere in which both form and content was that of the species, i.e., truly universal'. The political becomes 'formal and particular': 'Political life in the modern sense is the scholasticism of the life of the people' (CHDS 1975:89/90).

Hegel had rested his case upon the fact that the state is raised above society and can thus transcend its egoism and antagonism to achieve community. But for Marx only something ideal can stand above society in this way. Hegel's thought reproduces 'rational' dualism as the dualism of the modern world, achieving sociality only at the ideal level of the state given the fact of individualism at the real level of civil society: 'One is the spiritual realm of history; the other the physical world of necessity' (Dupre 1983:205). The ideal state as an 'abstraction from civil society' is merely compensation for the absence of real community in the reality of atomistic civil society (CHDS 1975:145 147).


Arguing that Marx targets this separation of the state from civil society as the denial of a real communality challenges Gouldner's contention that Marx devalued civil society, formulating a socialism without safeguards as a result (Gouldner 1980:355). For Gouldner, the only institution, apart from economic institutions, 'that clearly has a future in Marx's socialism is the state'. Marx, he continues, ignores 'the need for a rich, complex set of social structures in civil society that might resist the state's domination' since the proletariat as the new ruling class 'would not need social structures to help defend it against its "own" state' (Gouldner 1980:347/8).
Against this view, this thesis argues that Marx's political investment of civil society implies the development of a complex set of social structures to protect against the re-alienation of power. Further, Marx adheres to the concept of a public constituted within civil society, specifically by proletarian self-organisation (Marx CWF 1974:59 82 84 86 250 270; Marx CSF SE 1977:84; Rev Address 1973:323 324 326 327 330). In this way Marx is shown to value associative forms of social power as marking the emergence of new modes of social self-government. This also contests the view of Bowles and Gintis that marxism shares a 'state conception of politics' with liberalism: politics being 'what goes on in the state' (Bowles and Gintis 1987:24). To the contrary, Marx's restitution of power to the social body, breaking the connection of 'rational freedom’ with the state, implies a new public sphere rooted in civil society.

Challenging the state monopolisation of 'the political' - rejecting the modern republic as merely negating the alienation of monarchy within the greater alienation of the state (CHDS 1975:90) - Marx resolves Hegel's opposition between representation through deputies on the one hand and democratic participation in the state on the other into two possibilities (CHDS 1975:186 188). In the first place, the continued separation of the state from civil society prevents 'all as individuals' participating in the legislature except through the representation of deputies. Hegel's representation is thus the 'expression of the separation and merely a dualistic unity' (CHDS 1975:189). Against this, in the second place, civil society constituting itself as political society overcomes separation so that the abstractly representative character of the legislature would disappear (CHDS 1975:189).

No longer would political life be extraneous from individuals in their real lives. 'The legislature is representative only in the sense that every function is representative. For example, a cobbler is my representative in so far as he satisfies a social need, just as every definite form of social activity, because it is a species activity, represents only the species. That is to say, it represents a determination of my own being just as every man is representative of other men. In this sense he is a representative not by virtue of another thing which he represents but by virtue of what he is and does' (CHDS 1975:189-90). Real and effective representation recognises that individuals best understand and control those aspects of life in which they are most closely involved. [1]
Against Hegel, Marx defends the notion that all citizens had a right to participate in deliberation and decision making. It is not a question of 'all as individuals' participating but 'the individuals as all' (CHDS 1975:186). That is, the problem is not the form of participation in the abstract realm of the state but the separation of political life from real life (CHDS 1975:188). Hegel's dilemma results from the way he remains at the level of the political state abstracted from civil society (CHDS 1975:186).
So long as separation remained, individuals could only come to have an abstract political existence. 'The fact that all as individuals should wish to share in the legislature only proves that it is the will of all to be real (active) members of the state, or to acquire a political existence, or to prove and give reality to their existence as something political' (CHDS 1975:188).
The 'efforts of civil society to transform itself into a political society, or to make the political society into the real one, manifest themselves in the attempt to achieve as general a participation as possible in the legislature' (CHDS 1975:188). This 'implies the questioning of the principle of representation' (CHDS 1975:189).
Marx thus argues that the vote 'expresses the real relation of real civil society to the civil society of the legislature, to the representative body' (CHDS 1975:191). Marx was attempting to effect a unity between public and private so that civil society made its political existence actual and politics lost the abstract character it has when monopolised by the state, existing as a state-formalism without content. This is what Marx means by civil society rising to the abstraction of itself through 'unrestricted active and passive suffrage', to political existence, commenting that the 'realisation of this abstraction is also the transcendence of the abstraction' (CHDS 1975:191).
Though Avineri argues for this as a transpolitical conception (1968:35/8 211 202/20), Marx transcends the state rather than politics and government. Marx's critique points in the direction of the reempowerment of civil society through the restitution of social power and the principle of functional representation. Marx's target is the state monopolisation of politics as the depoliticisation of civil society (OJQ 1975:233). As civil society was divested of its political significance, the political, emancipated from the 'adulteration of civil life', came to be concentrated in and monopolised by the state', developing into 'the universal concern of the people ideally independent of particular elements of civil life'. The state arrogated the political functions and authority of civil society to itself (OJQ 1975:233; CHDS 1975:146), abolishing the political character of civil society in the process (Draper I 1977:118/9; Hunt I 1974:60/2). It follows from these premises that the abolition of the state is also the repoliticisation of civil society.
Given Marx's concern to expose representative institutions as self-contradictory in abstraction from the represented (CHDS 1975:19:74), it should come as no surprise that marxism lacks an adequate theory of parliamentary democracy (Hindess 1980:21). Marx was pursuing a deeper form of democracy against representative forms abstracted from the demos. Marx does not, however, fail to delimit the political, something which would threaten to abolish the private (Bowles and Gintis 1987:148). What concerns Marx is the alienation of common concerns, properly called political, from everyday life to the state (Thomas 1994:xii).
Marx's contention is that the institutional distinction between the political and other spheres of life fractures the individual identity between one sided and contrary pulls. [2] In the dualistic world of the state-civil society separation, the individual leads a double life: 'equal in the heaven of their political world, though unequal in their earthly existence in society' (CHDS 1975:146). Rather than realise a genuine reciprocity and commonality, 'rational freedom’ is invested in the legal apparatus of the state, presiding over a rationalistic desolidarisation in civil society. This has two aspects. Firstly, 'the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals who are related by law', the atomisation and privatisation of civil society into an aggregate of individuals exercising and protecting their rights within the rule of law. Secondly, 'the constitution of the political state’, the estrangement of the state from civil society, its autonomisation from civil society (OJQ 1975:233).

The state, as the other side of the particularisation of civil society, cannot be the universal sphere. Hegel's ethical state cannot transcend the individualism and particularism of civil society as a sphere of universal antagonism since its basis lies in this diremption, this dissolution of civil society into mutually antagonistic individuals united only in their legal existence (Marx CN 1975:411/2). Far from transcending the contradictions contained in civil society, the state actually sanctions its exploitative relations and its rule of property through a formal freedom and equality. Such a conception reduces individuals to rights-bearing beings for whom the state exists as a protective instrument. This is the freedom not of the individual but of 'egoistic man', the individual as an alienated being (OJQ 1975:233). Whilst, in the liberal conception, 'man’ is conceived as 'a sovereign and supreme being', this is merely 'man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect .. man who is not yet a true species being' (OJQ 1975:226). For 'the civil society of the present is the principle of individualism carried to its logical conclusion' (CHDS 1975:147).

In effect, through the determining power of 'bourgeois' social relations, 'rational freedom' - as targeted in Marx's critique of Hegel - becomes liberal political freedom as the freedom of the alienated life activity of the individual. Instituting 'juridical and political equality only upon the basis of a new and deeper inequality' (Colletti Introduction to Marx 1975:34), the dualism of political and civil society exposes the paradoxical nature of this liberal freedom. The reality of the 'slavery of civil society' appears as the 'perfect independence of the individual'. What seems to be the 'complete freedom' of the individual is actually the free movement of 'his alienated life elements'. This is 'the perfection of his slavery and his inhumanity' (Marx HF MECW IV 1975:116).

This connection of individual emancipation from ties of personal dependence - the extent of liberal freedom - with an impersonal dependence upon objects is something that Marx analysed further in The German Ideology and the Grundrisse (1973:162/4) and will be discussed in chapter 7 in defining the superiority of Marx's conception of individuality and community over liberal conceptions. The present discussion focuses upon the way that, through the alienation of social power, rationalisation takes shape as a bureaucratisation as against a democratisation.

5-2 The State Bureaucracy - The Universal Class

Marx's critique of bureaucracy is pertinent, not merely in exposing the universality of the state as the antithesis of a genuine public life rooted in the democratic associationalism of everyday civil life, but also in showing how the emancipatory potential of reason is turned into a repressive rationalisation. Long before Weber warned of the 'future subjection or enslavement' of individuals to 'rational-bureaucratic administration and management’ (Weber ES I 1978:52/4 212/19 223/6), Marx had challenged the bureaucratic incarnation of reason as abstracted from real life.
Hegel justified the state bureaucracy as the universal class in terms of its disinterestedness: 'The business of the state is in the hands of individuals. But their authority to conduct its affairs is based not on their birth but on their objective qualities' (PR para 277), on 'knowledge and proof of ability' (PR para 291). Individuals 'forego the selfish and capricious satisfaction of their subjective ends' in their 'service to the state’ (PR para 294). But the neutrality of Hegel's bureaucracy is questionable given its recruitment from the middle class as the 'pillar of the state' (PR para 297A), as the only class in which it is possible to find 'the consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of the mass of people' (PR para 297A).
Hegel is aware of the problem of officials 'owning’ the state, clinging to office 'to make a living without any real sense of duty' (PR para 294). But Marx's attack upon the state-bureaucratic conception of politics, as the rule and regulation of human affairs from above (Hunt II 1984:61 146; Draper 1977:514 ch20), goes deeper than the question of personnel in locating the basis of the state and its bureaucracy in the alienation of political subjectivity. 'Ownership’, the monopoly of political power, defines the abstract state, regardless of its personnel and the checks upon its power. Officials are the personification of this monopoly. Hegel confirms this alienation by asserting knowledge, vested at the public level, over 'opinion' rooted in civil society (Thomas 1994:29/30 31). With the state bureaucracy as the universal class, Hegel lowers the stakes of politics by making public affairs the monopoly of an elite insulated from the demos (Smith 1991:150; MacGregor 1998:188/9). In understanding Hegel’s view there is a need to refer back to ancient Greek roots and the distinction between nous, true knowledge and right reason, and doxa, opinion. Hegel’s point is that civil society is a congeries of self- and sectional interest and untutored opinion. Reason is not a function of numbers and majorities. There is little value in a democracy of erroneous opinion. The charge that Hegel’s institutional mediation curtails democracy can be rebutted by the assertion of nous over doxa, the primacy of reason as making available a greater, richer range of human potentialities. Plato called for the philosopher-ruler. This thesis reads this in a democratic sense as the rule of philosophy via the realisation of the rational element of homo sapiens. This will be developed further with respect to Marx’s conception of praxis as the democratisation and realisation of philosophy. Without this transformation, however, Hegel is correct to ensure good government resting on nous as against the opinion of civil society. Marx seeks to extract ‘the political’ from beneath this pretence of knowledge and neutrality by realising democratic norms against Hegel's hierarchical and, ultimately, elitist assumptions. In the end, this thesis reads the Hegel-Marx exchange as favouring a democracy of function over against a democracy of opinion. The rule of reason over opinion occurs through praxis establishing a direct connection between human creator and the social creation; the realisation of philosophy is also the democratisation of philosophy.

Marx's critique of the state bureaucracy exposes the way that 'rational freedom' is actualised as the repressive rationalisation of everyday life. Marx identifies the origins of bureaucracy in the dualism of public and private life, the universal and the particular, the abstract and the real (CHDS 1975:106). The bureaucracy offers the illusion of universality in a divided reality, reinforcing rather than overcoming this division (CHDS 1975:106/7). Bureaucratic rationality is an artificial-institutional substitute for a genuine rationality engendered within the real life affairs of individuals. Bureaucracy is abstracted from social reality (CHDS 1975:143/4), the bureaucrat having to 'abandon' civil reality and abstract from it (CHDS 1975:143 77). Bureaucracy is 'the religious republic' (CHDS 1975:107), an inverted world in which the state is regarded as possessing primacy over civil society (Draper 1977:318). Such 'state formalism' 'constitutes itself as a real power and thus becomes its own material content1. It 'follows inevitably that the 'bureaucracy' is a network of practical illusions, or the "illusions of the state"' (CHDS 1975:107).


For Marx, the state bureaucracy is not disinterested but conceals its particular interests behind the common good. Rather than perform a mediating function between social groups and the state, the bureaucracy derives from and maintains their separation, substituting its own purposes and interests for those of the community. 'For the bureaucrat, the world is no more than an object on which he acts' (CHDS 1975:108/9). Real life becomes an object of bureaucratic treatment (CHDS 1975:108 108/9). Wherever the bureaucracy is a principle of its own, the general interest of the state becomes a separate, independent and actual interest (CHDS 1975:106). A true universal interest requires a genuine universal class, not a bureaucracy that uses its universal claims to cover particular interests, but the class of all.





Marx would soon identify the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class able to constitute a genuine public out of the associational activity of real society. Such a public integrates the universal and the particular so as to embody a genuine 'rational freedom’ without splitting social existence into two spheres. Marx's 'class' politics, far from being based on an exclusive identity inimical to a democratic politics (McLennan 1989:ch4), possesses a democratic impulse. It is democracy that constitutes a 'true' universal or general interest. But for this to be so, the state-society separation has to be overcome for the way that it blocks the emergence of 'the general cause'.
Universalism and commonality could not be vested in the hands of a specially trained class presiding over all but needed to be diffused throughout the social fabric itself so that individuals could be active as public citizens. Rooting Sittlichkeit in a democratised everyday society, Marx's critique insists that public bonds and community cannot but be illusory when located in a realm abstracted from the real lives of individuals. These bonds had to be forged in the heart of civil society (Draper 1977:81/3).
Marx is alert to the way that Hegel's bureaucratically organised system of mediation works to undermine democracy as something rooted in an active citizenship of real life (CHDS 1975:112). Hegel's system works to constrain social power. The Estates 'prevent individuals from having the appearance of a mass or an aggregate and so from acquiring an unorganised opinion and volition and from crystallizing into a powerful bloc in opposition to the organised state' (PR paras 302 303R). Hegel, therefore, blocks attempts to organise social forces to exert power over the state. For Marx, Hegel’s system is designed to deradicalise possibilities for participatory democracy (CHDS 1975:131; Thomas 1994:64). From an Hegelian perspective, however, this mediation is designed to draw the individuals composing the demos out of their private, self and sectional interests and concerns into a rational appreciation of the universal good, offering a structured system of roles and activities in which doxa gives way to nous, the private and the sectional comes to an appreciation of the universal. 
Marx’s criticism is that Hegel's estates attempt to constrain the demos within the existing institutional order, the state supplying the principle of organisation rather than allowing individuals to supply it for themselves by constituting a new public. This is an institutionalised depoliticisation of those social forces capable of challenging the state monopoly of 'the political'. This 'powerful bloc' is to be managed and manipulated from above. Depoliticised thus, 'the mass" is 'unable to set itself in motion, but instead only be set in motion by the monopolists of the "organic state" and exploited by them' (CHDS 1975:132). By giving the mass 'the illusion of its own objectification' (CHDS 1975:132), Hegel's organised intermediation functions to 'preserve the state from the disorganised mass only by disorganizing the mass' (CHDS 1975:132). Marx's argument subverts any notion of a 'rational' state raised above individuals as embodying their higher interest, any notion of an educational elite monopolising 'truth' over against the demos. His reason is one generated through the demos. Marx’s criticism denies the universality of the state as anything but illusory. An Hegelian response would demand from Marx evidence that the civic sphere is itself capable of constituting universality. As Marx well knew (GI 1999), dominant classes in civil society do present their sectional interest as the general interest of society as a whole. The difficulties that Hegel faced in constituting the universal at the level of the state also face those attempting to construct the general interest within the civic sphere.

Marx's critique reveals that the existence of the state as an abstraction from civil society and of the state bureaucracy as embodying the universal interest presupposes the very social fragmentation of civil society which prevents the possibility of forging 'rational freedom' in actual relations and bonds. Social units, individually fragmented, are unified only by means external to them. This allows the state bureaucracy to claim primacy on account of its claim to possess the knowledge of society as a whole (CHDS 1975:106; Lefebvre 1972:140 143 145/6 147). Should the various partial groups of society begin to form organic bonds, the bureaucracy will act to preserve fragmentation as the condition of its own existence (CHDS 1975:132; Lefebvre 1972:141; Meister 1990:190/1 200).
Marx's critique of Hegel's state and state bureaucracy implies a new public sphere rooted in the associative character of 'real' civil society. Marx's critique shows that the 'rational' belief that a public spirited politics could be compatible with the extension of citizen equality has been realised as an homogenizing equality instituted by the abstract state and asserted over distinctiveness in social roles, interests and identities.
This transition from the state as the product of reason, the rational society which human beings require to live a 'good' life in conformity with their nature, to a repressive rationalisation which contradicts human ontology, abstracts from real life, and treats individuals as objects to be managed. The state as the product of reason is thus transformed into the 'statization' of reasons (Bobbio in Keane ed 1988:73). Describing this process as 'specifically modern’, Weber refers to 'the sure interests of the bureaucracy for the conditions of maintaining its power' through 'the canonization of the abstract and "objective" idea of "reasons of state"' (Weber B 1991:220).
In criticising the 'abstraction of the political state' as a 'modern product’ (CHDS 1975:90), Marx made this 'statization' and bureaucratisation of reason the key problem in the creation of the 'true' public. Rather than being the embodiment of ethicality, commonality and universality, the state becomes a coercive instrument, no longer transcending civil society but translating its dominant interests into public policy. The normative political assumptions of 'rational freedom' were subverted by capitalist relations. The state no longer exists as ethical agency but becomes the ‘concentrated and organised force of society' (Marx Cl 1976:915).
The question is how the destructive relations of an alienated system of production can be brought under control through the incorporation of the normative-political framework of ‘rational freedom’ within material relations and practices (Psychopedis 1992:42/3), upholding the categorical imperative that relations of competition and exploitation be replaced by relations of cooperation, reason and solidarity.
Marx seeks to offer an alternative to rationalisation as 'statization' by realising the normative and democratic dimensions of 'rational freedom' against its historical form. Democratisation overcoming bureaucratisation implies the demos controlling their own social forms, constituting social order from below rather than being managed and manipulated from above. Democratisation for Marx concerns all institutions which exercise power within the social infrastructure and is not merely limited to the formal legal apparatus. Such democratisation is promoted throughout social relations rather than being projected upwards to the level of the abstract state (Thomas 1994:17).
The rest of this chapter will, therefore, develop Marx's critique of 'bourgeois’ society around the definition of human emancipation as the restitution of social power (Marx OJQ 1975:234). Once the state power is reabsorbed back into society, social control is democratised and no longer concentrated at a single point. Society 'never again lapses into individualistic atomism' (Hyppolite 1969:111). The precise institutions regulating Marx’s social control may 'have remained elusive' (Bowles and Gintis 1987:146/7). This thesis agrees with Errol E Harris that ‘had Marx understood Hegel aright he would have found in him much that he (Marx) was seeking, including a basis for socialism that would not have led his followers astray into totalitarian repression of human liberty’ (Harris 1993:51). Marx is weak on institutional mediation and structures and, over time, the closer the proximity to practical politics, the more this weakness has become glaring. This underlines the importance of creating and sustaining a dense infrastructure of communities, institutions, organisations and groups within which the demos lives and through which it can seek the satisfaction of its needs, reducing its dependency upon external forms of mediation. Marx could certainly have been more sensitive to this aspect of Hegel’s thought. The differentiated structures of Hegel’s ethical life can be incorporated into Marx’s communism so as to avoid objections to its ‘homogeneous’ character (MacGregor 1998:141).
As this thesis develops, the restitution and reorganisation of social power that Marx sought will be developed with a view to outlining the institutional and structural features of communist society. This recovers politics as central to human self-realisation by progressively eliminating the coercive moment of state politics. [3] In the process, Marx is shown to realise the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' in the empirical world. He succeeds in bringing morality into the world of politics, thus realising the rational project.

5-3 Marx's Critique Of Bourgeois Society

This section develops Marx's critique of Hegel's state as a critique of 'bourgeois’ society, implying a conception of moral community. The argument is that Marx extracts the universal and communitarian component of liberal rights discourse to morally ground a 'true' conception of community. The communal-universal significance of rights -as the realisation of the principle of citizenship in a true political community - is employed against the egoism, atomism and economic reductionism of a property based social order.
This concern with the division at the heart of rights is consistent with Marx's attempt to extract the emancipatory potential inherent in the forms of modern dualism. Rights discourse, instituted under the state, expresses a split between the properly political demand for universality, commonality and reciprocity and a property based social order which reduces that demand to the protection of private individuals within instrumental relationships. Chapter 7 will pursue this recovery of the normative/political significance of 'rational freedom' against its realisation within rationalised forms of control with respect to the capitalist process of rationalisation. This section pursues this same aim with respect to liberal moral and political discourse. With the conception of human emancipation in general, Marx defines his version of 'rational freedom' - the return to all human relationships and power to human control.
This definition of true freedom considers the liberal emphasis upon rights and justice to be misplaced. The liberal view, associated with a 'protective' conception of government and fixes the conditions of individual freedom at a particular, 'bourgeois', stage of human development. In envisaging the dissolution of rational freedom's legal-institutional framework constraining individuals to the good into the reality of individual relationships, this section interprets Marx's critique of 'bourgeois' rights and relations as affirming a potential solidarity and sociality beyond this stage. Marx's communist society conceives a social identity which is able to dispense with the 'rights of man’ as the freedoms of the individual within a private sphere. Beyond bourgeois society as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism, individuals will be able to relate to each other in such a way that the enjoyment of the freedoms invested in an abstracted juridical sphere will become a matter of course, as an everyday moral practise. Individuals will no longer require the protection of a discourse or juridical apparatus of rights.
Fraser describes Marx's On the Jewish Question as an 'unsurpassed critique of liberalism' (Fraser 1992:140). The text has been largely overlooked. ‘I confess my inability to make any interesting sense of Marx's article ‘On the Jewish Question’ writes Elster in a footnote to his Making Sense of Marx (1985:504). On the Jewish Question is a key text in defining Marx’s conception of community, transcending political emancipation as 'the last form of human emancipation within the prevailing scheme of things' to address the relations and conditions which block 'real, practical emancipation' (Marx OJQ 1975:221; Avineri 1968:193/4 214 218; Wilde 1994:166/7). Marx attacks the abstract community offered by the state as illusory in preserving constraint. The state can liberate itself from a restriction without the individual being truly free of it (OJQ 1975:218).
Political emancipation abolishes the property qualification for the franchise but it does not liberate individuals from dependence upon private property as a private right freed from common, ethical and political considerations (OJQ 1975:233; Thomas 1994:73/4). Noting the dualism between abstract citizen identity and real identities (OJQ 1975:220/1), Marx demands the emancipation of all humankind from all kinds of partiality, particularity and limitation (religion, property, the division of labour) (OJQ 1975:218/20 221). Only with these conditions met could the commonality and universality implicit in 'rational freedom' be realised.
The basic constraint behind political emancipation is the alien control of capital, extirpating real democracy, individuality and community: ‘economics conceives of the community of man, or the self-activating essence of man, man's attainment of a species life, a truly human existence through the mutuality of men, in terms of exchange and trade’ (Marx JM 1975:266).

This 'estranged form of social commerce' ensures that the only bond between individuals in society is one based on egoism (Marx JM 1975:266). This blocks human fulfilment: 'Since, in the process of exchange men do not relate to each other as men, things lose the meaning of personal, human property' (JM 1975:261). The process in which the individual emerges destroys relations of personal dependence only by making mutual relations or intercourse external to all individuals. This entails the impersonal dependence of all upon alien powers. The individual 





Marx endorses Rousseau's 'description of the political man' as a truly socialised individual who substitutes solitary powers for powers that can be used only 'with the assistance of others' (OJQ 1975:234). Nevertheless, this 'rational' association remains ideal so long as the political community is abstracted from a civil society which 'is no longer the essence of community but the essence of difference', 'the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes' (OJQ 1975:221). The imaginary, 'unreal universality' of the state (OJQ 1975:220) is a necessary consequence of a society predicated upon universal egoism and antagonism, the 'asocial nature of civil life' (Marx CN 1975:412): the 'slavery of civil society is the natural foundation of the modern state' (CN 1975:412). Universality and communality, essential needs, cannot be attained in the real lives of individuals (Thomas 1994:61 62; Bonefeld 1992:116/7). The political, moral and communal existence identified as crucial to human well being in the tradition of 'rational freedom' becomes external to individuals as a solidaristic order is replaced by a legal order (the implications of this process of rationalistic desolidarisation will be taken up in chapter 7 in terms of the autonomisation of relations).

'The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals - who are related by law ... are achieved in one and the same act' (OJQ 1975:233). This dissolved civil society into its component parts - self-interested, isolated, autonomous individuals freed from communal and universal considerations and obligations (OJQ 1975:233 234). The state is not a genuine community but is the institutional expression of this separation from community. Marx depicts political democracy as 'Christian' in treating every individual as 'a sovereign and supreme being' whereas, in reality, this being is precisely the individual 'in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect', 'as he has been corrupted .. sold and exposed to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements of the entire organisation of our society': 'in a word, man who is not yet a true species-being' (OJQ 1975:225/6). The overcoming of the political as a 'religious' sphere is a condition of ensuring that the communality and universality central to the 'rational' tradition no longer possess a purely abstract character in relation to 'actual individuality', 'true life' (OJQ 1975:225).

Political democracy through the intermediary of the state (OJQ 1975:218/9 220) thus entailed the reduction of the political community to a means of protecting the rights of man as self-contained, isolated monads. The limitation of political emancipation thus lies in the 'splitting of man into his public and his private self (OJQ 1975:222). In abolishing the alienated conditions in which individuals are reduced to being means to external ends, Marx's 'true democracy' is Kant's realm of ends actualised. Under communism, 'rational freedom' is realised as the democracy of ends.

5-4 Citizenship And The Rights Of Man

Achieving genuine political community beyond the abstract state means recovering citizenship as an active designation against its legalistic existence as a means of protecting rights. Treating the relationship between citizenship and rights this way reads Marx as defining a new socio-relational morality and politics based on the socially situated character of human life. This is implicit in Marx's conception of species being, offering a critique of rights in terms of their individualistic and egoistic character (OJQ 1975:227/231 233/4). The idea of natural rights becomes for Marx an attempt to universalize and de-historicize a conception of human nature appropriate to a commercialised bourgeois society. As relations are reduced to exchange, morality becomes a legalistic code external to individuals, regulating and rationalising a society of substantive unfreedom (Marx CM REV 1973:81/3; Buchanan 1982:80; Maguire 1978:21; Collins 1984:130/1).

Marx's approach challenges the decontextualised view of the individual in rights discourse and which conceive relationships to be 'naturally' external, instrumental, competitive and conflictual. Through such relations, society, the relationship to others, 'species life itself, appears external and as a constraint upon individual autonomy (OJQ 1975:230). Such relations necessitate the authoritative regulation of conduct but are challenged by Marx's substantive conception of the good society as based upon species essence (chapter 6). Marx's conception presumes the existence of an unactualised potential for sociability which makes it possible to shift from the autonomous rational subject of the state to the situated relational subject of real society. That which is withdrawn from society as a private domain under rights-based liberalism becomes a sphere for full participation under the true democratic community.
This takes an alternate approach to the liberal recommendation to take rights seriously. This liberal recommendation is based upon the notion that all individuals, by virtue of their humanity, are endowed with a set of absolute and inviolable moral claims which take priority over competing reasons or policies (Dworkin 1977; Rawls 1971; Ackerman 1980). In the liberal conception, rights are morally necessary in attributing to the individual an absolute and irreplaceable dignity. In their absence there would be no grounds for criticising policies or forces that treat individuals as mere members of an impersonal social aggregate, making it possible for individuals to be subordinated to any collective purpose imposed by the state. This is how Femia criticises Marx's view of rights (Femia 1993:65/6 172 173). [4] Femia criticises Marx for believing that 'individual liberty’ 'could have but one purpose - the protection of private property’ (Femia 1993:26). But, rather than 'denigrate' rights as egoistic (Merquior 1986:54/5; Femia 1993:65; Pierson 1986:168/9), Marx is more profitably conceived as extracting a communalist-universalist significance from rights to foster a demand for community and solidarity, something akin to a conception of a social citizenship.

Arguing that Marx's communism embodies the 'rational’ ideal of internal moral coordination as against the reality of a coercive juridical apparatus constraining individuals to the good challenges the perceived necessity of rules, procedures and laws in liberal thought as a condition of social order (e.g. Hart 1961; Nozick 1974). Marx perceives the possibility of an earthly realm of ends, in which individuals relate to each other directly as moral agents, by strengthening social bonds. Marx's view is predicated upon a conception of human nature quite different from the essential selfishness posited by liberal thought and which justifies a coercive apparatus to maintain civil order (Markovic in Bottomore et al eds 1985:215; Levine 1987:26/7). The assumption of limited altruism limits political possibilities and lies behind Scruton's dismissive reference to marxism’s 'superstitious belief in a transformed human nature' as making it possible to 'live free from the institutions of compromise and law' (Scruton 1986:113). Marx can envisage such a transformation by ascribing just the one genetic trait to human beings, the need for self-affirmation through labour.
And this raises the question of whether legally protected rights and liberties are conditions of freedom, as some argue (Miller 1989:7; Pierson 1989:181 181/3) or whether they are simply necessary protective devices within an alienated social existence (Collins 1984:121). Granted that until the non-alienated community is established, the need for political and civil rights and liberties - universal suffrage, protection from arbitrary punishment, free speech and association (Little 1989:7) - can be affirmed. But Marx's project is to embed the political-communal dimension of rights in real community, as distinct from institutionalising their protective-egoistic aspect in the state, in a non-alienated community beyond the state. Developing 'rational freedom' as a socially rooted conception of relational freedom and authority is compatible with the retention of rules and procedures, democratically formulated and employed as a matter of everyday social practice. This avoids the dangers of a 'legal nihilism' entailing the totalitarian suppression of rational law (Fine 1993:51/2) and recognises the virtue of 'legalism' in subordinating government to rules and rights (MacCormick in Miller ed 1991:278; MacCormick 1993:142ff). But it does so by exposing and resolving the dual character of a 'rational freedom’ as imposing, realistically, a coercive juridical apparatus to constrain individual behaviour within competitive and instrumental relations whilst also implying, normatively, a moral coordination between individuals beyond these relations. Marx identified the possibility of realising the normative dimension so that individuals emancipated from reified relations would no longer need to coordinate their interaction through abstract moral codes and external systems guaranteed and enforced by state institutions.
Marx has thus been interpreted as arguing for a society beyond formal democracy, juridical concepts and rights (Pierson 1986:24 26 27 30 168/9; Pashukanis 1978). Against this, Lukes identifies four conditions making justice and rights permanent: scarcity in relation to desires, 'egoism', conflicting conceptions of the good, and imperfect knowledge and understanding (Lukes 1985:61-70). [5]
One can nevertheless distinguish Marx's concern to remedy the defects that are the product of specific social forms from features of the human condition which are ineradicable. This is compatible with the claim that communism makes possible a superior, non-bourgeois conception and practice of rights and justice (Lukes 1985:56/7). The more radical reading, however, is that Marx offers grounds, through a transformed, realised human nature, for dissolving the apparatus of rights and justice as abstracted from social relationships that have now become ethical in themselves. For Lukes, Marx is indeed beyond legal and moral rules, beyond rights as such, in embracing a positive conception of freedom, well-being and community (Lukes in Parkinson ed 1982:198/203; Lukes 1985:chs 345; Tucker 1970:50; Miller 1984:chs 1 2).

But it is not strictly true, as Buchanan argues, that Marx never made reference to rights in defining human emancipation (Buchanan 1982:67). Reading Marx as realising citizenship as a political-communal principle over against rights as based upon property relations makes it clear that Marx is not opposed to rights as such but is concerned to develop the universal human implications of certain 'public' rights. He thus distinguishes 'the member of civil society' from 'the citizen' in order to distinguish the rights of man from the rights of the citizen (OJQ 1975:228/9). By this distinction, Marx implies the wider significance of rights beyond bourgeois society and the separation of individuals from each other, developing the emancipatory potential of citizen rights into a conception of human association. The distinction between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen affirms the universal-communal significance of political rights against the particularism and privatism associated with property rights. Political rights are 'rights which are only exercised in community with others. What constitutes their content is participation in the community, in the political community or state. They come under the category of political freedom, of civic rights’ (OJQ 1975:227).
Having affirmed this participatory definition of citizenship, Marx proceeds to criticise the 'so called rights of man' as the liberty of man as 'an isolated monad' (OJQ 1975:229) and whose practical application lay in private property. Marx thus defends the political as against the nonpolitical character of rights. 'Bourgeois freedom' applies to the nonpolitical rights associated with private property, equality as equal right to a monadic liberty, security as the guarantee of egoistic rights. The abolition of rights associated with property, egoism and atomism thus implied the realisation of rights associated with citizenship, implying a true public life within real community (OJQ 1975:228/1; Hunt 1984:164 165).

Marx's argument is premised upon the recovery of 'the political' as concerned with the 'good' as human self-realisation. This concentrates upon the political-communitarian implications of rights in subverting the rule of private property (OJQ 1975:229/31), exposing bourgeois society as the denial of full individual freedom. 'Citizenship, the political community' is reduced by 'the political emancipators' to a means for conserving the rights of man: 'the citizen is therefore proclaimed the servant of egoistic man'. The political community, in which the individual behaves as a communal being, is 'degraded to a level below the sphere in which he behaves as a partial being': 'it is man as bourgeois .. and not man as citizen who is taken as the real and authentic man' (OJQ 1975:231).

From this perspective, the process of political emancipation is limited, constituted on the basis of selfishness, abolishing 'the political character of civil society’, dissolving it into its simple component parts, 'without revolutionising these parts' (OJQ 1975:233 234). Revolutionising these parts realises a genuine public and a genuine citizenship. [6]

Marx thus conceives the liberal discourse of rights as limited on account of its impoverished and distorted vision of what is essential to a truly human life. The 'rational' tradition possesses a richer vision of human life but, on the basis of the coercive order of capitalist civil society, instituted rationality within a juridical apparatus raised above a diremptive real society. In elaborating a conception of the good as the truly human community Marx moves beyond an abstracted moral framework towards a morality embodied in individual relationships in a community.
Marx's critique shows the extent to which the 'rational' conception, despite its richer conception of individuality and community, is effectively dissolved into the individualistic conception of freedom given the determining power of bourgeois relations. Abstract individuality, external morality and instrumental relations of mutual exploitation and antagonism express the social ontology at the basis of the Lockean liberal discourse of rights and justice. 'Security', as the 'supreme social concept of civil society’, 'does not enable civil society to rise above its egoism' but, instead, 'is the guarantee of its egoism'. It is the concept of 'police', 'the concept that the whole of society is there only to guarantee each of its members the conservation of his person, his rights and his property’ (OJQ 1975:230).
The extension of community from the abstract idealized form of the state to the social life of individuals, implying the constitution of mutually affirmative, identity-recognizing, co-operative relations between individuals, goes beyond the discourse of rights and justice to realise the 'rational' conception of the good. The 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and of all is affirmed within the bonds of real society. Further, once each individual self is able to conceive the relationship to every other self as a condition of, rather than as a constraint upon, mutual well being, and once public life is seen as a pooling of the common purposes and powers of each individual and not as an agency external to the individual, the two paradigmatic threats to individual liberty perceived by individualist liberalism are removed. Marx thus realises the liberatory normative potential identified in the tradition of 'rational freedom' against the legal-institutional apparatus within which that principle had come to be invested.
In Marx's critical perspective, the necessity of an authoritative set of rules, defining and securing the rights of individuals, adjudicating between competing claims, is the product of a specific form of social life where private property sets up mutual utility, exploitation and estrangement as the dominant form of personal interaction, and where the institutional separation of public and private renders the life world of individual need, solidarity and reciprocity vulnerable to the encroachments of the abstract state.

But the rights of individuals, as isolated, egoistic beings, form too thin a basis from which to generate the moral and social context which individual liberty requires. Marx writes that the right of liberty in practice 'is the right of private property', the liberty of 'man as an isolated monad who is withdrawn into himself (OJQ 1975:229). The 'so-called rights of man' are the rights of 'egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community' (OJQ 1975:229), 'the expression of the separation of man from his community, from himself and from other men' (OJQ 1975:221).
This liberty is 'not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man'. It is 'the right of the restricted individual, restricted to himself (OJQ 1975:229), the 'right to private property' as the 'right to enjoy and dispose of one's resources as one wills, without regard for other men and independently of society: the right of self-interest' (OJQ 1975:229/30). This monadic freedom is the subordination of all in society to a universal and mutual antagonism, a situation in which each sees in the other 'not the realisation but the limitation of his own freedom’ (OJQ 1975:229/30). The rights of man mean mutual self-limitation as the state is reduced to being a juridical instrument regulating possessive, competitive relationships (Clarke 1991:14/5).

Against these rights, Marx develops the universal implications of the rights of the citizen, i.e. of the individual as a communal being. Marx is applying the principles of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity drawn from 'rational freedom, the idea that the unity of the freedom of each and all requires an integral moral, political and social framework so that individuals can perceive in the well being of the other their own individual well being. Marx employs a notion of 'rational' association in his critique of the separation of individuals from each other in real life and the legalistic nature of the unity imposed upon them by the state. 

In searching for the holistic bond lacking in atomistic society and conceptions of that society, Marx clearly drew inspiration from the classical tradition of polis democracy. Marx's Aristotelian conception of political community objected to an individualist liberalism which reduced public freedom to property rights and citizenship to economic self-interest. Adopting a classicist stance, Marx refused the liberal identification of freedom and self-interest.

The 'rational’ undercurrent of community is explicit in the concept of 'political community' Marx employs in identifying the universalism implicit in rights and liberty.





Civic unity would resolve the dualism of Hegelian idea and reality, of Kantian inclination and duty. Irreducible to either private interest or abstract norms, this unity embodied moral association in real life.
Marx is careful to avoid his call for community being projected upwards to the 'abstract and restricted’ community of the state as 'the intermediary between man and man's freedom' (OJQ 1975:218/9). He is pursuing 'the political' as a 'true' public life rooted in society. Clearly, Marx's 'social' conception of citizenship is distinguished from the way that citizenship has been employed in the legitimation of the modern state, as 'an alternative ‘civil religion’' to replace the real forms of community destroyed by bourgeois society (Hobsbawm 1983:267/9). Dandeker shows the extent to which, historically, citizenship, rights and democracy have been associated with the modern centralised state, exposing the coexistence of coercive or authoritarian rule within this discourse (Dandeker 1990; Polity Reader 1995:263).
Marx's active citizenship is against and beyond this association, beyond an abstract state community and the civil egoism at its base. Marx's 'citizenship' as a social movement from below subverts 'abstract state citizenship' as the reduction of the individual to the egoistic member of civil society (CHDS 1975:195).
The abstract individualism which Marx criticised is a necessary component of the liberal view which endorses private property as constitutive of individual liberty. This view reduces the individual to an 'egoistic man' of civil society, who has 'private desires and interests that are separated from the community' (OJQ 1975:230). As a result, the only bonds which hold individuals together are 'natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and their egoistic persons' (OJQ 1975:230). Individuals 'subordinate' themselves to the 'alien substance' of money, which is the very 'estranged essence of man's work and existence' (OJQ 1975:241 249). Money, not the object, becomes the 'real need’ of all individuals in the world of private property (EPM 1975:358).
Only with communism can 'human needs' be properly satisfied. Communism is the 'true community', the 'essence of man' (JM 1975:265), containing the 'real, conscious and authentic existence' of man's 'species-activity' and 'species spirit' through 'social activity and social enjoyment' (JM 1975:265). Since private property does not allow individuals to recognise themselves as human or 'give the world a human organisation, this community appears in the form of estrangement' (JM 1975:265). For 'true community', the genuine public life implied by 'rational freedom', this estrangement has to be replaced by a mode of existence realising human need. Reason and nature have to be re-integrated and the alienation of power overcome.
Marx's reworking of 'rational freedom' thus emerges as nothing less than human emancipation in general: 'All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself’ (OJQ 1975:234). Complete human emancipation involves the establishment of communal human nature in those areas of life excluded from political society, transcending the opposition between civil society and the state itself to realise a genuine public rooted in real life:





Kant's search for a moral as against a pathologically enforced union culminates here in a social union. The restitution of social power and the abolition of the political sphere as something separate from human life is the realisation of 'rational freedom' as an ethicality, communality and universality forged within social bonds.
The ontological foundations of this investment of political and ethical bonds in everyday interaction between individuals will be the subject of the next chapter. This chapter concludes by exploring the implications of replacing the liberal discourse of rights and justice with a conception of the good which envisages the dissolution of an authoritative institutional framework. This would represent the social and material embodiment of 'rational' principles of reciprocity, interaction, communication and exchange. Individuals would no longer be institutionally constrained to the good from above via the 'rational' state but will realise rationality in their everyday relationships.

This section develops the implications of Marx's critique of bourgeois rights and relations from the perspective of the moral community which emerges from Marx's critique of Hegel's 'rational' state. As has been argued, with the abstraction of social relationships from individuals, 'rational freedom' takes historical form as a lawful freedom invested in the state and imposed as an external general interest upon individuals who cannot supply it for themselves. Reason becomes a protective device concerned with security. This section explains how Marx applies the 'rational' necessity of an overarching moral and political framework against an atomistic and instrumental society that splits individuals from each other. Marx continues his attack upon the public-private dualism in pursuit of a 'true' political-moral community in which the individual obtains a genuine relationship with others as a communal being.
The ontology of community implicit in Marx's writing (Selucky 1979:81/8) needs to be brought out as an integral part of the pursuit of the 'true' public. The argument recognises that the concept of community has had a high level of use and a low level of meaning (Plant in Miller ed 1991:90). For liberals, community is a vague notion which is probably oppressive of individual liberty: 'For reasons of clarity among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one another' (Rawls 1971:264).

But Rawls is aiming at a straw man here. The 'rational' tradition carefully defines the clauses and conditions of community in relation to real individuals. Further, Marx shows that the problem with community is less one of its clarity than of its availability in other than abstract form within modern asocial relations. The 'rationalised’ or alien forms of 'community' in modern society - capital, money, the state, bureaucracy - are parasitic upon and destructive of real community. In attacking the false and external commonality and universality of these reified constructs, Marx demands 'true' community as supplied by real individuals themselves as integral to their self-actualisation.
This chapter has shown how Marx applied the principles of 'rational freedom’ in his critique of atomistic bourgeois society to define the socio-relational context of individual freedom. This addresses the question of community in terms of the quality and character of its relationships. Marx's community, therefore, goes beyond the liberal 'good society' as merely providing an environment for freely chosen partial communities rather than embodying community itself and beyond also the conservative predilection for organic rootedness. [7]
Marx affirms the ethical mode of an integral citizenship against the self-interested rights based liberal citizenship. This ethos of a communal social order is missing from the self-interested politics of Hobbes, Locke or liberal contractarianism generally (Boucher and Kelly ed 1994:chs 234). But it is central to the 'rational' tradition and its concern for concrete others, for mutual recognition, reciprocity and ethical relations.
The tradition of 'rational freedom' offered Marx a paradigm for free and equal relationships within community. But the argument that Marx's 'true community' implies an ontology of the good taking precedence over justice and rights has to acknowledge the problematic character of 'the common good'. The difficulties are apparent in the way that Raskin, in The Common Good, presupposes an implicit conception of the commonality of the good, assuming 'a caring instinct' as common amongst individuals as human beings (Raskin 1986:89). He takes his stand on 'the bonds of community and natural law' (1986:195), the 'natural right that people have as a result of their being human' (1986:276). Raskin's argument, however, fails to deal with the fact that the social identity connecting the private interest of individuals with the common good is unavailable in the modern world. In a pluralist, even atomised and privatised, society, appeal to the common good on the basis of natural right lacks social relevance.
This thesis shows that Marx develops an adequate conception of the common good by making available a social identity which, in contrast to liberal 'bourgeois' relations, connects private and public interest. This makes it possible to reconcile social pluralism and the common good through an internal coordination rather than an externally imposed good embodied in an overarching institutional-legal apparatus. It all depends upon how widely or narrowly the nature of the good is conceived. As the next chapter shows, Marx roots his good community in the human ontology, in the unfolding of the creative human essence.
Seidler has argued that the 'alternative morality' which marxism poses simply reproduces the dualistic structure of bourgeois morality by opposing a self-sacrificing 'selflessness' to a self-interested individualism (Seidler 1994:22/3). Marx's socialism is thus condemned for remaining within rationalist terms in which morality involves self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of an alternative ideal which is merely the converse of self-interested bourgeois morality (Seidler 1994:64). Lacking the appropriate social identity connecting public and private good, such appeals to the general good entail an irrational self-sacrifice on the part of individuals acting within instrumental relationships (Poole 1991:7 13/4). This position more accurately expresses the historical fate of Kant's morality of duty. In contrast, Marx develops the good community embodying an alternative morality by overcoming the dualistic rational framework, resolving the rational into the natural, avoiding a split between altruism as rational and egoism as natural.

Russell Keat nevertheless accuses Marx of 'mistakenly adopting a simple, mutually exclusive and exhaustive dichotomy between self-interested and other-interested motivations', something which endorses altruism as the alternative to 'egoism as a purely negative category'. Marx is therefore 'trapped in a form of ‘moralism’ in which any kind of self-concern is automatically rejected as morally unacceptable, and to take as one's ideal a society of selfless other-regarding agents'. Such an ideal achieves 'co-operative harmony’ but only at the cost 'of any genuine differentiation and sense of autonomy amongst its individual members' (Keat 1982:73/4).

This thesis argues that Marx achieves cooperative harmony precisely by incorporating genuine differentiation and individual autonomy within community. Marx does not oppose the selflessness or altruism of socialist morality to the selfishness of bourgeois morality but dissolves the dualistic framework of modern morality. Marx's morality implies no individual self-sacrifice or self-denial for the sake of an abstract moral ideal but concentrates upon social transformation to make the appropriate social identity available which connects individual and communal well-being.


In uniting the public and private lives of individuals in the conception of normative democratic community, Marx provides the social identity which overcomes the antithesis between altruism and egoism forced upon the individual by modern instrumental relations (Lukes 1985:34). Marx's view of interests cannot be reduced to either an emotional appeal to a latent idealism and self-sacrifice nor to a calculative rationality based upon self-interest.





By connecting the private interest of the individual with the public good - by connecting reason and nature, public and private - Marx offers a means of ensuring the commonality of the good. The problem is, as Marx understood, modern instrumental, commercial relationships sever the connection between private and public good. Identity is conceived of as a matter of individual choice within a market society, the individual being free to move according to a calculation of self-interest in a market economy. The identity connecting public and private life, requiring an overarching ethical framework, is unavailable in the modern world. And without that framework, questions of how individuals should live become matters of subjective opinion and arbitrary choice. As chapter 7 shows, Weber argues that this is the fate of morality within modernity, explicitly denying the possibility of reconstructing the overall framework which alone could give objective status to morality.

The next two chapters show how, by uprooting the 'material basis engendering' the 'contradiction’ between self-sacrifice and egoism, Marx makes this ethico-social framework available, less as a recovery of Hellenic Sittlichkeit than a new creation presupposing modern differentiation. Marx is, of course, aware of the temptation to oppose 'society' or 'community' or some other artificial and abstract collectivity to real individuals (EPM 1975:348). He condemned Rousseau's ideas of association in The Social Contract as 'arbitrary’ (GI 1999:85) and referred to the state as an 'illusory community’ (GI 1999:83).

Communism as a society in which the association of individuals 'puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control' contrasts with the way that association under capitalism has become an 'alien' bond (GI 1999:85) subjecting all to an objective dependency (Marx 1973:164).

Community is not some vague and ill-defined concept in Marx's writings but is supplied with a full range of conditions. Socially and historically, Marx develops the conception of the normative democratic community which has emerged in this chapter, recasting of the terms of 'rational' philosophy in the process. Marx's attempts to situate the individual within the context of social life stem from his rejection of the character of a society in which individuals require the protection of rights. Marx proceeds from a moral conception of the conditions and contexts of individuality and community. And this is based upon an implicit conception of the good.
Marx's position, therefore, contrasts with the project of contemporary, deontological, liberalism and its characteristic silence on the good: 'That we have one conception of the good rather than another is not relevant from a moral standpoint' (Rawls 1975:537). Rawls's view associates a commitment to individual freedom with a pluralist society in which individuals pursue their own chosen conceptions of the good life in a variety of ways but within limits. This is the sphere of ‘right’ taking precedence over the good and over substantive goals (Rawls 1971; Rawls 1985:223/51; Dworkin 1977; Dworkin 1978). But, unable to find a source of value other than subjective opinion, liberalism is compelled to institute this 'right' in the form of impersonal systems of rules. The absence of a view of the good 'makes it impossible to justify any exercise of power at all’ (Unger 1984:238/9). For Unger, liberalism's 'artificial view of society’ as a perpetual struggle of individuals and interests necessitates the 'coercive enforcement' of laws: 'the less one's ability to rely on participation in common ends, the greater the importance of force as a bond among individuals. Punishment and fear take the place of community' (Unger 1984:75). Rules 'are the main devices for establishing order and freedom' (Unger 1984:83/4). As Weber will be shown to argue, the impossibility of a conception of the good standing above the irreducible pluralism of modernity makes artificial limits necessary. However, the moral failure of Weber's legal and instrumental rationality (chapter 7) justifies a consideration of how Marx transfigured the conception of 'rational freedom' so as to envisage society generating a self-regulating and self-enforcing order from within itself. What is needed is an account of the good that avoids both the arbitrariness of subjective opinion in a modern pluralist society and the repressiveness of objective imposition via a constraining institutional framework.




This chapter has employed Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy and of bourgeois rights and relations to develop Marx's case for 'true democracy' as implying 'true' community and individuality and as begging a conception of 'the good'. The first section reinstated the social character of human life against Hegel's abstraction of reason in the form of the state and the state bureaucracy. The dissolution of the overarching, abstract institutional-legal framework in which 'rational freedom' has historically been invested amounts to the embodiment of universality, ethicality and commonality within a genuine public life. The second section developed this socialising thrust of Marx's critique further as an attack upon the atomising roots of bourgeois society as responsible for the projection of universality, commonality and rationality to the higher level of the state. Overall, Marx's critique of the bourgeois state and society has been shown to imply the realisation of the normative democratic community which exists as an ideal in the 'rational' tradition. The precise form of this realisation is the subject of the final two chapters.
Marx's critique of bourgeois society and politics, implying 'true' conceptions of democracy, individuality and community, locate the moral priority which liberalism accords to the integrity and autonomy of the individual within a post-bourgeois conception of sociality.
The insights generated by Marx's critique make it clear that the moral priority of the individual under 'bourgeois’ liberalism must form an integral part of a positive conception of the normative community, rather than existing as an abstract substitute for such a community, detached from conditions of realisation and invested in the state. Rights and justice are neither necessary nor sufficient for the realisation and exercise of personal autonomy. Marx exposes the discourse of rights as fixing the conditions of individual well being at a socially undeveloped stage. Marx's critique of bourgeois society has been shown to affirm the 'rational' possibility of a more advanced sociality. This critique implies that the protection of a juridical apparatus of rights will not be required in communist society. The new forms of identity or selfhood, in this situated, relational context, renders the very terms of rights discourse inapplicable and incoherent.
The third section explored these implications with a view to orienting the remainder of the thesis. Marx's version of 'rational freedom' emerges as a reciprocal, relational freedom practised between individuals within relationships rather than imposed by an overarching, abstract institutional-legal framework. This amounts to an ethical embodiment within a genuine community so that individuals no longer need to be institutionally constrained to the good. The rest of this thesis shows how Marx realises the 'rational' principle of reciprocity as a solidary coordination proceeding from within society. The next chapter develops Marx's political and ethical investment of everyday interaction between individuals. By rooting reason in the self-realisation of an essential, creative human nature, Marx resolves the moral problems of liberal modernity. In conceiving of a coincidence between individual and communal well-being as realising the unity of the freedom of each and all - the basic principle of 'rational freedom' implying mutuality, solidarity and reciprocity - within a communal mode of life that corresponds to human nature, Marx both resolves the liberal split between individual and community without having to project the community implicit in 'rational freedom' to the ideal form of the state. Reason is no longer raised above the real natures of individuals.
This chapter has attempted to develop Marx's critique of the 'bourgeois' state and society so as to engage with the moral and political discourse of liberalism. This has raised issues concerning community, human nature and the good. In developing Marx's 'true democracy' as a demand for a genuine community which connects individuals with each other, the private with the public good, this chapter has begun to show Marx's 'true' grounding of 'rational' reciprocity, intersubjectivity and communality. Following chapters will deal with the specific conditions and clauses of 'true' democracy, community and individuality.

6 MARX'S ACTIVE MATERIALISM
This chapter will build upon Marx's incorporation of citizenship into social and individual relationships, as introduced in the last chapter, to argue that Marx's materialism generalises 'citizenship' by revaluing the moral and political significance of the full range of human activity. [1] Having shown in the last chapter how Marx overcomes the public-private dualism, this chapter will focus upon how Marx overcomes the other dualism undermining 'rational freedom', the reason-nature dualism. The contention in this chapter will be that Marx's materialism, deepening his critique of the state-civil society dualism, represents a radical epistemological shift from the ethical and political theories of modernity.
Focusing upon the way Marx restructures 'rational' principles to attain an embodied, situated freedom within the interaction of individuals, this chapter shows the novel way in which Marx constitutes the self. Unlike the •rational' tradition, Marx has no need to denature individuals in order for them to realise their 'true' selves. This chapter shows how Marx subverted the central category of liberal modernity - the autonomous rational subject - through an active materialism which revalues the political and moral character of the full range of human activity. In the process, Marx exposes the potentially repressive character of a 'rational freedom' which presumes, in abstraction from empirical reality to institutionalise and legislate the good for others. This chapter thus examines the ontological and anthropological roots of Marx's critical appropriation and development of 'rational’ freedom on the material terrain of lived experience. [2]

This chapter shows how Marx's materialism challenges the way that the 'rational’ tradition comes to be actualised in terms of the autonomy and externality of the rational over the natural, separating the key value of freedom from human experience and, anticipating chapter 7, imposing an instrumental rationality over a substantive rationality. Marx's materialism exposes the paradoxical character of a 'rational' tradition whose democratic principle of self-legislation prepares the ground for the submission of individuals to the dictates of instrumental rationality within capitalist forms. Integrating reason and nature, Marx subverts the rationalised structures of an alienated social life. This chapter constructs Marx's concept of the human essence as creative self-realisation so as to envisage a 'true' mode of life which corresponds to the ontology of human beings rather than, as with capitalism, contradicts it. This achieves a genuine coincidence between individual and communal well-being. The unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all - the basic principle of 'rational freedom' expressing human mutuality, interaction and reciprocity - becomes integral to social existence and no longer exists, as in the 'rational' tradition, as an abstract code, an impossible or impotent 'ought-to-be' raised above the real natures of individuals. 'Rational' principles are invested in the everyday life of real individuals. Affirming a fuller sense of material life in terms of what it means for individuals to realise their 'true’ selves, Marx is able to conceive a genuine reciprocity, interaction and exchange located within a communal modus vivendi.

This chapter shall consider these related topics in order, dealing first with Marx's social conception of citizenship as beyond 'rational’ dualism (section 1) and the Foucaultian critique of reason as repressive (section 2) before proceeding to Marx's location of the philosophical ideal in real life (section 3), his ideas about the creative human essence (section 4), and with the democratic implications of his 'active' materialism (section 5). The purpose is to establish Marx's anthropological and ontological foundations for transcending 'rational' dualisms, rescuing the normative component of 'rational freedom' from within an alien realisation under the state and capital and identifying it with the realisation of the communal human essence. The rational 'ought-to-be' is thus rooted in the real, creative, unfolding natures of individuals.

The first section possesses something of an intermediary character, relating to the incorporation of citizenship in social relationships discussed in the last chapter in relation to Marx's critique of Hegel's state-civil society dualism, but also introducing Marx's materialism as pertinent to contemporary attempts to challenge the 'rational' terms of modern politics. This introductory section identifies the political and moral implications of Marx's reworking of the rational tradition, relating the 'active' conception of citizenship as a social movement to the materialist basis of Marx's transformation of 'rational' philosophy. Marx is shown to dissolve the institutional-systemic apparatus of state and capital raised above real society by revaluing the sensuous practicality of human experience. He challenges the way that the 'rational' tradition invests politics and morality in the state in abstraction from the real life activities of real individuals (section 1).
In seeking to define Marx's communism as actualising an ideal community of ends drawn from the tradition of 'rational freedom', this thesis is careful to show Marx as addressing the repressive tendencies of 'rational freedom'. Marx is shown to remove the basis for raising public over private, reason over nature. In arguing that Marx's appropriation of 'rational' themes explicitly dissolves the 'totalitarian’ possibilities of reason institutionalised as the state, law and bureaucracy, particular use is made of Foucault's critical stance on the relation of reason and freedom. Section 2, therefore, discusses certain aspects of Foucault's work in order to set Marx's appropriation and transformation of 'rational freedom' within a critical framework which stresses the emancipatory as against the repressive tendencies of reason. Foucault is important in delineating Marx's reworking of 'rational' themes. With freedom emerging as a practise embedded in social life, Foucault is compared to Marx in developing an alternative to the abstract-institutional realisation of reason in the state.
Having set the argument within an interpretative grid which highlights the dual character of reason, the chapter proceeds to show how Marx realised the emancipatory potential of reason against its repressive tendencies. Proceeding from the view that Marx didn't so much break with 'rational' philosophy as define a normative materialist immanence which socialised the ideal (section 3). Marx is shown to define an ontology of self-creation as the basis of politics as expressing a mode of life which realises human nature and satisfies human needs (section 4). The rational is united with the natural. The ideal community of ends implicit in rational freedom obtains a materialist-ontological basis here. Further, by locating the revolutionary force in the transformative praxis of the demos, Marx is shown to be able to realise the emancipatory and normative principles of 'rational freedom’ without having to resort to an educational dictatorship, whether this dictatorship is exercised through the 'illusory’ general will of the state and law (anticipating the argument of chapter 7) or through the 'revolutionary' party (section 5). In short, Marx's materialism is shown to be crucial in integrating the dualisms of public-private and reason-nature so as to realise the 'rational' ideal community of ends in everyday society.

6-1 Marx's Social Citizenship

This section returns to the unresolved problems of 'rational freedom' so as to support the claim that Marx's materialism realises the emancipatory themes of 'rational freedom' whilst subverting the repressive or totalitarian implications of a 'higher’ unitary morality and politics, institutionalised, codified and imposed from above through the alien state. Power ceases to be institutionalised force, a coercive order of legality, and becomes a more intimate phenomenon, operating within the person through the self. The intention is to show how Marx, in pursuing a substantive concern with reason, exposes the threat to individual identity from specific forms of social existence. Emphasising how capitalist modernity has been shaped in the guise of an alien form of rationality and power, Marx is shown to open up a theoretical space for a politics of difference which recovers identity from within the oppressive, homogeneous forms of the state and capital. Putting reason on a material basis, Marx outlines a critical project in which individuals invest more in their relationships rather than having to subordinate individuality to identities subject to externally imposed ends as economic or legal persons, as bourgeois or citoyens.

Marx has been connected in this respect with a form of postmodernism in challenging the modern subject and its key characteristics of autonomy, separateness, rationality, disembodiment (Coward and Ellis 1977:61).

The connection between Marx and Foucault as radically affirmative thinkers, opposing all forms of moralizing doctrine that conceive virtue in terms of passive obedience to a set of ethical injunctions, will be made in the next section. 
Poster attempts to establish a connection between marxism and Foucaultian pluralism so that marxists are more responsive to a 'discontinuous and unsynchronised' multiplicity of forces in an 'age of information’ (Poster 1984:88 164). Poster's argument is, however, vitiated by the way that he uncritically accepts the postmodernist caricature of marxism as producing a 'Leviathan of Reason' based on the myth of 'the labouring subject' (Poster 1984:57 73). This thesis argues that there are other ways of constructing reason in Marx. Marx himself exposes the way that 'rational freedom', confined within capitalist relations, is institutionalised in the state as a system of internalized checks and interdictions. As a result of this institutionalisation, reason is abstracted from nature and comes to lose its affirmative power.
The specific focus of this introductory section is to develop the implications of Marx's active conception of citizenship as a social movement subverting the state, as defined in the last chapter. Developing the materialist basis of Marx's critique of public-private dualism meets Hirst's demand for a 'complex multifocal polities' undermining the state. Hirst is critical of the 'new republican' current on the Left, based on 'majoritarian democracy' and a 'common ideal of citizenship' as 'ill-suited to a pluralistic society': 'Citizens need a political community that will enable them to be different, and not one that exhorts them to be the same' (Hirst 1994:13/4). It is in this sense that Taylor criticises the homogenising tendency of a unitary 'rational' citizenship. Where there is the 'aligning of equal freedom with the absence of differentiation1, 'the margin to recognize difference is very small' (Taylor 1992:51/2).
It is crucial to argue, then, that Marx's appropriation of the 'rational' tradition avoids any such homogenising tendency by locating reason in the everyday life world of real individuals. Marx's political morality is defined as a practice embodied in relationships, rather than as an institutionalised code administered over individuals. This responds to the Foucaultian critique of the 'rational' concern to generate public institutions as a rationalisation of the all-pervasive domination of the centralised state, subjugating otherness and difference (Dallmayr 1993:9/10). [3]
The Foucaultian critique questions the existence of an emancipatory dimension in the 'rational' tradition. The pursuit of the emancipatory ideal implicit in the project of 'rational freedom' has to be critically aware of the repressive tendencies of reason in the modern world. Foucault has drawn attention to the 'other, dark side' of the 'formally egalitarian juridical framework' in the form of the development and generalisation of 'disciplinary mechanisms' (Foucault 1977:222/3). In exposing the soldier behind the citizen and the 'military dream' behind democracy, Foucault's 'rational freedom' is a critical concept, looking 'not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility’ (Foucault 1977:169).
For Connolly, Marx's and Hegel's modernist 'quest for a perfectly ordered self and a perfectly ordered world’ is part of a 'drive to force everyone and everything into slots provided by a highly ordered system', pretending that 'the result is self-realisation, the achievement of reason, the attainment of the common good'. 'Rational' thinkers thus become 'unwitting allies of technocratic agencies of social control', suppressing 'otherness' (Connolly 1989:14). The faith invested in reason results in social life being penetrated more and more by coercive power and subjected to detailed regulation. Like Foucault, Connolly refers to the 'docility' achieved through replacing 'faith in a common God with a common faith in the civilizing power of citizenship' (Connolly 1989:39/40).
Marx's 'citizenship' is not to be found here. Marx taps into the classical notion of the public sphere as a place in which free and equal citizens may actively deliberate upon and determine their common affairs. This thesis has sought to show, through the evolution of 'rational freedom', how Aristotle's active and social idea of citizenship came to be replaced by a passive liberal conception which protects the person, property and liberty of the individual within the formal equality and legality of the modern state. Marx's critique of 'bourgeois' society and state showed that whilst the rhetoric of citizenship flourished within the modern nation state, the actuality was quite different - a passive citizenship within the abstract state associated with what Riesenberg has called a 'slack non-participatory democracy' (Riesenberg 1992:xxiv).
Though the ideal of the public as a sphere of citizen interaction and discourse determining common affairs has been only very imperfectly realised in both the classical world and the bourgeois world this thesis argues that Marx is able to realise this ideal, but in a radically new sense. As the last chapter demonstrated, Marx demanded the incorporation of 'abstract state citizenship’ (CHDS 1975:195) into individual relationships as an integral part of his definition of human emancipation, restituting all power and relationships to the social body (OJQ 1975:234). With Marx, the attempt to realise an active and participatory citizenship is thus developed as a social movement from below, implying both the abolition of the state and the extension of public spaces. Marx's view in this respect is pertinent to the contemporary re-emergence of a civic culture (McLennan 1989:122). Marx offers a critique of the attempt to neutralize class relationships by bringing all within the orbit of what Mann refers to as the 'sham political citizenship' of the liberal state (Mann 1987:345).
Marx's project, in reworking the political and the moral terrain of liberalism beyond the division of social space as blocking citizenship as an active designation, savours a little of contemporary developments concerning the creation of new mechanisms and structures in and outside the forms of liberal political subjectivity (see e.g. Keane 1984 ch5; Melucci 1989 ch 8; Young 1990 ch 6). Some go so far as to argue the 'refusal of a unitary construct of citizenship as exhaustive of the political tasks of the present' (McClure 1992:123). But although postructuralism has problematised the autonomous subject as the central category of liberal thought, as the source of political and legal authority (Barron 1993:80), Marx took the first steps. And, whereas contemporary 'post- liberal' theorists like Keane maintain the classic liberal separation of the state and civil society as a condition of democracy and freedom. Marx subverts the whole dualistic basis of liberal politics.
This chapter develops Marx's materialism as challenging the way that liberal moral philosophy, exemplified in Kant's categorical imperative and Rawls' original position abstracts from the experience of situated individuals to postulate a universal and absolute moral realm. The tendency of this tradition has been to define a unitary morality within an abstracted public realm, excluding all other forms lying outside this realm as neither truly moral nor political.

In displacing morality to a supernatural world, Kant abstracts rational will from the empirical world and prioritises it over human inclination and hence over the possibility of self-fulfilment. Moral worth is invested in a noumenal self raised above empirical individuals. This dualism devalues the real world of individual interaction by making the abstracted public realm alone the realm of rationality and universality. As Rawls states the principle, 'it is as a rational person, as pure will, abstracted from the empirical conditions of lived experience', that one is 'capable .. of a sense of justice' (Rawls 1971:12) and hence entitled to a political voice.
Rawls' 'veil of ignorance' metaphorically expresses the boundary separating the 'public’ from the 'private' and exhibits the totalising character of liberal political and legal thought in instituting a closure around 'the political', dividing the individual identity between that allotted in law and that in lived experience. The split between the public identity assigned to the individual as a citizen and the lived experience of this individual defines liberal universal citizenship as a mechanism of exclusion, closing off the categories of the public sphere to the social and natural qualities of individuals.

6-2 Foucault - Reason And Repression

Foucault sheds an alternative light upon the approach this thesis takes to Marx's reworking of 'rational' themes. In going beyond the autonomous modern subject, Foucault affirms other ways of constituting subjectivity than that contained in the 'rational' tradition. This section is particularly interested in Foucault's view of freedom as a way of living between individuals as opposed to being an abstract ideal or an institutionalised moral code. This makes the point that freedom is a practice embedded in social life.
The central argument of this thesis is that Marx realised the emancipatory dimension of a 'rational' tradition concerning how human beings should live. Foucault questions the very notion of emancipation in exposing the absence of a non-coercive conception of the 'good' society. Whether this absence is the impossibility or the unavailability of 'the good' is a question this thesis addresses. Marx's realisation of the emancipatory dimension of 'rational freedom' beyond the abstracted legal-institutional sphere cannot simply be presented, as Levine presents it, as 'the internalized compulsion of reason' (Levine 1987:14). Foucault's critical perspective on reason shows a need to be aware of the repressive potentialities of 'rational' norms, authority and political institutions.
Foucault's critical approach severs the coincidence of reason and freedom in the project of modernity. Whereas, for the modern subject, knowledge promises to free people from power, for Foucault, knowledge, subjectivity, and power are irrevocably connected (Foucault 1980:52). 'The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of relations of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces' (1980:74). Foucault here opens the possibility that there are other ways of conceiving agency than that implied by the modernist subject. The world is not filled with autonomous, self-legislating moral subjects but with subjects who are scripted by relations of power (Foucault 1991:70). The subject is constituted through practices of subjection and of liberation (Foucault in Rajchman 1991:110).
What this implies is that the modern, Kantian subject is predetermined within the rigid boundaries that define it. Abandoning the modernist conception, Foucault's subjects cease to be social dupes and instead create themselves. Subjectivity is less a truth to be deciphered but a potential to be actualised (Donzelot in Burchel, Gordon and Miller eds 1991:271). Foucault's theory of power makes resistance to power more accessible in that 'one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remoulding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds' (Foucault 1978:96).
Power is no longer located in structures or institutions at a single point of origin but circulates through the mobile and unstable interrelations of force at local levels. Power is 'everywhere' as 'the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society' (Foucault 1981:93). Power is not external to and causally related to other relations like economic processes but is generated immanently from below, from within the multiple force relations operating in the apparatuses of production, families and institutions constituting the social body.
Foucault's rejection of the 'rational' meta-narratives of the Enlightenment (Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist) is complete. His detailed 'micrological' analysis shows how individuals are recruited, disciplined, and subjected to various forms of institutional control through the operation of a pervasive 'power/knowledge' which extends to every aspect of private and public life (Foucault 1980; Rabinow ed. 1985). For Foucault, the problem is not of the domination of class interest or the state as a class machine but of multiple, decentred 'discourses' which circulate without any clear point of origin, 'technologies of the self that do not require punitive sanctions since they are voluntarily embraced by subjects pursuing self-knowledge. Foucault's critical observations make it clear that Marx's freedom beyond rules and codes cannot simply be presented as the internalisation of reason leading to the moral coordination of human affairs. Reason emerges in Foucault's perspective as a product of a pervasive 'will-to-truth’ subjugating the body to various disciplinary regimes. [4]

Foucault's critical perspective makes it important to underline how Marx realises an internal as against an external conception of reason, how he assimilates reason subjectively, socially and materially without it taking the form of an internalised moral and social compulsion.
In treating the link between ethics and the subject as a central theme in Western thought, Foucault denies that to argue that power is everywhere implies that it is nowhere and hence that there is no freedom (Foucault 1987:124). Power entails not merely domination but resistance to domination. Foucault invokes the Greek notion of 'ethos' in arguing that ethics is always a practice, a way of being. A good ethos would be the practise of freedom (1987:117). Foucault thus upholds a view of freedom as a way of living between individuals rather than an abstract ideal or institutionalised moral code, a 'practice of freedom' embedded in the social life of individuals (1987:114). This creates possibilities for a 'politics of difference’ (Connolly 1991) which holds that individuals can be united politically without having to posit an abstract common identity instituted through the state (Young 1990; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Brittan and Maynard 1984). As such, it compares with Marx's social conception of citizenship as a movement from below. Foucault characterizes his method as the 'freeing of difference', embracing divergence, the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not confined by the constraints of similarity (Foucault 1977:185).
As radically affirmative thinkers, Marx and Foucault are both concerned less to abandon morality than to articulate it as a 'practise of freedom'. Both are alive to the way in which morality is divorced from a way of life and institutionalised as a 'rational' system of internalized checks and interdictions. The question concerns how each proposes in their different way to overcome this predicament.
Foucault's genealogical analyses reveal the repressive, irrational and iniquitous aspects of the architectonic conception of 'rational freedom’. The problem for Foucault is not that the project of emancipation has been deflected or obstructed but that in being realised its true nature has been revealed in the form of the panopticon society (Turner 1993:118 127). The Panopticon emerges as the ideal mechanism of power, a diagram of power (Deleuze 1986), providing the model for correctional institutions subjecting individuals to constant surveillance. This system of physical control entails a mental re-education through the total discipline of the body in a rationally managed architectural space (Foucault 1973 1977). Where reason once promised emancipation from coercive and arbitrary rule, it is now shown to bring an expansion in the technologies of power, surveillance and control.
To the extent that Foucault's intention is to question and rethink the categories and practices within which individuals live, making individuals more self-aware, his project helps subvert 'the grip which the human sciences currently exercise over the self-understanding of the subject of the modern state' (Philp in Miller ed 1991:159/60). And Foucault is not as dissimilar to Marx on reason and subjectivity as one might imagine, particularly with respect to Marx's concern to defetishise the social world and to realise the human potential for self-definition through their life activity. The rest of this chapter develops this aspect of Marx. Foucault, moreover, is concerned to claim that his critical 'ontology of ourselves’ (Foucault 1988:95) continues the spirit of the Enlightenment, particularly Kant (Foucault 1986).
Marx, nevertheless, is more nuanced. He thinks both within and against the modern 'rational' public sphere. He does not regard reason as a wholly delusive notion which serves to legitimize a powerful apparatus for the surveillance and control of individuals. Whereas Foucault ignores the differences between various forms of the modern (post-feudal) state and civil society (Walzer 1986:51/68), Marx recognises the modern 'bourgeois' state as a political emancipation presaging human emancipation in general. And whereas Marx's distinction between 'descending' exploiting classes and 'ascending' exploited classes capable of embodying progressive goals, Foucault's concepts of "war", "resistance", "power" and "the social" 'encourages us to conflate all struggles in one universal struggle, rename it social warfare and leave it at that' (Neocleous 1996:86). Foucault's power/knowledge risks becoming a modern version of the Hobbesian thesis that the pursuit of naked self-interest is the motivating force in human affairs, so that state authority is merely the outcome of a contract entered into for the sake of limiting its more destructive effects. This is a step back from the 'rational' tradition in that it fails to explain or resolve the problem of perpetual war within the social order.
The problem lies with the way that Foucault's genealogical project rejects philosophical anthropology. There is no constant human subject in history for Foucault, no 'true' or essential human nature (Foucault 1977:153). History is permanently subject to contingency and possesses no intrinsic meaning. Human beings are condemned to struggle to avoid domination, yet struggle cannot guarantee freedom since power is an ineradicable feature of social relations (Foucault 1980:52).
Foucault denies the possibility of human emancipation and has to since, on these premises, he can offer no rational basis as to why a future society would be preferable to an existing society. This thesis has sought an alternative in locating Marx in a 'rational' tradition which makes an anti-authoritarian case for public authority through the voluntary assent of citizens who agree to give up their natural freedom in order to obtain civil freedom and a communal modus vivendi. Should ethics be translated directly into politics and absorbed into social relationships it would be possible to dispense with the need for forms which institutionalise self-assumed collective restraint. Marx can make this crucial switch within the 'rational' tradition since he does possess a philosophical anthropology. Marx is thus able to fill the abstracted noumenal or moral realm in the tradition of 'rational freedom' with the creative human species essence and its realisation.
As this chapter will show, Marx did more than radicalise reason to theorise the end of the state. He switched the focus from the state and the abstracted institutional world, in which the principle of 'rational freedom’ was invested, to the everyday social world, in which reason was to be embodied. Marx had already taken 'Foucaultian' steps to avoid the repressive aspects of reason as an institutionalised and systematised form suppressing individuality. But, in proceeding from a philosophical anthropology, he could do more than Foucault. Against accusations of the assimilation of otherness (Connolly 1989:132), Marx developed a liberatory conception of 'rational' freedom through a detailed presentation of human needs, relationships, self and social identity within a 'social' and materially embodied conception of citizenship.

The inadequacies of Foucault's own perspective, particularly with respect to asserting the permanence of power as struggle, reaffirms the value of Marx's pursuit of the 'rational' project to replace coercion with morality in human affairs. By locating the repressive tendencies of reason in the dualisms of public-private and reason-nature, and by resolving these dualisms, Marx, unlike Foucault, can realise the democratic and emancipatory implications of the 'rational' principles of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity, putting them on a materialist basis which emphasises everyday society and real natures.

The novel element of Marx's conception lies in the way that he reworks the self. In the 'rational’ tradition, the autonomous self is given in the context of a division between reason and nature which excludes crucial aspects of human nature from the moral and public realm. With the assertion of public identity in the form of reason over nature, Kant's moral person is characterised by will, devaluing the bodily and affective aspects of social existence. Marx's materialism will be developed as subverting this hierarchical conception by reinstating the multidimensionality of human life activity, revaluing the moral and political significance of the various intensities of human activity. 
Such a view presupposes a philosophical anthropology and a notion of the 'good'. Beginning with a discussion of how Marx transcended rather than repudiated 'rational' philosophy, the ontological basis of Marx's position as in and against the 'rational' tradition is the subject of what follows. In showing praxis to be at the core of Marx's 'good’ society as the 'true' public life, this chapter is concerned to revalue the everyday world of individual interaction, reciprocity and solidarity against the abstracted and external institutional-systemic world. Marx's critique of alienated social conditions in favour of a materialist embodiment gives practical force to Kant's categorical imperative (Marx CHPR I EW 1975:251).

6-3 Marx And The Realisation Of Philosophy

The underlying argument of the reconstruction of the tradition of 'rational freedom' in this thesis is that Marx adopts a situated, relational conception of freedom primarily because of his disillusionment with the philosophical approach to the problem of determining the relation of reason to the world. But Marx does not so much abandon philosophy as socialise it. By attaching philosophy to the forces and agencies of social transformation, Marx discerns a way of empowering the 'rational' 'ought to be', of realising philosophy. This section proposes to argue that Marx does not suppress philosophy but incorporates the philosophical ideal within a normative materialist immanence.
Certainly, Marx argues that one has to 'leave philosophy aside', 'leap out of it’ in order to study actuality (GI 1999:103). But this view is consistent with the repudiation of the speculative character of philosophy as abstracted from the actual world rather than of philosophy as such. The questions Marx continued to pursue remained philosophical questions in the deepest sense, concerning human flourishing, the good life, the nature of human beings. The difference is that the philosophical is now buttressed by the ontological and anthropological and is located socially and historically.
Marx explained his future direction in the 1843 Introduction. 'You cannot transcend philosophy without realizing if’ (CHPR:I 1975:250). The transformation of philosophical into social critique means that, with communism, philosophy - and specifically 'rational' philosophy - was not so much abandoned as made a reality.
In resolving philosophical questions within the terrain of material reality, Marx expresses his disillusionment with the attempt to establish the relation between the ideal and the real in the 'rational' tradition, particularly the way that the normative dimension came to be established in an abstract realm apart from real life. Marx thus criticises the 'German Ideology' for the way that it detaches communism from 'real movement’, forcing communist systems into 'arbitrary connection with German philosophy'. This 'true' 'German philosophical consciousness’ transforms relations between real individuals into 'relations of "Man"'. Marx, in contrast, opposes the 'realm of real history' to the 'realm of ideology' (GI 1999:119). Marx's concern that the philosophical ideal should be part of social life led him to emphasise the normative significance of dynamic social practices and human activities.

This section, therefore, traces Marx's relationship with philosophy, reading his concern to realise the philosophical ideal as grounding the normative dimension of 'rational freedom’ within real society. Marx's claim concerning the realisation of philosophy and the transformation of the world has significant consequences. In the first place, the philosophical ideal is no longer detached from the real world as an impotent 'ought to be', located in an abstracted noumenal realm or ethical state. 

Philosophy becomes worldly in galvanizing and energizing those social forces which possess the structural capacity to transform existing reality. In the second place, this transformed reality signifies the end of philosophy as something apart from the affairs in the world. Philosophy is realised when its ideal becomes real.
Marx's preoccupation with overcoming the dualism of the 'is’ and the 'ought to be' represents an attempt to resolve the tension between politics and morality as the most salient characteristic of the 'rational' tradition as 'purely idealistic' (MECW I 1975:11 12). Marx focuses directly on the dual character of 'rational freedom' as a lawful freedom, real in there being actual laws which punish, coerce, or regulate individuals and as 'exemplified by the state'; abstract in that the principles grounding these laws are detached from real life (MECW I 1975:12).
Marx proceeded beyond this ideal-real dualism to locate morality within the real world. In pursuing an immanentist position, Marx rejects Kant and Fichte for Hegel, 'seeking the idea in reality itself (MECW I 1975:18). But Marx became 'ever more firmly bound to the modern world philosophy' (MECW I 1975:19) in identifying the ought-to-be as a radical potentiality within reality, abandoning the speculative premise that the ideal exists in a realm separate from the real.
Philosophy is conceived by Marx as a radical activity which normatively confronts an unphilosophical reality as an act of critical judgement upon it, measuring 'individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the Idea' (MECW I 1975:85). In the process, 'as the world becomes philosophical, philosophy also becomes worldly' (MECW I 1975:85). Addressing its own defects as the defects of the real world, philosophy could go in two directions, entering the real world, which is the 'turn about of philosophy, its transubstantiation into flesh and blood', or further distancing itself from the real world, retreating to a transcendental, religious position.





Taking the first course, Marx defines his position in terms of the realisation of philosophy, emphasising its role as a critical and normative activity which generates the demand that the unphilosophical world be made philosophical. For Marx, 'philosophy does not exist outside the world' (MECW I 1975:195). The time must come when philosophy 'comes into contact and interaction with the real world of its day... it becomes the philosophy of the contemporary world' (MECW I 1975:195/6).

In arguing that philosophy must encounter the real world of everydayness, Marx seeks to give philosophy a more creative and transformative relationship with the world. In engaging with the real world of power and conflict, philosophy becomes active and political, 'secularised' by being drawn into struggle. Marx develops the radical implications of normative 'rational' philosophy into a demand for the 'ruthless criticism of the existing order, ruthless in that it will shrink neither from its own discoveries nor from conflict with the powers that be' (Marx 1975:207).
The philosopher becomes a social critic able to develop 'the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as it ought to be'. Political questions obtain a normative dimension as philosophical criticism becomes 'a criticism of politics'. Entering into and identifying with 'real struggles' does not mean confronting the world with 'new doctrinaire principles' but developing new principles 'from the existing principles of the world' (Marx 1975:208). The political character of philosophy becomes apparent in the identification of possibilities for transformation, making these possibilities 'conscious' in relation to the 'real struggles' people are engaging in, revealing the forces which shape and mould the 'is' (Marx 1975:208/9).

In moving from philosophical to sociological critique, seeking to 'establish the truth of this world’ (CHPR:I 1975:244), Marx addresses the normative concerns of 'rational' philosophy to the alienated forms of human activity. The 'immediate task of philosophy' is to unmask 'human self-estrangement', religious criticism turning into the criticism of law and politics (CHPR:I 1975:251).

Marx explicitly targets 'rational freedom' as invested in the state as an ideal agency, demanding its realisation in actual life.

the political state .. contains the postulates of reason in all its modern forms, even where it has not been the conscious repository of socialist requirements It consistently assumes that reason has been realised and just as consistently it becomes embroiled at every point in a conflict between its ideal vocation and its actually existing premises. This internecine conflict within the political state enables us to infer the social truth.

Marx to Ruge 1975:208

Marx's discovery of the roots of diremption, antagonism and egoism in the very structures and relations of real society made it clear to him that the 'rational' attempt to build this framework as an ideal realm removed from the empirical world had to be modified. Rational freedom's moral framework existed as an ideal, abstract, realm exercising moral judgment apart from the immoral world incapable of changing that world, only imposing morality in external fashion as the command of duty.
Marx attacks Germanic 'rational freedom' directly. Challenging German 'illusions' about the State, particularly the way that 'the State built itself up into an apparently independent force' (GI 1999:98), Marx goes so far as to describe Kant as 'whitewashing spokesman' of the German burghers (1999:99). He explains the 'moral' and 'disinterested' character of German 'rational freedom' by German economic underdevelopment: political forms corresponding to a developed bourgeoisie were accepted 'merely as abstract ideas, principles valid in and for themselves ... Kantian self-determinations of the will and of the people, such as they ought to be’ (1999:99). For Marx, the German idea of freedom is constituted apart from the material relations of production. Kant 'separated this theoretical expression [will] from the interests which it expressed', thus making 'the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of "free will", of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates' (1999:99).
Marx strikes at the heart of 'rational freedom' as a lawful freedom instituted under the state by exposing the way that the general interest becomes an 'illusory’ community or communal life in the form of State and law divorced from real individuals (GI 1999:53 83 88). For Marx, this power 'can only be broken by revolution' (1999:88). (This will be developed fully in chapter 7).
With Marx, philosophy is no longer simply critical but activist and engaged, proceeding to 'tasks which can only be solved in one way - through practice [Praxis]' (CHPR:I 1975:251). In energizing the forces and agencies of social transformation, philosophy becomes political and practical: 'material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses' (CHPR:I 1975:251).

Philosophy issues in social revolution as rationality is embodied through connection with human needs. Marx identifies this radical demand with the proletariat, the 'class with radical chains' representing the universal interests of society. The proletariat is the universal class not simply on account of its material futurity but also its ability to embody universal ideals. The proletariat constitutes a class which is compelled to overthrow the dehumanised social order and establish human emancipation 'by its immediate situation, by material necessity and of its chains themselves'. The proletariat is the universal class since it 'cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society' (CHPR.-I 1975:256).
Marx breaks through from philosophic to practical social critique, then. But proletarian praxis embodies the philosophical ideal: 'Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realisation of philosophy’ (CHPR:I 1975:257). Marx confirmed this synthesis of the proletariat and philosophy as the interdependence of theory and practice in the Theses on Feuerbach.
Marx repudiates the 'rational' attempt to found the moral order upon 'higher' human characteristics abstracted from the world of experience, from natural inclinations as irrational and from civil society as a diremptive sphere.
Arguing that the interchange between human beings and nature serves as the ground for history denies the existence of immutable moral foundations for human freedom. A 'self-sufficient philosophy loses its medium of existence': 'when things are seen this way, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved . . quite simply into an empirical fact' (MECW 5 1975:39).
In placing a heavy emphasis upon the concept of Verkehr or Verkehrsform, meaning traffic, association, communication, commerce or intercourse (Marx GI 1999:42/3nl), The German Ideology is a key text, underlining how Marx relocated the key principles of the tradition of 'rational freedom' - reciprocity, interaction and intersubjectivity - from the abstracted institutionalised world (as the embodiment of reason) to the everyday social world (as the natural world of experience for real individuals). This idea of 'intercourse' is valuable in showing Marx's direction away from a 'rational’ interaction between self-legislating moral agents in an ideal realm towards a material interaction between real individuals in an associational social reality. The relational aspect of 'rational freedom' is thus located not in an abstracted moral realm but in 'the intercourse of individuals with one another' (1999:42).
Marx defines a critical and emancipatory project oriented to the understanding of 'rational freedom’ from the perspective of the material activities and social needs of real individuals. Thus the 'production of material life itself generates new needs which provides the foundation upon which any examination of the actual life process of society must rest (1999:47). The mediation between reason and nature comes through the production of material life. Marx relates the history of humanity to 'the history of industry and exchange', focusing upon the 'materialistic connection of men with one another', 'determined by their needs and their mode of production' (1999:50).
Marx criticises the 'German Ideology' (Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner) for its belief in the power of ideas and concepts to change the world (1999:37). This belief, in exaggerating the power of the intellectual in abstraction from the real, issues in a false conception of what human beings are and, as a result, is blocked from a fuller conception of what human beings could become. The 'German' inflation of the power of ideas and concepts precludes attempts to realise the radical implications of the concept of human nature precisely because it abstracts from the real world of needs and interests, of material life and social production. This material sphere forms the basis of Marx's reworking of the 'rational' tradition of philosophy.
Referring to 'the illusions of The German Ideology' (GI 1999:39) and accusing German criticism of 'mystification' in never leaving the realm of philosophy (1999:40), Marx's object is to 'debunk and discredit the philosophic struggle with the shadows of reality' (1999:37). Marx criticises Stirner's view that 'concepts should regulate life, concepts should rule' as mistaking 'spirit' for real life (GI 1999:26). Instead of examining real relations, Stirner takes the distorted ideological expressions of these relations to be the real substances of history, changing his concepts but leaving the world unaltered (GI 1999:26/7).
In contradistinction to the abstract, ahistorical approach, Marx stresses the 'real movement’ of history. Freedom is achieved in relation to the 'real basis' of existing productive forces, emphasising the 'real practice' of the people satisfying their needs as against Stirner's ideal concept of man and his 'idea' of the people (GI 1999:59 60). Freedom is the universal satisfaction of needs beyond 'exclusion of one class from development'. The 'positive expression "human" corresponds to the definite conditions predominant at a certain stage of production and to the way of satisfying needs determined by them' (1999:116).
The intercourse and interaction of real individuals realises the 'rational' principles of intersubjectivity, cooperation, and communality in material life. Marx proceeds not from the self-seeking monad or the spiritual 'Man' independent of the process of real development but from the real individual as a sociable and objective being located in a social context (1999:40 83 93/4).

6-4 Ontology - Praxis, Power And Nature

Following Marx's incorporation of philosophy within the real mode of life of individuals, this section defines Marx's ontology of self-creation as supplying the material content for rational freedom's ideal community of ends. Marx's project of realising philosophy is thus connected with the realisation of human nature.
As has been argued, with its dualistic framework, separating reason and nature, the 'rational' ideal is abstracted from a real world which manifestly does not embody a community of ends. Under capitalism, relations of competition, exploitation, and domination are the rule rather than the exception. Thus, the idea of a universal human community of interacting moral agents drawn from 'rational' philosophy exists merely as a regulative ideal: individuals should relate to each other as though such a community existed. The fate of the 'rational' realm of ends was to be institutionalised in the state and law regulating the commercial relations of capitalist modernity. By attacking this flawed historical realisation at its roots, Marx brought the 'rational' community of ends into existence as a community of everyday life, a true democracy of ends. As against the abstract community of state and capital, Marx will be shown in this section to identify the 'true' community with the realisation of human need.

Post-modern thought is anti-foundationalist in rejecting any objective ground for the existence of human beings as an arbitrary fiction. Marx is Aristotelian in establishing the ground of existence to be 'species being'. This concept involves a view not only of what human beings are but also, on account of inherent potentials, what they ought to be. Human beings are naturally social, dependent upon each other. Marx argues this point not only as an anthropological fact but as a political value, implying an end state in which species essence would be fully realised.
For Marx, the 'rational’ notion of a universal human community is implicit in the real natures of individuals. Integrating the rational and natural, public and private, lives of individuals through his concept of universal species being, Marx's critical appropriation of the 'rational' ideal of a community of ends develops principles of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity beyond the abstracted moral sphere into the real lives of individuals.
Since Marx's conception of human nature is most fully articulated in the Paris Manuscripts, this section makes this text central in illuminating the democratic character of Marx's anthropology and ontology. The prime object of Marx's ontology is labour as the process through which freedom, as essential human nature, is realised (Marx EPM EW 1975:284/314; Miller 1982:ch3). This section argues that Marx is able to realise the rational life in a richer form than is possible in the tradition of 'rational freedom'. Communism, as the freedom-embodying community for each and all, realises freedom through realising the species character of all individuals as free, conscious activity (Marx EPM EW 1975:328; McCarney 1990:156/7).
The basic argument of this section is that praxis, as the core of Marx's materialist ontology, [5] possesses clear moral and political implications, connecting the good as human well being and flourishing with freedom as self-determination (Lefebvre 1972:38/9). Freedom as self-determination implies emancipation from external and internal constraints imposed by natural and social necessity. The individual engages in material praxis to humanise nature and in socio-political praxis to create a social order which corresponds to human nature. Human well-being, as the telos of praxis, is thus defined in terms of the capacity to define and realise needs (Parekh 1982:188).
Laclau and Mouffe accuse Marx of upholding 'the anthropological assumption of a "human nature"', determined a priori (Laclau and Mouffe 1990:153 152 116 177). Geras has shown conclusively, however, that Marx's concept of human nature is not an hypostatised ideal essence but is based upon common needs and cannot be conceived in abstraction from human self-creation in the historical process (Geras 1983:27/58 63 82/4 90). If Laclau and Mouffe have read the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, they have not understood it. The point is important in making it clear that the imperative to change reality in Marx derives not from some abstractly moral 'rational' perspective but from the evolving needs and natures of human beings.
Marx's philosophical anthropology (Schmidt 1971; Markus 1978; Axelos 1976; Bernstein 1972) is not, then, abstract or static. Marx's 'normative usage' of human nature allows him to criticise social conditions which fail the intrinsic and common needs of humankind (Geras 1983:71). This 'moral indictment' presupposes a conception of human needs and nature (Geras 1983:83/4; West 1991:43) but does not imply an anthropological mode of critique which invites moralism through the hypostatisation of essential human nature. Rather, Marx examines the social order for repressed potentialities for social and personal development (Miller 1982:28).
These points are crucial in developing Marx's resolution of 'rational' dualisms as the realisation of a genuine public life. The conception of communism which emerges from the Paris Manuscripts gives a central place to a materialism in which human self-realisation proceeds through the integration of reason and nature. Identifying inner need as an ontological necessity constitutes the moral case for communism, recovering the self from within the rationalised forms and codes set by the autonomous moral and political systems. Marx develops a materialist account of the noumenal realm through the connection between power, identity, freedom, and needs.
The concept of species being is crucial here. Species being contains potentialities that can be realised only through the joint development of human nature and human society (Meikle 1985:59/60).
For Marx, human beings only realise themselves as human beings to the extent that essential powers are objectified. Marx thus proceeds to put 'rational freedom' on a materialist basis since such objectification is possible only in relation with others. Individuals cannot become truly human by remaining at the level of immediacy and subjectivity but must give essential powers objective form (Marx EPM 1975:327/9). This process of objectification of essential being is undertaken through labour (Marx EPM 1975:329).
Self-realisation as the end of species-being forms the content of Marx's morality and requires no independent moral justification in a set of ends postulated beyond it. The process of unfolding is simply part the common nature of human beings. But this morality conflicts with the instrumental rationality of modern class society in which individuals exist for the sake of a goal external to them. Marx establishes a direct connection between means/ends rationality - which reduces human beings to means - with a capitalist society in which 'labour, life activity, productive life itself appears to man only as a means for the satisfaction of a need, the need to preserve physical existence1. Species life 'appears only as a means of life' (EW 1975:328). Within class relations, the individual is compelled to convert the end of self-realising species-being into the means of survival.
The point is not that Marx denies instrumental rationality. A rational society requires the appropriate fitting of means to ends. Instrumental rationality would, that is, be put in its true place as facilitating and coordinating human action and intercourse in a realised society in the individual is able to flourish as ends in themselves.
Society is thus critically evaluated according to the extent to which it enables human beings to realise their essential powers and the extent to which it constrains, distorts or destroys these powers. 'Free, conscious activity is man's species character' and, as a result, alienative relations are the denial of the species character of human beings (Marx 1975:329/31; Walton and Gamble 1976:6).





Alienation, implying the possibility of a better human condition through an appeal to inherent human qualities (West 1991:44), is crucial. Whereas human self-realisation ought to be an end in itself, under capitalism it becomes purely instrumental to external ends: 'This fact simply means that the object that labour produces, its product, stands opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer' (EW 1975:324). Through their labour, the workers actually strengthen the condition of their domination: 'the more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over against himself ... the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien' (EW 1975:324). Labour becomes something repugnant to the worker, a 'loss of reality', a 'bondage' (EPM 1975:324 329), reducing the worker to idiocy and cretinism (EPM 1975:326) - the consequence of the division of labour (EPM 1975:369/74; Walton and Gamble 1976:13/4; Ollman 1976:135/6). The alienation of labour is the estrangement of the producer from the product and of human beings from each other (EPM 1975:329/30 331), imposing a mode of life upon individuals which denies their essential species attributes (EPM 1975:328). In consequence, human potentiality is unactualised and 'conscious life activity', 'species life', becomes a mere means for existence (EPM 1975:328).

Marx, therefore, makes the abolition of alienation an ontological necessity. Since individuals are creatures of needs, well-being is the satisfaction of these needs through the human interaction with nature (EPM 1975:358ff). Communism is the positive resolution of the various dualisms which have characterised human history -man-man, man-nature, individual-species, freedom-necessity - so that individuals may live a realised life (EPM 1975:348; Miller 1982:26; Meikle 1985; Meszaros 1970; Ollman 1976). Marx puts power and needs at the heart of politics as a mode of life expressing an ontology of self-creation. [6]

Marx takes his leave of 'rational’ dualism and the powerful influence it exerted over the ways in which human fulfilment has come to be conceived. His notion of the individual as a species being is crucial to this recasting of the ideal universal community of 'rational freedom’ as a real community:





For Marx, the activity of the individual forms an organic part of species life as an interconnected whole. The concept of 'species being' enables Marx to show how, through 'conscious life activity', human beings can choose what they want to do or be (EPM 1975:328/9). In engaging actively with the material world, human beings demonstrate their 'conscious species being', producing free from the constraints of 'immediate physical need’ (EPM 1975:329) so that they may affirm their true essence through creative labour. The world is 'the creation of man through human labour', proof of a 'self-mediated birth' (EPM 1975:357 329).
The self-creation of humanity is a process in which the transformative, sensory, aesthetic and cognitive powers of individuals are transformed and expanded and, with them, the structure of human need (EPM 1975:349/50). Central to this notion is the idea that self-realisation comes to be the object of need. Marx refers to what might be called 'self-realisation' needs, criticising 'absence of needs as the principle of political economy' (EPM 1975:363). These are 'radical needs' insofar as individuals, conscious of their alienation, seek a satisfaction that cannot be realised in existing society (Heller 1976:94/5; Elliott in Panichas ed 1985:51/102). Marx's materialism, therefore, is able to get to the roots of rational freedom's transformation into a repressive rationalisation by addressing capitalism's alienated system of production.
Marx's ontology, demanding an internal relation to the world as opposed to the external imposition of identities, is 'radical' in showing how the ontology of human beings is contradicted by capitalist society. Marx criticises the way that 'social needs' impact negatively upon the individual in being determined by them as 'alien to him and which act upon him with compulsive force' (JM 1975:269). The individual submits to this force of 'social need ... from egoistic need, from necessity' (JM 1975:269).
Individuals relate to each other not as human beings but merely as means to the end of satisfying their 'egoistic needs'. They 'subordinate' themselves to the 'alien substance’ of money, the 'estranged essence of man's work and existence' (OJQ 1975:241 249). Money becomes the 'real need' of all in a society governed by private property (EPM 1975:358 375).
The satisfaction of 'human needs' is possible only under communism, the 'true community' as the 'essence of man' which 'arises out of the need and the egoism of individuals' (JM 1975:265) and which expresses the 'real, conscious and authentic existence' of man's 'species activity’ and 'species spirit' through 'social activity and social enjoyment' (JM 1975:265). Marx's 'true' community challenges alien community, the alienation of the social bond, under capitalism. With private property, 'community appears in the form of estrangement' (JM 1975:265). To achieve 'true' community, the form that 'human need' takes under capitalism as 'egoistic need' must be replaced by a genuine form of 'human need'.
Within the realm of private property, however, the need to realise the human essence confronts the individual 'as the de-realisation of his life' (JM 1975:266 269). The abolition of this 'de-realisation' is a moral imperative since 'man' is 'in need of a totality of vital human expression; he is the man in whom his own realisation exists as inner necessity, as need' (EPM 1975:356; McCarney 1990:159/60).
Given the social character of species essence, this self-development takes place in relation to others within community (West 1991:58 59/60). With self-realisation, the individual experiences 'his greatest wealth - the other man - as need' (JM 1975:267), recognising other individuals as the 'source' of their own life (JM 1975:267). Individuals no longer experience social relationships as an external imposition. No longer does reciprocity have to be projected to an ideal, noumenal world abstracted from real life. In these circumstances, when the individual is 'in his most individual existence he is at the same time a communal being’ (EPM 1975:347). The social character of species essence - human nature as true communal life - defines 'rational freedom' as social, proceeding between individuals in their everyday relations. 'The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men’ (EW 1975:349).
In integrating reason and nature, Marx identifies the normative dimension of reason with the creative self-realisation of essential human nature. The abolition of private property, moreover, enables individuals to establish a proper, 'inner relation' to their objects. In the 'true community', where individuals produce as human beings, labour, as 'conscious life activity', exists as a form of self-affirmation through objectifying individuality (JM 1975:277). Here, 'human need' replaces 'egoistic need', the production of an object now 'corresponding to the needs of another human being' (JM 1975:277). Marx demands a 'real and true' relationship of human beings to their mutual objects of production as the instrument of 'mutual needs' (JM 1975:276)). As the 'free expression and hence the enjoyment of life', labour would be 'authentic, active, property' (JM 1975:278). Marx's social freedom consists in the mutual ownership of products as an expression of need whereas alienation entails private property (Marx EPM 1975:331/4; West 1991:47/8).
This argument goes some way towards answering MacGregor's accusation that Marx lacks a fully explicated theory of property, something which makes state ownership inevitable and leaves the individual defenceless against the encroachment of the state (MacGregor 1998:166). The way Marx affirms productive activity in terms of human self-development forms the basis of a positive conception of property. With human appropriation, objects are no longer experienced as external or estranged but become 'the particular, real mode of affirmation' (EPM 1975:353).
By criticising alienation as 'forced labour imposed .. not through an inner necessity but through an external arbitrary need', Marx affirms labour as the 'free expression’ and 'enjoyment of life' (JM 1975:278). Only under communism will 'need or enjoyment' lose their ''egoistic nature' and nature lose its 'mere utility in the sense that its use has become human use' (EPM 1975:352). The individual is at home in a world which represents the 'objectification of himself as a realisation of his 'essential powers' (EPM 1975:352/3), 'the creation of man through human labour, and the development of nature for man' (EPM 1975:357).
On these premises, the rationality of social forms, and the whole organisational and institutional framework that goes with them, is to be evaluated according to the extent to which they expand or deny essential human powers. This employs the wider definition of praxis as embracing the full range of human activities. True, Marx identifies industrial production as 'the open book of the essential powers of man' (EPM 1975:354). But he goes on to argue that, through estrangement, 'this history has not been grasped in its connection with the nature of man, but only in an external utilitarian aspect' (EPM 1975:354). Marx thus determines to uproot the economic reductionism of capitalism as responsible for the transformation of reason into a rationalisation repressive of the human ontology. Relating the 'extended wealth of human activity’ to 'common need' (EPM 1975:354), human growth and development will be complete only through a transcendence of the fragmentation of human activities under capitalist relations.
For Marx, social existence, the everyday life world of real individuals, is the sensuous material terrain for embodied experience, providing the basis for dissolving those abstract forms divorced from human life. Marx's case for communism as a uniquely human mode of relationship to natural conditions of life argues that the human interaction with the 'sensuous external world’ (Marx EPM 1975:325) is crucial to the formation and maintenance of personal identity. The conception of wealth 'as something outside man and independent of him .. is abolished': 'its external and mindless objectivity is abolished inasmuch as private property is embodied in man himself and man himself is recognised as its essence' (EPM 1975:342).
Marx is seeking the de-commodification of human existence so as to emancipate the wealth of sensuous human growth from the domination of exchange value: 'The supersession of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes' (EW 1975:352).
Production, for Marx, signifies self-realisation but is reduced to economics under capitalism. Far from making the domination of the economic factor eternal, Marx asks 'when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc, created through universal exchange?' (Gr 1973:488). Marx defines 'wealth' as the 'absolute working out' of 'creative potentialities', 'the development of all human powers as such the end in itself (Gr 1973:488). Production, then, is grounded in species being as naturally creative, concerned with the unfolding of human powers through the transformation of the world: 'man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need' (EW 1975:328/9).
For Marx, human beings are most human when producing freely, beyond direct material need. But this freedom requires certain material conditions enabling the assertion of self-determining human rationality over predetermined nature. What distinguishes human beings from animals is consciousness in producing the means of life (GI 1999:42). The unity of social being and consciousness occurs most explicitly for Marx in language as 'practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well’ and which 'only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men’ (GI 1999:51).
Language originates in need, as necessary to collective life, but is not tied to necessity. Human interaction embodies meaning, intention, imagination: 'Man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges' (EW 1975:328).
This materialism is far richer than the economism with which Marx has been associated. For Marx, the 'mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals' but as 'a definite form of activity of these individuals', 'expressing their life’, a 'definite mode of life on their part’ (GI 1999:42). 
Marx's stress on an affirmative mode of life emphasises the ontological basis of politics and recovers the normative dimension of the full range of human activity. Human beings produce materially and mentally (GI 1999:42 64/8). The essence of human beings is expressed in creative activity, the production of the social world and everything in it from language to institutions. Power thus operates through the promotion of subjectivity and is thus a more intimate phenomenon than that conception which concentrates upon its institutionalised forms in the state and economy. Since 'religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production', the 'positive supersession of private property’, as the 'appropriation of human life', is 'the positive supersession of all estrangement, and the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc., to his human, i.e. social existence’ (EPM 1975:349).
All of which offers a basis for the transformation and socialisation of the politics and morality of 'rational freedom', rooting it in a 'true' mode of life that corresponds to the human ontology as opposed to investing it in a 'higher' institutional realm apart from real society and real individuals in their empirical existence.
'Rational freedom’ is thus dissolved into the real social life of individuals. With practical reappropriation and reorganisation, power does not act on individuals in a remote fashion but acts on the interior of the person. Marx's communism is thus a mode of participation within social existence. Communism 'is at once real and directly bent towards action' (EPM 1975:349), demonstrating 'what significance the wealth of human needs has' and creating a 'new mode of production' as a 'fresh confirmation of human powers and a fresh enrichment of human nature' (EPM 1975:358).
This is also a new, associative, mode of politics. Marx enables the recovery of the sphere of fellowship and reciprocity as against the rationalised, externalised regulations of an abstracted institutional world, something which restores a concern with the personal aspects of life. Communist workmen gathering together for instruction, propaganda etc. 'acquire a new need - the need for society'. 'Company, association, conversation' 'has society as its goal' (Marx EPM 1975:365). It is this life world that Marx opposes to the official world of abstracted rationality. The reciprocal community that Marx affirms emphasises friendship, sociability, sympathy and empathy as fundamental social attitudes forming the basis of society itself.
This approach challenges the equation of justice with the public realm as an impersonal domain. Marx reworks rather than recovers the classical belief that human beings realise themselves within the political life of the public realm. This 'political life' has a unique meaning for Marx, rooted in an associative mode of life that recovers the public character of personal life. Marx's case for self-determination through social control (chapter 7) is thus rooted in ontological assumptions that challenge the rationalised social order that subjects individuals to external processes and authorities. Marx's perspective permits the intervention within the public realm of human needs, etc, the very things which have been confined to the private sphere in being defined as 'personal'.
In sum, this section has shown the crucial role played by Marx's ontology of self-creation in defining the 'true’ public life as incorporating reason into material life. Integrating reason and nature, the normative ideal of a 'rational’ community of ends is identified as unfolding through the self-realisation of essential human nature. Praxis, as the core of Marx's ontology, embraces the full diversity of human activity and, critically, possesses a democratic aspect in treating all individuals as knowledgeable and transformative agents. Precisely what this democratic aspect is and what it implies will now be examined.

6-5 Praxis - The Democratisation Of Politics, Power And Philosophy

This section examines crucial aspects from the Theses on Feuerbach in so far as they elaborate upon the democratic aspects of Marx's embedding of 'rational freedom' in real life. The argument pays particular attention to the potential for new modes of political expression in Marx's praxis, particularly in subverting the educator-educated dualism as the basis of the theoretico-elitist model of politics. This model puts politicians and philosophers in a position of authority as alone being able to rise above the general determinism of circumstances. In locating the revolutionary power in the transformative praxis of the demos, Marx will be shown to be able to realise the emancipatory and democratic principles of 'rational freedom’ without having to have recourse to an ideal educational agency, Rousseau's Legislator as public tutor, Kant's moral law as the command of duty, Hegel's state as ethical agency.
Marx's materialism incorporates conscious, creative human agency, taking an activist view of human beings, defined in terms of capacities and powers (Parekh 1982:26; Tucker 1961:25 45/69). In this, he builds upon Kant, for whom the human mind possesses certain innate mental equipment for interpreting the material obtained by sense experience (Kitching 1988:14/5; Kant 1974:113; Callinicos 1983:14/5; Korner 1955:27/32 chs 3 4), and upon Hegel, for whom spirit and reason - the Idea - develop through 'the progress of the consciousness of freedom' (Hegel 1953:19; Kitching 1988:17). Materialising Hegel's concepts of objectification and alienation (Norman 1983:174/5), Marx took the standpoint of 'socialised humanity' (Thesis X 1975:423), arguing for the emancipatory-revolutionary incursion of human beings as subjects into fetishised and alienated 'matter' (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:38/9). 'Circumstances' are not external to human beings but inherently subjective. This section examines the democratic implications of this argument, showing how Marx subverts hierarchical and elitist claims to power and knowledge, however 'rational'.
The fundamental point of Marx's critique of Feuerbach is that all previous materialists have conceived reality 'only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively' (Thesis I 1975:421). This purely contemplative attitude characterised Enlightenment materialism, confronting individuals deterministically with laws of nature which could be observed but not altered. Consequently, 'the active side was developed abstractly by idealism' (Thesis I 1975:421), regarding the real movement of history as an expression of the movement of Spirit.

Marx incorporates idealism's activist, creative principle so as to replace the old conception of human beings as the passive, unconscious product of circumstances with the new view of human beings as the active, conscious producers of circumstances. Hence Marx's emphasis upon 'human activity' as 'practical-critical' activity that creates 'objective' reality (Thesis I 1975:421). This makes the point that 'objective' structures and relations are human, that there is subjectivity in objectivity and vice versa (Sherman 1996:35/7).

In empowering creative human agency, this active materialism possesses a democratic character. Though Marx's concern with the 'scientific' analysis of underlying structures implies an access to knowledge denied to those remaining on the surface level of appearance (McLennan 1989:114 202/3 214/5; Wright 1978:12), in subverting the idea of an alienated, inert totality, the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis makes reality accessible to all. Marx conceives of progress from the externally imposed societal determinism of 'circumstances' to freedom as self-determination through the conscious self-activity of human agents (Parekh 1982:27; Gunn 1992:40; Meister 1990:249 250).
Philosophy is superseded, resolved into practical, social life. Objective truth is defined as a practical question (Thesis II 1975:422). Since 'all social life is practical’, the mysteries of theory 'find their rational solution in human practice and the comprehension of this practice' (Thesis VIII 1975:423). The comprehension of the world, of the material as sensuously real, must therefore be integrated with 'practical human-sensuous activity' (Thesis V 1975:422). Reason is now not only located in the world but takes shape as '"practical-critical" activity' (Thesis I 1975:422). For Marx, 'thought' and 'reality' are inextricably connected through human activity whereas speculation about 'thought' in abstraction from activity generates the problems of philosophy (Thesis II 1975:422). Hence Thesis XI: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however is to change it' (1975:423).
Feuerbach's materialism, Marx argues, cannot understand that human existence is the product of the 'practical-critical' activity of human beings as conscious, deliberate agents. 'The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself (Thesis III 1975:422).

Passive materialism, transferring activity from the human agent to circumstances, possesses conservative implications which it avoids only by a dualism of the ideal and the real, dividing society into 'two parts, one of which is superior to society’ (Thesis III 1975:422) in being raised above social determinism. This privileging of an ideal agency as the emancipator of society forms the basis of an authoritarian politics in which an elite is raised above the general social determinism. Consequently, philosophical materialism, like idealism, 'justifies the state, not on the pretext of organization but that of education' (Lefebvre 1972:33). This was precisely the historical fate of 'rational freedom' in having to become a lawful freedom within an abstract public regulating a coercive, competitive social order organised around private property. Law would force people to be free. Femia may compare Rousseau's advocacy of a 'superior intelligence' to educate people to submit to their 'higher self in the form of the general will with a vanguardism implicit in Marx's position (Femia 1993:119/120) but there is a reciprocity in Marx's position which is specifically designed to overcome the dualism of educators and educated (Thesis III 1975:422).


Marx's activist conception of 'revolutionary practice', asserting the 'coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing' (Thesis III 1975:422; Draper 1978:72/5), the view that 'circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances' (GI 1999:59), roots out the philosophical basis of an abstract educative public. In the process, Marx explicitly renounces the revolutionary tradition which emphasised the minority seizure of political power to reshape society from above. Such authoritarian politics would engineer changes from without in the manner of the educational dictatorship of the 'rational' tradition whereas Marx would engender changes from within as a self-change on the part of the human agents. One has, therefore, to insist upon Marx's conception that the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself (a point reaffirmed in the Circular Letter of 1879 where Marx rejects the view that the workers are 'too uneducated to emancipate themselves and must first be freed from above by philanthropic bourgeois and petty bourgeois' (CL FI 1974:375).

The rest of this section explores the political implications of Marx's Theses, arguing for the centrality of praxis in transcending the 'rational' tradition by integrating the phenomenal and the noumenal through 'sensuous human activity' (Thesis I 1975:421).
By repudiating environmental determinism, thus overcoming 'the paradox of emancipation' in which change is conceivable only over the heads of those being emancipated (Femia 1993:118/21; Lindley 1986:169 ch 10; Benton 1982:15), Marx rejects the authoritarian educational implications of the old revolutionary - and 'rational’ - politics. The Weitling-Buonarroti view that the masses are too determined by circumstances to emancipate themselves (Thomas 1985:110/1; Geras 1986:134/5 141; Draper 1986:30/4) replaces proletarian self-emancipation by emancipation from above via the ideal agency of self-appointed educators who have, somehow, escaped the general societal determinism (Geras 1986:141; Cleaver 1979:29). In contrast, Marx's active materialism makes the working class the (active) subject rather than the (passive) object of social change (Callinicos 1983:45/6; Draper 1977:59). The education of the working class is not supplied 'from the outside' by an enlightened elite but is a self-education generated by the working class themselves in the course of their self-development (Callinicos 1983:46/7). This shows how a new associative public is constituted through the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class able to forge 'rational' bonds of universality and commonality at the heart of society as a new public without having recourse to the state. Marx argues that 'only the proletarians' can accomplish the 'new social task' 'for all society’, abolishing the state - and class - as 'the centralised and organised governmental power usurping to be the master instead of the servant of society' (Marx CWF 1974:250).
That Marx's 'proletarian' public or 'party' is a broad notion constituted by proletarian self-organisation is evident throughout his politically engaged writings, Marx calling for 'revolutionary workers' governments' constituted through 'local committees and councils or workers' clubs or committees' (Marx REV 1973:326) and 'constituent assemblies of the proletariat’ forming a civil state within the abstract state (Marx CSF SE 1977:84; Marx Instructions FI 1974:91 92; Gilbert 1981:226; Draper 1978:99/103 599/622). The International was especially valued by Marx for showing the proletarian capacity to generate publicity (Marx FI 1974:99 271). Marx's 'proletariat' is the crucial social agency in avoiding the historical incarnation of reason as a bureaucratisation, evident in both Hegel and Weber.
Through the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, Marx is able to avoid the way that the thinkers in the 'rational' tradition had to resort to an external ideal realm or agency to embody and impose morality. Femia makes a direct comparison here between Rousseau's Legislator and marxism's vanguard party, praising Lenin's willingness to confront the elitist implications of marxism's redemptive project (Femia 1993:119/120). Presenting Marx's praxis as a democratisation of power, politics and philosophy challenges the arguments that Marx's materialism is linked inextricably with a vanguard politics (Laclau 1990:77; Post 1996:17 291 292 293 325). Marx exposed and repudiated the elitism and authoritarianism implicit in the old materialist determinism, particularly in the raising of an elite over society as an ideal/superior agency able to 'educate' human beings passively dependent on circumstances. With this in mind, his active materialism was designed to root out all possibilities for vanguardism (Meszaros 1995:675; Smith 1996:37/8; Draper 1977:48 50/1; Therborn 1976:332). That the theoretico-elitist model privileging politicians and philosophers raised above a societal determinism returned in the 'scientific socialism' of the marxist parties (Avineri 1968:147/9; Perkins 1993:25; Miller 1982:116 118/23; McCarney 1990:3) suggests a political failure to appreciate the democratic potentialities of Marx's materialism in subverting alienated social conditions (Psychopedis 1992:38/9) rather than any totalitarian potential in Marx's communism itself. Since neither orthodox nor western marxism could incorporate a shaping role for proletarian class praxis, proletarian self-development generating the new public was replaced by a model in which these capacities were supplied for the proletarian movement from the outside (with deleterious consequences for the communist public sphere) (Cleaver 1979:73/4; Cleaver 1992:127/8; Parekh 1982:164/5 168; Colletti 1972:375f; Lukacs 1971:68f 163f).
Marx's connection of praxis with proletarian self-emancipation is designed to overcome the elitism of educational dictatorships (Thomas 1985:110/1; Geras 1986:134/6 137/8; Draper II 1978:78; Draper 1986:39/42). Unlike Rousseau, Marx had no need of the device of the Legislator as public tutor, generating the capacity for transformation and achieving a genuine commonality and universality from within civil society itself (Miller 1982:93/4), reconstituting individuals as free social beings as a process of self-transformation, without the need for external or ideal agencies.




The purpose of the opening two chapters of this thesis was to construct and trace the development of the concept of 'rational freedom' with a view to establishing the normative and political character of Marx's communism. The basic theme has been that whilst the 'rational' tradition promised a rich, reciprocal definition of individual freedom, the realisation of its ideal community was blocked by two basic dualisms - reason and nature, public and private.


This chapter has argued that Marx defined an affirmative mode of life which, in providing an environment for a fulfilling existence for each and all, embodied reason in the material life of society. Marx, with his conception of the human essence as creative self-realisation through history, is able to conceive of a 'true’ public life which realises the 'rational' principles of reciprocity, interaction and intersubjectivity within actual social existence.
This chapter, therefore, constructs Marx's concept of the creative human essence so as to envisage that mode of life which would enable the realisation of that essence. By achieving communism as this 'true' public, morality and politics become coextensive with the practical lives of individuals in everyday social existence, no longer existing as an ideal 'rational’ sphere abstracted from the world of experience. And, as the final section defining praxis as a democratisation of politics, power and philosophy demonstrated, Marx realised 'rational freedom’ without having to resort to the institutional constraint or educational dictatorship of the 'rational' tradition.
The 'rational subject' of modernity requiring an institutional-legal apparatus constraining the individual to morality has been shown to betray an anti-democratic distrust which Marx overcomes with a conception of emancipatory interaction focused on the everyday life world. Conceiving praxis in terms of human self-creation makes it possible to recover the normative and political dimension of the full range of human creativity from within the rationalised world, putting the moral and the political in touch with the reality of lived experience. Marx thus offers an approach which can confront the way that reason becomes an instrumental notion through a Weberian process of 'rationalisation' which penetrates every area of social existence, removes relations and identities from individuals, imposing its own, and which instrumentalises individual life via overarching transformations proceeding externally (Turner 1992; Brubaker 1984; Bologh 1990). Such a process denies 'rational’ emancipation. The next chapter thus confronts Weber, proceeding to develop Marx's alternative rationalisation thesis as identifying possibilities for community and individuality immanent in the capitalist process of development.


7 REASON AND RATIONALISATION 

The last chapter showed Marx as tracing the unresolved 'rational’ dualisms bequeathed by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel to the alienation of labour as the alienation of the conscious life-activity of the species. Marx's awareness that the principles generated by the tradition of 'rational freedom’ - the unity of autonomy and communality, mutual respect, reciprocity - are not automatically translated into the institutional fabric of real life, is shared by Weber. Weber's analysis of routinisation, standardisation, the calculability of rules, depersonalisation, bureaucratic structures, exposes the centralisation of authority, depoliticisation, and the encroachment of formal rationality into all aspects of social life within the historical process of capitalist modernisation. Both Marx and Weber make it clear that modernity cannot be conceived as the progressive realisation of an ideal of reason. Both share an emphasis upon the expansion of technical rationality within the historical process of capitalist modernisation. But whereas Weber thought this process to be irrevocable, Marx can propose a path beyond 'rational' modernity.
The conception of modernity which emerges is that of power alienated from the demos and institutionalised in a reified framework of control. Weber's awareness that rationalisation comprises a series of separations reveals 'rational' reason-nature and public-private dualisms as constituting capitalist modernity as a domain of alien control. The state and capital are shown to be inherently anti-democratic forces resting upon the alienation of social power. [1]

That Weber's rationalisation thesis possesses a strong normative dimension locates Weber in the tradition of 'rational freedom'. However, Weber's 'rational' concern with the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation is less the promise of an emancipation to come than an awareness of how the process of rationalisation works to suppress autonomy. Just as Marx's critique of alienation demonstrates a Kantian concern with individuals as ends in themselves, so Weber demonstrates a concern with the servitude accompanying the rise of bureaucratic structures, the uniformity of life, and the merging of politics, economics and culture within an overarching administered apparatus of bureaucratic power.

Weber's rationalisation thesis is similar to Marx's critique of alienation, particularly in the sense that human agency is transformed into human bondage through the means-ends inversion (Turner 1993:179). Although their purpose is to exist as administrative means to ends independent of them, formally rationalised institutions are ineliminable once developed. But since Weber does not believe that formally rationalised institutions can be made the servant of substantive political ends, the problem is resolved on the side of means elevated to the status of ends. Alienation is not abolished at all in Weber's rationalisation thesis.
This chapter seeks to make Weber's project true to his own 'rational' roots in the Greco-Germanic tradition as against Anglo-American empiricist interpretations. Whereas the loss of meaning and freedom is an irremediable feature of rationalisation for Weber, a reworking of the rationalisation thesis in light of Marx's historical materialism offers a more positive thesis rationalisation as the expanded possibility for collective control and as the progressive institutionalisation of reason in society. This approach reads rationalisation as containing potential for embodying reason in the positive, emancipatory sense of human growth and realisation as well as in the repressive sense of institutional control.
The modern individual lacks the constitutive relationships connecting each and all which the 'rational’ tradition considers crucial to freedom. Though capitalist relations have situated the individual within an extensive network of social inter-connection, individuals are, paradoxically, simultaneously separated from each other. The reduction of relationships to a monadic rationality in which ends have become purely personal results in the paradox that whilst individuals have never been more inter-dependent than under capitalist relations, this inter-dependency takes impersonal, objective and external form. The question is whether this alien bond contains potential for a genuine universality in human affairs. The last two sections of this chapter examine Marx's alternative rationalisation thesis as examining the process of capitalist development with a view to identifying this possibility.
This chapter thus proceeds beyond Weber's predicament to show how Marx recovered commonality by putting inter-dependency on an associative basis. Marx defines real community against the impersonal unity and interconnection imposed upon separated individuals by the abstract communities of the state and capital/money/exchange. As the third section argues, this external imposition is explained by the fact that the powers generated within capitalist modernity - capital, bureaucracy, the market, the state and law - are collective powers which are not accompanied by collective forms of control. Through their separation from each other, individuals are subject to an external control. In the absence of mechanisms for conscious common control within the 'system of general social metabolism’ (Marx 1973:158/9), human powers are experienced as alien. Further, where power is external to individuals, imposing an alien unity on separated individuals, real community is displaced and can be achieved only as illusion and representation.
At the heart of this chapter, then, is the question of relations, control and community - the question of whether the bonds connecting individuals are real or abstract. These issues are of contemporary political significance. For capital's ‘oligarchic control of the means of power' renders notions of citizenship and community 'thin of meaning’: 'the vast majority of people are separated from these means of power' (Miliband 1994:91/2). The question of power and participation is central to Marx's pursuit of 'true' democracy as enabling individuals to determine the quality of their lives as citizens (Bottomore 1993:41). This chapter will show that Marx rests repoliticisation as the realisation of citizenship as an active concept beyond the state upon a conception of conscious common control by united individuals.

In fine, the first section discusses Weber in relation to the demise of emancipatory reason within 'rational' modernity. With disenchantment making it impossible to conceive the good as anything more than irreducible subjective opinion, Weber registered the impossibility in the modern world of the moral and institutional framework which the 'rational' tradition makes essential to individual identity and self-realisation. Instead, the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' becomes a legal rationality regulating capitalist relations.
The second section identifies 'separation' as the key figure blocking the emancipatory potential of reason, realising it in such a way as to repress democracy and individuality, thus rendering community abstract and artificial as an external restraint imposed via an objective apparatus of control.
The third section traces the evolution of an emancipatory reason into a repressive rationalisation through the independence of relations from the demos. This is used to support a demand for the conscious common control of relations on the part of the united individuals. The 'rational' coincidence of the freedom of each and all is thus located by Marx in the associative activity of everyday life.
The final section sets the problem of rationalisation in the context of Marx's attempt to extract a notion of 'true' community out of the tradition of 'rational freedom'. The argument thus returns to the definition of 'true community’ in chapters 5 and 6, showing Marx's development of the concept. The crucial point is that Marx is able to analyse the modern erosion of subjectivity in relation to capitalist processes of rationalisation, thus being able to distinguish between repressive and emancipatory rationalisation within the historical embodiment of reason under capitalism. Integrating substantive human faculties within reason, Marx is able to avoid Weber's ultimate pessimism as regards the possibilities for freedom, democracy and happiness in a totally rationalised society.
A particular issue in this section is the way that the division of labour, separating individuals from each other, generates the state as an abstract community. By establishing real community, Marx removes the need for an overarching institutional framework to constrain individuals towards an alien general interest. In the process, Marx exposes the limited nature of the liberal conception of freedom as a personal independence which is compatible with - and historically emerges with - the subjection of each and all to an impersonal dependence upon capital.
This section concludes by distinguishing Marx's alienation, with revocability built into it, from Weber's rationalisation, as a permanent condition. With his critical concept of alienated labour, Marx is able to recover the emancipatory dimension of reason and conceive the progressive realisation of freedom in, and not above, the material world.

7-1 Weber: Modernity And Morality

In both his combination of reason and will and his normative concern with human ontology, Max Weber is the heir of idealist philosophy and of 'rational freedom’. However, his rationalisation thesis makes it clear that the triumph of reason promised by this tradition has produced not freedom but an 'iron cage' of impersonal economic forces and of bureaucratically organised administration (Weber P 1994:314; Turner 1993:207; Schroeder 1992:114/6). In showing how the project of freedom is realised in the rational organisation of society, Weber's project registers the 'final bankruptcy' of idealism (Murphy 1993:66 75).
Nevertheless, Weber emerges as a potential 'rational’ ally with Marx in questioning individualist liberal self-conceptions which conceive the structure of social relations as growing out of individual moral decisions. With the ethical development of 'Menschentum' as his central question, Weber has his roots in the 'rational' tradition of political philosophy, dating from Aristotle to German philosophical anthropology and characterised by a normative concern with the most appropriate mode of life for human beings (Schroeder 1992:4/5; Turner 1993:7 31 228/9; Turner Preface to Gerth and Mills ed 1991:xxvi). Weber's scientific analysis of rationalisation involves an anthropological analysis of the relationship between 'personality’ and life orders, displaying a qualitative interest in the history of humankind. The self-affirmation of essential subjectivity emerges as the mechanism by which to evaluate the differential modes of conduct of life (Hennis 1988:107ff; 1983). Weber's rationalisation thesis, therefore, is crucial in assessing the viability of a politics of creative human self-realisation. Weber's philosophical anthropology shows how the ontology of human beings - human nature - is contradicted by the cultural and social requirements of modern civilisation (Turner Preface to Gerth and Mills ed 1991:xxvi). [2]
This philosophical anthropology gives a fundamentally moral dimension to Weber's process of rationalisation, converging around the notion of disenchantment, implying powerlessness in face of the bureaucratisation of the world and generating a search for the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation (Turner Preface to Lowith 1993:6/7; Lowith 1993:42/4; Turner 1993:212; Mommsen 1987:91/2).
Weber is a key figure in addressing the fate of liberal values in a disenchanted world (Bellamy 1992:158), charting a universal trend toward illiberal forms as capitalism generates a new feudalism from within itself (Bellamy 1992:165; Mommsen 1974:ch5). Whilst he valued the ability to plan and coordinate one's life as the essence of liberalism's rationalism, and whilst he considered 'discipline' to be necessary to the modern social order, Weber considered the extension of bureaucratic techniques and the consequent standardisation of everyday life to be ultimately life denying (Turner Preface to Gerth and Mills ed 1991:xxvi; Beetham 1985:44/9 and ch7). For Weber, 'individualists' are swimming "against the stream' of material developments leading 'in the direction of increasing "unfreedom1" (Weber in Runciman ed 1978:282/3).
Weber reveals that the triumph of reason as rationalisation brings not human emancipation but the control of life by impersonal economic imperatives and bureaucratically organised administrations. In the rationalised and disenchanted world of capitalism, meaning is undermined by the 'dominion of the "orders", "installations", and "establishments" of modern life which came into being through rationalisation’ (Lowith 1970:108). Thus Weber portrays capitalism as a 'tremendous cosmos' that determines with 'irresistible force' the lives of 'all the individuals who are born into this mechanism’ (Weber 1985:181).

By 'rationalisation', Weber means the process in which identifiable, abstract, calculable rules and procedures replace the traditional in all spheres of activity, resulting in the disenchantment and instrumentalisation of life (Weber SV 1991:139). The rationalised world imprisons individual agents within impersonal routines and compels action to become calculating, instrumentalist and predictable. As a result, 'meaninglessness was no longer an aesthetic experience of the few, but a contagion' (Wolin 1984:8A). The technical control of the environment is accompanied by a loss of moral meaning. Modernity is marked by an ever-increasing sense of the apparent meaninglessness of the historical process and, by way of reaction, by a deep desire to recover a sense of purpose (Levy 1993:84/5).

This thesis has argued that Marx, targeting the dualisms of reason and nature/public and private as responsible for modernity's dissolution of the moral framework, proceeded from a conception of creative human essence to embody 'rational’ principles in social existence. Weber, in contrast, rules out the possibility of any alternative universally valid ethical code in arguing that the modern world has made it impossible to conceive the 'good' in anything other than subjective terms.

Weber sees the fate of the age in the rise of a new polytheism taking the depersonified, objectified form of an irreconcilable antagonism among irreducible orders of value and life: 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces' (SV 1991:149). This rationalised world becomes meaningless, a struggle between a multiple set of values, ruling out the possibility of an objective, integral framework for the common good (TL 1994:78/9; Habermas 1991:246). Hence the claim that the world lacks intrinsic meaning: 'The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world"‘ (SV 1991:155). Philosophy is stripped of its normative dimension in relation to the world. Underlining the 'queerness' of the view that such a world might contain values, Mackie questions how objective values could relate to or co-exist with those characteristics revealed by science; by what means we could come to know of them; and what possible relevance they could have to our existence (Mackie 1977:38/42). [3]
Weber shows how this loss of moral meaning is accompanied by the domination of an instrumental reason embodied in capitalist institutions. This domination is so great that many identify instrumental rationality with rationality as such (see the editorial introduction to Elster ed. 1986). This form of reason is not concerned with ends but with the efficient organisation of means.
One finds in Weber the same failure to secure morality in the real world, the same fractured self-identity, which expresses the central problematic of the tradition of 'rational freedom’. For if the pursuit of power is the dominant value of instrumental rationality, then the purpose of Weber's second form of reason, formal legality or legal rationality, is to regulate an instrumentally rational society and its pursuit of power through the application of impersonal and impartial principles to particular cases (ESI 1978:217). This is the same 'rational' constraint of private ends by an abstract public realm that characterised the historical form of 'rational freedom'. Weber's discussion of law in relation to formal rationality is the juridical counterpoint to the domination of instrumental rationality through the institutions of capitalist modernity (ES2 1978:665/7). Weber's split between formal and substantive rationality, showing the split within reason between the modern institutional order and the ontology of human beings, is a variant of the transition of 'rational freedom' into a lawful freedom.
That is, Weber's legal rationality, like Kant's moral law, is the form taken by the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' within a social reality governed by other than moral principles. But Weber, like Marx, is also aware of the attempts by sections of the demos particularly the organised working class - to press substantively rational demands. There is, as Therborn argues, a split between two forms of rationality in the modern state (Therborn 1978:51/56). For Weber, what matters with regard to law is consistency: 'formalistic law is .. calculable’ whereas law based upon substantive notions of justice is not (Weber 1966:252). Lawful freedom is an attempt to secure the freedom of each and of all by artificial-institutional means given the impossibility of embodying this 'rational' unity in a diremptive, capitalist reality. But it means more than this. 'Rational' law necessitates the modern bureaucratic state to ensure 'a reliable formal guarantee of all contracts by the political authority' (Weber 1964:275). 'Rational freedom' becomes a framework of rights and duties designed to preserve the institutions of the capitalist market and to regulate, but not alter, individual behaviour within that market. But the demand for a more substantive conception of rationality, connected with human needs and natures, persists and is expressed through class struggle.
Weber acknowledges the class interest behind formal legality. Denying that class constitutes community, Weber defines the 'communalisation’ offered by the modern state as 'a specific kind of "legal order"' which is 'specifically structured to protect the possession of goods per se, and especially the power of individuals to dispose, in principle freely, over the means of production’ (CSP 1991:184/5). Therefore, the point is not simply that 'rational freedom' in the form of a lawful freedom achieves merely an abstract equality of each and all but that, within a capitalist institutional order, formal or rational legality possesses a clear class purpose. Whereas the tradition of 'rational freedom' sought to substitute force by morality in human affairs, Weber is explicit that 'rational' law is to protect class relations by the force of the state: 'the modern economic order under modern conditions could not continue if its control of resources were not upheld by the legal compulsion of the state; that is, if formally "legal" rights were not upheld by the threat of force’ (Weber 1964:160).
Breaking radically with the 'rational' legacy, Weber defines the state not as the embodiment of a rational telos but strictly as an instrument of force. 'Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends ... Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of force' (PV 1991:77/8). Weber identifies 'politics' with a struggle for power within and between states. Kant's end of political peace and Hegel's end of ethical totality are completely abandoned.
Weber's argument expresses the transformation of 'rational freedom', concerning ends, emancipation and the good, into a lawful freedom establishing a framework of rights and justice regulating a diremptive society. The normative component is abandoned. The state, resting on force, could no longer be legitimised in terms of natural law and substantive conceptions of justice given the absence of an overarching system of values in a disenchanted, pluralistic world. Rather, the state could be justified only in terms of ensuring compromise between conflicting interests (ESI 1978:215 56; ES2 1978:874/5).
Weber himself doubted whether legal rationality was strong enough to regulate the instrumental rationality of capitalist society and hence embody 'rational' norms in a diremptive class society which patently contradicts them. Weber's problem derives from the way capitalism, as an instrumentally rational and substantively irrational order, splits reason. Capitalism, that is, is an unnatural order which requires an abstract legal framework for purposes of regulation and control but which also provokes, as a reaction from within society, demands for more substantive conceptions of reason.
This is a class issue, as Marx had understood in making the proletariat the agency of rational freedom's universality, i.e. its emancipatory rationality. Weber's legal rationality is caught between the demand to maintain social order on the part of the capitalist class, thus maintaining a repressive rationality, and the demand to realise social justice on the part of the working class, thus affirming an emancipatory conception.
Weber refers to working class demands as being founded upon the 'emotionally coloured ethical postulates' of 'justice and dignity'. These could not be given technical legal form since they expressed 'substantive justice rather than formal legality’ (ES2 1978:886). Weber is in no doubt on which side this problem is resolved in practice:





But Weber, throughout Economy and Society, returns to the problem of political legitimacy in light of the breakdown of the natural law tradition. His view is that, in the context of regulating an anarchic market economy of competing interests, the formal and technical character of legality would increase and become ever more divorced from practical, class, struggles over substantive conceptions of justice. In making these points, Weber makes explicit the separation of 'rational' law from the needs of the demos, its formal character showing the thin and attenuated character of its 'lawful’ reason as against the substantive conceptions, concerning human ontology, for which the organised working class fight and which were once integral to the concept of 'rational freedom' as creative self-realisation within community. Marx seeks to realise this normative dimension of 'rational freedom' against its legal-institutional form by overcoming the reason-nature and public-private dualisms which led to the 'rational' promise of a community of ends taking form as a lawful freedom regulating capitalist society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism.

Given the roots of formal legality in a coercive class order, Weber's attempt to constrain individual behaviour in the real world by means of a juridical apparatus expresses the same dualism of noumenal and phenomenal which reduced the 'rational' project to an impotent ideal. An abstracted moral code rubs against the compulsion individuals face in their real, practical lives to make themselves efficient means to external ends. Weber offers no reason for supposing that a formal legal rationality abstracted from the empirical world can predominate over an instrumental rationality embodied in the institutions of capitalist reality. Lacking a social identity connecting public and private, individuals will not sacrifice their private ends for the public good.

Like Kant's moral law and Hegel's ethical state, Weber's juridical reason regulates rather than alters a fundamentally irrational society. Further, the imposition of formal legality is revealed as an ideological project, claiming to respect the equality of each and all whilst serving to protect asymmetrical relations of class power.

With Weber, the divorce between legal rationality/lawful freedom and social needs was connected to the collapse of the natural law tradition (Strauss 1953:36/78). This moral failure of modernity is serious. For morality, in the 'rational' perspective, is not merely a method of social control but gives coherence to individual and social existence. In the absence of an overarching framework within which moral argument can claim authority, the world expresses a plurality of values, no one of which can claim priority over the others (Weber in Lassman and Velody 1989:22). The individual experiences this as an overall meaninglessness.

To the extent they refused to accept the 'fundamental fact' that they are 'destined to live in a godless and prophetless time’ (Weber SV 1991:153), Weber expected individuals to have recourse to false prophets, surrogates, and artificial communities as compensation. Weber repudiated such 'communitarian' solutions to the modern crisis: 'Ideas such as "state", "church", "community", "party" or "enterprise" are thought of as being realised in a community' whereas in truth 'they provide an ideological halo for the master'. As 'ersatz', totalising and collectivising representations are capable of generating 'fanatical sects but never a genuine community' (Weber SV B 1991:155 199; Turner 1993:17/8; Sayer 1991:143 152).
But Weber himself did respond to 'the meaninglessness of human existence' (Wolin 1984:74), attempting to recover some sort of individualist freedom and political indeterminism against the inevitability of bureaucratic and oligarchic rule (Therborn 1976:189/90), offering a revolt against positivism and positivistic politics by placing great emphasis upon a charismatic politics as a possible means of generating new meanings (Mommsen 1974:113). Politics has this potential since its substance is in values capable of subverting rationalising and routinising forces (ES2 1978:902). But Weber's faith in the 'value oriented' actions of individuals, especially 'charismatic leaders' (Mommsen 1974:102/3) is unconvincing given the magnitude of the task of recovering meaning against the bureaucratic regulation of life.
For Marx, if the framework connecting each with all is lacking due to a certain form of social existence, then, rather than embrace a legal framework or 'formal legality' (ES2 1978:886) regulating a monadic rationality, there is a need for social transformation. If identity is undermined by the lack of mutual recognition, then there is a need to develop an adequate moral framework which recognises that identity is not the achievement of the self alone but requires reciprocity.

Marx took from the 'rational' tradition a notion of the individual as something more than an egoistic being locked in a world of immediacy. At the same time he rejected the self-denial inherent in the reason/nature dualism at the core of 'rational freedom' and which became integral to capitalist rationalisation, particularly in terms of its split between the public domain of state and capital and the private domain of disempowered interaction.

Weber rejected the possibility of recovering Hellenic Sittlichkeit (Weber 1985:180/1; Liebersohn 1988:esp ch4). In a 'disenchanted world’, meaning is established in personal relations rather than through socialisation to certain communal ideals. Denying the possibility within modernity of establishing an objectively valid and universally shared ethical orientation entailed a neo-Kantianism on Weber's part, emphasising a personal commitment to self-chosen values in relation to real possibilities (Levy 1993:92). Weber affirms an 'ethic of responsibility, which means that one must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one's actions' (P 1994:359/60).
One can, with Weber, embrace this fairly onerous responsibility a liberating experience (Weber SV 1991:148 149). But, rejecting monadic freedom as illusory, in cutting individuals off from the greater range of possibilities they obtain in relation to each other, Marx, in line with the 'rational' tradition, maintains that self-identity requires a wider communal and ethical framework with which individuals may identify. [4]
In terms of the 'rational' tradition, Weber, in Kantian fashion, deals with this question of moral and political commitment in individual, ahistorical terms. In contrast, Marx, in Hegelian fashion, stresses the communal and historical dimension of politics and morality. As chapter 3 argued, the fate of Kantian morality was to have taken an external form in which the individual was obliged to obey the command of duty in conformity with the universal categorical imperative. In contrast, chapter 4 demonstrated the superiority of Hegel's embodied, socially orientated morality in which the highest duty of the individual is given in terms of participating in a moral and political framework. For Marx, individuals supply this framework from within social relationships rather than have it imposed as a 'higher' order via an abstracted institutional framework. He thus combines Kantian personal commitment, no longer abstracted from the real, 'phenomenal’ world, with the Hegelian ethical community. As such, Marx finds a way of making 'Hellenic Sittlichkeit' available on - but going beyond - the modern terrain. Much depends upon how this rational community is constituted. Weber fills the moral vacuum created by the absence of Sittlichkeit with bureaucracy. He comments upon 'the sure interests of the bureaucracy for the conditions of maintaining its power' through "the canonization of the abstract and 'objective' idea of "reasons of state"‘. This 'specifically modern' idea (B 1991:220) shows the lasting importance of Marx's criticism of the 'rational' tradition's tendency to abstraction, idealism and bureaucratisation as compensation for the failure to locate morality in the real sphere of human affairs. Marx's break with rational freedom's ideal socialisation process, in which individuals obey external moral codes or the internalised compulsion of reason, is crucial. As chapter 5 demonstrated, Marx saw philosophy and politics, the university and the state, as expressing a bureaucratic-regulatory approach exercised over against the everyday life world, denying the sensuous reality of individuals and organising their disempowerment and disembodiment (Marx CHDS 1975:106/9 112/6 124 143/4). The separation of the state from civil society, separating the abstract and the concrete (CHDS 1975:70 145), makes the individual available as a target for bureaucratic control (Sayer 1991:78/9; Meister 1990:189/90; Avineri 1968:23/4). [5] But it is incapable of embodying a genuine rationality, one rooted in human natures and needs.
The modern state is a substitute for rational community, the 'illusory community’ (Marx GI 1999) or, as Nietzsche conceived it, the 'new idol' (Turner 1993:188/90; Stauth and Turner 1988:54 56/7 210 216 216/7). As Mommsen has argued, as a nationalist committed to a strong German state, Weber himself was not immune from this modern tendency (Weber 1980:442; NS 1994:1/28; Mommsen 1974 1985; Turner 1993:217/223). But there is an interesting parallel with Marx in Weber's argument for a nation of 'masters' (Herrenvolk), not a master race but a nation of free individuals in control of their lives and responsible for their political activity (SD 1994:129). The possibility of this libertarian conception will be pursued in the next sections. These will show that it is Marx rather than Weber, with his impotent Kantian-liberal individualism, who conceives the possibility for a moral and communal framework capable of constituting the truly human society of free individuals.

7-2 Rationalisation, Alienation And Separation 
The Bureaucratisation Of Reason

This section identifies Weber's general category of 'separation’ as the key figure behind emancipatory reason taking form as a repressive rationalisation. The 'rational' dualisms of public and private, reason and nature are institutionalised in the form of a general separation within the social order. Weber's extension of the range of alienations through his concept of 'separation', separating individuals from their means of control, offers parallels with Marx and the way he proceeded from the critique of the abstract state and state bureaucracy to capitalist relations. For Weber, it is only in 'the complete depersonalisation of administrative management by bureaucracy' that ‘the separation of public and private' spheres fundamental to the capitalist economy is realised 'fully and in principle' (B 1991:239). 'General' separation 'is the common basis of the modern state, in its political, cultural and military sphere, and of the private capitalist economy' (ES2 1978:1394), generating bureaucratisation and centralisation in place of self-regulation. The section, therefore, develops the notion of 'alien control', comparing Weber's general separation as an anti-democratic force inherent in rational modernity with Marx's identification of the state and capital as alienated social powers blocking democratisation.

In Weber's general 'separation', the development of the modern state 'is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through the gradual expropriation of independent producers' (Gerth and Mills ed 1991:50). The separation of the producers from their means of production is but one of many 'separations' characterising modern social organisation (Weber 1968:39), including the expropriation of 'the means of polities' and the material means of administration (P 1994:314 315), the separations of officials from the means of administration, of workers from the means of production, of intellectual workers from the means of mental production, of soldiers from the means of violence in the army (S P 1994:279 281 314 315/6; Turner 1993:177; Sayer 1991:135; Turner in Gerth and Mills ed 1991:xxiv). The 'means of operation' in all spheres are 'concentrated by means of a bureaucratically structured human apparatus' (S 1994:281).
This has profound implications for democracy. [6] For Weber the 'concentration of the material means of operation' entails an increasing 'socialisation' which 'inevitably means increasing bureaucratisation' (PG 1994:147). On these premises, democratisation does not involve the governed taking an active share in governing but the 'levelling of the governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group, which in turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and in form' (B 1991:224/6 231). This returns to one of the central themes of Rousseau and Marx - the divorce of the government from the governed, both in fact and form. In alienating their political subjectivity, the governed become objects of administration. Their sovereign power is illusory.
In addressing this problem, Weber repudiates Marx's project of dissolving hierarchical organisation through subjecting relations of authority to the elective principle as Utopian (B 1991:229). The ruled cannot replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists. The bureaucratic 'machine' 'makes "revolution", in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, increasingly impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure' (B 1991:230). Not only is bureaucracy the most effective form of organisation for complex industrial societies (Wright 1978:184; Beetham in Miller ed 1991:48), it is an instrument of power (Wright 1978:185). Those in control of the bureaucracy have effective power.
Democratisation itself implies further bureaucratisation since ‘the great state and the mass party are the classical soil for bureaucratisation' (B 1991:209), socialism elevating both in the dictatorship of the officials (R S 1994:70 292; Bottomore 1985:26). The universal community promised by 'rational freedom' is thus realised as an 'inescapable universal bureaucratisation' (S 1994:279). Weber argues that 'in large states everywhere modern democracy is becoming a bureaucratised democracy’ governed by 'paid officials' (S 1994:279). Unable to identify an alternative to the seemingly inexorable descent into a monocratic bureaucratised society, Weber was gloomy about the future, predicting that the 'bureaucratisation of society will encompass capitalism too, just as it did in Antiquity' (Weber 1983:159).
Weber asserts bureaucratisation as the highest form of societal rationality and bureaucracy as 'indestructible' (Weber 1968:987), subjecting individuals irrevocably to 'the objective force of an apparatus operating autonomously above their heads' (Habermas 1989:307). This heavy emphasis upon bureaucracy as irrevocable and 'inescapable' (PG 1994:146 156 159) suggests that Weber is a prisoner of what Maclntyre refers to as a bureaucratic ideology (Maclntyre 1981:26/7 114/5). This ideology narrows social possibilities for self-government and hence possesses political and ethical implications. Though Weber's 'bureaucratic' version of 'rational freedom' is 'realistic' in fitting the contours of a repressive modern rationalisation, it explicitly abandons the 'rational' concern to put human affairs on a moral footing. Instead of a view of the 'good’ life there is a bureaucratic regulation which exercises an ideological and, indeed, an illusory control.
The state is thrown back into the arbitrary exercise of power from which the 'rational' thinkers had sought escape. As the characteristic institution of the liberal state, claiming neutrality whilst preserving class society, bureaucracy fails to resolve the internal conflicts of either 'rational' philosophy or the liberal society it regulates. The bureaucratic institution cannot resolve the problem of coercion and cannot find a moral standard to justify the exercise of power (Unger 1984:172). As such, bureaucracy represents precisely what Marx said it represented in relation to Hegel's state, an artificial embodiment of reason and an illusory universal interest, blocking a genuine rationality, commonality and universality (Marx CHDS 1975:60 85/6 89 106/8 109 115/6 124 127/31). The bureaucracy either remains trapped within the constraints of class society or it issues in a new form of dependency in which the bureaucratic interest becomes the public interest. Most important, from the perspective of rational freedom's normative concern with human ontology, bureaucratic forms deny opportunities for human growth and self-development, subordinating persons to things, and failing to satisfy the essential need to be human (Unger 1984:174; Ehrlich 1996:63; Bottomore 1985:27). The tradition of 'rational freedom’ is thus dissolved into a rationalised social order which denies the human ontology. The process of rationalisation which replaces communal social action with rationally regulated action (Habermas 1991:341/2) is a rationalistic desolidarisation which systematically eliminates 'rational* interaction, reciprocity and cooperation from everyday life. The standardisation and uniformisation which worried liberals like Mill in the nineteenth century (Mill 1971:20 23 70/1 85 130 135/6 138 141; 1961:167) comes to be articulated in the refinement of discipline, surveillance and regulation, the domination of administrative personnel and the increasing instrumentalisation of the individual in an increasingly formalised life (P 1994:314; Sayer 1991:144; Turner 1993:207; Stauth and Turner 1988:49/50; Schroeder 1992:114/5).

Though Weber is critically aware of the extent to which rationalisation contradicts human ontology, he nevertheless affirms the permanence of the reason/nature dualism at the heart of this process. This dualism generates 'a strictly regulated, reserved self-control' on the part of individual subjects (Weber 1974:173).

And Weber affirms that direct connection between reason and religiosity which Marx identified in the 'rational' tradition (Marx CHDS 1975:89/90; OJQ 1975:222 223 225/6), emphasising that 'a religious total personality pattern may be envisaged as something which may in principle be acquired through training in goodness', entailing 'a rationalized, methodical direction of the entire pattern of life' (Weber 1968:272). Weber links these qualities of the modern self to the Protestant ascetic who 'will always demand of the world an ethically rational order and discipline, corresponding to his own methodical self-discipline’ (Weber 1968:281). Ethical-rational discipline eliminates from everyday life all 'ungodlike factors' which are 'the average habitus of the human body and the everyday world, as those are given by nature' (Weber 1968:275). Nature, 'the spontaneous enjoyment of life' (Weber 1974:166), exists as something to be mastered.
In characterising rationalisation as a disciplinary modernising process, Weber's view is consistent with the way Foucault details a whole panoply of techniques for the normalised regulation of subjectivity (Foucault 1967 1977 1981 1984). The repressive tendencies of reason become institutionalised in the carceral network 'of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the "social worker" judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based' (Foucault 1977:304). Weber is aware of how the process of rationalisation operates to suppress the distinctive values of western civilisation, authenticity, spontaneity, creativity and autonomy (Turner 1993:228). But his affirmation of the reason-nature dualism at the heart of capitalist modernity offers no hope of checking the subordination of the individual to macro-social processes which progressively eliminate autonomy within a world of bureaucratic domination (Weber 1968:987; Schroeder 1992:115 117/8). [7]

In contrast, Marx's identification of identity with the creative human essence is able to uproot this external regulation. Marx proceeds beyond 'the imprisonment of a potentially self-defining humanity within defining and restraining forms' (Tester 1993:35) by conceiving these forms - namely the state and capital - as alienated social powers and by conceiving alienation as a revocable self-alienation. Social power alienated to the state and capital can be resumed by society. Marx can thus conceive of an alternate rationalisation thesis which, in contrast to Weber, recovers the emancipatory dimension of reason.





This section defines Marx's conscious/human collectivism as a libertarian project against capital's abstract/alien collectivism. Though Post values recent attempts on the part of 'rational choice' marxists to install the individual actor as the basic unit of analysis (Post 1996:59), Marx's focus upon the interaction of real, social individuals is a much richer conception (Miller 1982:13). The freedom of the 'real individual' is the premise and, indeed, the promise of Marx's project. Marx's consistent view is that the 'only subjects' of production are 'individuals, but individuals in mutual relationships, which they equally reproduce and produce., anew' (Marx 1973:101 712). This section argues that Marx 'grounds real as against alien community in the association of individuals as they assume control of their collective forces, producing consciously whereas once they had produced only unconsciously (Miller 1982:41 46).
Marx shows that the problem of creating and maintaining a social order embodying individual freedom has a complexity which individualist liberalism ignores. Hayek's defence of Western capitalist society as a 'self-generating or spontaneous order' (1982:2 37/8) is comparable to Weber's defence of private capitalism but fails to appreciate that the roots of the collectivising and bureaucratising tendencies condemned as socialistic lie within in the dynamics of the capitalist system (Marx 1976:ChXXXII). As Weber appreciated, capitalist rationalisation itself suppresses the self-generating or spontaneous order from within. What is needed is a strategy checking the autonomous evolution of an authoritarian and illiberal form of collective property from within capitalism (McDermott 1991:77/86). The question is not one of individualism versus collectivism but of how supra-individual forces could be subordinated to collective control so as to expand individual freedom. Those liberals concerned to retain the core liberal value of autonomy would be forced to confront capitalism as an autonomy impairing and denying order (Lindley 1986:165/6; Forbes 1989:137).
Given the external constraint exercised over society in the capital system, individuality appears as a real but uncertain achievement in the modern world (Miller 1982:3). Indeed, with the progress of humankind there is also 'a diminution of the capacity of each man taken individually' (Marx EPM 1975:373). The expanding possibilities for humankind are blocked to the detriment of real individuals. What this section argues is that this contradiction can only be resolved through the reorganisation of society so that the concrete collectivity of real individuals is opposed to the abstract collectivities of capital's alien systems of politics and production. Communist society subordinates social relations to a common control 'exercised by and for all members of society' (Wood 1981:52). This common control actualises the ideal community of ends defined in the tradition of 'rational freedom'.
Communism for Marx is a society in which social institutions and relations are subordinated to 'the power of united individuals' (Marx GI 1999:86). This realises autonomy against the way, within the division of labour, 'social relationships take on an independent existence' (1999:83). Marx explains how the freedom of the abstract individual of liberal conceptions coincides with the subjection of real individuals to the external determination of their own powers and relations. 'Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are more subjected to the violence of things' (1999:83/4). With the division of labour, 'there appears a division within the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labour and the conditions pertaining to it' (1999:83/4). If 'the individual' emerges with the ending of ties of personal dependence, the development of individuality is blocked, confined within the system of social roles imposed by the modern division of labour (Marx 1999:54; Marx 1973:196/7). 
In criticising the transformation of personal powers (relationships) into material powers as the result of the division of labour, and in arguing for the abolition of the division of labour as a condition of subjecting these powers to conscious control, Marx seeks to resolve the central problem in 'rational' political philosophy, the contradiction between the 'general interest' and the 'private person'. This contradiction, Marx reasons, 'is only a seeming one because one side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter it is by no means an independent force with an independent history' (MECW vol 5 1975:247). Marx thus looks to overcome those social relations which generate the autonomy of the general interest from real individuals. But the general interest is only achieved through the abolition of private property as a condition of the 'all-round development of individuals'. Since existing social intercourse and productive forces are 'all-embracing’, only individuals developing in an 'all-round fashion’ can appropriate them and turn them into 'free manifestations of their lives' (MECW vol 5 1975:439). Only at this stage does 'self-activity coincide with material life', corresponding ‘to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting off of all natural limitations' (Marx 1999:93). And this implies real associative community.





'Rational freedom' in Marx's hands therefore assumes an associational and libertarian character. The coincidence of the freedom of each and all - the intersubjective and interactive character of 'rational freedom’ - is realised in the associative activity of lived experience.
In contrast, liberal individualism leaves individuals subject to the objective determination of supra-individual force, the 'invisible hand’ which unconsciously allots 'fortune and misfortune to men' (Marx GI 1999:54). Only the communistic regulation of production destroys the 'alien relation' between individuals and what they produce, bringing the mode of mutual relation under the control of united individuals (1999:54/5). In exercising common control, associating individuals are freer than the individual who remains isolated, pursuing self-interest. The alien mediation exercised by the state and capital is replaced by 'rational self-control' (Miller 1982:26).
Marx had credited Rousseau with understanding the need for individuals as solitary beings to associate so as to preserve and expand their freedom (OJQ 1975:234). But Marx developed this 'rational' ideal much further so as to outline the organisational basis of society. 'Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all' (GI 1999:86). Marx believed that the individual possessed this capacity for constituting this new form of association. He identifies the communist revolution with 'the liberation of each single individual'.





The principle of 'rational freedom' as a communal and reciprocal freedom thus achieves a materially and historically effective basis. The objective dependency to which the world is subjected (Marx 1973:162ff) universalises inter-relationships and, in so doing, establishes the conditions for the 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and all. Communist society as the 'only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase' is possible only through 'the connection of individuals', consisting 'in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all' and the 'universal character of the activity of individuals on the basis of existing productive forces' (Marx 1999:117/8).
This is the realisation of human emancipation as Marx's 'rational freedom', defined in terms of the bringing of all human relationships under human control (Marx OJQ 1975:234). Communism creates the basis for 'rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves’ (Marx 1999:86). Marx thus overcomes the fetish systems of politics and production in which relations, conditions, social powers etc. achieve autonomy from individuals as alien powers, extraneous bonds and abstract communities.
Implicit in Marx's analysis is a libertarian conception of community, prioritising individuals against abstract, impersonal collectivities. This is apparent in the role played by the proletariat as Marx's universal class, as the non-bureaucratic class capable of embodying a genuine rationality within its form. The superiority of the proletarian movement lies in its ability to expand the full range of individual powers, elevating individuals above an existence as 'average individuals' within pre-established collective relationships. Communism overcomes the class designation which capitalism imposes upon individuals (Marx 1999:82). Significantly, Marx prioritises not 'the proletariat’ as a collective agency. It is 'as individuals that the individuals participate' in the 'community of revolutionary proletarians' (1999:85). Where, formerly, conditions had been abandoned to 'chance' and had obtained an 'independent existence over against the separate individuals just because of their separation as individuals', the proletarian 'combination of individuals' 'puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control' (1999:85).
The political implications are radical, affirming revolution as a process of self-emancipation on the part of actual proletarians as individuals against action engineered from above and without via an abstracted form of organisation. The proletariat, as the universal class, embodies the ideal community of ends in its self-activity and self-organisation, constituting the new, associative public.

7-4 Communist Individuality And Community

This concluding section develops Marx's pursuit of individuality and community with respect to the problematical character of reason in history, paying particular attention to the split between general and particular interests and the resulting tendency of universality, as the collective interest, to take the abstract forms of state, capital, money and exchange. The argument proceeds to locate ‘rational’ possibilities for 'true' community and individuality in the process of capitalist development. The material basis of Marx's communism as a rational ideal are is thus identified.
Although Weber's concern for the loss of individual freedom in the modern rationalised world led him to defend private capitalism, Marx is shown in this section to expose the illusory character of this individualist liberal freedom as based upon the objective dependence of all upon uncontrollable collective forces and conditions. In the process, Marx is shown to assert the association of individuals as against their separation under capitalism as the condition of human freedom. 'Rational freedom’ as a collective project uniting each and all is employed in this context as a demand for common control by individuals over supra-individual powers. This concluding section, then, defines Marx's alternative to Weber's rationalisation thesis by identifying real possibilities for realising the 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and of all on the ground of material reality. 'Rational freedom' becomes an associative conception rooted in mutual relations.

As chapter 6 argued, The German Ideology is a key text in transforming the conception of the autonomous subject of the 'rational' state into a concept which emphasises the reciprocal, situated, interactive character of individual life within society. Its central concept of Verkehr, 'intercourse’, as active contact, commerce, traffic, association, and communication between individuals (Therborn 1976:256; Arthur note 1 in Marx GI 1999:42/3), establishes the interconnection crucial to self-identity. This implies neither an individualism nor a collectivism on Marx's part but an approach which recognises that, separated from each other, both these are abstract forms which deny real individuality and sociality (Kosik in Lobkowicz ed 1967:189; Wood 1972:128/9).
Individual emancipation, within rather than against relationships, forms the core of Marx's project (Wood 1981:112). Marx's critique of individualist liberalism does not imply the end of the individual and is more adequately understood in terms of what Dallmayr's post-individualist conception of politics defines as 'an open-ended, non-possessive individuality enmeshed in, but not entirely congruous with, its surroundings' (Dallmayr 1981:12). Conceiving these surroundings in terms of interconnection, intercourse, and mutual relations challenges the way liberals have deployed 'the individual' as a moral and political weapon against 'collectivising’ marxists (Forbes 1989:136). Marx's concept of the 'real individual communal being' (EPM 1975:351) realises both the social and the individual as essential aspects of human nature. 'The individual is the social being'; the vital expression of the individual is 'an expression and confirmation of social life' (EPM 1975:350).

To show how this is so means examining the nature and preconditions of community, how real community transcends abstract liberal individualism (Miller 1989:51).
The argument begins with a central problem in the 'rational' tradition, the split between general and particular as issuing in the 'illusory' community of the state (Marx 1999:83 88). Marx's search for 'true' community, as concerned with the full emancipation of the social individual, has the state as its central critical focus (Meszaros 1995:908). In demanding 'true' community, Marx looks to dissolve the state as ‘a special organism separated from society through the division of labour' (Marx CGP 1974:356). The imperative to abolish the state arises from the need for human beings to assert themselves as individuals (Marx 1999:85).
Marx's argument is that the division of labour, entailing the contradiction between 'the separate individual' and 'the communal interest of all individuals', is responsible for 'community’ taking the 'independent form of the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community' (Marx 1999:53). As a result, the general interest becomes the 'illusory form of communal life' (Marx 1999:53).
This is the social basis of the 'rational' dualism abstracting reason from practical existence and investing it in the state. Community becomes artificial and abstract in relation to real individuals. The 'practical struggle' of particular interests, which run counter to communal interests, 'makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory "general" interest in the form of the State’ (Marx 1999:53/4). It follows that the dissolution of artificial unity, through the reconciliation of particular and communal interests at the level of the real community, would make recourse to the state as an overarching 'rational’ body redundant.
The fundamental question Marx poses with respect to the transition from an emancipatory reason realising the good to a repressive rationalisation, therefore, is how relations between human beings come to assume the alienated form of relations between things. This concerns how 'rational freedom’ becomes a morality and politics removed from the real lives and needs of real individuals, how 'personal interests' develop into 'common’, 'class' interests against the will of 'actual individuals' and 'acquire independent existence' as a general interest in relation to individuals. In this alienation, personal interests 'can be conceived by consciousness as ideal and even as religious, holy interests', 'a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual' (1999:103/4).
Marx's 'rational freedom' is premised upon the achievement of the self-realisation and development of each and all within an associative community beyond the separations and dualisms of the rationalised capitalist order. This was Marx's definition of 'true' community from the first. Before showing Marx as locating the possibility for 'true' community and individuality in the historical process, then, there is a need to return to Marx's moral-anthropological conception of community developed in chapters 5 and 6. For it is this ideal that Marx would identify as immanent within the process of capitalist development.
To recapitulate, Marx defined 'the essence of man’ as 'the true community of man’, By 'activating their own essence', individuals create the 'human community'. This community is 'no abstract, universal power' but is the 'essence’ the 'activity', 'life', 'spirit', 'wealth' of 'every individual'. This 'true community' is not a philosophical or 'rational' ideal abstracted from real needs and natures, 'the product of reflection', but 'arises out of the need and the egoism of individuals', 'from their own activity'. Marx thus resolves the rational community of ends into the material reality of real individuals. But so long as individuals do not realise their essence by giving the world a 'human organisation', community appears in the guise of estrangement as the separation of each from all appears as 'true existence' (Marx JM 1975:265/7).
From this notion of 'true’ community as expressing the 'essential bond' of individuals, Marx proceeds to show how exchange relationships estrange individuals from their essence and transform this essence into an artificially imposed communality. With the 'alienated mediation of human production' all the qualities proper to species activity are transferred to the mediator. Money as this 'alien mediator' becomes a 'veritable God' (Marx JM 1975:260/1; West 1991:44/5), intervening between individuals and their relations, products and activities. This 'mediating movement of man engaged in exchange' is not a human relationship but the 'abstract relation' of private property to private property which achieves value in the form of money. The abstract equality imposed by money expresses the 'universal inversion of individualities' (EPM 1975:378) within bourgeois society.
Marx confronts such a society with the demand that all relations must correspond to 'real individual life’ (EPM 1975:379). Communism represents the realisation of this promise, the cultivation of a rich 'subjective human sensibility’ (EPM 1975:344/5 353/6 358). With the emancipation of the individual from alienated social conditions 'Labour would be authentic, active, property' affirming 'individual life' (JM 1975:228).
Far from proposing some homogeneous species being in an abstract collectivity, Marx prioritises real individuals over abstractions and individual relationships over artificial and imposed community. Despite critical liberal references to a 'thickly textured communitarianism' (Femia 1993:65 170), 'homogeneous society' (Vajda 1981:11.2), and 'totalitarian democracy' (Talmon 1960:2/7 254), Marx pursues real community against the artificial, abstract communities imposed by the state and money. Marx defends individuality and heterogeneity against the homogeneity imposed by liberal capitalist institutions. Though Turner and Robertson regard marxism as 'an inherently nostalgic paradigm' committed to 'pre-modern' 'communal values and assumptions' (Turner and Robertson 1991:253), Marx's 'true' community is quite distinct from a nostalgic communitarianism modelled upon Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and its 'reciprocal, bonding sentiment' (Tonnies 1955:53 55 57 39 74; Freund 1978:156). [8] Marx builds upon rather than rejects the process of modernisation, differentiation and individual emancipation (Therborn 1996:59/60; McLennan 1996; Miller 1982:13) to offer a critical project of subjects and communities which postulates the 'free social individual' as a 'point of departure' and not merely the end of the future communist society (Marx Gr 1973:197).
Marx shows how the process of individual emancipation is inaugurated but arrested within bourgeois society as real individuals are freed from feudal ties whilst being subjected in the process to an alien mode of interconnection and mediation. Pursuing the free and full development of the individual, Marx castigated conservative and Romantic yearnings for the harmonious feudal order (Gr 1973:83/4; Draper 1978:237; Draper 1990:ch7; Geras 1989:250 253). Within feudal society, 'instead of the independent man, we find everyone dependent'. Given this personal dependence, 'there is no necessity for labour and its products to assume fantastic form different from their reality’ as in a society based upon commodity production (Marx Cl 1976:170). This personal dependence expresses an undeveloped state of social organisation in which individuals bind together socially in an undifferentiated unity, a 'definite self-sufficient development of one sided abilities' (Gr 1973:497).

Though an advance, Marx nevertheless also castigated the 'bourgeois viewpoint’ for being unable to advance beyond the antithesis between itself and the romantic viewpoint which yearns for a return to a feudal condition of 'original fullness’, Both views are 'ridiculous' (Gr 1973:161/2). Marx therefore criticises the fact that under bourgeois society the social bond possesses an 'alien and independent character', individuals having yet to 'live it’ as their own, to realise their natures through it (1973:161/2).

Marx transcends the choice between the undifferentiated unity of the pre-modern age and the differentiation without unity in the bourgeois age by restating the principle of reciprocity at the heart of 'rational freedom’ against individualist liberal freedom. Liberal 'independence' 'is at bottom merely an illusion': individuals are 'free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom'. This appears as independence only by abstracting from 'the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact', conditions 'independent of and 'not controllable by individuals' (Gr 1973:163/4).
Marx thus criticises the 'absurdity’ of liberal thinkers who regard competition 'as the absolute mode of existence of free individuality’ when it is not individuals who are set free by competition but capital. He criticises the way that this is 'dogmatically propounded’ as freedom 'through constant reflection back on the barriers torn down by free competition’ rather than reflecting upon the 'real development of capital' in the present as an 'external necessity' (Gr 1973:649/51). 'Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him’ (Marx Cl 1976:381). Hence 'the insipidity of the view that free competition is the ultimate development of human freedom; and that the negation of free competition = the negation of individual freedom’ (Gr 1973:652). This is ‘free development’ on the 'limited basis' of the 'rule of capital’ (1973:652).
The ancient worship of Nature, as a natural necessity, gives way to the worship of Capital, as a new social necessity, in a 'society in which the process of production has the mastery over man instead of being controlled by him’, This appears to the 'bourgeois consciousness’ as a 'self-evident and nature-imposed necessity' (Marx Cl 1976:174/5). But capital's relations of objective and impersonal dependency suppress individuality. Liberal freedom is the 'most complete' 'suspension’ and 'subjugation' of individuality under 'overpowering objects': 'things independent of the relations among individuals themselves’ (Gr 1973:652). The equation of free competition with freedom 'means nothing other than that middle class rule is the culmination of world history' (1973:652).

But the liberal claim that the pursuit of private interest unwittingly produces the general interest could just as easily mean that 'each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests' so that the pursuit of private interests produces not a 'general affirmation' but a 'general negation' (Gr 1973:156/7). 
The 'collisions' between 'mutually indifferent individuals' results in their 'subordination to relations which subsist independently of them' (1973:157). The 'mutual interconnection' between individuals, a 'vital condition' for individuality, appears as something 'alien' and 'autonomous’ to individuals: 'In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth’ (1973:157). The exchange relation establishes itself as 'a power external to and independent of the producers', a means to production thus becoming 'a relation alien to the producers' (1973:146).
Motivating Marx's criticism is the core component of 'rational freedom' - the idea that freedom is a common project uniting each and all in mutually affirming relations. This project is blocked by the way that interconnection becomes alien and abstract under capital's exchange relations. Exchange and trade establish common life, the self-activating human essence and mutual reintegration toward generic and truly human life, as 'an estranged form of social commerce' or intercourse (JM 1975:266). The social bond, 'the reciprocal and all sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another', is 'expressed in exchange value, an alien 'generality' 'in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished' (Gr 1973:156/7; Meszaros 1989:430 426). Equality and freedom within the capitalist mode of production are thus revealed as formal endowments confined to the abstract realm of law or vested in money, which establishes its equivalence value by levelling all distinctions between things and individuals (1973:156/7 161/2 296 409/10 651/2).
The 'rational' community of ends takes form as capital's abstract community as money becomes the 'objective bond' of society, the 'real community' dissolving ancient communities held together by ties of personal dependence (Gr 1973:146/7 161 162 222/3 225 226; Rosdolsky 1989:128/9). The medium of exchange is important because it indicates the extent to which the abstractness characterising social relationships renders real community unavailable: 'The less social power the medium of exchange processes .. the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individuals together' (1973:157).

'Monetary greed' dissolves ancient communities: 'It is itself the community and can tolerate none other standing above it. But this presupposes the full development of exchange values' (Gr 1973:223). Money must dissolve the human community to make itself the community (1973:224 540).
 For capital can tolerate no power greater than itself and will subordinate all to its control: 'Money thereby directly and simultaneously becomes the real community', making community a 'mere abstraction, a mere external, accidental thing' which becomes 'merely a means' of private satisfaction for 'isolated' individuals (1973:225/6). In these conditions, the individual appears free only because the mechanisms mediating the social interaction of individuals separated from each other are impersonal and objective (1973:156/7).
Marx's view, however, is positive rather than negative, conceiving the development of production in terms of the unfolding of human potential (0 Neill 1969:xix) and as 'a process of individualisation' (Gandy 1979:30/5). Capitalism is both progressive and alienative, revolutionising the world of production, universalising itself and finally pushing beyond its own barriers (Gr 1973:410). This universalising mission is connected with the all round development of human needs, knowledge and potentialities, the 'all-sided' development of a 'rich individuality' (1973:325). The capitalist mode of production, however, only furthers individual emancipation within the limits of commodity production and exchange relations (1973:160 164). The individual is blocked from real social contact and self-expression (1973:164/5).
Emancipation from personal dependence imprisons the individual within 'objective dependency relations' so that 'individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another' (1973:164). Far from abolishing 'relations of dependence', capital's external relations' are the 'dissolution of these relations into a general form' (1973:163/4).

Nevertheless, this objective dependency extended over all has a positive aspect in establishing the material basis for the 'rational' unity of each and all. The 'connection of the individual with all' and the independence of this connection from all develops to such a high level that 'the formation of the world market already at the same time contains the conditions for going beyond it' (Gr 1973:161; Wood 1981:29). The true significance of the expansion of the productive forces lies in the view that human agency could take more emancipatory and powerful forms, overcoming the systemic imperatives of capital by subjecting the life process of society to the conscious regulation of freely associated individuals (Marx Cl 1976:173). This is the stage of free individuality.
Individuality is of a higher order under communism (Forbes 1989:145). The disappearance of ties of personal dependence made objective dependence universal but this depersonalisation of human relationships also makes repersonalisation possible at a higher level. Marx thus refers to 'the possibility of the universal development of the individual': 'Not an ideal or imagined universality of the individual, but the universality of his real and ideal relations' (Gr 1973:542). Autonomy from the domination of circumstances and chance has become a material possibility under the universalising and revolutionising dynamics of capital (Marx 1999:117/8; 1973:410). This is not Kant's moral autonomy distinct from the material world but affirms the unity of agency and the self-made world in an individuated sense (1999:42 47/8).
Having established how Marx grounds autonomy materially, this section concludes by developing Marx's structural and institutional alternative to Weber. Weber himself remained within the dualistic framework of 'rational' modernity so that the individual is subject to an objective social world which functions autonomously of the demos (Clarke 1991:288/9). Identifying the roots of this seemingly neutral, objective process of monetarisation and bureaucratisation in alienation, in the dialectic of dead and living labour (Habermas 1991:343; 1989:302 332), Marx conceives the possibility of subverting a seemingly inexorable process.
Interestingly, although Wright criticises Weber for conceiving capitalist development as a 'harmonious rationalisation process' (Wright 1978:217), Weber does actually locate this process within a class infrastructure infused with asymmetries in power. This introduction of 'political' questions of power, class and control means that the apparent formalism of the rationalised social order loses the inexorable, automatic and harmonious character it seems to have in Weber's rationalisation thesis (Rueschemeyer 1986:171/2). The objective world becomes subject to human intervention and transformation.
Weber agrees with Marx that the basis of this control as 'unfreedom' lies in the social division of labour, the expropriation of the means of production (ES2 1978:138; Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980:155/169). Weber's formal reason presupposes the existence of material conditions such as the competitive 'battle of man with man' in the market (ESI 1978:93), the existence of money as a means of measuring value and the separation of the working class from the means of production (ESI 1978:107/9 150/3). The 'developed money economy' is the 'normal precondition for the unchanged and continued existence of pure bureaucratic administrations' (B 1991:204/5).
The difference is that Marx, unlike Weber, is able to conceive of the possibility of uprooting these objective facts of capitalist reality. As the last chapter showed, Marx's conception of labour presents the development of human capacities through labouring activity, through its alienation and its recovery from constraining relations, organisations and forms (Marx EPM 1975:386; Vazquez 1977:107/8). This approach is developed further here in terms of the domination of the value form and the fetishism of commodities, locating rationalisation within an alienated system of production (Clawson 1980:253 260/1 266; Rueschemeyer 1988:84/5; Wright 1978:198 217). Far from being 'rational' in any technical, objective, politically neutral sense, capitalism is identified as a structured class antagonism in which the capitalist produces labour as alien, and labour produces the product as alien (Marx 1973:458; Bonefeld 1992:114). The labour that the capitalist class appropriates as surplus value and transforms into capital 'as a power alien to labour' (Marx 1973:455) creates the means of enslaving labour to 'the compulsion to create yet further surplus capital etc. etc.' (Marx 1973:455).
The argument thus moves on from the centrality of labour as conscious life activity in the last chapter to address relationships of structured power as inherently political.
The reproduction of the capital system depends upon the ability of the capitalist class to control the working class through the 'political apparatuses of production' (Burawoy 1985:11) so as to facilitate the production, extraction and accumulation of surplus value, the power of labour taking the alienated form of surplus labour (Clarke 1991:208).
Marx shows that the labour process under capital is not, therefore, simply a technical process but expresses a class conflict over wages, the work day, labour intensity, and the degradation of the worker (Marx Cl 1976:chs 679 10 15 17 19). The domination of 'rational' technique and organisation as apparently independent forces stems from capital acquiring 'command over labour' within the process of production and imposing a 'coercive relation’ as 'an extractor of surplus labour and an exploiter of labour power' (Marx 1976:424 425). Capital as 'dead labour’ exercises power over 'living labour', producing 'alien wealth' 'standing over against labour capacity' (Marx 1973:462/3; Dunayevskaya 1988:114). The supposedly 'rational' process of production rests upon capital appropriating both the material and the means of labour as its own property, instituting 'the command of the capitalist over labour'. As a result, 'real labour' confronts the worker as the 'alien power' of capital (Marx 1973:306 307 308).
In comprehending property as 'alien labour' (1973:238), Marx shows that the power of capital is the power of labour in alien form. Thus, imprisonment in Weber's iron cage is a self-imprisonment which may be subverted by recovering the constitutive, self-defining power of living labour as human subjectivity (Marx 1973:462/3).
Marx's critique is Kantian in that it charges capitalism with suppressing autonomy. Marx's critique of exploitation concerns less a material issue than the value of autonomy, the value of the human being as an end in itself. Relations of exploitation are relations of domination and subordination which systemically subverts the law of universal autonomy. The conflict between communism and capitalism is thus a conflict between autonomy-enhancing and autonomy-denying structures. Common conscious control over the surplus product is justified not so much in terms of the justice of social distribution than the self-determination of each and all is ensured (Levine 1978:256-68).
Autonomy is a class issue. The conception of capital as alien labour identifies the roots of rationalisation in exploitative class relations (1973:452/4). These relations rest upon 'the expropriation of the worker' (Marx Cl 1976:940), the radical 'separation of labour and property' 'so that labour will create alien property and property will command alien labour' (Marx 1973:238). The alienating separation of the objective conditions of labour from the worker, 'their ownership by the capitalist', means that the worker is maintained 'as abstract labour capacity', as the capacity of producing capital as alien power (1973:822/3).
The implications are revolutionary, suggesting the power of labour to transform existing relations beyond capitalist 'rationalisation'. Labour possesses the capacity to disempower capital since capital is 'the result of labour, specifically the surplus derived from employing labour’ (Johnston 1989:51/2). Capital cannot achieve autonomy from labour, but labour can autonomise itself from capital (Bonefeld in Bonefeld et al I 1992:103; Meszaros 1995:606/7 718/20 725 728/9 733/734; Meszaros 1970:21/2; Clarke 1991:118), can disempower capital and block the mechanisms of accumulation and valorisation which are essential to capital's expanded reproduction (Cleaver 1979:73/4; Cleaver 1992:127/8; Negri 1996:164/178).
For many, Marx is unclear as to what alternate form of social organisation would replace Weberian bureaucracy and capitalist organisation (Miliband 1994:67; Beetham in Miller ed 1991:49). However, Marx's 'rational freedom' as human emancipation, takes shape as the struggle on the part of the working class - as the value creating class -to supply social labour directly through their free association as against the indirect supply of labour through the value form (Marx Cl 1976:173; Meikle 1985:99/100; Clarke 1991:66; Meszaros 1995:494). Communist society would no longer be coordinated by the value form. Marx thus rejected those contemporary socialist schemes which attempted to achieve 'control by the united individuals' on the basis of exchange value and the value form (Marx 1973:158/9).
Marx's cooperative mode of production may be presented in terms of Kantian morality as a community of colegislators determining collective affairs democratically within autonomy-enhancing conditions (Van Der Linden 1988:250).
Marx discerns the cooperative autonomy implicit in the ethic of ends in increasing automation. This 'general productive power' increases 'mastery' over nature so that 'the development of the social individual' is 'the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth' (Gr 1973:704/5). Undoubtedly, society's 'economisation of time’ makes possible 'the multiplicity of its development' in individual enjoyment and activity, the 'free development of individualities' (Marx Gr 1973:171/3 706).
In the emancipated society of individuals as ends rather than wage slaves, the concept of 'wealth' is measured in terms of needs and need fulfilment (1973:705 706).
With necessary labour reduced as much as possible, individuals would be free to develop their potentials in more fully rounded ways. The 'real wealth of society' 'does not depend on the length of surplus labour but rather on its productivity'.





In making the distinction between freedom and necessity, Marx is not, as Seidler claims, trapped by a Kantian dualism between a free abstract world and an unfree real world (Seidler 1994:142). Marx is not attempting to establish a noumenal realm of freedom in abstraction from a diremptive phenomenal realm, accepting the inevitability of a coercive reality, but puts 'rational freedom' on a socio-structural and institutional basis.
Marx's 'realm of necessity' is not an alienated system of production. Within the 'realm of natural necessity', freedom is constituted democratically through 'socialized man, the associated producers', coming to 'govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature' (C3 1981:959).
Nevertheless, the 'true realm of freedom' as 'the development of human powers as an end in itself begins only beyond the 'realm of necessity'. With the reduction of the working day, individuals would have the free time to develop their personal identities, so long as this respects the imperative that all others are also respected as ends in themselves (C3 1981:959).
Locating the Weberian problem of the subordination of society to instrumentally rational forms of domination in alienated labour, Marx integrates rather than opposes instrumental and substantive rationality. Conscious regulation of the human interchange with nature puts instrumental rationality in its proper sphere, forming the material precondition of the 'rational' public of ends (McCarney 1990:158; Clarke 1991:322/3).
Marx is opposed not so much to the division of labour as 'enslaving' subordination of the individual to the division of labour (Marx CGP 1974:347; Evans 1975:159/60). Affirming that 'mediation must, of course, take place', Marx contrasts mediation through the exchange of commodities, exchange value and money, with communal production in which 'the labour of the individual is posited from the outset as social labour' (Marx 1973:171/2 87). Marx thus envisages 'an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force' (Marx Cl 1976:171). This is a vision of freely associated labour developing a consciously controlled form of mediation against capitalistically alienated forms (Meszaros 1995:17; Meszaros 1970:78/9 92 248/9 285). 'The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-processes, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control' (Cl 1976:173).
Marx's cooperative mode of production is a moral vision. Marx develops the radical potential of Kant's morality by exposing capitalism to be an autonomy-denying system of domination and subordination in which the worker is treated as a means to the end of capital accumulation (Van Der Linden 1988:225/6). In Kantian terms, the cooperative worker is an autonomous and lawmaking being whereas the will of the wage labourer is subject to the necessity of producing surplus value. The connection of wage labourers 'lies outside their competence'; it is not their own act but capital's (Cl 1976:449/50).
With socialisation, the capitalist can be replaced by a manager 'paid by the workers instead of representing capital in opposition to them' (C3 1981:511 512). The 'directing authority' necessary in a 'socially combined process', and which takes antagonistic form under capitalism, is separated from capitalist ownership, emancipated from the systemic imperative of accumulation, and assumed by labour directly (Cl 1976:448; C3 1981:507 507/8 511/2). This democratisation of the coordinating and directing function transforms the vertical division of labour between manager and worker. Labour discipline is established, not through the external imposition of an exploiting class, but through the internal identification of the workers with the process of production. Functional control is no longer external to the workforce as the 'exclusive' property of managers as a class apart concerned with the class function of extracting surplus value (Cl 1976:450). Authority in the production process is thus given a democratically 'rational’ foundation.




This chapter has explored the implications of Weber's rationalisation thesis with respect to both the dualistic problems and the emancipatory and democratic possibilities of 'rational freedom'. Though both address the problematical character of reason, Weber and Marx take alternative paths within and beyond the tradition of 'rational freedom'. Their contrary perspectives exhibit their different assessments as to whether 'rational' liberal modernity can overcome the repressive-alienated forces and forms intrinsic to its constitution.
Weber makes explicit the complex and contradictory nature of the relation between reason and freedom in the modern world. Any project which upholds the emancipatory normative dimension of 'rational freedom' has to be able to address that complexity and contradictoriness at its very roots. Marx does this in targeting the whole series of dualisms constituting the formulation of 'rational freedom' in the modern world. Marx's emancipatory project obtains precise formulation in this chapter in Marx's critique of alienation as a revocable process of self-alienation on the part of human subjects. In contrast, Weber envisages no such emancipation, theorising an overarching process of rationalisation that encloses individual subjects within irrevocable forms of technique and organisation, reproducing the split between a public domain constituted by the state and capital and the private affairs of individuals separated from their means of control and operation.
In fine, although alienation and rationalisation seem similar (Turner 1993:30), Marx and Weber are quite different in that Marx offered a therapy whereas Weber offered only a diagnosis. Whereas rationalisation for Weber is a universal and inevitable process, Marx's alienation is a universal but transformable condition (Lowith 1993:49). Marx has been shown to explain capitalist modernity in terms of a universal but transformable self-alienation, an active process which contains the potential for an alternative future. Weber, however, abstracts 'rational' processes from their origins in labour and consequently conceives the modern world as the passive product of a universal and irrevocable rationalisation (Clarke 1991:288/9).
Weber may have possessed a philosophical anthropology similar to Marx (Lowith 1993:43/4; Lassman and Speirs ed 1994:xi/ii xxiv/xxv; Turner 1993:117/8; Schmidt 1971) but he also affirmed the irrevocability of a rationalisation which extinguishes human subjectivity. Thus, although Hennis has argued forcefully that Weber's concepts of personality, life orders and life regulation express a normative philosophical anthropology that may be traced back to a tradition of political philosophy deriving from Aristotle (Hennis 1988:26 195 201), it is Marx, rather than Weber, who realised this normative dimension by going beyond the terrain of modernity.
Weber's rationalisation, entailing the general separation of the demos from their means of conducting their common affairs and the subjection of the ontology of human beings to a life denying social order, bears some similarity to Marx's alienation of social power. The difference is that Marx locates the dialectic of enlightenment not in a general process of rationalisation but in an alienated system of control in the productive life of society (Clarke 1991:288/9). Marx could thus demand democratisation as the reappropriation of the power alienated to the state and capital. With respect to Marx's reworking of the 'rational' perspective, this recovery of control beyond alienation is also a moral project recovering meaning in a disenchanted world.
Weber could conceive of neither the recovery of control or meaning. Denying that there is anything essential about human nature and history, Weber replaced Marx's Aristotelian thread of social labour as the transformative force organising history with a plurality of rationalisations. In place of a conception of human beings rationally organising their own history, Weber asserts the basic irrationality of the world (PV 1991). As a repudiation of Aristotelian teleology, Weber's pessimism mirrors Veyne's assertion that 'the world has promised us nothing, and we cannot read our truths into it.. Eternal realities - government, domination, Power, the State - cannot explain the haze of detailed events. Such noble draperies are nothing but rationalist abstractions laid over programs whose diversity is secretly enormous' (Veyne 1988:125 120).
This Weberian loss of meaning, which blocks the 'rational’ reconstitution of Hellenic Sittlichkeit, is revealed by Marx to be in origin a loss of control by individuals of their 'mutual relations', their power, community and subjectivity (Habermas 1991:244; Miller 1982:33 35). Unlike Weber, Marx can envisage individuals bringing 'exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relations under their own control' (GI 1999:55; Lowith 1993:48/9). Marx's definition of 'true' community and individuality, based upon common as against alien control, offers an alternative to Weber's rationalisation thesis that is located in the historical process of capitalist development.
There is no way out of the 'iron cage' on Weber's premises. Weber could not get to the roots of the contradiction between formal and substantive rationality since he conceived the alienated forms of social labour to be 'rational' (Clarke 1991:288/9). Absent in Weber's process of rationalisation is Marx's conception of how present society may be transformed into an alternative future as a result of its own internal dynamics and contradictions (Bottomore 1985:27). The existence of bureaucracy as a substitute for the genuine embodiment of a 'rational' public underlines the need for a deeper form of mediation which 'can only be accomplished through the direct participation of workers in political struggles and political organisations' (Wright 1978:225). This mediation is located in the conscious common control exercised by the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class.

This chapter thus concluded by showing how Marx offered an alternative to Weber's process of capitalist rationalisation. The key to Marx's break with 'rational freedom' is found in the critique of the 'objective dependency' and alien control at the heart of capitalist modernity. The chapter developed Marx's critique of alien, external forms of mediation - state, bureaucracy, capital, money, exchange and their personifications - in support of a positive conception of a 'true' public.

This chapter has shown how Marx's emancipatory project proceeds further than the 'rational' tradition to establish the coincidence of the freedom of each and all in the historical process itself. The ideal community of ends of 'rational freedom' is no longer abstracted from the world of experience but is shown to be immanent in material development. Marx's historical analysis of capitalist development demonstrated that the commitment to 'true' democracy, individuality and community does not require the construction of an institutional and moral framework removed from real individuals and society - as compensation for the absence of morality in the real world - but exists as an ideal immanent in real historical development.

Socialising the 'rational' ideal makes it possible to conceive of reason and freedom coinciding within everyday relationships rather than having to be artificially secured by the function of the state and law as a 'higher', universal, general interest.

This chapter defined Marx's real community, as constituted on the basis of the common control exercised by associating individuals, against the alien, abstract communities of the state and capital, as constituted on the basis of the separation of individuals. The chapter proceeded to address the question of what non-alienated structures and institutions look like, the material basis of the communist public takes. Marx's 'realm of necessity' is not a repressive-alien rationalisation but rests upon a democratically constituted common conscious control that embeds the moral ideal of rational autonomy.
The thesis concludes with an examination of the figure who has offered the most ambitious attempt to revitalise the tradition of 'rational freedom' within the contemporary world - Jurgen Habermas. With his reworking of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, and with his conception of discursive democracy also savouring a great deal of Rousseau, Jurgen Habermas offers a creative synthesis of the emancipatory residues of 'rational' philosophy in light of a problematic Weberian rationalisation. Further, in seeking a more secure basis for emancipation in light of the moral, practical and political failures of marxism, Habermas discerns a way of making Marx true to his own 'rational' roots. Habermas helps to recover Marx as a 'rational' thinker. The final chapter, therefore, critically examines how, in seeking to go beyond Marx and Weber, Habermas has developed the most important formulation of 'rational freedom' in the modern world.





Marx's material grounding of 'rational freedom' has structural and institutional implications as regards the future communist society as a 'true' public. This chapter defines the end of Marx's communism as cooperative autonomy. Repudiating the atomistic conception of isolated individuals existing in enclosed spheres of rights and liberties, Marx's transfigured conception of 'rational freedom' is reciprocal, concerned with the relation of autonomous individuals to equally autonomous others, mutual recognition being a condition of autonomy. This chapter gives this ethic institutional and structural form.
Pursuing this question in this chapter has a bearing upon the contemporary crisis of socialism generally and of marxism in particular. No small part of the crisis of socialist economic theory (Adaman and Devine 1997:54; Blackburn 1991:5/67; Gwertzman and Kaufman eds 1990; Halliday 1990:5/23; Jeffries 1993:1) is the 'profound absence of working models of a fully achieved socialist society' to offer alternatives to the 'moribund' doctrines of state socialism and the shift towards market solutions (McCarney 1990:vii). Further, the failure of socialist parties to imagine the public sphere beyond the conventional terms of parliamentary government may be considered a 'terrible weakness' in a tradition which is concerned with 'the political governing of the economy' (Eley 1998:111; Sassoon 1996:126f).
This thesis has argued that Marx developed rational freedom's regulative ideal of moral union in practical terms as an internal social union overcoming the alien control of the state and capital. This implies a 'true' public on Marx's part, confronting what may be called the 'unpolitics' of liberalism, the extent to which liberalism is a depoliticisation that lacks a genuine public sphere (Pierson 1986:186/8). This chapter deals with the organisational implications of Marx's 'true' public of democracy, community and individuality.
This examination, however, has a very particular focus. Having argued throughout this thesis that Marx's reworked 'rational freedom' conceives 'the political' in terms of the realisation of the human essence, the primary concern in this chapter will be the extent to which the institutions and structures of communist society expand rather than inhibit the human ontology. Reason in its emancipatory and democratic aspects is realised against a repressive capitalist rationalisation. The title of the chapter, therefore, derives from Marx's 'Excerpts from James Mill', where Marx defines 'true', 'human' community as the realisation of the 'essence of man', calling upon human beings to 'give the world a human organisation' (Marx JM 1975:265). Giving the world a human organisation defines Marx’s critical and emancipatory project. Dealing first with the economic aspects, the objective of this final chapter is to define the kind of social organisation which corresponds to Marx's ethico-rational commitment.
By treating the economics and politics of communism together, this chapter challenges the view that there is a 'mutually exclusive' division between a centralising (mature-economic) and decentralising (early-political) Marx, the one supporting vertical (hierarchical) relations of superiority and subordination in a centrally planned state, the other horizontal relations of equality in a free association (Selucky 1979:xi; Harding in Harding ed. 1984:9). Marx's economics complement rather than contradict his politics, however much many consider that his later critique of political economy contributed to the neglect of the political issues of community, communication, democracy and citizenship which had been central to Marx's early writings (Pierson 1986:17 29/30; Schecter 1994:122; Perkins 1993:2). Marx's early political-normative perspective continued to inform his later development of communism. This thesis has sought to show how Marx grounded these political issues in a conception of associative control as against capital's economistic control. Marx's recasting of the ideals of 'rational freedom' as the democracy of ends and the community of everyday life is developed further in this chapter in terms of the conceptions of the cooperative mode of production and the commune system of democracy.
This chapter explores the practical implications of Marx's normative concern to overthrow the autonomy impairing and denying structures of Weberian 'rationalised' society (Gouldner 1980:93/4; Meszaros 1989:437). Arguing that Marx recovered the constitutive power of human subjectivity from behind the immediacy of reified relations, within which social identity confronts individuals in the alien forms of state and capital (Clarke 1991:ix; Miller 1982:3/7 8), begs the question of how social order is to be maintained (Taylor 1982:1/2).
This chapter addresses this question by establishing rational freedom's regulative ideal of moral union as a social union achieved through the democratic restitution of alienated social power. Marx's recasting of the Kantian community of colegislators is developed in terms of the conceptions of the cooperative mode of production and the commune system of democracy. These conceptions enable individuals - as autonomous legislators - to participate in the general processes of common life. Marx's communism will be shown to be 'somewhat anarchistic' (Eagleton 1997:55/6) in being a cooperative commonwealth comprising 'free associations' constituting the whole socio-institutional fabric.
The argument that is presented in this chapter shows that Marx is able to avoid making 'Faustian bargains' with Weber's 'modern devils' of industry and the state (Sayer 1991:154) since these 'modern devils' are alienated social powers that are capable of being reappropriated (Marx OJQ 1975:234; Meszaros 1995:468 480). Though Miliband rejects the abolition of 'officialdom' - the state and bureaucracy as 'unrealistic' (Miliband 1994:77/8), Marx's restitution of social power implies precisely this as a condition of democratisation. Novel forms of autonomous social power, in Marx's account, imply not merely the democratic accountability that some advocate as sufficient (Bowles and Gintis 1987:99; Miliband 1994:77/8), but the practical reappropriation of alienated social power from the state-capital nexus so that the function of control is subject to the conscious decision of the social body - the 'associated producers' (Marx 1976:173; Meszaros 1995:32/3).
Capital's social metabolic order of anti-democratic control has to be attacked at its roots rather than checked through an assertion of rights via an abstracted political apparatus (Meszaros 1995:812 814). This chapter, therefore, establishes the socio-institutional context for the socialised individualism and democratic citizenship which this thesis has pursued and which are considered crucial to renewing the project of the Left (Miliband 1994:57; McLennan 1989:122/3).
A communist conception of the good, which this thesis has developed from Marx's critical engagement with the tradition of 'rational freedom', must address the problem of how the autonomous performances of the entire citizenry are to be coordinated (Dunn 1984:77 80). Dunn dismisses the view that harmony can be achieved without political authority as 'a pleasant fantasy' (Dunn 1984:80). Less fantastical but more unpleasant is the possibility of the 'all too visible fist of the state' coming to replace the invisible hand of the market as coordinator of production (Dunn 1984:82). However, though Dunn denies that 'socialist economic planning' is an 'integral rational control' (Dunn 1984:83), this chapter argues that Marx, in establishing the structural and institutional framework of rational freedom's ideal of internalised moral coordination, realises this integral control as a genuinely conscious coordination of human affairs from within society.
This chapter underlines the fact that Marx's economics are set within a political context (Dunn 1984:9; McFarlane 1982:216; Harrington 1977:ch5; 104; Cleaver 1979:25/9), conceiving the cooperative mode of production within an associative public, leading to commune democracy as a democratically constituted 'state' governed by common control as a democratic mode of coordination.
This challenges the view that Marx is vague with respect to planning, coordination and decision making in the future society (Nove 1983; Arnold 1990). Certainly, 'society’ is an evasive notion which leaves modes of decision making - and the identity, scope and power of the decision makers - unclear, inviting the realienation of power through the state, bureaucracy and capital as alien forms of collective control. But since this is precisely how Marx explained the emergence of the state as the alien general interest, one can assume that Marx's 'society' (e.g. Marx CGP 1974:347) is something other than a spontaneously self-ordering and self-regulating body of atomistic decision making. Granted, Marx is less than forthcoming when it comes to the precise form taken by this ‘something’. What can be said is that since 'rational' freedom takes place through relationships, rather than independently of or against them, mediatory institutions and mechanisms of coordination are implied.
There is a need, then, to discover how Marx's project of dissolving alien spheres of political and economic control into directly democratic communes of human scale offers more than the non-concept of 'society'. Marx's communism, predicated upon the productive achievements of capitalism, implies a complex economic infrastructure. It may seem inevitable that there would exist a specialised body of trained people possessing a key role in the administration and planning of economic activity. And this would imply a class of bureaucrats (Polan 1985:89/112). This would correspond to the Weberian view that the material welfare of the modern world is possible only on the basis of the hierarchical division of labour, bureaucratic organisation and a profit system (Clawson 1980:11 13 13/4).
The coherence and persuasiveness of Marx's vision of the communist society, above and beyond its normative status as a regulative ideal (Benton 1993:191), then, hinges upon the realisation of a non-bureaucratic, democratic form of collective control and authority beyond alienative and rationalised forms. The conception of the 'proletarian public' is important in this respect.
The chapter proceeds from a discussion of the division of labour, affirming the necessity of social roles and mediating institutions, going on to define the cooperative mode of production based on Marx's idea of self-directed labour. Such a view is shown to be compatible with the need for planning authorities and collective bodies regulating social production. But any coordination requiring central authority is constituted and implemented internally through cooperative societies.
From here the chapter discusses the political aspects of Marx's public, from proletarian associationalism as forming the content of the new public to the commune system of democracy as a new social polity.
Overall, the concern of this chapter is to show that, although Marx is considered to have been largely silent on the shape of future communist society, assigning the major creative role here to the participants themselves, his political-normative perspective does possess structural and institutional implications which he does address.

8-1 The Cooperative Mode Of Production

This section presents Marx's cooperative mode of production in terms of Kantian morality as a community of colegislators determining collective affairs democratically within autonomy-enhancing conditions (Van Der Linden 1988:250). Marx is show to develop the Kantian values of autonomy and of the human being as an end-in-itself as a critique of the capital system, capitalist relations being condemned for reducing individuals to mere means to external ends. The cooperative mode of production – and commune system of government – is shown to realise the categorical imperative as an ethic of content to envisage individuals as colegislators in their social and political institutions.

For some critics, Marx's communism is vague and question begging in lacking mediating institutions (Berry 1989:131; Cohen 1983:28ff; Cohen 1978:133 132; Arnold 1990:20). For Polan, Marx's 'unsophisticated anti-bureaucratism' has the paradoxical result of maintaining bureaucratic rule (Polan 1984:70). Marx’s supposed lack of clarity as to what alternate form of social organisation would replace Weberian bureaucracy and capitalist organisation in communist society (Miliband 1994:67; Beetham in Miller ed 1991:49) is explained by the fact that for Marx institutional questions are secondary to the value of the human being as an end-in-itself. From this perspective, institutional questions are resolved by creative human agents in the process of liberating themselves, asserting their autonomy in relation to each other and their environment, and in creating new social forms appropriate to their new identities. 

This section explains that, far from failing to appreciate how the 'constraints of role can help to link a person with others in satisfying community' (Cohen 1989:159), Marx is concerned with the contexts of action. Marx does not abolish mediation as such, only that imposed upon individuals as 'a form of domination’ (Parekh 1982:93/4). Marx affirms a conception of functional representation in which 'every function is representative' in so far as it 'satisfies a social need' (Marx CHDS EW 1975:189/90). This implies a functional division of labour organised around social role rather than class.
Marx's communist division of labour is also ethical in enabling the full and free expansion of individuality. This central theme runs through Marx’s work from the early writings (EPM 1975:285) to Capital (Marx 1976:455/58 474 484/5 486 614/5 619 798/9 ch 13 sec 4) and after. Marx's critique of the hierarchical division of labour emphasises that the proletariat lack autonomy and responsibility within capitalist relations. Marx looks to connect the 'appropriation of the totality of the instruments of production' with 'the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves’ (Marx GI 1999:92). Hence, under communism, 'nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes' (Marx 1999:54). This development of manifold abilities emerges as a possibility within capitalism itself. The detail worker, subjugated to a specialised function, gives way to the 'individual of all round development' able to participate in a diversity of functions in production (Marx 1976:546). 
The main point here, though, is that the question of mediation in Marx is subordinate to an ethic of individuals as ends in themselves. Marx is opposed not to the division of labour as such but to the 'enslaving' subordination of the individual to the division of labour (Marx CGP 1974:347).

Since the definitive characteristic of real individuals is their socially mediated action (Marx Gr 1973:87; McQuarrie in McQuarrie ed 1978:19), Marx explicitly recognises that 'mediation must, of course, take place’. Marx contrasts mediation through the exchange of commodities, exchange value and money within the capital system with a communal production in which 'the labour of the individual is posited from the outset as social labour' (Marx 1973:171/2). Society becomes 'an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force' (Marx Cl 1976:171). Marx thus conceives the self-mediation of freely associated labour developing a consciously controlled form of mediation against capitalistically alienated forms (Meszaros 1995:17; Meszaros 1970:78/9 92 248/9 285). 'The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-processes, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control' (Cl 1976:173).

For Marx, the material foundations for communism as a new, associative, cooperative mode of production are established by the way capitalism socialises property and economic relations generally (Marx C3 1981:368; CGP 1974:346). Nevertheless, the idea that capitalism is a form of socialism in itself (Meister 1990:311) needs to be sharply qualified. Communism as the product of capitalism's tendency to concentrate and centralise the means of production implies the inevitability of bureaucratised state planning (Elliott 1985:37/8; Howard and King 1985:145/6 198 243). It is important to note, however, that Marx emphasises subjective as well as objective factors in the process of transition towards communism. In describing 'capitalist stock companies' and the 'cooperative factories' as 'transition forms from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one', Marx distinguishes between the former as the 'negative' expression of this transition (as a passive objective evolution), and the latter as the 'positive' expression (as an active transformation) (Marx C3 1981:572).

In the transition from an antagonistic mode of production to a cooperative mode (Marx 1859 Preface 1975:426), showing how hired labour 'is destined to disappear before associated labour’ (Marx Inaugural Address 1974:79/80), the 'great merit' of the cooperative movement is 'to practically show' that the ‘despotic system of the subordination of labour to capital' can be superseded by the 'system of the association of free and equal producers'. Producer cooperatives thus go beyond 'dwarfish forms' to transform the capitalist economic system (Marx Inaugural Address 1974:90).

Though Kitching cites Marx's argument that cooperative societies 'regulate national production upon a common plan’ as evidence of a centralism on Marx’s part (Kitching 1988:148/50), the main point is that this controlling authority is constituted democratically by the 'united cooperative societies'. The means of production thus cease to be centralised as 'means of enslaving and exploiting labour' and instead become 'instruments of free and associated labour'. Marx's language is pluralist rather than unitarist, libertarian even, with 'individual property' replacing 'class property' (Marx CWF FI 1974:213 256; Marx to Schweitzer FI 1974:147; Marx CGP 1974:354). [1]

Marx sees the possibility of the cooperative autonomy implicit in the ethic of ends in increasing automation. Through automation Marx is looking to overcome 'enslavement' to the division of labour rather than the division of labour as such (Evans 1975:159/60). With the 'progress of technology', the creation of wealth depends less on labour time than 'on the power of the agencies set in motion during labor time'. As a result, the human being becomes more a 'regulator' than the 'chief actor' of the production process. This 'general productive power' increases 'mastery' over nature so that 'the development of the social individual' is 'the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth' (Gr 1973:704/5). Undoubtedly, society's 'economisation of time' makes possible 'the multiplicity of its development' in individual enjoyment and activity, the 'free development of individualities' (Marx Gr 1973:171/3 706). In the emancipated society of individuals, individuals as ends rather than as wage slaves, the concept of 'wealth’ is measured in terms of needs and need fulfilment (Gr 1973:705 706).

Marx's morality is 'aesthetic' in valuing that human activity which is its own justification and hence requires no external justification. Marx wanted a society with the maximum of automation so that, with necessary labour reduced as much as possible, individuals would be free to develop their potentials in more fully rounded ways. Marx conceives communist individuality as a creative all-round individual for whom artistic and intellectual fulfilment constitute self-realisation as much as material fulfilment.





Since the interaction with nature remains a necessity in order to satisfy needs and maintain and reproduce life, Marx accepted the necessity of a framework for production. Marx is clear that the distribution of time still implies organisation and a division of labour (Marx Gr 1973:173). In making the distinction between the realms of freedom and necessity, however, Marx is not, as Seidler claims, trapped by a Kantian dualism between a free abstract world and an unfree real world (Seidler 1994:142). Unlike Kant, Marx does not accept the inevitability of a coercive reality, attempting to establish a noumenal realm of freedom in abstraction from a diremptive phenomenal realm, but instead succeeds in putting 'rational freedom' on a socio-structural and institutional basis. Marx's 'realm of necessity’ is not an alienated system of production at all. Within the 'realm of natural necessity', freedom is constituted democratically through 'socialized man, the associated producers', coming to 'govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature' (Marx C3 1981:959).

Nevertheless, the 'true realm of freedom' as 'the development of human powers as an end in itself begins only beyond the 'realm of necessity', 'though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis'. Marx makes the reduction of the working day the basic prerequisite of this freedom (C3 1981:959). Free from the systemic imperatives associated with capitalist production, individuals would have the free time to develop their personal identities, so long as this respects the imperative that all others are also respected as ends in themselves.

Locating the Weberian problem of the subordination of society to instrumentally rational forms of domination in alienated labour, Marx is able to integrate rather than oppose instrumental and substantive rationality. He thus succeeds in embodying the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' within social organisation. Conscious regulation of the human interchange with nature puts instrumental rationality in its proper sphere, forming the material precondition of the 'rational' public of ends (McCarney 1990:158; Clarke 1991:322/3).

Marx's cooperative mode of production is a moral vision of a worker controlled communism. Through self-management, social production becomes a truly democratic task, embodying the moral and intellectual responsibility which is denied under the rule of capital. The worker within the cooperative factory can identify with its objectives through participating in the common decision making framework through which objectives are determined.
Marx thus develops the radical potential of Kant's morality by exposing capitalism to be an autonomy-denying system of domination and subordination in which the worker is treated as a means to the end of capital accumulation (Van Der Linden 1988:225/6). Whereas the cooperative worker expresses moral autonomy, the wage labourer expresses necessity. In Kantian terms, the wage labourer is not an autonomous and lawmaking being since his/her will is subject to the subject of an external force. Under the control of capital, the work of directing and superintending is subordinated to the overriding motive of extracting surplus value. The union and connection of wage labourers 'lies outside their competence' and is not their own act but capital's (Cl 1976:449/50).

The 'rational' end is to replace external union with internal union. Marx thus affirms the need for a 'directing authority' given that the direct process of production is a 'socially combined process' (C3 1981:507; Cl 1976:448). But the labour of supervision and management arising from the antagonistic capitalist mode (C3 1981:507/8) can be overcome since the functions of management can be separated from the ownership of capital (C3 1981:511/2). The capitalist can be replaced by a manager (C3 1981:511). The functions entailed by cooperative social labour can be separated from capitalist control, emancipated from the systemic imperative of accumulation, and assumed by labour directly: 'In the .. cooperative factory, the antithetical character of the supervisory work disappears, since the manager is paid by the workers instead of representing capital in opposition to them' (C3 1981:512). This contrasts with the 'coordinator mode of production' in which the professional educated and trained middle class displaces the proletariat to assume key roles as administrators, scientists, technicians and intellectuals. The proletariat remain a proletariat (Gouldner 1979:6/8; Albert and Hahnel 1978 1991). 

Marx’s democratisation of the coordinating and directing function transforms the vertical division of labour between manager and worker. Labour discipline is established, not through the external imposition of an exploiting class, but through the internal identification of the workers with the process of production. The managerial function is integrated with productive activity and is no longer invested in an external authority concerned with the class function of extracting surplus value. Functional control is no longer external to the workforce as the 'exclusive' property of managers as a class apart (Cl 1976:450). Authority in the production process is thus given a democratically 'rational' foundation.





Having discussed the economic-structural aspects of communism's internal, 'rational' coordination of human affairs, the rest of the chapter examines the political-institutional aspects of the cooperative mode of production. The argument here does two main things. In the first place, it shows how Marx valued proletarian associationalism as a new public in the making, forming the content of the associative public which is implicit in Marx's critique of Hegel's state (Chapter 5). The character of Marx's proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class is crucial here in resolving the commonality and universality of 'rational freedom' into practical relations, gradually extending the sphere of democratic, social authority. Emphasising that for Marx 'every step of a real movement is more important than a dozen programmes' (Marx CGP FI 1974:340), section 3 discerns a concept of a 'proletarian public’ in Marx to argue that the means of proletarian self-activity is the communist end in the process of becoming.

In distinguishing Marx's concept of the proletarian public from the theoretico-elitist model of revolutionary change - the educational dictatorship having to impose reason coercively on account of the failure of the demos to engender it spontaneously - the argument shows how the future 'rational' order is constituted by democratic self-organisation within the real world as a genuinely universal order.

In the second place, the rest of this chapter develops the idea of Marx's restitution of alienated power as a repoliticisation – the political investment of civil society with (self) governmental power. This embodies 'rational' principles of reciprocal, mutual self-determination in a concept of 'commune democracy’ drawn from The Civil War in France (section 4). The overall argument is that Marx's 'proletarian public' fulfils the requirements of functional representation, entailing a (social-self) governmental role for social groups. The proletarian transformation of 'the political' realises Marx's objective to overcome 'rational' dualism in favour of a participatory public co-extensive with everyday material life. Politics assumes a material, direct, character. In the process, Marx returns politics to its ancient character as creative human self-realisation (chapter 2 on Plato and Aristotle). This thesis is grounded in the anthropological argument concerning politics as human self-realisation - which this thesis has traced from Plato and Aristotle – so as to establish Marx's abolition of the state as the realisation of politics as a genuine public life.

The development of a theory of a communist public sphere/s here responds to the criticism that Marx lacks an adequate theory of politics and is silent on how freedom would be institutionalized under communism (McLellan in Miller ed 1991:321; Miller 1990:252; Held 1995:307; Held 1987:151/4; Pierson 1986:7 16/9 24/5 27/30). It is important in this respect to show that 'taking democracy seriously' (Hunt in Hunt ed 1980:7) entails the end of the state for Marx rather than, as liberals claim, the end of the political as such (Schwartz 1996; Polan 1984). On the contrary, Marx’s views entail the realisation of the political. 

Affirming the possibility of distinguishing government, as peaceful coordination, from the state, as coercive regulation (Vajda 1981:66; Mayo 1960:3; Hoffman 1995:4 ch 3 55 123/5), this argument identifies Marx's target as being the way that alienation turns the social power of individuals into an artificial force against individuals (Marx CWF 1974:249), the state thus becoming 'a special organism separate from society' (Marx CGP 1974:356). Freedom for Marx 'consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one thoroughly subordinate to it' (CGP 1974:354). And this absorption of the state power points directly to a repoliticised civil society assuming governmental functions.

There is, however, a problem with the way Marx identifies 'political power, properly so called' with 'the organised power of one class for oppressing another' (Marx CM REV 1973:87). Marx would seem to define socialism in an anti-political sense. He had argued that once its 'organizing functions begin and its goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask off (Marx CN EW 1975:420).

Yet Marx's criticisms here are aimed specifically at an exploitative class politics and entails a view which is perfectly compatible with a conception of a new political association (Gilbert 1981:39 40; Draper 1977:178/81). From this perspective, public power loses not so much its political character as its connection with the state as resting on asymmetrical relations of class power. The 'abolition of the state' is the 'necessary result of the suppression of classes' since the disappearance of classes 'automatically entails the disappearance of the need for an organised power of one class for the suppression of another’ (Marx in McLellan 1971:192). Once class rule has disappeared, 'there is no state in the present political sense' (Marx Conspectus 1974:336). The end of coercive state politics in this sense is the beginning of politics as integral to creative self-realisation, the realisation of the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a political animal. The Aristotelian character of Marx’s conception of politics is explicitly acknowledged by Marx in the Grundrisse, where he cites Aristotle’s argument that man is a zoon politikon, 'an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society' (Marx 1973:84; Meikle 1991:305). [2]

Further, the role and status of politics would be substantial under communism since control and coordination would no longer be the province of impersonal mechanisms but of individuals assuming conscious responsibility (Dunn 1984:81; Davis and Scase 1985:91; Miller 1990:252). McLennan notes that whilst Marx tends to assume a 'quasi-natural, spontaneous' mode of organisation, his 'classicist image of vigorous public discourse and action, and his commitment to socially organised science and technology, entails a considerable socialist public sphere in which decision-making organs would have to play a significant part' (McLennan 1989:124 125/6).

Certainly, stateless communist society was to be organised as a polity, which Marx referred to as a 'commonwealth', 'commune' or 'Gemeinwesen', possessing a structure for making and implementing collective decisions (Hunt II 1984:212). Before demonstrating and developing these points, this section defines Marx's attempt to critically appropriate and actualise the reciprocal-communal character of 'rational freedom' as implying the transformation of 'the political' under communism. This challenges the perceived necessity of rules, procedures and laws in liberal thought as a condition of social order (e.g. Hart 1961; Nozick 1974) by strengthening social bonds so that individuals could relate to each other directly as moral agents. Marx's communism thus embodies the 'rational' ideal of internal moral coordination as against the reality of a coercive juridical apparatus constraining individuals to the good.

The transformation that Marx envisages is predicated upon a view of human nature quite different from the essential selfishness posited by liberal thought and which justifies a coercive apparatus to maintain civil order (Markovic in Bottomore et al eds 1985:215; Levine 1987:26/7). This assumption of limited altruism limits political possibilities and lies behind Scruton's dismissive reference to marxism's 'superstitious belief in a transformed human nature' as making it possible to 'live free from the institutions of compromise and law' (Scruton 1986:113). Marx can envisage such a transformation by ascribing just the one genetic trait to human beings, the need for self-affirmation through labour as conscious life activity (chapter 6). And Marx can thus raise the question of whether law is an inevitable feature of human society or whether it represents the alienated character of social existence.

The insistence that communism must embody legally protected rights and liberties as conditions of freedom (Miller 1989:7; Pierson 1989:181 181/3) is problematic given that communism as a non-alienated community implies the end of the state as an instrument suppressing discontent (Collins 1984:121). Communism implies social relations in which human beings are able to relate to each other directly and spontaneously, no longer needing to project communality upwards to the state and no longer needing to invest sociality in external, impersonal bonds of law and contract. Granted that until the non-alienated community is established, the need for the full platform of political and civil rights and liberties can be affirmed. There is no problem in accepting Little's point that democratic socialism must embody political rights and liberties - universal suffrage, protection from arbitrary punishment, free speech and association (Little 1989:7). But there is a need to bear in mind Marx's distinction between the political-communal character of citizen rights, which Marx implicitly incorporated into his communism, and the egoistic-economistic character of bourgeois rights (chapter 5). This thesis has shown how Marx transforms the character of rights with a view to constituting a genuine political community integrated with the social existence of individuals. So long as individuals remain Kant's 'race of devils' within bourgeois society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism, there may well be a need for a protective apparatus of rights and liberties. The point is, nevertheless, that Marx is pursuing a deeper freedom than that which requires a protective apparatus, presupposing an anthropological transformation which affirms that human beings can, potentially, be more than a race of devils. The task is to define a form of non-alienated community which realises the universal claims made by rights and liberties in the reciprocal relations between individuals. It is that anthropological transformation which has primacy, the question of legal and institutional forms being a secondary concern.

Marx's development of 'rational freedom' into a socially rooted conception of relational or reciprocal freedom and authority is compatible with the retention of rules and procedures, democratically formulated and employed as a matter of everyday social practice rather than existing in a formal and abstract sphere. This avoids the dangers of a 'legal nihilism' entailing the totalitarian suppression of rational law (Fine 1993:51/2) and recognises the virtue of 'legalism' in subordinating government to rules and rights (MacCormick 1991:278; MacCormick 1993:l42ff). But it does so by exposing and resolving the dual character of 'rational freedom'. In a realistic frame, 'rational freedom' imposes a coercive juridical apparatus in order to constrain individual behaviour within competitive and atomistic bourgeois society whilst also implying, normatively, a moral coordination between individuals beyond the state. This thesis has argued that Marx identified the possibility of realising the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' so that individuals emancipated from reified relations would no longer need to coordinate their interaction through abstract moral codes and external systems guaranteed and enforced by state institutions.
Recognising that the strength of the liberal view derives 'from a degree of perplexity about the shape of a Communist society in which individual freedom can be realised without constraints' (Collins 1984:121), this chapter proceeds to define Marx's 'true' public as embodying a democratic conception of 'rational' constraint and authority in cooperative relationships of common control. These points will be established in relation to proletarian associationalism as the new public in the process of becoming and in relation to the conception of commune democracy.

8-3 Marx's 'Proletarian Public'

This section develops Marx's conception of the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class in order to define the 'proletarian public' as embedding a genuine commonality and universality in real society as opposed to the recourse the 'rational' tradition had to the abstracted political and legal sphere (Marx CHDS 1975:112 CHPR:I 1975:256). The proletariat emerge as the crucial democratic agency capable of forging the public bonds of the 'rational’ community at the heart of social existence. There is no notion in Marx of government possessing interests - however 'rational' - separate from the proletariat/demos. Any external government that emerges in this sense is open to Marx’s critique of alien politics (Thomas 1994). The section proceeds from Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat as organising the abolition of the abstract state as part of its internal logic to examine the implicit publicity in Marx's writings on proletarian self-organisation.

Despite attempts to play down the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat (Hunt II 1984:243/4: Avineri 1968:204), the idea of proletarian dictatorship is present throughout Marx's writings (Thomas 1994:122; Harding II 1981:ch 5; Marx in McLellan ed 1971:164; Marx 1973:57; Draper 1986:332/3). Though the term may imply a 'state communist' purpose on Marx's part (Merquior 1986:55), permitting liberals to stress the superiority of parliamentary democratic procedures (McLennan 1989:121; Sherman 1995:321/2), the concept of proletarian dictatorship is important in defining Marx's proletarian/communist public as extending popular, classless, associational control against centralised, class rule (Levine 1987:177; Mayo 1960:156ff). Terence Ball's description of proletarian dictatorship as the workers becoming the 'new ruling class' (Ball 1991:138/9) requires qualification in this actively democratic sense since Marx explicitly denies that the proletariat will establish 'a new class domination culminating in a new political power'. Since 'the condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class', the working class will 'substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism', abolishing 'political power properly so called' as 'the official expression of antagonism in civil society' (Marx PP n.d.146/7). The space for a ruling class - proletarian or otherwise - is thus removed.
Proceeding from a definition of 'the proletarian movement' as 'the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority' (Marx CM REV 1973:82), proletarian dictatorship prefigures the move to a democratic public beyond the exclusiveness of class identity and beyond the state (Marx CSF 1977:61 127; Draper 1986:ch 11; Levine 1987:140; Little 1989:7; Elster 1985:448 435; Hunt II 1984:244). Proletarian associationalism is the practical form the repoliticisation implied by the reappropriation of alienated social power (Marx OJQ 1975:234) takes, dissolving the monopolisation of power by the state and capital. Absorbing state power into the associational space of civil society means that the 'immense majority' could participate in government as constituted on the basis of 'the self-government of the Commune' (Marx on Bakunin in McLellan 1971:195). This principle of reappropriating social power alienated to the state, with which Marx had repudiated Hegel's defence of representative forms in the context of the state-civil society dualism (Marx CHDS 1975:188), contrasts with the bourgeois-democratic project of democratising the state (Marx 1974:354). Aware of the extent to which the state had appropriated common interests and activities, Marx's project of restitution reorganises this common purpose within practical existence in order to constitute real as against abstract community (Marx EB 1977:237/8).

This argument, connecting self-socialising communality beyond the state with proletarian self-organisation, abolishing institutions extraneous from practical existence (Callinicos 1976:105; Mattick 1978:85; Meszaros 1995:468), suggests the existence of a conception of a 'proletarian public' in Marx. As defined by Negt and Kluge, such a public transcends the 'rational' dualisms of public-private and reason-nature in being 'grounded in the process of production' and in being 'characterised by its direct, sensual and collective mode of experience' in contradistinction to the bourgeois separation of the political and the social (Negt and Kluge quoted by Medick in Samuel and Stedman Jones eds. 1982:87). [3]

This distinction also savours a little of Offe's distinction between 'dialogical' and 'monological' forms. In monological forms, policy formation and action are centralising and bureaucratic, occurring at the leadership level and being transmitted downwards to the led. Dialogical forms are decentralising and democratising, involving those subject to decisions in the decision making process. Power is exercised from the bottom upwards (Offe 1985:817/68). Though Offe identifies the 'proletarian' forms of party and trade unions with industrial capitalism as monological forms, this thesis places Marx's 'proletarian public' closer to the dialogical conception, certainly in the sense that the dissolution of the public/state-private/civil society dualism overcomes the dualism between rulers and ruled. In this respect, the ‘proletarian public’ realises Aristotle’s conception of citizenship as an active designation of ruling and being ruled in turn, constituting, exercising and acknowledge authority as part of the same process.

To recapitulate the argument from earlier chapters, Marx's public is 'the true community of men', the community of 'life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature' (Marx CN EW 1975:418/9). This community is 'of quite different reality and scope than the political community' of the bourgeois public (1975:418), that is, than the abstraction of the modern state (Marx CHDS ED 1975:90/1). ‘The abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world because the abstraction of private life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975). Marx is therefore challenging abstraction in order to recover ‘the political’ as something that avoids the dualism of public and private life. Marx thus affirms social existence as the true, 'earthly' reality of individuals as against the artificial, 'heavenly' realm of the state (OJQ 1975:220), uprooting the series of 'rational' dualisms which entail the alienation of sovereignty and the reduction of the demos to political passivity (Marx 1975:80 85/6 87/8 88 89 89/90 106 137 143/4). From the time he argued that Hegel inverted the real relation between the state and civil society (CHDS 1975:80/1 85/8 124 125), Marx emphasised the social content of politics and the state (Marx GI 1970:106). He rejects the 'Jacobin' attempt to force a revolution through political will as doomed to failure through channelling the social movement into the sterile forms of the unitary bourgeois public (CN 1975:412/3 418). But Marx’s 'socialism-from-below' (Draper 1996) is not anti-political but is a vision of a class hitherto 'excluded' from politics (CN 1975:401/4) and oppressed in society (CHPR:I 1975:255/6) reaching maturity as a class for itself (PP in Bottomore and Rubel ed 1984:194/5) and coming to win the battle for democracy (CM REV 1973:86,). As such, Marx realises the 'rational' ideal community of ends in an association 'in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (Marx CM REV 1973:87).
The 'proletarian public' constituted by the associational activity of the working class in both its economic and political movement invests Marx's 'true', 'rational' public with democratic content. The public which emerges through proletarian activity would not appropriate the institutions of the abstract state but would instead constitute a genuinely new, inclusive, non-class/non-coercive form of government, thus resolving what has been identified as the fundamental problem of exclusion at the heart of western political philosophy (Patterson 1991:163/4 404/5). Marx conceives the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class whose emancipation is the emancipation of the whole society (Marx CHPR:I 1975:256), the 'class of every citizen', possessing the potential to realise the universal as a 'true state', in contradistinction to Hegel's state bureaucracy as the 'illusory universal class' (CHDS 1975:112). Marx argues that 'only the proletarians' can accomplish the 'new social task', 'for all society', to abolish class and the state as 'the instrument of that class rule', as 'the centralised and organised governmental power usurping to be the master instead of the servant of society' (Marx CWF 1974:250). In extending 'the political' beyond its monopolisation by an abstracted state, the proletarian movement is crucial in avoiding the historical incarnation of reason as a bureaucratisation, something which is evident in both Hegel and Weber. Proletarian self-organisation extends the sphere of democratic, non-bureaucratic social authority into communist society. [4]

The Address of March 1850 is important in showing this aspect, underlining Marx's broad notion of 'party' as embracing an organic process of self-organisation (Draper 1978:599/622). Marx calls for workers to 'establish their own revolutionary workers' governments' - local committees and councils or workers' clubs or committees - so that 'bourgeois-democratic governments' are 'supervised and threatened' by 'authorities' constituted by 'the whole mass of workers' (Marx Address (March 1850 REV 1973:326).
These self-organising workers are 'independently organised and centralised in clubs', themselves centralised 'under a directorate' (Marx Address 1973:327). That Marx's proletarian 'dictatorship' or 'party' is constituted by workers' associations (1973:324) and represents the new public in embryonic form is made clear in the way Marx describes 'the formation of a workers' state against a bourgeois state' through 'constituent assemblies of the proletariat' (Marx CSF SE 1977:84; Gilbert 1981:226).

Communist revolution would not, therefore, be an event which captures state power but a process through which the future public emerges out of the self-constitution of the proletarian movement. As Marx wrote with respect to the Commune, by taking 'the actual management of their revolution into their own hands' the people have discovered the means of 'displacing the state machinery', investing state power 'in the hands of the people itself, and replacing 'the governmental machinery of the ruling classes by a governmental machinery of their own' (Marx CWF FD 1974:261).

Marx is distinguished from other revolutionary traditions in the importance he assigns to proletarian organisational activity, developing the new public as a matter of internal self-development (Marx 1974:270; Miliband 1977:119/20 133ff; Draper 1986:34/9 264 ch7; Geras 1986:214/5; Draper 1978:27 53 ch6). Marx breaks with the old conspiratorial politics, with 'alchemists of revolution' concerned with engineering revolution (Miliband 1977:119/20), with 'classless' petty bourgeois politics (Address 1973:323 324 327 330; Harris 1991:ch 4), and with 'socialism from above' generally (Marx CM REV 1973:94/7; Geras 1986:134/7). Marx’s concern with the self-development of proletarian moral, political and organisational capacities stems from his awareness that this self-organising process forms the subjective content of the new public (Marx in Kolakowski I 1981:303; Marx to Schweitzer 13 Feb 1865 1974:146/8-Draper 1990:70). [5] 
Marx thus affirms that the proletarian movement is capable of converting its immediate, economic organisation into a political movement embodying the socialist objective (Marx 1974:82 84 86; Marx to Bolte, Nov 23 1871 in MESW II 423f; Marx in Draper 1978:126/7). Proletarian 'association takes on a political character’ (PP in Bottomore and Rubel ed 1984:194/5), politicising struggle and generating the political party (PP in Bottomore and Rubel ed 1984:195; CM 1973:76; Resolution of the London Conference, 1974:270; Draper 1978:86/9 1978:ch5).
Marx thus affirmed the capacity of the proletariat to engender 'rational' commonality and universality and hence forge public bonds from within its own movement. Marx's evaluation of trade unions as forming the nucleus of the socialist society (1974:91ff) is quite distinct from the monocratic notion of 'the party' which mirrors and reproduces the statist bourgeois conception of the public. Against the Kautsky-Lenin thesis of socialism 'from without' (Negri in Makdisi et al ed 1996:173/5; Luxemburg in Basso 1975:100/1; Geras 1986:140 158), Marx was concerned not with 'imposing some Utopian system, but with self-conscious participation in the historical process of revolutionising society' (Marx 1953:75). Socialist consciousness is generated from within the proletarian movement. As 'schools of socialism', trade unions generate communist consciousness from within, laying hold of workers in a more enduring way than any political party (Marx in McLennan 1971:175/6; Miliband 1977:132/3). Thus the real value of trade unions lies less in the immediate economic benefits they may win than in the way that the 'ever-expanding union' of workers generates class and political consciousness (CM REV 1973:76; Draper 1978:81). Emphasising the importance of trade unions 'as organizing centres of the working class in the broad interest of its complete emancipation' (Instructions FI 1974:92; Draper 1978:99/103), Marx values the 'latent power of the working class' (1974:99) to generate a new public rooted in real life. Professional revolutionaries institutionalising their power as a leadership cadre in the state (Hunt II 1984:367) is the very antithesis of Marx's self-generated proletarian public. [6]
Though Laclau claims that Marx's 'dictatorship of the proletariat bases its legitimacy on the same privileged access to knowledge as the Platonic philosopher king' (Laclau 1990:77), Marx explicitly rejects such a notion as a 'doctrinaire socialism' which subordinates the 'total movement to one of its elements', replaces 'common social production’ with the 'brainwork of individual pedants' and, 'above all', 'dispenses with the revolutionary struggle of classes' (Marx CSF 1977:122/3). The relation between theory and practice, communists and proletarians, possesses an interactive and reciprocal character in Marx’s conception (Marx Theses EW 1975:421/23; Marx CM REV 1973:79/80; Geras 1986:139/40; Horkheimer 1972:215; Therborn 1976:326/7; see chapter 6 section 5), something which precludes a privileged position for politicians and intellectuals 'presenting themselves to the mass of workers as the hieratic practitioners of a secret science' (Alleged Splits FI 1974:307).

Though anarchists have long criticised Marx for encouraging the belief that salvation comes from above (Rocker 1989:79; Landauer 1978:31 46 57; Berkman 1989:75 83/4), Marx was just as keen to root out what he himself condemned as 'the cult of authority' (Marx to Blos, 10 November 1877). Marx's critical appropriation of 'rational freedom', that is, retained the rational concern with knowledge but, in conceiving social reality to be a human self-creation, avoided the imposition of abstract authority. Marx valued combinations, trade unions, etc as 'means of breaking the rule of the police and bureaucracy', thus releasing 'subjects' from 'state tutelage' (Marx to Schweitzer, 13 February 1865 FI 1974:147). The need to subvert the worker's dependence upon 'higher authority' and 'officialdom' caused Marx to explicitly criticise the centralist organisation of the German trade union movement (Marx to Schweitzer, 13 October 1868 FI 1974:156). Marx thus insisted that cooperative societies be the 'independent creations of the workers, and not the protégés either of governments or the bourgeoisie' (Marx FI 1974:354). Insisting upon the organisational independence of the proletariat through their trade unions and other societies and associations, Marx opposes Lassalle and rejects his attempt to prescribe in doctrinaire fashion the course to be followed by the proletarian movement (Marx to Schweitzer 13 Oct 1868 1974:155; Draper 1990:ch3; Avineri 1968:184).
Marx's rejection of 'political indifferentism’ - upon which the anarchist criticism is based - recognises the extent to which the proletariat themselves were seeking to enter political institutions (Marx PI FI 1974:327/9). Nevertheless, any peaceful, parliamentary, transition that Marx entertained would be part of, not in place of, a deeper social transformation proceeding through the proletarian movement at the same time.

Marx's defence of legitimate authority, as 'chosen and constituted by the workers', against charges of 'authoritarianism' (Marx AS FI 1974:306), reveals a democratic conception of authority developed from the 'rational' concept of self-assumed obligation, something which is implicit in the concept of proletarian dictatorship. Elitism and authoritarianism are a product of the immaturity of the proletarian movement (Marx AS 1974:298). Justifying the existence of the International in terms of proletarian self-development (AS 1974:299), Marx heavily criticises those who attempted to turn the International into a vehicle for the propagation of an ideal, an approach which considered the working class to be mere 'raw material' (AS 1974:306). The proletariat, in their organisational, political and intellectual maturity, were the active, creative agency of social transformation and were therefore capable of constituting their own democratic authority.

In contrast, Kautsky's thesis - celebrated as 'profoundly true and important' by Lenin - that 'socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it spontaneously', the product of the 'bourgeois intelligentsia' rather than the proletariat (Kautsky quoted by Lenin 1987:38/9; Miller 1982:116) is consistent with the educational dictatorship required by 'rational' thinkers unable to embody the normative ideal within the real. Breaking with this idea by resolving the reason-nature, public-private dualisms upon which it is based, Marx could deny that communism is based on 'ideas or principles' 'invented' by some 'would-be universal reformer' (Marx CM REV 1973:79/80). Marx argues that the emergence of the proletarian movement renders these theoreticians reactionary (Marx PP n.d. 140), condemning those 'educated and propertied bourgeois' who presume to lead the party on the assumption that 'the working class is incapable of liberating itself by its own efforts' (Marx CL FI 1974:369/70 372/3 374/5; Durkheim in Gouldner ed. 1962:61/2; Meszaros 1995:468 728/9). [7] The International was especially valued by Marx for being 'established by the working men themselves and for themselves’ (Marx FI 1974:271), for being the 'spontaneous growth of the proletarian movement' rather than being founded by 'radicals among the ruling classes for the working classes', rather than being the product of a sect or a theory (Marx 1974:99). As a hybrid organisation combining trade union and political organisations under one structural roof (Draper 1978:127), the International achieved that internal unity within the proletarian movement crucial to realising the universal public as the 'true state' rooted in associative society. [8]
In conclusion, the purpose of this section has been to argue for the centrality of proletarian associationalism in subverting 'rational' dualisms, engendering the 'true' public and hence embodying a genuine commonality and universality without being compelled to have recourse to the 'rational' state and law as an educational dictatorship. Marx is able to realise and embed rational freedom in appropriate social relations and forms.





THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF COMMUNISM
This section employs Marx's writing on the Commune as a model for the political structure of future society (Avineri 1968:240). Though he distrusted its Jacobin and petty bourgeois elements (Duncan 1977:176/7; Avirieri 1968:246), Marx nevertheless identified the futurity of the Paris Commune as 'the first modern, or "Left" revolution' (Schulkind in Brooks ed. 1983:77). The argument in this section develops Marx's concern to debureaucratise and deprofessionalize political life (Hunt II 1984:154) in terms of replacing coercive power with a democratic form of social authority. The democratic implications of 'rational freedom' are finally realised in an active and social sense. This realises Marx's conception of an active social citizenship (chapters 5 6) through individual participation in social mechanisms determining issues of common concern (Bottomore 1964:133; McLennan 1989:122/3). With 'commune democracy', 'the political' is no longer locked up in the abstract state of the modern world, conceived in narrow, passive electoral and procedural terms, but instead becomes co-extensive with real life as a practice, becoming integral to self-realisation as a genuine public life.

Though Hoffman identifies a contradiction between the post-liberal logic of Marx's political theory and the anti-liberal logic of Marx's defence of the Paris Commune (Hoffman 1995:131/4 136 137), the principles Marx elaborated with respect to the Commune are consistent with his early critique of the inversion of the state and civil society and his definition of human emancipation as the restitution of alienated social power (OJQ 1975:234).
Marx celebrates the 'reabsorption of the state power by society as its own living forces' rather than having this power take form as the 'artificial force' of the state 'controlling and subduing' society (Marx CWF 1974:250/1). Marx, further, identifies the Commune as the greatest move yet toward 'the conquest of the political power of the working classes' (Marx 1974:272).
Most importantly, 'rational freedom', hitherto invested in a legal-institutional sphere abstracted from real society, was realised by being incorporated into the structures, practices and relations of everyday individual exchange and interaction. Marx's 'true' public, drawn from the 'rational' tradition, is a social public defined against the unitary bourgeois public instituted under the state. With respect to France, Marx had already, in 1852, demanded that 'society's independent organs of movement' (Marx EB 1977:187) be restored to health, attacking the way that the state makes 'every common interest' a subject for governmental activity, appropriating this commonality and imposing it as a 'higher', abstracted general interest over the self-activity of the members of society (EB 1977:237/8). Marx proceeds in the work of 1871 to condemn the abstraction of control instituted by the state and capital as the 'creation of the middle classes' (Marx CWF 1974:247 249). The Communal constitution 'restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the state parasite feeding upon, and clogging, the free movement of society' (1974:211). Marx thus praises the Commune, as the 'social republic', because its aim is not to capture and reinforce state power but to abolish it, along with the 'enslavement' of labour by capital, as the 'supernaturalist abortion of society' (1974:208/9 249 250). This represented 'a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life' (1974:249).

Through its 'perfected' twin instruments of standing army and officialdom, the imperial state monopolises 'the political' and turns it against society as institutionalised force. The state institutes a fetish system of politics in which communal interests are 'separated from society itself .. and opposed to it in the form of state interests', individuals coming to be 'administered by state priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions' (Marx CWF 1974:247).

Commune democracy is antithesis of this centralised imperial state power (Marx CWF 1974:208/9), breaking up the central features of the old state power by making all public offices subject to elective principles. The mandat imperatif (1974:210) embodies the 'instruction' or 'commission' which Marx had demanded in his earlier criticism of Hegel (CHDS 1975:194), binding the deputies of civil society with the electors. This democratic control achieves 'a working, not a parliamentary body' (Marx CWF 1974:209). 'Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the central government' as 'the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the state was laid into the hands of the Commune' (1974:209). Whilst the 'repressive organs' of government were amputated, 'legitimate functions' were restored to the responsible agents of society' (Marx 1974:210/1). The nation would be 'organised into self-working and self-governing communes', with 'state functions reduced to a few functions for national purposes' (1974:252).
With the functions of a 'trained caste' of bureaucrats undertaken by workers as active citizens, the Commune allowed Marx to elaborate upon his conception of the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class and of universal suffrage as the attempt by civil society to make itself political society (Marx CHDS 1975:188/91). Such a politics proceeds on the basis of social practices. The general suffrage ceases to sanction the state power and is 'adapted to its real purposes, to choose by the communes their own functionaries of administration and initiation'. The authoritarian-elitist model of politics is thus subverted. Administration and political governing are no longer considered 'mysteries, transcendent functions' in the hands of state parasites (FD CWF 1974:251). The legal-bureaucratic incarnation of 'rational freedom' is overcome through the social democratic embodiment of rationality, commonality and universality.

In becoming an actively democratic freedom, 'rational freedom' realises a genuine commonality at the heart of society. Communism returns to society all those powers usurped by the state so that individuals freely associate around needs and interests, thus reducing the scope of bureaucracy as an abstract, substitute commonality. In the new political structure 'universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business', putting 'the right man in the right place' and redressing mistakes promptly (CWF 1974:210/1). As functional representation replaces abstract representation on the basis of the state-civil society dualism, universal suffrage ceases to be an 'instrument of fraud' and becomes instead an 'instrument of emancipation’ (1974:377).

Developing this aspect of Marx responds to MacGregor's criticism that whereas Hegel's classes offer a 'social bulwark against dictatorship and terror', Marx invites totalitarianism through reducing community to a 'nebulous jumble of individuals with identical (non)occupations' and through 'eliminating professionals and bureaucracy' (MacGregor 1998:128 129). Yet Marx's functional representation implies that the abolition of class does not entail the abolition of social differentiation at all. Lukacs' distinction between class, organised according to the ownership of productive property, and group, as organised according to social ties, develops this point to envisage communism as a society which has extended democracy not through social homogenisation but through the political empowerment of the diversity of social strata (Levine in Lukacs 1991:32). There is a place for social role in Marx's conception of civil society assuming governmental functions hitherto exercised externally by the state and capital. As opposed to Hegel's state bureaucracy as capable only of a mediation abstracted from real society, Marx's commune democracy generates a genuine universality through a functional democracy rooted in social existence.

Hunt concludes that Marx expected the state as coercive power to disappear 'after a new generation had so internalised the rules of social intercourse that no external coercion would be required' (Hunt II 1984:246). This suggests a Kantian colegislative community of individuals promoting the ends of each other, freely and spontaneously rather than through duty (Van Der Linden 1988:248). Whereas sociality and solidarity once took alien form as the state and capital, Marx envisages reason realised through the real natures, lives and activities of individuals, becoming an integral part of human self-realisation and social self-determination. In seeking a material basis for Kant's realm of ends, the noumenal aspect of human nature becomes species essence which, realising itself beyond alienation, fills the space hitherto occupied by the phenomenal aspect.

This makes sense of Marx's description of communism as a common life in which individuals may simply draw from the common fund of resources to meet their needs. Marx is affirming a genuine community based upon the harmonious interdependence of each upon all. When the 'springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly', society can 'wholly cross the narrow horizon of bourgeois right and inscribe on its banner: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!' (CGP 1974:347). Further, in transcending rights, Marx is affirming a principle of difference rather than of equality. For Marx, the notion of equal rights suppresses the 'particular side' of real individuals, their uniquely different endowments. Equal right 'is an unequal right for unequal labour', a right of 'inequality, just like any other right' (CGP 1974:346/7). Only under communism that particular differences can prevail against levelling conceptions of equality.
The view that external coercion is dissolved as 'rational' human beings come to internalise the rules of social intercourse needs to be qualified to make clear that external coercion is not replaced by an internal coercion. Further, it needs to be understood that internalisation in Marx does not imply the realisation of the rational as a purely moral, spontaneous existence. With Marx, internal 'rational' coordination is social as well as moral, a collective project proceeding through relationships and hence implying mediation. Hence the emphasis this section has placed upon the social practices of the Commune as practices of social and economic organisation.

This brings the argument full circle. Commune democracy as the abolition of the state - and, in association with the conception of common control, of capital - is the realisation of the ideal community of ends contained in the 'rational' tradition. Whereas dualisms of reason and nature, public and private blocked the realisation of this 'rational' end, with human sociality and solidarity taking the alien form of the state and capital, Marx can envisage reason in control as the realisation of 'true' democracy, community and individuality. Reason is no longer separated from the real natures, lives and activities of individuals but is an integral part of human self-realisation and of social self-determination. The legitimacy of this authority results from the internal identification of these individuals constituting this social authority with power.

8-5 The Democratisation Of Authority And Morality

This chapter concludes with an attempt to relate the 'anarcho-Aristotelianism' developed out of Marx's democratic reworking of the 'rational' tradition to contemporary libertarian conceptions of a new public sphere. This thesis has argued that, in revaluing natural inclination against attempts to impose, externally and institutionally, a 'higher’ notion of the self, Marx de-authorizes and democratises morality and politics. Marx avoids the danger inherent in the 'rational' tradition of reifying the connections between individuals into apparatuses and codes raised above them. Kant's external command of duty is replaced by a conception in which the ethical duties are determined in relation to other individuals.

Marx thus sought a material basis for Kant's republic of ends. The noumenal aspect of human nature becomes species essence which, realising itself beyond alienation, fills the space hitherto occupied by the phenomenal aspect. This thesis has sought to show how Marx strengthens social bonds so that the reciprocal freedom of each and all within actual relationships overcomes the need for reciprocity to take the form of impersonal/external systems of adjudication and legislation.
For Heller, Marx's communism, as a purely intelligible (transparent) and absolutely free society beyond justice (Heller 1989:107/8) is 'impossible and undesirable' (Heller 1989:223 224). 'Where there are no norms and rules, there are no institutions, no communities, no human bonds, no human existence' (Heller 1989:225 320). Yet the view of Marx developed in this thesis is closer to what Heller herself praises as 'the idea of the free and conscious construction of the human bond, of the proper distinction between the powers of domination and humane powers, of human solidarity' (Heller 1989:320).

This thesis has argued that Marx incorporated 'rational' principles of solidarity, reciprocity and interaction within everyday life without thereby embracing the
abstract universality or external projection of community and authority which has been central to modern rationality. Marx, that is, proposes a novel approach to the problem of political obligation. The view, discernible in the 'rational' tradition, that the individual is free from obligation to a state which does not conform to the primary moral obligation of individual self-realisation, takes a radical form in Marx.

Historically, this problem of political obligation has been shaped with respect to determining the legitimacy of the state. The problem is that terms of obligation were either too strict, as with Hobbes - alienation as permanent and irrevocable - or vague and tacit, as with Locke. As a result, the notion of consent was dissolved in favour of a defence of the existing state as legitimate and just. This even applied to Kant, for whom the people could act only as a 'mob' in repudiating the social contract, something issuing in 'anarchy' (Saw 1974:70n). Kant's condemnation of revolution makes consent in the social contract permanent (MEJ 1965:86/7).

As has been argued, Rousseau's originality lay in conceiving the coincidental moral transformation of both the state and the individuals composing it. Giving consent a more active and continuous expression develops the democratic conception of authority implicit in liberal voluntarism and contractualism, posing the highly subversive question of how the state can be justified if individuals are able to govern themselves (Pateman 1985:2 12; Hoffman 1995:99/100). Marx proposed a way of resolving the question democratically on the side of a self-governing society. Marx incorporated 'rational’ principles of solidarity, reciprocity and interaction within everyday life without thereby embracing the abstract universality or external projection of community characterising the modern state. [9]

Approaching authority this way suggests common ground with anarchism, despite the historical enmity between marxists and anarchists. [10]
Kropotkin's rejection of authority suggests the need for caution in appropriating 'rational freedom' (Kropotkin 1970:141; 1987; 1988:77 78 79 82 83 98; 1990:50/2). He attacks an education that seeks to develop 'submission to authority’ so that people can no longer understand that 'It is possible to exist otherwise than under the reign of law, elaborated by a handful of rulers' (1970:197). The state and its 'cult of authority' need to be abolished in favour of a society that has reduced obligation to a minimum and practises authority as merely an immediate and temporary exchange proceeding through free initiative, action and association (1970:123/4).
Fenn puts the anarchist case against even 'rational' authority in favour of the secular society of free individuals in arguing that repression comes from the state making 'complexity less threatening and more manageable' by making 'habituation to being dominated a moral and political obligation' (Fenn 1986:99). Arguing that 'social obligation taken too seriously inhibits the development of individuals', Fenn demands attention be devoted 'to studying the possibility of a society without even such a dominant institution of the state' (1986:9). Fenn's anarchist project is an attempt to create 'a society based on minimal obligations' and functional authority beyond the state (Fenn 1986:14/5). His free society would be the society of realised, self-conscious, free individuals no longer administered from above (1986:4).

The point is that this is precisely how this thesis has developed Marx's reworking of 'rational freedom', realising its normative dimension against its historical-institutional form, its democratic possibilities against the imposition of an educational dictatorship, and thus overcoming an alienated world administered by officials, politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, external mediators of all kinds (Marx CHDS 1975:107; OJQ 1975:217/8 218/9). The point at issue here is the abolition of alien or external forms of mediation (OJQ 1975:220 244/5; EPM 1975:341/2) so as to achieve the return to individuals of their social existence (EPM 1975:348/9).
In conceiving Marx's critical appropriation of the tradition of 'rational freedom' as an 'Anarcho-Aristotelianism', this thesis has argued for a democratic, non-authoritarian, libertarian conception of social authority as against the subjection of the individual to a moral and political obligation which is codified, administered and imposed from above. Marx's democratisation of authority is also the de-authorization of morality and politics. The communist society of free individuality is aimed against the cult of authority and its association with the abstraction of the state (OJQ 1975:222).

Though extracting the communal and normative potential of the tradition of 'rational freedom', this thesis has attempted to avoid an abstract conception of authority and obligation. There is no room in Marx's communist society for any power above the level at which real individuals -not abstract state citizens - and real communities - not the illusory state community - directly, actively and consciously exercise control. No cult of authority develops under Marx's communism since authority is not delegated to a level at which it becomes independent of and opposed to the will of individuals.
Realising the 'rational' ideal as an internal mode of integration and coordination against the external imposition of the state and capital in this way suggests a possible rapprochement with anarchism. Although Alan Carter distinguishes the anarchist abolition of state power as such from Marx's absorption of state power into society (Carter 1988:193), Marx's 'proto-government or protopolitical authority in a stateless society' (Draper 1977:240 240/1), is compatible with certain anarchist formulations of authority. Individualist anarchists reject legitimate governmental authority as a contradiction in terms since the primary moral duty of the individual is to maintain moral autonomy at all times, never subordinating judgement to another individual or collective judgement (Philp 1986:3/5 27/8 133/4). However, the inability to ground individual freedom in a supra-individual world has led some anarchists to employ the principle of self-assumed obligation as a non-coercive form of social authority. This acknowledges the 'rational' argument that cooperation between individuals on the basis of free agreement and association expands the scope of individual action and initiative as a collective form of self-empowerment: 'Through the creation of social relationships of reciprocal obligation, free association gives expression to and reaffirms human solidarity' (Graham 1996:76). The idea that association, solidarity and cooperation, far from threatening individual autonomy, are actually crucial to autonomy in developing individuality through relationships emphasises, against 'the individualist anarchist ideal', that freedom is not the absence of coercion or constraint but a social relationship (Graham 1996:77).

From a non-individualist anarchist perspective, Baugh argues that 'richly articulated' relationships educate the individual into 'moral probity, self-awareness and social commitment' so that 'each person acquires the competence to manage social affairs directly (Baugh in Clark ed. 1990:104/5). Morality practised in individual relationships takes the place of legal rules enforced through coercive sanction (Baugh 1990:106). Importantly, obligation is not reified so that it is owed to an institution, an ideal or a law. The free association of individuals for purposes of collective decision creates horizontal ties of political obligation with each other as against vertical ties with some separate body raised above them, i.e. the state (Baugh 1990:104/5). The point is relevant to the development of authentic public spheres against the centralised, unitary conception of 'the public' under the state. Political obligation resting on voluntarily created horizontal ties requires a 'more fluid, less institutionalised conception of direct democracy’. Rather than 'one general assembly having jurisdiction over all those in a certain area' there will be a 'multiplicity of political associations' responsive to changing needs and interests (Baugh 1990:105).

In the free society, individual citizens collectively legislate the rules of their association, are bound by them, but may also modify them. Rather than exchange obedience for the 'protection of the state', as in the social contract, citizens create 'reciprocal relationships of obligation in their collective undertakings and social life' through voluntary action from the workplace to the community (Graham 1996:78).
Such ideas - and their similarity to the way Marx's critical appropriation of 'rational freedom' has been developed in this thesis - offer a means of addressing the problems of 'mass’ democracy, particularly the accusation that Marx advocates the tyranny of the majority (Hoffman 1995:197; Hunt II 1984:ch6). This problem goes back to the tension between liberalism and democracy and the contrast between 'rational' and individualist perspectives on the state (chapter 1). The Anglo-American notion of limited government is based on the recognition that popular sovereignty could easily translate into a tyranny of the majority in which the democratic state infringed upon personal liberty. Hence the limitation of the state to a protective and negative function in the individualist liberal conception. Chapter 1 reconstructed the 'rational' conception of the state's positive and communal purpose with a view to addressing this point, arguing that wherever the state, however democratic, did infringe upon the liberty of its members in this way, its authority became illegitimate and the terms of its obligation ceased to operate.

What distinguishes Marx's 'rational' individuality from liberal individualism is the fact that the development of individuality for Marx is the realisation of a species being common to all, something that proceeds reciprocally, through mutual bonds, rather than in independence from others. The other is conceived not as an active obstacle to but as integral to individual self-fulfilment. The good ceases to be the product of an external educational process. Richly textured relationships educate individuals into the moral rectitude, self-knowledge and social responsibility required so that the 'rational' principles of self-assumed obligation and obedience to the moral law become social practices. Each individual develops the capacity through these reciprocal relationships to participate in the social regulation of common affairs. Morality and politics practised in relationships takes the place of legal rules enforced through coercive sanction, with obligation becoming a reciprocal conception practised within real relationships.

There is, in the 'rational' conception, an internal notion of power as something that inheres in the demos. It is precisely this notion which Marx radicalised as the empowerment of the demos as an active political sovereignty. From this perspective, Hunt's criticism of the absence in Marx of any reference to a constitutional framework to check 'the unrestrained rule of the majority' (Hunt II 1984:182/5) comes from a different philosophical base than that of Marx, having more in common with the Anglo-American, Lockean, individualist-liberal case for limited government. In contrast, Marx's 'rational' conception of sovereignty is able to conceive of an active empowerment of the demos. Marx's 'immense majority’ is not an undifferentiated 'mass' tyrannising over a minority through the state power but is a self-organised differentiated demos interacting within a self-checking social framework which serves to block the power of some to rule over others. Marx's restitution of alienated social power implies that power is diffused into the social centres in which individuals are active so that control will no longer mean power over others but power with each other. With self-assumed obligation taking active form as direct democracy, all members of the community 'participate equally in social rule' (Baugh 1990:103) so that there is no necessary connection with majority rule (Graham 1996:79).

In conclusion, this section has developed the notion of 'commune democracy’ as the model of the future 'social' polity beyond the state and capital. As with the proletarian public, this establishes the content of Marx's 'true’ public in actualising 'rational freedom’ as a social form as against the statist, bureaucratic, lawful apparatus abstracted from real society which has been the historically dominant form.

The concluding part of this section related this 'commune democracy' to certain anarchist attempts to address individual freedom in a supra-individual world. These perspectives illuminate the way Marx locates 'rational' unity, the coincidence of the freedom of each and all, in an actual rather than a noumenal community. The principle of self-assumed obligation becomes less a rationalisation of the state than a libertarian attempt to define a non-authoritarian conception of collective authority. The argument makes it clear that individual freedom occurs in relationships. Marx may go beyond the 'rational' state but he retains and embeds the 'rational' argument that a framework of community and authority, constituted by real association, solidarity and cooperation, expands individual autonomy whilst its absence diminishes individual autonomy. It remains to compare and contrast Marx's view with key perspectives in contemporary political theory.

8-5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has shown how Marx realised the emancipatory and democratic implications of 'reason', finding an institutional and structural way for individuals to exercise control over their supra-individual social power rather than alienating it to the state and capital and thus having it imposed back upon them as institutional-systemic force. This chapter has argued that the 'rational' attempt to achieve the internal identification of individuals with power is realised in a cooperative, communal system of politics and production.

The first section defined the cooperative mode of production, constituted by the associated producers, as the realisation of 'rational' principles in the productive life of society. The final two sections defined the political and institutional character of the communist public as constituted by proletarian associationalism and a system of commune democracy. The argument proceeded from Marx's concept of the proletariat as the non-bureaucratic universal class to show how the proletarian transformation of the political subverts 'rational' dualisms, engenders the new public from within its self-organisation and hence embodies a genuine commonality and universality without recourse to the state and law to educate individuals to the good. This section on the 'proletarian public', establishing its goal of true universality, led directly to the final section on a commune system of democratic government. The system of commune democracy was shown to be a social public in which politics becomes coextensive with social life. The consistency of the principles Marx affirmed with respect to the Paris Commune with his early demand for repoliticisation through the practical reappropriation of social power alienated to the state was shown. The new social public, the 'true state' (Marx CHDS 1975:112) rooted in the associational space of civil society and implicit in Marx's critique of Hegel's state, received its most explicit formulation here as a 'social republic'.

The final section brought the argument full circle, rethinking the public sphere against the state and capital in terms of a comparison between Marx's democratisation of the 'rational' tradition with an anarchist justification of collective authority and constraint. Communism is not simply a case of internalising rules of social intercourse so that no external coercion would be required, as Hunt argues. Such a view is compatible with an internal rational coercion, the cult of authority which Marx was concerned to rule out. Individuals are not internalising Kant's command of moral duty but achieving a genuine inner relation to themselves, to others and to their powers. The end of the state (as abstract/lawful reason) is the realisation of the normative community of the 'rational' tradition. implying social coordination in a supra-individual world. Acknowledging that individual freedom occurs in relationships, Marx puts practical life on a democratic foundation. The mode of social intercourse, subject to alien mediation under capitalism, is put under the democratic control of associated individuals as producers and citizens. 'Rational freedom' becomes an associational freedom implying political and economic structures which connect the freedom of each with the freedom of all in a democratically constituted social polity. 

9 THE RATIONAL COMMUNITY OF JURGEN HABERMAS

This chapter appraises Jurgen Habermas’ attempt to reclaim the emancipatory terms of "rational freedom’ on the modern terrain, paying particular attention to possibilities for a democratic public sphere generated out of the lifeworld. Habermas is firmly part of the tradition of 'rational freedom'. Looking to realise the freedom of each and all within community (Habermas 1992:146), Habermas is concerned to reject the postructuralist accusation that 'rational’ unity necessarily entails the totalitarian suppression of difference and autonomy (Lyotard 1984:73). Arguing that the social and philosophical grounds of both individualist liberalism and orthodox marxism have dissolved, Habermas argues that a critical theory of modernity is more adequately grounded in the 'suppressed traces of Reason' (Pusey 1987:14/5).
Habermas' 'rational' ideal anticipates and justifies a post-capitalist 'good' society characterised by the greatest possible happiness, peace, and community.





The 'rational society' is thus defined in terms of the satisfaction of the human needs of all rather than the subjection of all to the deprecations of arbitrary power.
Habermas theorises out of a 'rational' tradition that has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and which embraces Kant, Hegel and Marx. This tradition stresses the positive moral potentialities of State and Society as forming the socio-institutional infrastructure through which distinct individuals rationally associate to transcend the arbitrary limitations of private individual concerns to realise larger purposes that enhance the freedom of each and all. Characterising his work as 'an attempt to reconstruct Kantian ethics’ (1986:160), Habermas offers a powerful synthesis of the 'rational' themes presented in this thesis. Habermas, that is, integrates the Hegelian progress of Reason in history, the problematic Weberian process of rationalisation and how this process connects with the marxist centrality of power, economics and nature, within an understanding of how knowledge is embodied in culture, in the norms and values that guide everyday human action.
Lamenting the absence of 'constructive models' within marxism (Habermas 1991; Habermas in MacGregor 1998:143), Habermas is clear that the philosophical foundations of marxism need to be reworked. The rejection of the labour theory of value and orthodox notions of class and crisis serves to render the end of a better society - in which production, labour and social organisation are organised rationally to the satisfaction of the human needs of all as against being organised irrationally through the external purpose of capital accumulation - more philosophically and morally defensible. Habermas, then, does not so much reject Marx as reconstruct his thought as a rational project. Just as Marx 'wanted to capture the embodiments of unreason', so Habermas is concerned with the 'analysis of power constellations that suppress an intention intrinsic to the claim to reason announced in the teleological and inter-subjective structures of social reproduction themselves’. Though this claim is continually silenced, it has a transcending power since 'it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving emancipation'. Habermas compares his theoretical approach to Marx's in being 'guided by the intention of recovering a potential for reason encapsulated in the very forms of social reproduction’ (Habermas 1982:221). The difference is that Habermas sets the teleological and inter-subjective structures of social reproduction in a perspective that assigns a more creative role to the role of ideas, culture and morality in history. Checking tendencies to class and economic reductionism makes Marx true to his end of rescuing emancipatory reason against alien reason.
Habermas thus sees as one of his main tasks as restablishing the importance of knowledge and culture through reconstructing what marxism considers the 'independent variable' of social evolution, the forces of production (Heller 1982:ch 1). Labour is not simply an economic category but an 'epistemological category' through which Nature is known. Labour refers to the social coordination of 'instrumental' and technological knowledge, rooted in the culture and forms of symbolic interaction prevailing at each particular stage of social evolution. Habermas thus corrects the marxist tendency to overrate the economic factor as an independent determining force for human development in favour of a view which redefines the forces of production as an endogenous growth of human knowledge. Accordingly, the task is to reconstruct social evolution as a process that develops through expanded possibilities for learning and hence for the creation of a culture with an emancipatory potential. This represents the progressive institutionalisation of emancipatory reason against arbitrary power (Pusey 1993:28/9).
Whereas Marx pursued this aim through the reappropriation of alienated social power, Habermas revalues ordinary social interaction in arguing that culture has a decisive role in shaping the crisis tendencies and dynamics of modern society. Habermas replaces the view that law, religion, and morality are secondary phenomena with a view that the development of these normative structures is the pacemaker of social evolution’ (CES 1979:120), though certainly tied to 'economically conditioned systems problems' as 'superstructural phenomenon' (CES 1979:98 chs 4 5).
Habermas claims that, in being too narrowly focused upon productive labour, Marx's view fails to appreciate other forms of interaction, particularly the fact that human beings are symbolizing beings. Language as well as labour is an essential anthropological category: 'liberation from hunger and misery does not necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and degradation, for there is no automatic developmental relation between labour and interaction (TP 1973:169). Habermas' extension of the notion of interaction - and Marx himself did not reduce production to economics (chapter 6 section 4) – is valuable in establishing communism as a moral ideal. In emphasising the communicative dimension of human existence, including both moral praxis and reflection (critique) (Van Der Linden 1988:265/6), Habermas offers a path beyond communism as immanent in the historical process, making it clear that the goal of human emancipation is to be pursued not merely through material action but also through communicative action.
'Lifeworld' (Lebenswelt) is the key methodological term defining the substratum in which social and economic structures interpenetrate with human action and consciousness. The lifeworld is the 'background consensus of everyday life', the store of knowledge that is passed through the generations. The lifeworld is the context-forming horizon for the interaction between social action through culture, ethics and consciousness on the one hand and social structures on the other (Pusey 1993:59). For Habermas, the lifeworld 'stands behind the back of each participant in communication' and is 'so unproblematic that we are simply incapable of making ourselves conscious of this or that part of it at will' (Habermas 1981:4/31).
Habermas draws a distinction between 'socially integrated action contexts' in self-organising public spheres in the lifeworld - in which actions are coordinated through an intersubjective consensus about norms, values and ends -and 'system integrated contexts' - in which actions are coordinated through the functional interlacing of the steering 'media' of money and power (TCA 2 1989:189/92 202 338/40; Giddens 1987:232/3).
A substantively rational society is achieved by strengthening the lifeworld so that the communicative interaction of free and equal individuals may generate a rational consensus (TCA 1 1991:69f 339; 2 1989:126/7 187 352/3). These structures are grounded, not transcendentally as with Kant, but in the lifeworld, 'as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognised' (TCA 1 1991:69/70).
But any possibility of a public rooted in the lifeworld is precluded by the way Habermas rules out the transformation of relations of production, seeking instead to confine instrumental rationality to its proper sphere in the system world. Rather than engage in social transformation, Habermas seeks to balance discursive and non-discursive modes of coordination. [1] Attempts to abolish relations of domination, for Habermas, must accept the necessity of a system world in which the steering media of money and administrative power coordinate human action on nonratiorial/non-discursive grounds and concentrate instead on the life world. The problem is that as steering media assume increasing responsibility for coordination, the space for the lifeworld is diminished, generating socially pathological consequences (TCA 1 1991:299-303; TCA 2 1989:311/12 355/7 367/73 375 391/6).
Habermas's diagnosis of the encroachment by steering media into the lifeworld ruptures the tradition of 'rational freedom’. Given the tendency of 'monetarisation and bureaucratisation’ 'to overstep the boundaries of normality' by instrumentalizing the lifeworld (TCA 2 1991:323), destroying communicative contexts and non-renewable cultural resources, there are doubts whether Habermas can sustain his vision of the consensual and normative coordination of human action contexts (Giddens 1987:239).
Habermas's interactive freedom does, in a formal sense, raise issues of the good life and can critically evaluate existing social practices and processes in so far as they depart from ideal conditions (TCA 2 1989:8 11 23 25 26/7 32/42 60/2 86 143/4 150/2 163 180/1 186 187). Thus Habermas can ask why modernisation has excluded 'the erection of institutions of freedom, which protect the communicatively structured action domains in the private and public spheres from the reifying peculiar dynamic of the economic and administrative systems' (TCA 2 quoted in McCumber 1989:332). This results in 'a neutralisation of the possibilities for political participation opened up by the role of citizen' (TCA 2 1991:346/7).

Habermas's model of social evolution raises important questions concerning the dualistic framework of reason in the modern world, split between capital's objective necessity and the liberal promise of autonomy, showing how cognitive-instrumental rationalisation outstrips practical-moral rationalisation. This is a split between a positive or emancipatory rationalisation that is oriented towards the extension of reason in human affairs and a repressive rationalisation that imprisons human beings within the 'iron cage’ of a totally administered society.
Reasserting practical-moral rationalisation, which entails the abolition of 'those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and that prevent conscious settlements of conflicts and consensual regulation of conflicts', has the emancipation of the individual as a truly universal 'species being’ as its end (Habermas CES 1979:119).
But such a view, as compatible with Marx's ambition to unify particular and universal interests (Habermas CES 1979:115; Marx OJQ 1975), questions the view that system and lifeworld are absolutely separable realms, Habermas consigning business and state agencies to the former, households, society and culture to the latter. A logical distinction between the two realms still allows Habermas to argue that certain activities should be subject to one mode of integration rather than the other, that the hegemonic encroachment of market and administrative power into a domain primarily concerned with symbolic reproduction - family, school, public domains - ought to be resisted. Even so, this presupposes the rationality of the separation of the system and lifeworld, which itself remains questionable, especially given Habermas's attempt to subject, in part, the system world to the democratic ethos of the lifeworld (Ingram 1987:115/6).
Habermas's ambiguities here open up the lifeworld as a public sphere of emancipatory interaction to be invested with the power alienated to the steering media of money/capital and power/state. Although Habermas rejects a democracy based upon an idealised lifeworld, being concerned instead to resist the encroachment of the system world upon the lifeworld whilst affirming the necessary co-existence of the two, his theory expresses a demand for society to be governed normatively against the domination of instrumental rationality. Habermas's communicative ethic opens up the possibility of the discursive coordination of human action centred up the lifeworld as the necessary world of real individuals.
Habermas's original contribution to the 'rational’ project lies in recasting the study of society within a theory of communication. From the first, Habermas had argued that language is 'what raises us out of nature' as 'the only thing whose nature we can know':





Habermas integrates rationality, social action and structures, and social reproduction within the 'paradigm of communication’, developing a model which explains how rationality and irrationality are expressed in ordinary social interaction, particularly within ordinary communication between speaking and acting subjects. Habermas is concerned to value the emancipatory over the repressive aspects of rationalisation:





Habermas discerns a normative framework in language insofar as each communicative act implies the possibility of interaction free from constraint and distortion: 'the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding’ (TCA 1 1991:285). Understanding is uncoerced and disinterested, a Kantian idea which savours a great deal of Rawls.
Habermas's view of domination-free communication contains an implicit vision of the 'good’, or 'rational', society (Polity Reader 1995:129/30; Pusey 1993:69/75). Although the 'ideal speech situation' does not necessarily correspond with the empirical conditions of speech acts, given that it belongs to the structure of possible speech, individuals 'counterfactually proceed as if the ideal speech situation .. were not merely fictive but real’ (Habermas in Thompson 1984:266). The implications are radically democratic, presupposing symmetrical against asymmetrical relations in a society governed by discursive will formation (Habermas in Thompson 1984:264). The idea of domination-free communication demands that social relationships be domination-free, and that the unequal distribution of power end (Heller 1984:174; Miller 1987:75).
This 'ideal speech situation’ implies a communication community oriented towards mutual agreement (Habermas CES 1979:109). It is the 'achievement of mutual understanding by a communication community of citizens, their own words, that brings about the binding consensus' (Habermas 1989:82). Habermas is thus able to distinguish norms based on a 'rational consensus' from those norms that merely 'stabilize relations of force' (Habermas CES 1979:111). Communication, however distorted, always contains a transcendent moment pertaining to a radically egalitarian and free society, a unitary humanity as real and not merely ideal, a community of mutual understanding mutually supporting different forms of life overcoming relationships of subordination and superordination (Heller 1984:138). Reasonable speech is posited as the organising principle of societised humanity. Marx's 'socialised humanity’ is realised on the basis of a communicative ethic.

Although Habermas's ideal communication community suggests Rousseau (Habermas 1990 1979:178/205), the tension between situated reasoning and the need to transcend situatedness which is required by his model of rational consensus recalls Kant's dualism between the phenomenal and the noumenal (McCarthy 1992:51/2 54). This dualism ultimately vitiates Habermas's attempt to supply a normative ideal for democratic theory in the form of the discursive unification of empirical wills. [2]
Habermas' view that interaction needs to be freed in a broader sense than the common control of the means of production (Habermas 1971:81-122; 1973:195-282; 1968:43-60) has the merit of expanding democratic possibilities within socialism beyond the question of economic ownership. Habermas nevertheless accepts too readily the dominance of an instrumental rationalisation which empties human activities of normative democratic significance. Habermas's purely instrumental account of production ignores the 'anthropological meaning of work’ (Heller 1982:34) [3], confirming the rationality of alien forms of social labour (Clarke 1991:322; Larrain 1979:208/10).
This limits the scope of interaction by removing economic and governmental activities from discursive coordination. The idea of communicative interaction as an autonomous sphere abstracted from the real life activity of individuals both devalues labour as a source of self-realisation and condemns communication to a thin existence. Human activities conceded to the logic of instrumental reason are no longer available to enter into the construction of a moral or democratic order. All that remains is communication. Habermas leaves society divided between two forms of rationality, with no good reason to think that communicative rationality could resist the seemingly inexorable tendency of instrumental rationality to colonise the lifeworld (Heller 1982:29). Given the insistence on the strict demarcation of system and life world and the displacement of labour in favour of a communicative ethic, the normative principle of 'free and unconstrained dialogue among reasoning individuals' is left rootless, lacking any basis either in appropriate institutions or in the lifeworld (Benhabib 1992:88).

Habermas's thought is valuable as an attempt to oppose the dialogic mode of communicative reason in the social lifeworld to the monological mode of instrumental reason entailed by political and economic domination. But the contradiction within rationality that this contrast between dialogical and monological modes represents needs to be located in the alienated forms of labour (Clarke 1991:323 325). What is required is a morality which is able to comprehend everyday activity and real-life ethical choice as practices. This thesis has shown how Marx's active materialism, centred on labour as conscious, creative life activity, embraces a broader range of activities than communication.
Habermas’ attempt to make the 'rational' project relevant to contemporary society attempts to avoid an and rationalism divorced from the circumstances and concerns of real individuals in their everyday life. Habermas asks 'where in the intellectual work linked to it are moments of happiness, of satisfaction, without which one can hardly understand such effort?' (Habermas 1981:27). Habermas makes his motivations and concerns plain in searching for ‘forms for living together in which real autonomy and dependency can appear in satisfactory relation' and which do not require the surrender of modern differentiation. Habermas rejects 'backward-oriented forms of community' for a new collectivity of realised individuals. He seeks 'a web of intersubjective relations that . . make possible a relation between freedom and dependency that one can always only imagine with interactive models'. These ideas of 'interaction, reciprocity and distance, of separation and manageable yet not failed nearness, of vulnerability and complementary caution rise out of a horizon of experience, a friendly life together which does not exclude conflicts but focuses on those human forms by way of which one can survive them' (Habermas 1981:28). Habermas is as aware as his critics of the dangers of formulating a disembodied rationalism that bears little relation to human affairs. Reason, even that formulated philosophically, draws its 'libidinous' impulse from the promise of communicative structures within community (Habermas 1981:27). Habermas’ emphasis upon interaction conceives of the possibility of extending rationality in new social structures mediated through communicative ethics.
That Habermas offers no abstract rationalism is clear from the way that he connects the extension of reason to democracy. Habermas, like Marx, rejects blueprints of future social structures as pre-empting the praxis - moral and communicative - which is the basis of the rationally motivated agreements ensuring identity between human agents and society. The social and organisational structures of the future public are developed out of the interaction of the human agents themselves. This raises substantive questions concerning the social structure, democracy and the nature of the public sphere (TCA 2 1989 especially ch 8). Habermas distinguishes his position from traditional - party political - attempts to 'engineer’ the public sphere: 'Every intervention in complex social structures has such unforseeable consequences that processes of reform can only be defended as scrupulous processes of trial and error, under the careful control of those who have to bear their consequences' (Habermas 1985:104).
Habermas' concept of the public sphere, combining informal interaction, communication, and rational discourse (Hohendahl 1979:89/118), sets the ancient Greek polis within the citizen model of liberal modernity. For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere gives historical specificity and content to 'rational will formation' in legitimising action in terms of universal interests transcending the particular interests of the civil sphere. Habermas defines the public sphere as a realm in which public opinion can be formed. 'Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion .. about matters of general interest'. Public opinion, made possible through free association, assembly and speech, is the task of criticism and control which citizens informally practise as a body in relation to a ruling class (Habermas 1974:49/55).
Habermas' public sphere offers a potential mode of societal integration in which progressively larger spheres of life are subject to discursive coordination via citizen interaction as against the non-discursive modes of state power and market economics. Emancipation is possible only through the democratic reconstitution of the public sphere. Democracy is an active concept in which the demos exercise their sovereign power, embracing all that is done 'in’ and 'through' communicative interaction, through action that is 'oriented to reaching an understanding'. Democracy thus emerges as a process of shared learning achieving agreements through communicative action. This makes it possible to distinguish public arenas of citizen discourse and association from state apparatuses. The abolition of the state through the extension of participatory-democratic public spaces may thus be distinguished from the authoritarian-statist public of socialism as based on nationalisation (Fraser 1992:109/10).

Habermas presents a model of civil society whose 'institutional core’, excluding economic and governmental associations, comprises 'more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations and movements' which communicate popular concerns to the public sphere (Habermas 1996:366/7). Rejecting Marx's 'holistic aspirations to a self-organising society', Habermas insists that 'the administrative power' 'is not a suitable medium for fostering emancipated forms of life' (Habermas 1996:372; Ingram 1987:166/7).

However, although Habermas' democratic ideal aims to subordinate markets and administrative bureaucracies to popular will as formed in open and public debate, Habermas's model closely resembles the unitary bourgeois public in reproducing the state-civil society dualism (Habermas ST 1989:27 319; Calhoun 1992:36/7). The associational activity of citizens is seen as merely a check upon an external, remote public rather than, as with Marx, generating a new public. Habermas is open to the objection that he neglects the possibility of multiple (counter) publics - nationalist, peasant, proletarian, women's (Eley 1992; Fraser 1992:123; Spivak in Nelson and Grossberg 1988:271/313; Felski 1989). Habermas does, however, affirm the potential of new social movements - environmentalism, feminism, anti-militarism, and municipalism - to constitute the public sphere as a sphere of political resistance blocking the system world in focusing upon the quality of life, the social conditions for individual self-realisation, and the extension of democratic participation and control to all spheres of life so that the public may decide how shared, nonrenewable resources are to be disposed.
And they mobilise around other than materialist and class interests, becoming a motor for processes of pluralization and individualisation against centralised forms of state politics, uprooting hierarchy and domination (Habermas 1994:91 92; TCA 2 51; Ingram 1987:165/6; Eder 1992:112/118 137; ch 8; 169 172 179/80; Davis and Scase 1985:182/3).
Habermas develops Marx's critique of alienation as an understanding of how the encroachment of instrumental rationality destroys the social fabric of interaction, solidarity, identity and communication. The novel forms of conflict occurring at 'the seam between the system and the lifeworld’ 'no longer arise in areas of material reproduction; they are no longer channelled through parties and organisations; and they can no longer be alleviated by compensations that conform to the system'. Rather, 'the new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation' and are expressed in 'sub-institutional, extra-parliamentary forms of protest'. Valuing the democratic possibility of the new social movements, Habermas does not equate politics with its formal structures (parliaments, constitutions, legal bodies, representative institutions, elections, and other formal mechanisms and arrangements). Since the underlying deficits reflect a reification of communicative spheres of action, which the media of money and power are incapable of circumventing, the problem is not distribution within official politics but concern 'the grammar of forms of life’ (Habermas 1981:33/7). These new conflicts and resistances call for a new political theory that can give expression to struggles over ecology, peace, gender, race as well as citizen movements, workers cooperatives, and communes.
Subjecting corporate and administrative bureaucracy to the democratic accountability of 'autonomous public spheres', new social movements contain the potential to generate new counter-institutions, cooperative economic and participatory political organisations as against the economic and political dependence of buyer-seller/employer-employee and client-civil servant/elector-office holder relationships (TCA 2 51; Ingram 1987:165/7). But making the self-steering mechanisms of the state-economy sensitive to goal-oriented democratic will-formation implies the very de-differentiation of system and life world Habermas rejects in Marx. There is a need for a new, postbourgeois, model that is able to accommodate a multiplicity of interests and identities and which is connected to the sphere of labour and individual relationships. Marx's public, as coordinated by citizen-producer association and interaction and as embracing a broader range of human activities than communication, realises the possibilities for a new public sphere contained in Habermas's lifeworld.
This offers an alternative to the historical failures of the socialist public sphere which have attempted to manufacture a political culture externally, via the 'ideal’ agency of 'the party’ (Meyer 1983:6 8; Brown ed 1984; Brown and Gray 1979; White 1979; Almond 1983:127/8; Jancar 1984:71). A postmodern political culture, possessing a pluralistic, anarchic, disorganised, rhetorical, and abstruse character (Forbes 1989:233/4; Kroker and Cook 1988; Featherstone 1988; Held 1987:241/2) subverts the homogeneity, discipline, and mechanical operation of the bureaucratic power politics of modernity. [4]
New social movements may be embraced as generating a new participatory public sphere as a civic counterpower to the state as the homogeneous, singular public sphere. But what is lacking in this postmodern political culture is precisely what Marx's 'proletarian public’ retained from the 'rational' tradition - public bonds of universality as integral to human self-fulfilment. The new social movements have no necessary common interest and 'do not have a ready formed identity as a social movement’ (Frankel 1987:235). In so far as the value of the new social movements lies in spontaneously generating new forms of political expression from below, not having it manufactured and imposed from above, this is not a telling criticism. The crucial question is whether the new social movements generate publicity, transcending particularity for a universal standpoint. Habermas here makes an important distinction between those new social movements which seek 'particularistic’ change and 'those that seek fundamental change from a universalistic viewpoint' (Roderick 1986:136).
This thesis has shown Marx to extract this universal concern from the conception of 'rational freedom', investing it in the social agencies and forces for its realisation. Further, this thesis has demonstrated that Marx employs a conception of politics as creative self-realisation to explore the forms of decentralisation, self-management and self-acting citizenship which is at the foreground of a new leftist politics (Bookchin 1996:29). In defining citizenship as a social movement, Marx realises a participatory politics in the classic civic and the new communalist sense beyond the state.
The discursive form of coordination that Habermas seeks in order to supplement the non-discursive modes of money and administrative power is realised in Marx through the practical reappropriation of social power from the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power in the integral social public.

In sum, in developing a conception of the good in terms of human flourishing, reintegrating reason and nature on the basis of the human ontology and its realisation (chapter 6), and reintegrating public and private on the basis of social life (chapter 5), this thesis has shown how the 'rational’ community of ends becomes Marx's 'true’ democracy of ends and community of life. Marx's public is 'the true community of men', the community of 'life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature' (Marx CN 1975:418/9). This community is 'of quite different reality and scope than the political community’, the state as the bourgeois public (1975:418). Marx thus affirms social existence as the true 'earthly’ reality of individuals as against the artificial, 'heavenly' realm of the state (OJQ 1975:220), uprooting the series of 'rational' dualisms which entail the alienation of sovereignty and the reduction of the demos to political passivity (Marx CHDS 1975:80 85/90 106 137 143/4). From the time he argued that Hegel inverted the real relation between the state and civil society (CHDS 1975:80/1 85/8 124 125), Marx emphasised the social content of politics (Marx GI 1999:106), rejecting the 'Jacobin' attempt to force a revolution through political will as doomed to channel the social movement into the unitary bourgeois public (CN 1975:412/3 418). This is not anti-political but a vision of a class hitherto 'excluded’ from politics (CN 1975:401/4) and oppressed in society (CHPR:I 1975:255/6) reaching maturity as a class for itself (PP Ch II section 5 p145) and coming to win the battle for democracy (CM REV 1973:86). As the non-bureaucratic universal class whose emancipation is the emancipation of the whole society (Marx CHPR:I 1975:256), the proletariat, the 'class of every citizen', possesses the potential to realise the universal as a 'true state', in contradistinction to Hegel's state bureaucracy as the 'illusory universal class' (CHDS 1975:112). The 'rational' community of ends thus takes form as an association 'in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (Marx CM REV 1973:87). Marx thus locates 'rational' unity, the coincidence of the freedom of each and all, in an actual rather than a noumenal community, actualising 'rational freedom' as a social form as against the statist, bureaucratic, lawful apparatus abstracted from real society.

10 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY AND 'RATIONAL FREEDOM' 
- IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

In developing Marx's communism as the product of a critical engagement with the tradition of 'rational freedom', realising its emancipatory and democratic possibilities whilst resolving its repressive dualisms, this thesis offers a way of challenging the seemingly general agreement that the left has to 'unambiguously' acknowledge the value and importance of liberal democracy (Sayers in McLellan and Sayers ed 1991:3; Cowling in Cowling and Wilde 1989:1/2). [1]
This reconstruction of the 'rational' tradition has set the contemporary debate over the boundaries between the public and the private in an older, 'Greco-Germanic' tradition of socialised government which connects public and private (chapter 1 section 3). Interpreting Marx as democratising this concept, particularly in relation to Hegel's Sittlichkeit as superseding the abstract publics of Rousseau and Kant, is timely given that associationalism has become relevant again after a long period of eclipse by state socialism and liberal democracy (Hirst 1994:2). Advocates of associative democracy seek to renegotiate the boundaries between the public and private spheres by connecting the state with local and civil associations and communities. If core activities of social life like production, welfare and public service are to be recovered for citizen control from top-down administration 'then the whole of society and not just the state needs to be viewed politically': 'That is, civil society must no longer be viewed as a "private" sphere, it needs to take on elements of "publicity" in the original sense of the term. We require a constitution for society as much as we do for the state' (Hirst in Kirst and Khilnani eds 1996:101).
The argument of this thesis has been that Marx achieves some such social constitution, renegotiating the boundaries of 'the political' by challenging the liberal separation of social space into public and private spheres, the former identified with the state (monopolising the political) and the latter with economic affairs (depoliticised) (chapter 5). Though the view that Marx reduced civil society to the economic is common (Pelczynski in Keane ed 1988:364; Cohen 1983:184; Femia 1993:64/5), Marx's democratisation has been presented in this thesis as a repoliticisation of a civil society which has been depoliticised through the processes of liberal modernity. Such a view develops an alternative to the Weberian modern state as a political monopolist resting on coercion (Weber in Lassman and Speirs ed 1994: 310/1 316; Weber in Gerth and Mills ed 1991:78; Turner 1993:185 191/2). In identifying the state and capital as alienated social powers, Marx exposes the political monopoly at the heart of liberalism as much as the capitalist monopolisation of the means of production, associating the two forms of expropriation as a general alienation of social power.
This chapter builds upon this presentation of Marx to criticise contemporary democratic, liberal and communitarian theory. The first section argues that the claims made by contemporary democratic theorists to have gone beyond Marx are misleading, remaining aspirational rather than becoming actual. None of the various alternative construals of democratisation in contemporary perspectives are persuasive in the context of the state and capital as inherently anti-democratic blocks of centralised, monopolised power, particularly given the 'erasing' of liberal society by contemporary corporate capitalism (McDermott 1991:13/4). The contemporary emphasis upon the institutional separation of the state from civil society as a condition of democracy will be shown to be mistaken, reintroducing the public-private dualism and reinforcing the state as the unitary public. Purportedly novel concepts thus unravel as the antinomies at the heart of the 'rational' tradition are reinstated, rendering democracy thin and attenuated.
This first section, therefore, criticises contemporary democratic theory from the perspective of Marx's democratic resolution of the 'rational' dualisms of public-private and reason-nature. This thesis has argued for Marx as the architect of a new mode of political expression which invests associative civil society with the governing power of control. This plural as against unitary conception of the public sphere rests on the premise that there are only individuals and the forms they engender (Marx CHDS 1975:85/8; Meikle 1985:45/6; Kitching 1988:31). 'The demos' is the true subject in terms of affirming their creative species essence in an immanent process of historical development (Marx EPM 1975:345/51).
In contrast to Marx and the 'rational' tradition, contemporary democratic theory discards the search for philosophical, ontological or anthropological certainty concerning self-realisation. The task of democracy is not ethical but procedural-protective: to discover ways through which to secure a larger consensus and compromise on the basis of competing views and interests, without the notion of an ultimate philosophic court of appeal in the background. Thus Heller's 'formal democracy', based upon rights, pluralism, contract and representation, is deliberately silent on substantive issues. Heller condemns those replacing formal with substantive democracy, reunifying state and society, for surrendering democracy as such (Heller 1988:130/1). Yet for Marx, 'true' democracy concerns more than institutions and procedures for exercising or checking power in being inextricably connected with the realisation of 'true community' and 'true individuality'. Locating Marx in a tradition of 'rational freedom' thus serves to underline the incompleteness of contemporary conceptions of democracy.

This chapter builds upon the critique of Habermas' ideal communicative order as a an alternative to Marx's formulation of 'rational freedom'. As argued in chapter 9, the 'rational' ideal of substituting morality for coercion takes shape in Habermas as the assertion of communicative action and citizen discourse over force. Habermas is particularly important to this chapter in being a 'double' democratiser in the tradition of 'rational freedom', affirming the permanence of modern differentiation. Habermas' retention of the dualistic framework of 'rational' modernity undermines his project. His principles are formalistic in comparison with the broader range of activities and relationships which Marx rescues from the logic of rationalisation.
 Habermas' defence of the lifeworld against the encroachment of the system world is nevertheless considered to contain the potential to generate a new, 'postmodern', communalist public, even if this means going beyond Habermas himself.

Though contemporary democratic theorists preserving liberal institutional separation repudiate such ambitions, this chapter examines contemporary developments in the 'postmodern' political culture which bear close relation to Marx in promising a genuine public life beyond 'rational' modernity and its dualisms.

The first section in this chapter pays particular attention to the insistence by contemporary democratic theorists upon institutional separation as a condition of democracy. Democracy, in this perspective, is a 'double sided' process which preserves the separation between the state and civil society. As a result, many of the problems which emerge in this discussion turn out to be versions of problems which are central to the dualistic framework of the tradition of 'rational freedom'.

In the second section, Marx's communism as a 'true' public life is employed to resolve the central issues in the liberal-communitarian debate. This section critically evaluates communitarian attempts to furnish liberalism with a more historically and socially sensitive basis than that available in individualist and neutralist perspectives. The argument is that although the various communitarian approaches move in the right direction in recognising that the moral priority of the individual requires a positive moral vision of community, embracing conceptions of human flourishing and of the good life, communitarian perspectives nevertheless fit the contours of the modern liberal division of social space between public and private.





Having defined Marx's 'true' public as realising the emancipatory and democratic possibilities of the tradition of 'rational freedom', locating the noumenal in the practical world of human beings, this section takes a critical look at recent democratic theories. These demonstrate a shift from Marx's abolition of the state towards a 'double democratisation' which preserves intact the classical liberal separation of the state from civil society. Even radical critics of capitalism accept the state and bureaucracy as 'unavoidable factors' (Sekelj 1990:24), as forms to be democratised rather than abolished (0 Connor 1991:27 34/6; Frankel 1983:181).
The left's 'startling rediscovery' of liberal political theory (Aronowitz 1990:256/7) [2] affirms the formalised distinction of the state from civil society as essential for democracy in providing the essential framework for legislative activity, law enforcement, rights, the protection of liberties, conflict resolution. Only with this centralised machinery in place can the left proceed to democratise the state on the one hand and civil society on the other (Held and Keane in Curran ed 1984:176; Pierson 1986:150/1). [3] This section criticises this 'liberal' revitalisation of 'the left' from Marx's reworked 'rational' perspective.
The consensus affirming the permanence of the state/civil society separation, [4] is based upon a rejection of 'the radical wish for a perfectly substantive democracy' as an 'anti-political', 'never-to-be-realised Utopia' (Keane 1984:256). There is general agreement against Marx that the state and civil society cannot be re-unified. Instead, a 'socialist civil society' functions alongside but is distinct from 'a decentralised and substantially democratic State' (Schecter 1994:175).
Such views effectively support Hegel, who also rejected the reunification of the state and civil society (Smith 1991:237; Dallmayr 1993:198/9), against Marx. Hegel himself offered a version of reform as a double sided process, combining the restructuring of the state with the conception of the democratic corporation (MacGregor 1998:195/6). Which is another way of saying that the 'bourgeois horizons' of Hegel's thought (McCarney 1991:37), in working within the liberal institutional framework of the centralised state, private property and market society (Wood 1990:207), are also those of contemporary democratic theorists. As will become apparent, contemporary democratic theory works within the disabling 'rational' dualisms which Marx sought to resolve in his attempt to realise 'true' democracy, community and individuality.
Questioning marxism's account of democracy, especially given its relation in practice with bureaucracy, surveillance, hierarchy and state control (Held in Polity Reader 1995:309), David Held is unambiguous about the necessity of liberal tenets such as the centrality of an impersonal structure of public power, the constitutional guarantee and protection of rights and mechanisms to debate alternative public platforms. He cautions against models of democracy which unify the state and civil society, opting instead for an interdependent transformation which protects the division between both spheres as 'a central feature of democratic life'. Democracy has thus to be 'reconceived as a double sided phenomenon: concerned on the one hand with the re-form of state power and on the other hand with the restructuring of civil society' (Held 1987:283).
The problem is that the institutionally separated state - no matter how ethical or democratic - cannot, as Held demands, be 'free of the inequalities and constraints imposed by the private appropriation of capital' (Held 1987:283). Held's belief that capital can be publicly controlled (Held 1987:283ff), ignores the structural and systemic nature of the 'private' control that capital exercises over government and society (Marx CHDS 1975:166 167 168 168/9 173; Miliband in Miliband and Saville eds 1965:280; Miliband 1977:72/3; Poulantzas in Blackburn ed 1972:245/6; McLennan 1989:253). In these circumstances, as Marx had shown, any constraint-free vision of democracy requires that 'double democratisation' be reformulated as a singular process overcoming the state/civil society separation (Marx CHDS 1975:88/91). Marx's singular process of democratisation alone can realise Held's ideal in which political life becomes 'a central part of all people's lives' (Held in The Polity Reader 1995:312), realising in turn Held's principle of autonomy. This is the principle that 

persons should enjoy equal rights and accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others.

Held 1995:147; see also Held 1991:228; 1995:188

The first part of this principle suggests the 'rational' attempt to secure by juridical means the unity of the freedom of each and all. The latter part, asserting the principle of self-determination, implies something more materially effective, field's ideal of autonomy is thus assessed against its obverse 'nautonomy', 'the asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation' (Held 1995:171). Since nautonomy is inherent in the structures of contemporary capitalism, Held's double sided democratisation looks exceedingly thin and ineffective and, as a substitute for the socialisation of the means of production, 'has had little concrete impact' (Hirst 1994:14). The realisation of autonomy, that is, requires a more radical model of democracy and democratisation than the one Held offers on the basis of institutional separation. It requires the restitution of alienated social power from the state and capital to self-governing civil society. This would give Marx's associative public its material power (chapter 5).

The need for a more associative conception of the public would seem to be recognised by John Keane. Yet the way he favours, against Hegel and Marx, the Tocquevillian concern with civil institutions as self-aware associations of citizens checking state power (Keane in Keane ed CSS 1988:55/62) has more in common with contemporary attempts to mount 'the strongest defense of liberalism and the free market' 'against communitarian and republican critics of liberalism' (Macedo in Paul, Miller, Paul and Ahrens ed 1989:139 113). Though this thesis has identified a richer and deeper associationalism in the Greco-Germanic tradition of 'rational freedom', for Keane, 'early modern German discussions of the scope and power of the state .. were the least receptive to the democratic political implications of the new distinction between civil society and the state’ (Keane in Keane ed CSS 1988:63). It all depends upon how democracy is conceived. As will be demonstrated, Keane adheres to the Anglo-American/empirical conception as against the 'rational' conception defended in this thesis. Taking his stand on 'the growing differentiation and complexity of contemporary capitalist systems', Keane makes 'the preservation of the institutional distinction between state and civil society’ the 'sine qua non of democracy in complex societies' (Keane in Keane ed CSS 1988:25 27/8).


Keane's concern to develop forms of socialist public life accessible to individual agents has the merit of offering a counterpoint to the statist degeneration of socialism, envisaging an 'extended process of decentralisation of decision-making power to a plurality of public spheres' (Keane 1984:8). This is a political strategy oriented 'towards a "socialist civil society" of non-patriarchal public spheres that relate to state institutions only at the levels of criticism, negotiation and compromise' (Keane 1984:256/7).
But Keane's public sphere, as limited to holding the state 'permanently accountable' (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1991:8), is a retreat from the associative public this thesis has discerned within the 'rational' tradition (chapters 4 5). In theorising power as something external, to be staked down and fenced in as potentially oppressive, Keane defines democracy as 'a system of procedural rules with normative implications', a 'method' which subjects governors to 'procedures which enable others to question, rotate or sack them', 'making power 'secular and "disembodied"' (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1991:8 9). This conception is consistent with the Anglo-American 'empiricist' conception of power as external as against the internal 'rational' conception (chapter 1). Rather than being an expression of creative self-realisation and popular power, democracy is merely a 'mechanism' for 'limiting the scope and haughtiness of state power', a check that disembodies power, keeps it remote, serving as an 'antidote to the abuse of power' (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1991:9/10 15).

There may be a need to avoid the overextension of 'the political’ so as to confine democratisation to just those common concerns properly termed 'public' (Miller in Miller ed 1991:391; Thomas 1994:xi/xii). But, in reducing democracy to method and procedure, Keane reproduces the identification of the political with state mechanisms and cannot therefore opt for the repoliticisation of civil society the way Marx can.
This is apparent in the way that Keane argues that these 'political checks upon despotism must be reinforced by the growth and development of civil associations which lie beyond the control of state institutions' (Keane in Keane ed. CSS 1988:60). These civil checks upon state power are independent of politics and do not form part of a socialised conception of politics and government. There is, therefore, a need for greater attention to the articulation between civil society and the state as opposed to the concentration upon what Melissa Lane calls the 'watchdog function' of civil society against the state (Lane 1995:144). Social centres within a pluralist civil society need to be valued as more than intermediate or civil associations, autonomous of the state and holding it in check. The fusion of the state and civil society need not entail that administrative suffocation through the absorption of civil society within the abstraction of the state to which contemporary democratic theorists draw attention (Keane in Keane CSS 1988:58; Habermas 1990:70). In arguing that Marx realises an extensive public sphere in which politics is no longer extraneous to everyday life, this thesis has distinguished the absorption of state power into a self-governing civil society from the 'totalitarian' subjection of society to bureaucratic control from above. Power alienated to the state and capital would be absorbed back into society and reorganised as social power. Implying a reduction in the scale of political units, this offers a means of recovering the democratic ideal as popular rule and participation (Pateman 1970:2 110/12). [5]
Keane offers his own version of this thesis, arguing that democratic reform 'depends crucially upon the weakening of the power of corporate and state bureaucracies through the establishment and strengthening of spheres of autonomous public life' (Keane 1984:2). Whilst this draws attention to liberal society's 'unprecedented accumulation of unaccountable power in state and economy', 'undermining sources of personal and traditional collective autonomy' (Bowles and Gintis 1987:98/9), Keane's 'bureaucracies' are better formulated in Marx's terms as the state and capital as alienated social power.
Contemporary democratic theorists fail to appreciate that political arrangements are not freely available, [6] particularly given the tendency to transnational monopoly capitalism (Haymer in Frieden and Lake 1987:31/46; Dicken 1986:chs 135 11; Cox 1987). Whereas Marx argues for legitimate governmental functions being restored to society (Marx 1974:210/1), the contemporary trend is towards the corporate conquest of governmental tasks (McDermott 1991:116). The emergence of a new property system based upon the corporate form threatens to erase the roots of liberal democracy and create a 'post-society' as the victory of property over society (McDermott 1991:13 14 145). In restricting their aspirations to the completion of the project of liberal democracy (Sayers on Keane in Sayers and McLellan ed 1991:4), the 'new democratic Left' (Keane 1991:17) becomes part of this process rather than offering a coherent response to it. These same points also undermine Norberto Bobbio's 'liberal socialism’.
Capitalist collectivisation - 'the twilight of the bourgeois epoch' (Harrington 1977:339/40) - threatens to evolve into illiberal authoritarian forms. Yet Bobbio argues that 'democracy will be even more difficult' under socialism given the extension of state control over political and economic life (Bobbio WS 1988:99). Bobbio's criticisms here repeat Weber's warning that the socialist abolition of private capitalism would issue in the general alienation of a 'state socialism' through the merging of private and public bureaucracies (Weber 1994:157 286). This same point was also made by Mill in his Chapters on Socialism (Mill in Williams ed 1985:347). 'The situation would resemble that of ancient Egypt, but in an incomparably more rational and hence more inescapable form' (Weber 1994:158). Weber's conclusion follows only if rationalisation is indeed irrevocable and the coincidence of reason and freedom, existing at an ideal level, cannot be restored in the organisation of society.
Marx's alternative to Weber's rationalisation thesis, presented in chapters 6 and 7, is thus also relevant to Bobbio. For whilst Bobbio affirms democracy as 'a much more subversive idea than socialism itself’ (Bobbio WS 1988:74) in challenging the traditional sense of power as something that flows downward, his Weberian view of liberal modernity systematically checks the ascending conception of democracy. Further analysis shows that it is Marx, rather than Bobbio, who affirms the view of power flowing upwards through society. Whereas Marx uproots the alien control of state and capital in favour of a post-liberal common control realising autonomy, Bobbio argues for the necessity of representative institutions, bureaucratic organisations and decision making by experts in modern 'complex' society (WS 1988:47/84), ruling out the particular forms of direct democracy, revocable and binding mandates, referenda and popular assemblies (WS 1988:79 80/2). Bobbio acknowledges the influence of Bernstein and Kautsky here (FD 1988:47/52, WS 1988:109/110). Indeed, Kautsky's description of the view that 'public affairs should be administered not by functionaries but by the popular masses' as a 'a reactionary and anti-democratic Utopia' (Kautsky quoted by Femia 1993:97; see also Kautsky 1971:100/1), is expressed in Bobbie's claim that 'nothing risks killing off democracy so much as an excess of it' (FD 1988:31).
Yet Bobbio recognises that the 'representative state' is something of a misnomer. The state consists of administrative and coercive apparatuses of an authoritarian, descending, secretive and hierarchical character which predate, and are largely insulated from, representative democracy (WS 1988:82/3). The representative aspect of the state has never been able to make the authoritarian aspect 'wholly submit to it' (WS 1988:83).
Bobbio also notes the absence of democracy in the institutions of civil society. In schools, churches, factories and families, autocracy is the mode of government (WS 1988:113). These various centres of power 'are subject to no democratic control' (WS 1988:43). Bobbio makes the case for the representative principle in extending the right of free organisation and decision from the political ballot to the basic units of practical existence, to work, leisure, home, education. 'The present problem of democracy no longer concerns "who" votes, but "where" we vote' (WS 1988:114; FD 1988:56). Yet Bobbio also theorises the objective processes which block the present operation, let alone extension, of representative democracy - corporate power, bureaucratisation, technocracy, massification (FD 1988:28/39). Bobbio is aware of the paradox: 'we seek ever more democracy in conditions that are ever worse for obtaining it' (WS 1988:69). [7]
Bobbio is thus critical of his own proposals for structural reforms from above and democratic reforms from below. Structural reforms will provoke a reaction from 'the system' long before total transformation has been achieved (WS 1988:100/1) whilst the democratisation of civil society encounters an 'insuperable barrier' in the economic realm (WS 1988:101). Bobbio is forced to admit that the 'extension of democratic instances to civil society now seems to me more an illusion than a solution' (Bobbio in Anderson 1992:121).
To overcome this impasse, Bobbio's 'two great blocks of descending and hierarchical power', that is, the 'big business and public administration' blocking 'the democratic transformation of society’ (Bobbio 1988:57), are better formulated as the state and capital as alienated social power. But whereas Marx details a project for the restitution of this alienated social power in a democratically self-organising civil society - thus avoiding Weber's great fear of a union of bureaucracy in the state and economy (Weber in Lassman and Speirs ed 1994:159) - Bobbio - like Weber - is, ultimately, a prisoner of the descending conception as the only mode possible given the complexity of modern society (WS 1988:47/84). Given, that is, the permanence of the hierarchical division of labour, the state-civil society separation and the power of capital.
Rather than the left embarking upon a 'postmarxist' project of 'double democratisation', it is as well to recognise that Bobbio's lifelong attempt to pursue much the same thing has produced limited results. A few classical marxist themes are re-asserted here. The improvement of existing conditions by means of formally guaranteed rights has become progressively more dependent on changing the material determinations and imperatives of a capital system based on a process of private accumulation and valorisation, as opposed to the attempt to control politically a substantively uncontrollable system (Meszaros 1995:712/3; Reuschemeyer 1986:70; Giddens 1973; Bottomore 1985; Marceau in Bottomore and Brym ed 1989:49; Martinelli and Chiesi in Bottomore and Brym ed 1989:113). Which is to argue generally that the 'postmarxist' democratic theory fails to get to the roots of the capital system (Hennessy in Makdisi ed 1996:228; Jameson in Makdisi et al 1996:20/1), and that the 'radicalization of democracy’ (Heller and Feher 1988:34) possesses a firmer basis in Marx's 'true' associative public beyond the alien control of the state and capital.
For Callinicos, the strategic focus upon democratisation 'could only reinforce the deep seated parliamentary cretinism of the British left' whereas 'the path to socialism lies through the revolutionary destruction of the state, not its reform' (Callinicos 1988:102). This still begs the question of what replaces the state. Poulantzas's approach is more nuanced in asking how the state may be transformed so that 'the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy' .may be 'combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies?' (Poulantzas 1978:256). The 'democratic road to socialism' is a 'long process' involving the creation of 'diffuse centres of resistance which the masses always possess within the state networks', establishing 'real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state' (Poulantzas 1978:258). This idea can connect the associative public sphere of Hegel and Marx (chapters 4, 5 and 7) with the postmarxist commitment to 'a socialist and pluralist civil society' (Jean Cohen 1983:184; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:140; Mouffe 1988:32/4). But there is a need to distinguish clearly between the less than pluralist contemporary civil society and the ideal of democratic civil society. As Marx demonstrated, civil society is structured around asymmetrical relations of class power between capital and labour and needs to be transformed along with the state (Marx CHDS 1975:191; Schecter 1994:20 184; Parekh 1982:32; Lane 1995:144).
Though this thesis has presented Marx as the theorist of an associative public, Marx has been criticised for being weak on institutional pluralism (McLennan 1989:125; Pierson 1986:189). Nevertheless, the basis of a democratic pluralism does exist in Marx. The dissolution of the state and capital empowers social centres and expands possibilities for individual participation. Overcoming 'separation' as a general category unites the demos with the means for exercising control and implies Poulantzas's continuum of representative and direct forms in a social polity. Marx's 'true’ public challenges the way that the dualism between public and private generates an individualism contrary to the notion of political participation and ethical involvement proceeding through the full range of social practices and identities. Suggestive here is Habermas's public realm in which coordination is ensured by citizen discourse, association and interaction, entailing a substantive and participatory process which prevents a bureaucratic and technocratic conception of politics (Habermas 1971:75 1987:67 75/6). But before examining Habermas' alternative 'rational' democratisation thesis, this section concludes by criticising the 'liberal' versions of democratisation in comparison with Marx's democratisation as overcoming the dualism of state and civil.
Conceiving civil society as constituted by public associations, the overcoming of institutional separation, far from undermining democracy, as contemporary democratic theorists argue, actually represents a democratic advance (Postone in Calhoun 1991:173; Fraser in Calhoun 1991:133/4). In speculating upon the form the interimbrication of a plurality of competing publics may take against the single, overarching public, Fraser refers to market socialism (Fraser 1992:122/3 136). Much better in envisaging forms of self-management, interpublic coordination, and democratic accountability is Marx's associative public rooted in civil society and developed as a commune system of social self-government (chapters 5 and 8).
Marx's public refers to more than simply 'allowing for points of view other than one's own’ (Geras 1986:206), being based upon the individuals and groups constituting the demos controlling the multiplicity of the forms they engender (chapters 7 8). The possibility of this multiplex public exists in Marx's multifaceted conception of praxis and power (chapter 6), his conception of an active citizenship embodied in associative relationships (chapter 5 6) and in the way he develops the principle of common control into commune democracy and the cooperative mode of production (chapters 7 and 8).
Integrating the ontological and anthropological aspects of Marx's project with his conception of democratisation as overcoming the institutional separation of the state and civil society suggests Fraser's multi-sectored public sphere as replacing the unitary concept (Fraser in Fraser 1989; Fraser in Calhoun ed 1992:109/42). Rejecting the way that marxists have traditionally assigned the role of proletarian representation to 'the party' as both class reductionist (Jessop in Hunt ed 1980:72/4; Miliband 1994:90/2) and as a 'false option' which alienates subjectivity to abstracted political apparatuses (Lefebvre 1976:39), this thesis has shown Marx's proletarian public to comprise a multiplicity of forms - councils, communes, unions etc (chapter 8; Miliband 1977:ch 5; Geras 1986:209/10). Marx recognised the need for the formation of blocs and alliances forging organic links with a wide range of mass movements pushing for social and democratic reform (Gilbert 1981:131 201 256; Draper 1978:38/9 358ff 405). This democratic self-constitution of the communist public contradicts the notion of a singular public sphere and offers the basis of a genuine multi-sectored plural public sphere.
In conclusion, in developing these concepts, this thesis has shown how Marx realises the principal objectives defined by contemporary democratic theorists - the principle of autonomy, associative and radical democracy, socialist public life and pluralist civil society, the combination of representative and direct forms - by challenging key institutional aspects of contemporary democratic theory, particularly the separation of political and civil spheres, as traceable to the historical dualisms bequeathed by the tradition of 'rational freedom'.

10-2 Liberalism And Communitarianism -A 'Rational' Critique

In this concluding section, the 'true' public which has been developed by revaluing the political and normative dimension of Marx's communism will be related to contemporary liberal and communitarian theories. The post-liberal implications of Marx's reworking of 'rational freedom' will be employed to criticise both sides in the Liberal-Communitarian debate for remaining within the dualistic framework of 'rational' modernity. Going beyond this framework to realise a genuine public begs - and has been shown to receive in Marx - an account of the good. In contrast, though some communitarian perspectives go some way in this direction, they do not go far enough in recasting their liberal premises.
Since there would appear to be similarities between Marx's critique of individualist liberal views of rights and liberty and the communitarian critique of Rawlsian liberalism, the argument begins with a presentation of Rawls's theory of justice before going on to assess communitarian liberalism. Rawls is all the more important with respect to this thesis given his relation to the 'rational' perspective of Kant. Whereas this thesis has sought to develop, through Marx, the post-liberal implications of the 'rational' tradition, Rawls explicitly develops the Kantian moral framework in terms of the categorical priority of universal rights over substantive conceptions of the good. This thesis has argued for the superiority of the alternate route out of the 'rational' tradition, showing Marx as exploring its implications with regard to a conception of the good.

Rawls takes a different approach. Rawls explicitly rejects the Aristotle's teleological politics. 'In order to find an Archimedean point it is not necessary to appeal to a priori or perfectionist principles. By assuming certain general desires, such as the desire for primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the agreements that would be made in a suitably defined situation, we can achieve the requisite independence from existing circumstances' (Rawls 1971:263). Primary social goods he defines as 'things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants' and comprise such things as rights, income and wealth.
As against the positive conception of the state in the 'rational’ tradition, Rawls's liberalism offers a neutral framework for individuals to pursue ends they have chosen for themselves. 'Right’ takes precedence over the 'good' (Rawls 1971:30/3 446/52). Rawls argues that his conception of justice as fairness derives from 'a procedural interpretation of Kant's concepts of autonomy and the categorical imperative' (Rawls 1971:256), admitting that his 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' 'is not, plainly, Kant's view, strictly speaking; it departs from his text at many points' (Rawls 1980:517; also Rawls 1971:256). Indeed, this thesis has presented Kant as a 'rational' thinker raising ethical possibilities quite distinct from deontological liberalism. Whereas Kant displayed a normative concern with human beings and sought to locate the moral within the empirical sphere of politics, Rawls has no need to enter the difficult area of evaluating substantive concepts of the good and of the moral in politics, since his assumption of mutual disinterest 'involves no particular theory of human motivations' (Rawls 1971:130 189). Whereas, for Kant, morality establishes the realm of freedom, with Rawls, it is merely instrumental in the distribution of primary, essentially nonmoral, goods (Rawls 1971:253 263 396). By reducing justice to neoclassical assumptions, Rawls buries Kant's ethic of ends beneath a monadic rationality, a means-ends instrumental rationality, and self-maximisation. [8]

This thesis has argued that, in line with the 'rational' tradition, Kant's rationality connotes a universal faculty, making the point that the individual embodies social interests and expresses capacities which are of a universal character (Miller 1982:4). This implies a common life of mutually supporting relations between individuals realising their nature. The kind of liberalism offered by Rawls, in contrast, is narrow and legalistic.
Rawls' attempt to replace Kant's realm of ends with an 'original position’ corresponding with liberal conceptions of justice reads as an attempt to discard the critical normative component of 'rational freedom' in favour of an explicitly deontological liberalism which has more in common with the Anglo-American conception of freedom. Rawls sets out to excise German 'transcendental idealism' from Kant's doctrine and make it compatible with the 'canons of a reasonable empiricism' (Rawls 1977:165). Rawls' 'theory of justice tries to present a natural procedural rendering of Kant's conception of the kingdom of ends, and of the notions of autonomy and the categorical imperative. In this way the underlying structure of Kant's doctrine is detached from its metaphysical surroundings so that it can be seen more clearly and presented relatively freely from objection' (Rawls 1971:264). Rawls has no intention of exploring the radical and critical possibilities of a 'rational' politics and morality. With Kant, the priority of right and the moral law can only be ensured by positing the noumenal realm of free and rational beings. Rawls' 'original position' is an attempt to preserve the moral force of Kant's principles without the community of ends and 'within the scope of an empirical theory' (Rawls 1979:18).
Rawls thus attempts to find 'an Archimedean point for judging the basic structure of society' (Rawls 1971:260/3 584) by means of the device of the 'original position'. Individual subjects determine principles of justice from behind a 'veil of ignorance', unencumbered by the contingencies of real life. 'The principles regulative of the kingdom of ends are those that would be chosen in this position, and the description of this situation enables us to explain the sense in which acting from these principles expresses our nature as free and equal rational persons' (Rawls 1971:256). By this process, Rawls arrives at two principles of justice which are fair as regards the whole of society and are untainted by particular desires and interests (Boucher and Kelly in Boucher and Kelly ed 1994:9; Raphael 1981:71/2; Gorovitz in de Crespigny and Minogue ed 1975:278/9 280).

First principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a)	to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,




Significantly, Rawls's lexical ordering and separation of his two principles of justice presupposes that 'rational' dualism between public and private which works to block ethical possibilities. [9] The 'rational' attempt to unite the freedom of each and all is expressed here but only in terms of the abstract individualism and instrumental rationality of modern society. This offers no grounds for supposing that individuals, as rational-egoistic agents, will choose to submit to fair principles of justice. For these principles have been determined in abstraction from the real life of individuals. To be able to supply reasons why individuals should act according to principles of justice, over above their private interest, the theory of justice needs to be located within a conception of the good.
On Rawls's terms, however, autonomous individuals, isolated from each other, are incapable of perceiving a notion of good, seeing as this good is constituted in relationships with concrete others. Hence Rawls's morality is formal, seeking not to guide choices concerning a fulfilling mode of life, but to restrict them. Morality is limited to what is right, leaving individuals to work out what is good (Sandel 1998:1 15/7). In seeking an external vantage point - the Archimedean point - from which to assess social issues, Rawlsian liberalism has issued in a formal morality which, compared with an Aristotelian politics of the good as human self-realisation, is vacuous and irrelevant. [10]
In defining the 'original position' as 'a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative' so that these notions are no longer 'purely transcendent and lacking explicable connections with human conduct' (Rawls 1971:256), Rawls offers a means of deriving principles of justice which abstracts from contingent influences but without having to postulate, in the manner of Kant, a noumenal realm and transcendent self beyond experience. The problem is that this preserves the moral force of Kant's principles only by reducing his ideal realm of ends to the diremption of the empirical world. As a result, Kantian 'rational freedom’ becomes an explicitly formal and lawful conception:





Though Rawls' 'original position’ takes account of circumstances, this recovery of human situation against Kant's disembodied conception is achieved only at the expense of reinstating the diremptive features of real society which make moral self-regulation impossible and legal-institutional regulation necessary. This is apparent in Rawls’ denial that his views assert individualism against communitarianism: 'there seems to be no reason offhand why the ends of people in a well-ordered society should be predominantly individualistic' (Rawls 1975:544). Individuals are free to pursue communitarian values in a 'well-ordered society'. The basic liberties 'are not intended to keep persons in isolation from one another' 'but to secure the right of free movement between associations and smaller communities' (Rawls 1975:550). But Rawls is disingenuous here. The freedom to pursue communitarian ends is based on individualist premises. Rawls' self is antecedent to the interests and ties the individual has and, being independent of the values any particular individual has, precludes any sense of individual participation in community as itself constitutive of self-identity: 'the essential unity of the self is already provided by the concept of right’ (Rawls 1971:563). It is plain that 'community' from Rawls's perspective is merely one possible end among many that may be pursued by antecedently individuated selves within a framework already defined by principles of justice. 'There is, to be sure, one collective aim supported by state power for the whole well-ordered society, a just society wherein the common conception of justice is publicly recognised; but within this framework communitarian aims may be pursued, and quite possibly by the vast majority of persons' (Rawls 1975:550). Rawls does not allow community, the good community, to emerge as an alternative to this framework of justice, with the state as liberalism's substitute community forming its centrepiece.
Within the Rawlsian framework of justice, individuals are free to pursue the good as they see fit. The problem is that, as Sandel argues from a communitarian perspective, Rawls' conception serves to cut individuals off from the relationships constituting self-identity, undermining the sense of self (Sandel 1998:182 182/3). Rawls's attempt to mediate the conflicts of contemporary plural society by appealing to impersonal and impartial rules may thus be criticised for neglecting the particular attachments which are constitutive of identity and which make individuals moral agents in the first place (Sandel 1982:147/152). Looking to restate the bonds of community against the narrowly legalistic character of formal rights and rules, Sandel defines community as 'a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive of the agent's identity' (Sandel 1982:150). And some such concept is implicit in Rawls's notion of shared final ends in the community of humankind, cooperating in realising their common nature, so that 'the self is realized in the activities of many selves' (Rawls 1971:527 529 565). This being so, the conflict between neutralist and communitarian liberalism may be more apparent than real, with broad agreement over liberal values and institutions.
Rawls, despite his disclaimers, does have his own particular view of the good society. In his more recent work, the idea of a political society as a fair association of free and equal individuals has a higher profile than the device of the 'original position' and 'veil of ignorance' (Boucher and Kelly in Boucher and Kelly ed 1994:10). Rawls now explicitly defends a liberal theory of justice premised upon Western institutions and a 'model-conception of a moral person' (Rawls 1980:515/72; Rawls in Sen and Williams eds 1982; Rawls 1985:223/51; Rawls 1987:1/25; Rawls 1988:251/77; Rawls 1993:157). Behind Rawls's assumption of neutrality, then, lies the definitive liberal ethic pertaining to individual autonomy and the existence of a reasonable moral community sharing specific value commitments.

And the point does not apply only to Rawls. From the other direction, most communitarians are concerned to salvage liberal values from the contractarian and individualist foundation. In the main, communitarian critics attempt a synthesis in which individuality and communality are not antithetical but are reconciled (Taylor 1982 1989; Walzer 1983; Sandel 1982; Unger 1975; Taylor 1982; Barber 1984; Balbus 1982; Buchanan 1989).

Maclntyre is exceptional in not being concerned to establish the communitarian basis of liberalism but to reject liberalism altogether (1988 ch XVII). The only viable basis for a moral tradition, for Maclntyre, is the practice of virtue as it was exercised in past societies (1984:122). This tendency to idealise premodern communities is even evident in Sandel (1984:17). Unlike Sandel, however, Maclntyre can see no liberatory potential in modernity, seeking 'the construction of local forms of community’ so as to escape 'the new dark ages which are already upon us' (1984:263).
Though one can reject the nostalgic character of Maclntyre's communitarianism - seeking to affirm, with Marx, possibilities for future sociality within modernity Maclntyre nevertheless does have the merit of identifying the central problem. In the modern world, individuals are unable to assign any meaning to the moral terms they use since these terms are no longer connected to a totality of moral beliefs. The notion of 'good' has become meaningless. Maclntyre's way of stating the problem goes deeper than both liberal and communitarian theorists in going to the heart of the nihilism of liberal modernity which this thesis addressed in chapter 7. Hegel had grasped this transition.

Virtue in the ancient world had its own definite sure meaning, for it had in the spiritual substance of the nation a foundation full of meaning, and for its purpose an actual good already in existence... But the virtue we are considering [the modern concept] has its being outside of the spiritual substance, it is an unreal virtue, a virtue in imagination and name only, which lacks that substantial content.

Hegel PS 1977: para 390

But whereas Hegel's Sittlichkeit attempts to give substantial content to the notion of the good so that moral terms once more connected with a moral totality, taking the high road of modernity to a future good society (Dallmayr 1993), Maclntyre expresses the moral crisis of modernity nostalgically, as the loss of moral certainty and community (Stauth and Turner 1988:2). Whereas Maclntyre expresses self-definition nostalgically as loss, Marx followed Hegel's path in developing a critical conception of community out of the 'rational' tradition, identifying those trends and forces within modernity which point towards a possible higher sociality in an alternative future. Morality is to be embedded in social practices through a social identity which connects the individual with a wider moral purpose. This concept establishes a basis for community without having to resort to abstraction.
Marx transcends the terms of this liberalism versus communitarianism debate and the way it makes both individual and community abstractions by offering a critical project of subjects and communities. This thesis has argued this point by showing how Marx overcame the dualism of public and private. This is the dualism which is central to the individual/community dualism upon which the liberal-communitarianism debate rests. Chapters 6 and 7 dealt with the ontological and sociological bases of Marx's 'true' public, chapter 8 with its structural and institutional features. Marx's reworking of the 'rational' perspective reveals not only the individualist liberal position but also the communitarian perspective to be liberal.
Critics of communitarianism have noted the conservative implications of community: 'In the vocabulary of antiliberals, "community" is used as an anesthetic, an amnesiac, an aphrodisiac' (Holmes 1988:25). Despite its apparent potential to generate an alternative moral theory, the aims of the communitarian critics are betrayed by their fundamentally liberal premises, remaining within a dualistic framework separating the individual and common good. And both liberalism and communitarianism are undermined by the fact that individualist premises are too thin a basis to ground obligation. Communitarian conclusions cannot be derived from individualist premises without having to have recourse to an ideal and abstract form of community independent of the individuals subject to it. With Marx, the abstractness or reality of the concept of community is determined by whether or not individuals supply it for themselves.

10-3 Hegel, Marx And The Communitarians

In arguing for a greater appreciation of the moral depth that membership of community gives to the self (see Sandel ed 1984:125/63), communitarian critics have been inspired by Hegel. And, as chapter 4 demonstrated with respect to the system of Sittlichkeit, Hegel has plenty to offer. For his critique of the method of natural rights doctrine applies to deontological liberalism. Hegel repudiates the approach of empirically minded theorists like Hobbes and Locke who purported to have discovered the universal characteristics of human beings by stripping away, as 'particular and transitory', characteristics individuals have contingently acquired through manners, history, civilisation, and the state. What remains 'is man in the image of the bare state of nature, or the abstraction of man with his essential potentialities' (Hegel NL 1975:63/4). But those potentialities, as Hegel makes clear, are only expressed and objectified in history, culture, civilisation, politics etc. That is how human beings define themselves and develop their self-identity. Hegel's view may thus be read as repudiating Rawls's attempt to discern abstract principles of rationality from behind a 'veil of ignorance".
Hegel criticises contractarian liberalism for the way it is predicated upon the separateness and autonomy of individuals, making the state a voluntary association in which obligations are freely chosen. This prioritises private over public right. This idea of rights as justifiable claims possessed by individuals threatens to dissolve not merely unjust government but the political or communal life which is necessary for human self-realisation (Smith 1991:72). Hegel was therefore critical of 'the form of such an inferior relation as the contractual one [having] forced its way into the absolute majesty of the ethical totality' (Hegel NL 1975:133). He rejects the contractual relationship as 'a casual tie arising from the subjective need and choice of the parties' (Hegel in Pelczynski ed 1964:281) which ignores the centrality of the state for individual self-realisation (PR paras 106 150 153).
Neo-Kantian liberalism has modified its position in light of the Hegelian inspired communitarian critique (Caney 1992:273/89). And with Rawls's recent work assuming a more Hegelian character (Kukathas and Pettit 1990:144/5), one charts the journey of Anglo-American liberalism away from utilitarianism via Kantian deontology to Hegelian historicism. Both the deontological liberals and their communitarian critics reject the idea that rights are natural, 'that rights have some special metaphysical character' (Dworkin 1977:xi). But, without that support, liberalism either retreats into a Burkean conservatism that relies on 'history' to maintain liberal traditions or advances into 'a radical rejection of liberalism as a once useful but now exhausted way of thinking' (Zvesper in Miller ed 1991:289).
And, in pushing beyond liberalism, there is the question is the extent to which Kant and Hegel are themselves deontological and communitarian thinkers respectively. By reading Kant and Hegel as 'rational' thinkers pursuing a normative concern with freedom as something intersubjective, reciprocal and relational, and by reading Marx as resolving the dualisms which work to undermine the emancipatory and democratic possibilities contained in both thinkers, this thesis has proposed a way of uprooting the premises of the liberalism-communitarian debate. The argument is that Marx makes the post-liberal potential of 'rational freedom’ explicit by going beyond public-private dualism to reconcile individuality (autonomy) and community (sociality).
Like Hegel, Marx also denies the possibility of a pre-social existence for individuals and also denies that identities are given prior to social interaction. The problem is that whilst Hegel's Sittlichkeit situated individuals in a social context, thus embedding 'rational freedom' in the empirical world, Marx revealed that this context rests upon a dualistic framework implying alienation, exploitation and class. A genuine community of 'rational freedom' beyond this alien condition requires social transformation so that the liberal antithesis of individual and community is resolved in favour of a recognition of their mutual interdependence. With respect to the development of the 'true' public of Marx, this section closes with an examination of liberal attempts to supply a conception of the good.
Liberal theorists have themselves attempted to resolve the impasse in the liberal-communitarian debate by making explicit 'the full theory of the good latent within liberal practice’ (Galston 1982:627). Such theories seek to define a richer, more historically and socially sensitive form of liberalism than that of Rawls. For such theorists, the conditions for individual autonomy are not attained merely as a result of protecting the individual against the interference of others. Further, for these theorists, it is too simple to argue, as Rawls argues, that the individual is free to pursue the good as s/he sees fit. Repudiating the rights-based approach to justice, the communitarians argue that liberalism represents a certain quality of life for a whole community. Rights need to be considered as 'fundamental components in the way of life of a community' committed to certain forms of human flourishing for all (Finnis 1980:222). This implies a conception of the good life.





Finnis argues that the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (Finnis 1980:220). But communitarians do not leave the character of these goods open to historical contingency. The Aristotelian influence is evident as these goods are defined according to a set of characteristics which distinguish the human species.
As has been argued with respect to Marx, essential human potentialities and their realisation point in the direction of a certain mode of life. This universal human nature gives the world a certain moral order so that the plurality of goods pursued by individuals may be compatible. This is how communitarian liberals seek to develop a conception of the good, exhibiting a 'rational' concern with the unity of the freedom of each and all. Thus Raz's argument is predicated on:





The attempt to secure the core liberal value of individual autonomy within a communal context is, however, undermined by the fact that, far from being of genuinely universal significance, the communitarian solution offers an idealisation of community within a liberal framework.
The communitarians are correct in emphasising that autonomy presupposes a social context. Nevertheless the communitarian failure to get beyond the public-private dualism has entailed investing claims for universality in an impersonal realm raised above ethical and social plurality. As chapter 5 argued with respect to Marx's normative democratic community and the possibility of a conception of the common good, this communitarianism contains dangers of an overly moral liberalism which entails the imposition, through the state, of a particular definition of community which represents certain dominant interests rather than the genuine plurality of identities.
Given the modern process of differentiation and the way that it results in individuals adopting different, even contradictory modes of reasoning in different contexts, the identities and loyalties of individuals are multiplied through membership of different groups. In the context of the public-private divide, such a situation means that no ethical code can integrate human life, in all its diversity, into one scheme of values.
Raz has acknowledged the force of these points, arguing that autonomy presupposes a competitive pluralism which issues in a number of difficult, conflicting, choices: "whatever a person does he would irreparably damage one of the projects or relationships which he pursued or which shape his life' (Raz 1986:366). For Raz, the morally good person tolerates the existence of such a dilemma in society as crucial to autonomy.
Though Raz seems to have found a way of defining a pluralistic conception of autonomy within the good, his thought reproduces the dualisms of public-private and reason-nature in a number of key respects. In particular, Raz's distinction between 'personal well-being’ and 'self-interest' restates the distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' activities which has been shown to fracture human self-identity and undermine the 'rational' project of freedom. As a result, the good was abstracted from real nature and society, being invested in an impersonal public realm. That this results in a devaluation of human nature is apparent in the way Raz identifies moral goals attaining 'worthwhile' options integral to human well-being as generally compatible, in a way that merely self-interested goals are not. In arguing this point, Raz identifies self-interest with human nature, with insatiable and non-diminishing biological requirements. Personal well being, in contrast, is satiable and diminishing in being oriented towards the achievement of goals independent of biological requirements. This orientation is capable of achieving happiness (Raz 1986:ch 9 295/9). Raz's view comes with the corollary that the 'self-interest' of natural inclination can be subordinated to a more 'worthwhile' goal leading to happiness.
And the 'rational' tradition does certainly affirm the greater freedom available to individuals as a result of identifying their individual goals with a broader moral and social framework. An individualist freedom is abstract and subjective, cut off from the more expansive range of possibilities available to a genuine community of individuals practising a reciprocal freedom. The danger is that notions of a 'higher' good can become abstract in relation to real natures and can work to devalue the broad range of material activities integral to human self-realisation. Hence this thesis has sought to show how Marx retained the 'rational' notion of the good by connecting it to a notion of human flourishing. The noumenal realm, lacking content in the 'rational' tradition in being abstracted from the empirical world, is filled by Marx with the creative human essence. Marx, in other words, avoids a split between rational good and natural inclinations, between personal well-being and self-interest, thus overcoming the split between altruism and egoism as implying (within 'bourgeois' relations) the imposition of an impossibly high moral standard given the equation of nature with self-interest. Raz's notion of the good is much more narrow in comparison and betrays its liberal character in presenting the morally autonomous agent as overcoming 'lower' inclinations and impulses, subordinating them to 'higher', more 'worthwhile', notions.
Raz, challenging neutralist and individualist liberalism, certainly has an important part of the truth. Autonomy is not a subjective creation but requires a community within which it may flourish in relation to others. The activities individuals pursue in defining themselves as individuals are shaped by interrelationships within a particular social context. Community supplies the social forms making the conditions for autonomy and its exercise - inseparable from each other - possible.
But such a view also involves a worryingly illiberal role for coercion as applied to all acts which may be construed as harming autonomy. Raz concludes that 'for those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society' (Raz 1986:391). There would appear to be a clear comparison here with the way that this thesis has sought to show how Marx combines public and private identity so as to make the good society possible, realising the community of ends implicit in 'rational freedom' by putting human relationships on a 'rational' as against an instrumental basis.
As Raz puts the point, once social forms 'enshrine sound moral conceptions'





Raz here envisages a form of society which is not at all dissimilar from the way that this thesis has sought to define Marx's communism as the good society. Reciprocity is built into social relationships so that, in acting in pursuit of a private good, the individual also achieves the public good directly rather than coincidentally. But Raz's distinction between personal well-being (as a higher rational interest) and self-interest (as a lower natural interest) introduces a potentially oppressive element in which the good is abstracted from real individuals. And the point is that, historically, there has been no other way of embodying this moralised liberal community except through the state as an educational dictatorship.
Ultimately, the communitarians, with the exception of Maclntyre, remain liberal in their assumptions. Finnis sums up their position in arguing that the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (1980:154).

The problem is that this community is identified with the public realm of the state in the absence of a genuine community embodying reciprocal freedom. This problem becomes most apparent in Michael Walzer's attempts to define community.

Walzer's contribution to this debate makes clear the extent to which communitarian attempts to develop a liberal conception of the good have remained aspirational rather than have become actual. Walzer attempts to delineate a nonabsolutist approach to morality through the character and purpose of society: 'Human society is a distributive community ... We come together to share, divide and exchange’. It follows that distributive justice is the moral problem that human societies must face (Walzer 1983:3). On this premise, Walzer defines his central thesis concerning the pluralistic nature of principles of justice - different social goods are to be distributed according to different principles and by different procedures (1983:6). Whether distributions are to be considered just or unjust is determined relative to the socially created meanings of the goods at stake (1983:9). Societies are characterised by different spheres of justice which must be kept separate from one another: 'Good fences make just societies' (1983:319).

Crucial to Walzer's argument is the notion of justice as 'rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life’ (1983:314). [11] Walzer's view corresponds with that of Finnis concerning the shared understanding of individual and communal good. Walzer defines philosophy in terms of the attempt 'to interpret to one's fellow citizens the world of meanings we share', arguing that the meaning we share to be an egalitarian society.
Such a notion is implicit in our concepts and categories (Walzer 1983:xiv 320). The aim of this political egalitarianism is to achieve 'a society free from domination' (1983:xiii). Thus Walzer advocates a 'complex equality' that renders domination impossible; spheres are autonomous, with no one sphere dominant (1983:19/20).
Walzer's attempt to reconcile individualism and communitarianism within a conception of a common but pluralistic culture moves the debate on but remains problematical. Walzer's argument assumes that the plural spheres of society can be united by common meanings even though, as he points out, conditions of domination render the sharing of a common life impossible (1983:250n). In dealing with this problem, Walzer betrays the ethical liberal tendency to resort to the state in order to impose its impossible moralised community upon recalcitrant individuals (Bellamy 1992:35 39 46/7 155/6): 'the political community is probably the closest we can come to a world of common meanings' (Walzer 1983:28). This appeal to the political community reveals Walzer's inability to proceed beyond the dualism of liberal modernity, identifying the abstract public as the realm of equality. Walzer's plural spheres ultimately derive from liberalism's abstract political community under the state. His scheme fits the contours of the 'rational' dualisms -public-private and reason-nature - which constitute the political and social lives of individuals in the modern world.
This same point applies to Rawls, for whom the final, highest stage of moral development is the morality of principles as abstract and above 'contingencies' (1971:462/79). Rawls is not looking for a priori principles but for the moral sentiments that people espouse: 'The social role of a conception of justice is to enable all members of society to make mutually acceptable to one another their shared intuitions and basic arrangements by citing what are publicly recognised as sufficient reasons, as identified by that conception' (1980:517). Rawls looks to 'the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and principles' (Rawls 1993:8).
As with Walzer, such views seem egalitarian, even pluralistic. But, as has been seen, the individuals who articulate Rawls's principles of justice are autonomous and disembodied subjects. With identity conceived in abstraction from the relation that the individual has with others, it becomes difficult to conceive of activities which are genuinely other-directed. The connection between the pursuit of self-interest and overall social well-being is maintained only within the limits set by private property and contract. Yet, since there is no guarantee that self-interested individuals will acknowledge those limits, there is a need for an effective legal-institutional apparatus, based upon force, to constrain individual behaviour. The common purpose is located in the state once more. Even Sandel concedes the necessity of justice in this sense since 'we cannot know each other, or our ends, well enough to govern by the common good alone' (Sandel 1982:183).

Unger is full of insight on this question. Liberalism's 'artificial view of society' as constituted by individuals and interests locked in a perpetual struggle requires the 'coercive enforcement' of laws since society lacks a self-regulating or self-enforcing order. And 'the less one's ability to rely on participation in common ends, the greater the importance of force as a bond among individuals. Punishment and fear take the place of community' (Unger 1984:75). Rules 'are the main devices for establishing order and freedom' (Unger 1984:83/4).

In this context, the aim of liberal theories of legislation and adjudication is to show how freedom is possible despite the individuality and subjectivity of values. For society to generate the self-regulating and self-enforcing principle of order from within itself requires a conception of the good. 'If objective values were available to us, if we knew the true good with certainty, and understood all its implications and requirements perfectly, we would not need a method of impartial adjudication... we would content ourselves with a regime of substantive justice, in which rules were unnecessary' (Unger 1984:93). But since 'there are no conceptions of the good that stand above the conflict and impose limits on it, artificial limits must be created' (Unger 1984:68). Yet the inadequacy of the theory of adjudication and the theory of instrumental rationality create 'the need for rules and more rules', begging the question as to whether a regime of substantive justice is possible (Unger 1984:98 100).
The ideal of the community of ends, uniting the freedom of each and all, which this thesis has developed by reconstructing Marx's relation to a tradition of 'rational freedom', has the potential to overcome this problem of impersonal adjudication and legislation by supplying the necessary substantive conception of the common good. As has been argued, this potential is undermined by the dualisms of reason-nature and public-private within the 'rational’ tradition. This is most evident with respect to Kant and the abstract character of his universal principle of right. As Unger writes: 'it seems impossible to derive from it definite conclusions about what precisely the laws should command, prohibit, or permit' (Unger 1984:85). This is too simple. Kant's categorical imperative has content with respect to the ethic and realm of ends (chapter 3). The problem is that Kant, pointing in the direction of deontological liberalism, is ultimately agnostic as regards the conception of the good life. Kantian respect for the dignity of each is a quite different notion from the Aristotelian promotion of the virtues. Respect for persons involves respect for the liberty and autonomy of each individual, not the collective promotion of ends in the name of the happiness of all. With Kant, each individual is free to pursue private, individual ends. Not surprisingly, this entails a great emphasis upon the notion of rights which cannot be violated in the promotion of ends (Kant 1963:193/4). To this extent, Kant is indeed an ancestor of deontological liberalism.
Recovering the Aristotelian conception of politics as creative self-realisation by philosophical means prepared by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, Marx develops a unique version of 'rational freedom'. The argument returns here to the notion of an anarcho-Aristotelianism, showing how a conception of human flourishing within a positive conception of the good life can envisage the dissolution of abstract institutional-legal bonds imposing unity. Marx critically appropriated the 'rational' themes of intersubjectivity and put them on a materialist basis. Marx has thus been shown to challenge the recourse to a legalistic, rights-based morality by developing a conception of the good in terms of human flourishing, reintegrating reason and nature on the basis of the human ontology and its realisation (chapter 6). The free association of individuals exercising common control creates horizontal ties of obligation with each other as opposed to vertical ties with some separate body raised above them, i.e. the state. Obligation is not reified so that it is owed to an institution, an ideal or a law. Marx reconstitutes the principle of self-legislation as collective self-determination. Rather than exchange obedience for the protection of the state, as in contract theory, Marx's free individuals practise a reciprocal obligation through social relationships, each connected with all through everyday communal interaction. The 'rational' community of ends becomes Marx's democracy of ends and community of life, a 'true’ public uniting democracy, individuality and community.
In fine, although their positions seem similar to those of Marx, the communitarian critics of liberalism have difficulty in specifying what form common life should take and how to achieve this moral ideal. What little they have said here has been considered 'disappointing or implausible', 'similar to the abstract liberalism to which they take such exception' (Boucher and Kelly 1994:25 26). The communitarians are correct in emphasising that autonomy presupposes a contextualised conception of human nature. However, rather than realise a genuine universality and a real community, the communitarians are led to idealise community within a liberal framework. The revised liberalism of communitarianism, where not plainly nostalgic as in Maclntyre, does not extend beyond effectively moralising the very capitalist relations denying true community and individuality in the first place. What is required is not so much the alternative liberalism of communitarianism as an alternative to liberalism. This is what Marx provides. Marx may have been 'reluctant to outline how substantive freedom would be realised in communism' (Wilde in Boucher and Kelly ed 1994:170/1), but Marx's rooting of politics and morality in the creative human essence offers a way forward.

Marx's view in this respect would appear to correspond to contemporary attempts to define an alternative moral theory out of Aristotle's practical ethics (Flanagan 1991:180; Jaggar 1991:83; Code 1988:196; Nunner-Winkler 1984; Foot 1981). Nussbaum is an important figure in this regard in delineating the switch from an ethics based on enlightenment ideals of universality, principles, theoretical justification, the isolated individual, and ahistorical detachment to an ethics based on tradition and particularity, virtue, local wisdom, affiliation and care, concreteness and history (Nussbaum 1992:9). Most important is her distinction between Socratic and Aristotelian ethics, the former entailing an abstract, removed, and disembodied ethics (Nussbaum 1986:195), the latter affirming the responsive intercourse of individuals as the achievement of happiness (1986:361/2).

This Aristotelian perspective offers a firmer basis for a communitarian politics as a genuine alternative to liberalism than does communitarian liberalism. Nevertheless, though charting a similar course away from an abstractly 'rational' morality and politics enclosed in an impersonal public, Marx's morality of materialist embodiment, developed in chapter 5, offers more than a renewal of the Aristotelian tradition and a contemporary 'communitarian' form of Aristotelian ethics. A split between a morality of duty and a morality of virtue, as a split within contemporary philosophy between the attempt to resuscitate liberalism through the development of Kant and the attempt to recover an older moral tradition in a modern context, is to be avoided. Marx transforms the moral tradition, both modern and classical, building upon Hegel to avoid the antithesis between universality and particularity. The autonomous rational self giving way to the situated self in Marx implies a different understanding of the way in which subjectivity is constituted. The notion of a unitary morality, embodied in an abstract institutional realm and externalised as a code of behaviour, is replaced by an approach which locates morality in the social interaction and practices of individual subjects.
But Marx does not dissolve the rational into particularity but seeks to engender a genuine universal on the basis of the diversity of human experience. That is, though he rejects an abstract, removed and disembodied ethics and politics as much as the Aristotelian 'communitarians' do, he nevertheless retains a 'rational' sense of the necessity of the overarching moral and social framework as making available a greater range of human possibilities.
Marx has a distinctive way of realising the possibilities implicit but ultimately blocked in the tradition of 'rational freedom'. Historically, this tradition reached an impasse within the dualistic framework of the modern world. Whereas the Aristotelian concept of the polis evoked the image of an undifferentiated polity of self-governing citizens abolishing the distinction between rulers and ruled - a democratic ideal of government for, by and of the people - modern differentiation makes it seem that the Hegelian state, denying the identity of rule and self-rule, is the highest and the last form of 'rational freedom'. Despite its anthropological shortcomings as regards politics as creative self-realisation and self-definition, the strict Hegelian institutional separation of state and civil society is, for some, 'the best we can hope to achieve' (Levy 1993:111). The first section of this chapter examined a number of democratic theorists (Held, Heller, Keane, Bobbio) who insist upon this liberal institutional separation as a condition of freedom and democracy. By showing how Marx overcomes this institutional separation as obstructing human self-realisation, thus recovering the classical politics of the good in the modern world, this thesis develops the possibility of a (post)modern polis as a differentiated polity of self-governing citizens beyond the rulers-ruled dualism.
Marx's resolution of the 'rational' dualisms of public-private and reason-nature begs - and receives - an ontology of the good. Having rooted his politics in the creative human essence, Marx proceeds to define the conditions and clauses of his 'true' public beyond public-private dualism. Marx's ability to combine 'true' democracy, individuality and community in a unified project is all the more pertinent given the fact that the ethical basis sustaining the liberal-communitarian debate has been eroded (Bellamy 1992:218). Communitarian liberalism lacks social roots. Since morality in the modern Weberian world has become a matter of irreducible subjective opinion, liberalism is in the process of changing from being an ethical or 'comprehensive' theory to becoming a political theory, avoiding controversy over conceptions of self (Rawls 1993:xx xxviii). Rather than engage in a search for the philosophical or ontological foundation of principles of justice, Rawls's 'political' liberalism rests upon an 'overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 1993:10).
The argument is that liberalism is relieving itself of unsustainable anthropological themes and values concerning the nature of the individual and is instead focusing upon 'fair' institutions and procedures (Bellamy 1992:7/8 253/4). Despite its shortcomings in terms of self-identity, deontological liberalism, as a neutralised and demoralised liberalism, is the only option within the parameters of the disenchanted Weberian world.
Rawls modifies the Kantian position in taking the standpoint of persons as autonomous selves given prior to their ends to be limited to the public identity of persons as citizens (Rawls 1993:30). The encumbrances of the individual as a matter of personal identity must be bracketed out in the public realm so that the individual is independent of particular loyalties and conceptions of the good (1993:31).
Rawls's 'political liberalism' clearly fits the contours of modern 'bourgeois' society. Rawls supports the dualistic political conception of the person, split between public and personal identity in abstracting from ends, by arguing that this dualism 'originates in the special nature of modern democratic societies' (1993:xxi). Rawls thus defends his political conception of the person as an autonomous self as 'implicit in the political culture of a democratic society' (1993:193). But Marx's critique shows this 'bourgeois' society to be a denial of 'true' democracy, individuality and community.
Whilst Rawls secures the priority of the right over the good, particularly in defining an unencumbered individual apart from controversies over the nature of self, he shows more clearly the extent to which the project of deontological liberalism presumes and does not challenge the dualistic framework of modern society. The failure of ethical liberalism to realise its core values - especially autonomy - is admitted, not to further the process of individual self-realisation by going beyond the liberal order but by reformulating liberalism in such a way as to discard its values and assimilate the doctrine to a 'disenchanted' liberal order. The argument is cogent, persuasive even, but only if Weber is right and morality is unavailable in other than subjective terms.
This thesis has challenged the notion that the Weberian process of rationalisation is irrevocable. The realisation of the liberal value of autonomy needs to pay attention to Marx's attempt to recover human subjectivity from within the alien forms within which it is encased in the modern world. Marx developed a critical perspective which addresses the roots of this disenchantment - the alienation of labour and of sovereignty in fetish systems of production and politics - and can therefore counter the contemporary demoralisation of liberalism with an account of the 'good’.
Marx does this, firstly, by challenging the reason-nature dualism implicit in the 'rational' tradition in favour of an integral conception of essential, creative human nature (chapter 6), and secondly, by identifying historical possibilities for 'true' individuality and community within capitalist development (chapter 7). Marx, that is, integrates reason and nature so as to propose an alternative, 'good', social order that actualises the human ontology rather than, as with 'rationalised' capitalism, contradicts it. The emphasis upon the creation of an appropriate social identity so that private action and public good coincide, upon the social world as the real world of individual reciprocity, exchange and interaction, forms a crucial part of Marx's attempt to conceive community in the real and active sense of people producing and constituting their social existence. [12]
In sum, this thesis has shown how Marx unites the philosophical, ontological and anthropological by socialising the principles of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity in the everyday life and relationships of individuals. This is Marx's distinctive contribution to moral theory, envisaging a mode of life which provides a free and fulfilling existence for each and all as individuals, integrating individual and community in the process. It is upon the convergence between human flourishing and a form of social life which corresponds to the human ontology that Marx has been shown to rest the possibility of recovering morality.
As chapter 6 argued, the possibility of a conception of the good depends upon being able to envisage a mode of life which enables a satisfying and fulfilling existence for all individuals, something which presupposes a notion of human flourishing. The good is inextricably related to human nature and envisages a certain form of social life. The task of specifying a mode of life which will earn the assent of all individuals is a daunting one, particularly in the context of a modern pluralistic community. This thesis has sought to show how Marx's notion of the good was rooted in a conception of human nature. By affirming a concept of the creative human essence, Marx can envisage communism as a certain form of human life which realises the human essence. Marx can therefore offer grounds for a common life as the good life for all individuals in the diversity of their everyday activity. Communitarian liberals, as has been seen, offered their own conceptions of human flourishing and the good, rightly attributing a social component to human nature. With Marx, these 'Aristotelian' terms, implying an active and affirmative materialism, transcended liberal forms to realise a new morality and politics beyond modernity.
Morality, far from being silent on the question of the good, merits consideration only to the extent that it addresses what is the most meaningful and satisfying way of life for individuals. Though communitarians like Galston, Finnis and Raz have sought to raise these points within liberalism, the limitations of their liberal premises have been exposed in their retention of the public-private dualism. Both community and the 'good' come to be located in a public realm abstracted from the real natures of social individuals, denigrating crucial aspects of the human ontology and of social life. As with the 'rational' tradition before Marx, morality cannot be actualised in the real affairs of individuals and instead functions as an external system regulating commercial society. This thesis has argued that, for Marx, the demands of morality are affirmed as the demands of the human nature shared by all individuals rather than as external constraints institutionalising a 'higher’ self over real individuals at the level of the state and law. The tendency to repression in the tradition of 'rational freedom’, realised in the processes of capitalist modernity, is thus overcome. This is not the case with the communitarian critics of liberalism, particular with respect to the way that they locate the shared bonds of social life in the abstract community of the state.
Marx's approach offers a way of constituting a common life which incorporates pluralism. Though the argument from human nature can have conservative implications, legitimising the arrangements of an existing social order as natural, Marx's notion of a creative human essence is more radical and more future oriented. Marx does not press a fixed conception of human nature but affirms the freedom of individuals to make their own nature. Such a notion can conceive the good life in broad terms, leaving the major creative role for individual agents to determine its content for themselves.
Marx's purpose is to move beyond liberalism, not retreat to a position before it. Taking this approach makes it possible to incorporate the liberal emphasis on individualism and pluralism within a conception of the good. The good, and the mode of life which makes it possible, is conceived as a condition of individual freedom, not a restriction on it.
Though this thesis has located Marx in a philosophical tradition displaying a normative concern with the human good, the intention has not been to restate a form of Aristotelian communitarianism against modern liberalism. Marx is more artistic than archaeological in his approach. His project is not a nostalgic one of recovery but one of creation. Marx's communism as the realisation of human nature bringing into existence a form of life which has never existed before. Communism is not the good life as already legislated in 'rational' philosophy according to conceptions of the good abstracted from human nature but a form of life which individuals create in actualising their natures.




By tracing Marx's project back to its philosophical roots, reading communism in light of the themes and problems brought to light in the reconstruction of a concept of 'rational freedom', this thesis has sought to show the extant to which the resources exist within Marx to develop democracy, individuality and communality as an integral emancipatory project. This integral conception is lacking in contemporary perspectives. Although both liberalism and communitarianism have been increasingly inclined to revisit the 'rational’ roots of political philosophy, the various attempts to reconcile individual and community in these theories reveal a retreat from the 'rational' tradition. Though deontological liberals look back to Kant, they fail to incorporate a sense of Kant's intersubjective rationality. Similarly, though communitarians seek support in Hegel, they fail to appreciate the extent to which Hegel's connection of universal or collective life with individual freedom transcends the liberal order. This thesis has sought to develop alternative post-liberal possibilities contained in the 'rational' tradition.
This chapter has also criticised contemporary democratic theory. Here the claim is not so much that democratic theorists adopt a liberal interpretation of 'rational freedom' than that they repudiate 'rational' perspectives almost entirely. Contemporary democratic theorists fail to appreciate power as something internal, as bound up with subjectivity, and instead fall into a protective conception in which power, as something physical and external, needs to be institutionally checked and constrained as a potentially oppressive force.

This chapter has argued that the claims of contemporary democratic theorists to have gone beyond Marx are premature. Whilst a number of valuable themes and principles have been identified in 'postmarxist' democratic theory - the notion of a socialist public sphere; the notion of a socialist and pluralist civil society; the ascending (or 'subversive') conception of democracy; the need to combine direct and representative forms of government - the point is that conceiving democratisation as a 'double sided' process proceeding within the liberal institutional separation of state and civil society works to confine democracy within the anti​democratic alien control of the state and capital. This thesis has shown how Marx located this institutional separation within a series of 'rational' separations and dualisms which ensure that the emancipatory promise of reason is realised as a repressive rationalisation.
The chapter proceeded to examine Habermas's own attempt to reclaim the emancipatory terms of 'rational freedom' on the modern terrain as an alternative to Marx's 'true' democracy, community and individuality. Habermas was shown to suggest possibilities for a democratic public sphere generated out of the lifeworld. This aspect of Habermas was further related to the contemporary development of liberatory modes of political expression within the new social movements as delegitimizing old state parties, politics and bureaucratic government. The argument nevertheless concluded that both Habermas's distinction of system and lifeworld and his communicative ethic reproduced the dualisms of public-private and reason-nature which undermined the emancipatory and democratic potential of 'rational freedom'.
The concluding section employed Marx's actualisation of the moral and communal framework of 'rational freedom' as a 'true' public to engage with the Liberal-Communitarian debate. Proceeding from a critique of deontological liberalism, points of convergence between Marx and the communitarian critics of liberalism were established. In seeking to develop an alternative to neutralist, individualist liberalism, the communitarian perspective was considered to be particularly important in that several of its positions appear similar to those of Marx. This is particularly the case with respect to arguing that the autonomous or unencumbered subject is incoherent since autonomy flourishes only within community, since the individual interrelates with other individuals and since personal autonomy raises questions of the good and of human flourishing. The problem is that the premises of the communitarian critique remain liberal and hence were shown to express the liberal division of social space between public and private. Communitarian liberals attempt to reconcile the claims of individuality and communality without overcoming the antithesis of the individual and community inherent in modern social relations. Far from resolving the dualism of individual and community, communitarian perspectives presuppose and reproduce it, incorporating the 'good' aspects of individualism within the liberal community they advocate. Not surprisingly, communitarian liberals have difficulty in specifying the form that common life should take. Ultimately, the communitarians are led to attempt to synthesize the individualist premises of modern social relations with communitarian values at the level of the state, Marx's 'illusory community' and still the only public realm available on liberal premises. What is missing in liberal-communitarian accounts is an attempt to transcend the social roots of the dualism of individual and community. As a result, both individualism and communitarianism take abstract forms. Neither a genuine autonomy nor a genuine community is possible. This thesis has argued that Marx, in making available the appropriate social identity -'connecting public and private - is able to go beyond the abstract individualism and abstract communitarianism of liberal philosophy. Marx, that is, develops a more complex, socio-relational conception of the conditions and contexts of individuality and communality than is possible in either individualist or communitarian liberalism.
In sum, to realise the aspirations for 'true' democracy, individuality and community requires that the liberal premises of contemporary democratic, liberal and communitarian theory be transcended and the division of social space between public and private be abolished. In locating the problem of rationalisation in a general conception of 'separation' as a loss of control and a loss of meaning, blocking democracy, preventing community and dissolving the socio-ethical framework required for individuality, this thesis has argued that Marx marked out a critical and emancipatory project capable of resolving the problems of liberal modernity. By targeting the 'separation’ inherent in the modern 'rational' order, Marx is able to propose a path beyond the impasse in the rational project. In the process, he is able to realise democracy, individuality and community in an integral project that transcends the perspectives of contemporary democratic, liberal and communitarian theory.

11 REASON, FREEDOM AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

Zeldin concludes his Intimate History of Humanity by declaring that 'humanity's most long-lasting purpose has been to produce more humanity’. Whereas this once referred simply to reproducing the species, 'today humanity is above all an ideal of caring and kindness extending ... to every living being' (Zeldin 1995:465). This thesis has sought to locate this ideal in the philosophical tradition of 'rational freedom’. Zeldin's point that the question whether the 'better life’ is individualist or collectivist 'has no point any more because they are two sides of the same coin’ (Zeldin 1995:466) had always been central to the 'rational' tradition. From Aristotle to Habermas, 'rational’ thinkers understand freedom as something arising within relationships and as dependent upon the interaction between individuals within these relationships. Marx's originality lay in his attempt to extend this principle beyond the legal and moral codes instituting the unity of each and all through the abstract community of the state into real relationships.
Developing Marx's relation to a tradition of 'rational freedom' in this way means swimming against the philosophical tide. As Partridge has noted, 'the ruling trend of contemporary theory has been reacting against the more optimistic philosophies or ideologies of the past two centuries ... it has set -about deflating the larger ideas of human possibilities that recommended themselves to many thinkers in the past, and has engaged in the job of cutting down our notions of man's nature to size' (Partridge 1967:40).

Plenty rests upon how this 'cutting down’ is done. This thesis has sought to show how Marx avoided inflated notions of the good by rooting morality in the creative human essence. Marx avoids placing excessive demands upon philosophy by assigning the creative role in realising the 'rational’ community of ends to the human agents themselves as they act to realise their essential natures. Marx can thus envisage the realisation of a 'true' public life without having to appeal to an a priori rationality. Through the unity of self- and social transformation, Marx could make good the claims made in 'optimistic' philosophies by establishing the material conditions for realising the 'larger ideas of human possibilities' contained in the 'rational’ tradition.
Located in a tradition of 'rational freedom', Marx's communism is presented in terms of the search for the proper location of the 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all, discovering how 'rational' principles of communality and reciprocity intersubjectivity could be incorporated into the social life of individual interaction. The central claim of this thesis has been that, in realising the coincidence of the freedom of each and all - the intersubjective and interactive principle of 'Greco-Germanic' 'rational freedom' - in the associative activity of lived experience as a 'true' public beyond dualistic framework of the 'rational' tradition, Marx opens up space to think seriously about the nature of public life.

In this sense, the appropriate conclusion to this thesis is contained in its beginning. In taking 'Marx and Rational Freedom' as the title and central theme, the purpose of this thesis has been to offer a philosophical standpoint for reading Marx's communism as philosophy's 'good' society (1-1), the 'true' public realising the 'rational' unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all (1-2). This is all the more pertinent at a time when a global neo-liberal individualism is hollowing out both civil society and the public realm. Marx's reworking of the 'rational’ tradition shows that the alternative to such individualism need not be an homogenous communitarianism. From Aristotle to Hegel, the case for the common good always contained clauses and conditions pertaining to the individual good within the whole.
This thesis has sought a way of setting crucial aspects of Marx's communism - association, cooperation, democracy - within a normative framework in which individual and community are mutually enhancing. Though this makes the point that freedom can only be realised through the renewal of public life, this notion is distinct from bringing the state back in as a sphere for regulating the private domain (MacGregor 1998:175; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). Public life has a different meaning in Marx, relating to participatory conceptions of power and politics as integral to human self-realisation. In arguing that Marx radicalises the normative dimension of 'rational freedom' against its institutional forms, this thesis has presented Marx's communism as an 'anarcho-Aristotelianism'. Politics as creative self-realisation transcends the institutionalisation of reason in the abstract state.

Marx does not identify politics with formal structures (representative institutions, parliaments, constitutions, elections) but applies it to everything which is integral to the democratic governance of collective affairs, practised through everyday interaction, communication and reciprocity as an associative process of shared experience. Extending democratic control throughout society recovers the classical notion of politics as essential to the truly human life. Politics is no longer defined as the conquest and monopolisation of institutionalised power but as something integral to human self-realisation. Distinct from state-centred perspectives, it has nothing in common with attempts to engineer the socialist public through the ideal agency of 'the party’. Genuinely novel social, organisational and normative structures emerge through an associative process of everyday interaction.
Presenting Marx's communism this way addresses criticisms that Marx's alleged 'holism’ betrays a totalitarian design suppressing otherness and difference. In place of Marx's 'true’ public, Foucaultian/postmodern critics emphasise radical difference and diversity, celebrating the fragmentation of identities and asserting the permanence of power struggles (6-1 6-2). This thesis has been concerned to defend the 'rational’ tradition - and Marx's democratic and libertarian reworking of it – against claims that its vision of political inclusiveness imply the extension of all-encompassing tentacles of political domination. Marx's achievement lies in incorporating the 'rational' perspective within the social intercourse and interaction of real individuals. Marx, that is, finds a way of integrating the universal and particular, community and the individual, so as to enhance rather than suppress the differentiation and particularism celebrated in postmodern modes of thought. At the same time, Marx avoids postmodern tendencies to separatism and fragmentation.

The sense of all the old paradigms being in crisis, the sense of being on the brink of a new social epoch (Smart 1992; 1-1) certainly requires that Marx be read in new light. A particular concern of this thesis has been to show the extent to which Marx challenged the modernist conceptions of reason and freedom and of the relation between them. In that spirit, Marx has been shown to recast the substantial inventory of themes and possibilities contained within ‘rational freedom’. Marx sets the ideal of self-determination in new terms, no longer set within a rationalist framework which raises public over private, reason over nature.

The thesis identified the emancipatory and democratic possibilities in a tradition of 'rational freedom’ deriving from Aristotle (2-2). Though Hegel sought to resolve the antinomies of Rousseau (2-3) and Kant (3) by grounding freedom more adequately in the socio-institutional world (4-1 4-2), these same dualisms reappeared in his doctrine of Sittlichkeit (4-3 4-4). In showing how Marx overcame the dualistic framework which had transformed the emancipatory possibility of 'reason' into a repressive rationalisation, this thesis presents Marx's communism as the community of ends realising the normative potentials of 'rational freedom’ against its flawed institutional character.

Though Benton argues that Marx's moral thesis of 'popular-democratic control’ 'is worthy of endorsement as a kind of regulative ideal', a 'social norm' (Benton 1993:191), this view actually amounts to a reversion to the pre-Marx 'rational' position. It could well be that a Kantian regulative ideal as the object of our willing may be the best we can hope for. This is not the view taken in this thesis. The basic problematic of this 'rational’ position was shown to be the impossibility of locating morality in the world of experience. Conceiving Marx's communism as a regulative ideal would mean that the impasse between ideal and real would remain unresolved. Marx achieved more than this, realising the rational project of replacing coercion with morality in human affairs by embedding the moral ideal in democratic and participatory structures within real society.
The 'rational' tradition had promised to transform what Kant referred to as a 'pathologically enforced social union' into an internal moral coordination (UH 1991:44/5). This is a vision of an intersubjective community of ends, an association of individuals regulating their affairs internally. Nevertheless, unable to realise this ideal, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel resorted to institutional devices to compel individuals to behave as they ought, obeying reason over and against their natural inclinations. By rooting politics in the human ontology (6-4), Marx avoids having to denature individuals in this way. In overcoming the dualisms of reason and nature, public and private (5), Marx also overcame the need for an abstracted moral and political realm constraining individuals to the good, whether in the form of Hegel's state, Rousseau's Legislator or Kant's moral law.
What Marx understood is that the coincidence between freedom and reason could no longer be assumed and required a more direct relation to social realities than had been achieved. The 'rational' tradition had reached an impasse, its emancipatory claims being locked up in an abstracted moral and political realm in the context of an
irremediably diremptive sphere of social reality. The attempts by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel to establish morality within the empirical sphere of politics had persistently broken down in the interface between the ideal and the real. Whereas these 'rational' thinkers failed to establish the basis of moral freedom in the empirical world, Marx worked out its historical possibility. Marx identified the normative dimension of 'rational freedom', detached it from its institutionalisation as a lawful freedom regulating capitalist relations, and socialised and historicised it. Social power, hitherto alienated to the state and capital and imposed as external force, would be practically
reappropriated and reorganised within the social body. Marx thus supplied the 'rational' ideal of internal moral coordination with appropriate mechanisms of social control and mediation. Marx's 'rational freedom' was thus defined as 'human emancipation' (5-2).
Marx's 'true' public adumbrates the 'rational' community of ends as participation in a community of life which is expansive of individuality, a democracy of ends which is multi-faceted rather than unitary (Marx CN EW 1975:418/9). Though Hegel's Sittlichkeit generated possibilities for such a democratic associationalism (4-3 4-4), Marx's critique exposes public-private dualism as causing Hegel's mediation to take bureaucratic form, abstracting universality and commonality from real life (5-1 5-2).
Going beyond the institutional separation of the state from civil society, Marx defines a new associative public, actualising 'rational freedom' and forging public bonds within real civil life. In seeking to embody Sittlichkeit within social bonds, Marx affirmed, against Hegel, the capacity of civil society to generate and sustain commonality and universality within itself. Civil society, rather than being irremediably diremptive and grounded in coercion, as in Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, is considered by Marx to contain possibilities for public life. What was required was not an 'abstract state citizenship' (Marx CHDS 1975:195) but a social identity connecting public and private, reason and nature. As Marx's critique of Hegel developed into a critique of the modern state and civil society, a more complex, situated, relational view of freedom than is possible in liberal theory – both 'rational' and individualist - emerged (5-1). Through embedding morality within social relationships as an everyday practise, the need for the protection of rights and justice codified by the state is rendered redundant. Marx exposes the process by which 'rational freedom' takes a non-relational turn within the state, becoming reduced to the liberal-bourgeois view of society as composed of abstract individuals who have no relation to one another and whose inalienable natural rights derive from an original state of nature. Though, in the 'rational' tradition, individuality is the endowment not of a monadic, self-moving agent but of a person situated and interacting within relationships, the failure to overcome the split between ideal and real meant that 'rational' thinkers had to locate interaction in an abstracted moral-political sphere presiding over the reality of civil society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. Without the reappropriation of social power from the abstracted institutional-systemic world and its investment in real relationships, the individual remains an abstract subject endowed with a formal liberty but entangled in a reified network which contradicts agency. 'Rational freedom’ is reduced to an abstracted juridical conception regulating a diremptive, coercive social order (5-2).
In actualising 'rational freedom' by rooting its normative dimension in the human ontology, Marx's communism gives centrality to material embodiment. Chapter 6 developed Marx's materialist basis for the normative democratic community implicit in the 'rational' conception and which emerged in Marx's critique of Hegel. Marx's conception of the creative human essence is crucial in generating the conception of the 'true' public life, the 'true state' realising democracy, individuality and community (Marx CHDS 1975:112), making it possible to appreciate the normative and political character of human activity in general. Morality and politics are no longer abstracted to a 'higher' realm but become coextensive with practical life as practises of freedom (6-1 6-2). The 'rational’ unity of each and all is achieved within a mode of life that actualises human nature (6-4). Marx realises a 'true' public which connects individuals with each other and connects politics and morality with the actualisation of real natures.

In realising this 'true' public, Marx is able to address the impossibility of conceiving the good in other than subjective terms in the disenchanted Weberian world.
Materially grounding the intersubjective community of reciprocal freedom, Marx proceeded to examine relations of power in the interstices of everyday life and social institutions. Marx could thus recover human subjectivity from within the rationalised Weberian world in which it is encased by identifying the dualistic framework of 'rational freedom’ as a revocable process of self-alienation on the part of human subjects (7-1 7-4). Marx's critique of capital's alien forms of control - state, bureaucracy, money, exchange - ruptures the seemingly inexorable process of Weberian rationalisation. By identifying the potential for individuality and community in the historical process, Marx recovered the possibility of a normative 'rational' public uniting the freedom of each and all. The community of ends is no longer located in an ideal realm abstracted from the social world but is shown to be immanent in a real process of development (7-4). The realisation of this possibility requires the dissolution of capital's reified network of control through the restitution of alienated power to the social body. In defining a solidaristic mode of common control on this basis, Marx re-affirms the 'rational' conception that freedom lies in the association as against the separation of individuals (7-3).
Marx thus showed how associating individuals control their social power, preventing it from taking alien form. This dissolution of the institutional-systemic force of the state and capital through the democratic reorganisation of social power is the realisation of ‘rational freedom' as an associational freedom within real life. Unlike Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, Marx is able to secure the 'rational' unity of each and all in the practical world of everyday relationships.
Hunt's argument that Marx expected the state as coercive power to disappear 'after a new generation had so internalised the rules of social intercourse that no external coercion would be required' (Hunt 1984:246) Suggests the Kantian colegislative community of individuals promoting the ends of each other, freely and spontaneously rather than through duty (Van Der Linden 1988:248). Whereas sociality and solidarity once took alien form as state and capital, Marx actualises reason through the real natures and activities of individuals. In seeking a material basis for Kant's realm of ends, the noumenal aspect of human nature became species essence which, realising itself beyond alienation, fills the space hitherto occupied by the phenomenal aspect (6).
In incorporating 'rational’ principles of solidarity, reciprocity and interaction within everyday life without thereby embracing the abstract universality or external community characterising the modern state, Marx resolves the problem of political obligation. Historically, the terms of political obligation have either been too strict - alienation as permanent and irrevocable (Hobbes) - or vague and tacit (Locke). As a result, the notion of consent was dissolved in favour of a defence of the existing state as legitimate. This even applied to Kant, who condemned the people repudiating the social contract as a 'mob’ (Kant Saw 1974:70n; MEJ 1965:86/7).
Rousseau's originality here lay in conceiving the coincidental moral transformation of both the state and the individuals composing it. Giving the consent in liberal contractualism an active and continuous expression poses the highly subversive question of how the state can be justified if individuals are conceived as able to govern themselves (Pateman 1985:2 12; Hoffman 1995:99/100).
Fenn's anarchist critique denies that any such emancipatory potential exists within the 'rational' contract, arguing that domination becomes habitual under the 'moral and political obligation’ of the state (Fenn 1986:99). But Fenn's end of a stateless society based on minimal obligations and functional authority (Fenn 1986:9 14/5) can be achieved better from within the 'rational' tradition, recasting authority as a democratic practise and exchange proceeding through free initiative, action and association. In realising the normative and democratic dimension of 'rational freedom' against its juridical-institutional form, Marx has been shown to overcome an alienated world administered by officials, politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, external mediators of all kinds (Marx CHDS 1975:107; OJQ 1975:217/8 218/9). Marx abolishes all alien or external forms of mediation to achieve the return to individuals of their social existence (OJQ 1975:220 234 244/5; EPM 1975:341/2 348/9).
In conceiving Marx's transfiguring of 'rational freedom' as an 'Anarcho-Aristotelianism’, this thesis has shown Marx to avoid the danger inherent in the 'rational' tradition of reifying the connections between individuals, avoiding an obligation which is codified, administered and imposed from above (OJQ 1975:222). There is no room in communist society for any power above the level at which real individuals - not abstract state citizens - and real communities - not the illusory state community - directly, actively and consciously exercise control. No cult of authority develops under Marx's communism since power is not alienated to a level at which it becomes independent of and opposed to the will of individuals.
In Marx's 'rational freedom', the free association of individuals exercising common control creates horizontal ties of obligation with each other as opposed to vertical ties with some separate body raised above them, i.e. the state. Obligation is not reified so that it is owed to an institution, an ideal or a law. Marx reconstitutes the principle of self-legislation as collective self-determination. Rather than exchange obedience for the protection of the state, as in contract theory, Marx's free individuals practise a reciprocal obligation through social relationships, each connected with all through everyday communal interaction.
Realising the principle of self-assumed obligation as a non-coercive form of social authority materializes the 'rational' argument that cooperation between individuals through free agreement and association expands the scope of individual action and initiative as a collective form of self-empowerment. Association, investing formerly alienated social power in relationships expressing mutual obligation, far from threatening individual autonomy, develops individuality. Marx's 'rational' conception is distinguished from liberal individualism in that the development of individuality is the realisation of a species being common to all, something that proceeds reciprocally, through mutual bonds, rather than in independence from others. The other is conceived not as an active obstacle to but as integral to individual self-fulfilment.
The common good thus ceases to be the product of a legal-institutional educational process. Richly textured relationships educate individuals into moral rectitude, self-knowledge and social responsibility. Through relationships of reciprocal obligation, each individual develops the capacity to participate in the regulation of common affairs. Morality and politics practised in relationships takes the place of legal rules enforced through coercive sanction, with obligation becoming a reciprocal conception practised within real relationships.
Marx actualised 'rational' principles of reciprocity, interaction and intersubjectivity in an associative public as a social mode of control. The 'Greco-Germanic' necessity of a communal and ethical framework is given a practical institutional form. 'True' democracy leads Marx beyond the formal decision making bodies of political society to examine the full range of social institutions through which power is exercised. This goes beyond the point made by Bobbio and Keane that the crucial question is now where citizens can vote (Bobbio WS 1987:114; FD 1987:56; Keane 1991:11). Democracy entails more than voting. Marx's definition of democracy as an active, participatory concept transcends the periodic, individualistic activity of voting. It also transcends politics as an exclusive activity located within the abstract state. Marx's realisation of 'the political' is shown to entail the radical enlargement of the sphere in which people could assume control of their own lives.
Marx exposed the consequences of 'rational' dualism in fragmenting public life: confining democracy within the alien public of the state (5-1); suppressing community within instrumental, exchange relationships and having it take the form of the state, capital, money and exchange as an alien social intercourse (5-2); subjecting the individual to the objective dependency of capital (7-3).
By realising the 'rational' unity of each and all within social relationships, Marx is able to envisage a democratic authority in which the regulative principles of social order are supplied through participatory structures. Marx's socialisation of reason entails neither an abstract moral framework repressing individual freedom nor the dissolution of organisation into a pure, atomistic, spontaneity.
This is where the advantage of the 'rational' definition of freedom as a collective project is most clearly seen. This thesis has argued for Marx's freedom as a self-determination overcoming the deterministic constraint of alien control. But there is a need to be clear about this prefix 'self. It is not an atomistic conception. In the 'rational’ tradition, individualistic and particularistic conceptions of self-determination are integrated within a common life as making possible a richer, more expansive, conception of freedom (1-2). This recognises that individuals always interact within a complex mutual dependence.

For Marx, the problem of 'rational freedom' lay in the nature of this interdependence, with 'rational' unity coming to be locked up in an abstracted moral and political realm whilst social intercourse assumed alien form under capital. Marx thus sought to replace the alienated social intercourse which prevails under capitalist relations with the genuine interconnection promised by the 'rational' concept. Situating the individual self within relations of interdependence, the task which Marx set himself was to forge public bonds at the heart of society so as to make available more collective notions of self without abstracting general or universal interests from real individuals as an 'illusory community', i.e. as state, law, bureaucracy (Marx 1999:83 88). This offers an alternative to the historical incarnation of reason within capitalist relations as Weber's 'inescapable universal bureaucratisation’ and 'modern bureaucratised democracy' (Weber 1994:279).

This thesis has presented Marx's communism as a practical vision of the 'rational’ ideal, a 'true' democracy of ends and community of everyday life. But this vision is no abstract ideal, divorced from the means, processes and agencies for its realisation. Given Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality (6-3), to be a marxist, as Kitching argues, does not entail a cognitive commitment to believing a set of ideas but an emancipatory commitment to doing something (Kitching 1988:229). Rather than burying themselves in epistemological and methodological questions, marxist 'philosophers' have a more creative role in incorporating a vision of the communist politics of the good society into an agenda for a free society (Callinicos 1985:157/8). Any assessment of communism as the ideal public of ends has to assimilate the full import of Marx's assertion that 'philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it' (Thesis XI EW 1975:423).

This thesis has employed Marx's critical appropriation of the 'Greco-Germanic' tradition of 'rational' philosophy to present a vision of communism as the emancipated society. To expect a detailed model of this future society is, however, to misunderstand the nature of Marx's project.

An ideal vision or practical model of communism is neither possible nor desirable given Marx's commitment to praxis as the coincidence of self-change and social change (Marx Thesis III EW 1975:422). Resolving the philosophical problem into a social-practical problem, the demands which once fell upon philosophy are now placed upon the human agents themselves as they participate in building the 'good' society. Which begs the question as to why, lacking a moral ideal or political vision, these agents would engage in any kind of practical action in the first place. Participating in the building of the ‘good’ society implies a notion of the good.

Marx’s historicism, then, is not entirely innocent of a moral ideal. Rooting politics in the creative human essence, thus giving material content to the 'rational' ideal community of ends, possesses clear ethical and democratic implications. Marx's communism is established as a goal not merely immanent in the level of material development but as a 'rational’ goal which individual agents may find worth incorporating into their praxis. There is no guarantee that individuals will in fact engage in emancipatory transformation or that such activity would succeed in realising the emancipated society. But there are grounds for arguing that such activity would engender some of the conditions for communism as a practise of freedom. Through the coincidence of self- and social change, the individual comes to appreciate a broader range of possibilities in community with others. And once individuals, through association, escape the atomising and paralysing logic of separation, it is reasonable to suppose that participation may build upon itself to generate from within its own movement Marx's 'true' public of ends.

And it may be that the contours of such a social movement are becoming visible in the 'participatory revolution’ of contemporary society (Kaase 1984). The apparently dominant view that freedom is a private and individual good is in the process of being contested by new social movements, breaking the neo-liberal hegemony from below. In a way that reinstates the centrality of Marx's coincidence of self- and social change, without the need for the intervention of the ideal 'party' as the educational dictatorship of 'rational freedom’ (6-5), individuals associate within social movements to affirm values beyond the external constraints of the capital system and institutionalised state politics. In challenging atomising and privatising conceptions in favour of democratisation, autonomy and emancipation, the new social movements are in the process of forging public bonds from below. 

In these circumstances, Marx's implicit notion of a new associative public becomes pertinent, regardless of controversies concerning party and class, ownership of the means of production and capitalist crisis. Marx's material preconditions for communism refer not merely to economic socialisation but also to the level of self-organisation within the associational space of civil society.

Marx continued to emphasise the 'universal’ significance of the proletariat, conceiving proletarian self-emancipation as a self-socialisation from below through civil associations, constituted by democratic participation, and coming to absorb and reorganise the social power invested in the non-associative mode of alien control exercised by the state and capital. The ‘universal' proletariat succeed in embedding rationality in a genuine public life, thus severing the connection between rationalisation and bureaucratisation characterising modernity. 





CHAPTER 1 - NOTES
[1]
For the dialectic of freedom and reason within modernity see Horkheimer and Adorno 1973; Lyotard 1988; Kumar 1978:ch 3 4; Aron 1968; Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974:ch 8 9.
[2]
For Habermas on Utopia 1992:144/6
[3]
For a critical view of marxism as a libertarian utopianism
see Anderson 1980:159/62.
[4]
On this concept in Marx see Berki 1988:90/1; Meikle
1985 :ch2. For an analysis of the good life in terms of
reason and freedom in Critical Theory see McCarney
1990:23/6.
[5]
On self-activity as the character of the dialectic, applicable to the emergent rationality of human society (McCarney 1990:8 104/5). Also Golding on the rational in Gramsci's 'real' dialectic (Golding 1992:55/67). On Marx's dialectic as connecting reason with reality in the shape of the proletariat as the collective agency transforming capitalist society from within (McCarney 1990:168).

[6]
On the distinction between 'rational' and individualist concepts of liberty as a distinction between Continental and Anglo-American concepts (Raphael 1981:81/7; Raphael 1970:115/118; Sabine 1952 Sartori 1965 1987).
[7]
On ancient Greek democracy see Jones 1964; Davies 1978;
Mayo 1960:ch2).
[8]
For a similar view which concentrates upon Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in relation to Marx see Miller in Callinicos 1989:ch 6.
[9]
Strauss defends the anti-democratic implications of
classical thought by reference to the good of the whole as
being for the good of the individual (Strauss 1988:36/8).
For Plato's criticisms of democracy (Republic VIII; Held
1987:28/32).
[10]
See Hoffman 1995:8/9 on this point.

CHAPTER 2 - NOTES
[1]
Mansbridge also exposes the repressive character of a consensus in which conflicts of interest are artificially suppressed (Mansbridge 1983).
[2]
This secularisation of religious self-denial in external systems of rule and regulation took extreme form in Durkheim's subordination of the individual to the externality of social rules as embodying a higher vision of morality (Durkheim 1961, 1974 and 1984; Lukes 1983; Giddens 1977).
[3]
Chapter 7 will develop this split with respect to Weber's formal legal rationality as an attempt to regulate instrumental rationality.

CHAPTER 4 - NOTES
[1]
For Hegel's direct criticisms of Kant's antinomies see
Hegel SL 1969:99; HL para 100.
[2]




In this respect, Hegel's Sittlichkeit is comparable to Barber's 'strong democracy' as constituted by a network of local and regional institutions (such as neighbourhood assemblies, town meetings, civic associations, cooperatives etc) (Barber 1984).


CHAPTER 5 - NOTES
[1]
This implies a division of labour, one proceeding on democratic rather than class lines, that is 'specific and functional' rather than 'general' and abstract (see Wright on the call to socialise the representative function in both Cole and Schumpeter in Wright 1979:59).
[2]
There is a sense in which liberalism does not conceptualise a public sphere at all, reducing it to an arena in which private activities are played out and managed (Arendt 1958; Sennett 1978; Habermas 1989; Habermas TCA II 1989:332/373).
[3]
Marx reaffirmed the key themes of his critique of Hegel in his writings on the Paris Commune, Marx's institutional principles here recovering the model of Athenian democracy and Rousseau's related conception of a self-governing republic in the modern world (Held 1987:130/1; Elster 1985:448). The 'commission' which Marx demands against Hegel (CHDS 1975:194) is achieved by making all public
offices subject to the elective principle, the 'mandat imperatif binding deputies with the electors and achieving 'a working, not a parliamentary body' (1974:208/9 209 210). The reappropriation of alienated -'supernaturalist' - power from the state (and capital) (1974:211 247 250/1), representing 'a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life' (1974:249), realises the principle of self-representation through social function by restoring 'legitimate' governmental functions 'to the responsible agents of society' (1974:209 210/1). The dualism of rulers and ruled is overcome as the general suffrage is 'adapted to its real purposes, to choose by the communes their own functionaries of administration and initiation’, putting 'the right man in the right place’ and redressing mistakes promptly'. Administration and political governing cease to be 'mysteries, transcendent functions' in the hands of state parasites (1974:210/1 251).The legal-bureaucratic incarnation of reason is thus overcome through the social
democratic embodiment of rationality, commonality and universality.
[4]
On the problematic nature of rights (Raphael ed. 1967;
Milne 1986; Flathman 1976).
[5]
See Campbell 1987 on socialism and rights.
[6]
Bowles and Gintis similarly oppose the priority of liberty and democracy based on the exercise of personal rights to the preeminence of economic privilege based upon property rights (Bowles and Gintis 1987:3; see also Lukacs 1991:74). They refer to the conflict between the 'expansionary logic of personal rights' and 'the expansionary logic of capitalist production' (Bowles and Gintis 1987:29).
[7]
Plant 1974 deals with these various conceptions.

CHAPTER 6 - NOTES
[1]
Argyle (1992) develops an approach which recognises relationships between individuals as the basis of social support, health and happiness, the main activities of everyday life, work and leisure.
[2]
The Frankfurt School is full of insight as to how the realisation of reason is embraced as a 'higher ideal' for individuals to strive for. Horkheimer (1974) attempts to recover a substantive conception of reason against the ways in which it has been formalised within	a modernisttradition (Dews 1987).
[3]
See Chapman and Rutherford 1988; Squires 1993; on postmodernism see Bauman 1991 Foster 1985; Smart 1993; Featherstone 1988; Anderson 1991).
[4]
One witnesses here the repudiation of 'theory' as an abstract or totalizing project in favour of a perspective fitted to the rhythms and intensities of lived experience (Barthes 1976; Deleuze and Guattari 1977; Bogue 1989).
[5]
Gorz 1989; Godelier 1986; Habermas 1990:62; Hoffman 1975;
Kilminster 1979; Prawer 1976:ch 5
 [6]
Heller 1974. Soper 1981 presents a view of needs from a mainly structuralist perspective. A contrary view is given by Siedler 1980:103-56. See also Ignatieff (1984).

CHAPTER 7 - NOTES
[1]
Criticism of the violence of abstraction can be found in Sayer (1987)
[2]
For a rejection of Hennis’ normative interpretation of Weber and a defence of Weber as searching for an objective social science see Schroeder 1992:28.
For a non-‘Germanic’ view of Weber which nevertheless argues that Weber offered more than 'value free' social science see Callinicos 1999:ch 7.
[3]
See also the attempt to recover Aristotelian virtue theory as an alternative to the dominant Kantian and utilitarian forms of modern morality in Williams 1985:chs 1 10.
[4]
These are points that Marx continued to make against individualist anarchists, criticising Stirner's egoism or irreducible individualism for repudiating institutions of all kinds as fetters upon the individual (Thomas 1980:128/34 142 168/9).
[5]
See here Sartre's conception of 'idealistic violence' (Sartre 1968:22/3) depicting bureaucratic control divorced from reality.
[6]
For a comparison of Lenin and Weber as a contrast between direct and bureaucratic conceptions of democracy see Wright 1978:183/225).
[7]
Weber's 'iron cage', subjecting the individual to the inexorable, all-pervasive logic of instrumental rationality, has clear affinities with Adorno's notion of 'the administered society' and Foucault's 'panopticon society' (Turner 1993:127/8; Sayer 1991:122; Miller 1987).
[8]
See also Weber's rejection of attempts 'to re-create Gemeinschaft through a corporate state' (quoted in Mitzman 1993:185).

CHAPTER 8 - NOTES [
[1]
Approaching the question of economic organisation this way suggests that Marx's communism is not incompatible with certain forms of 'market socialism', the attempt to combine social justice with economic efficiency (Bardhan and Roemer eds 1993; Bowles, Gintis and Gustafsson ads 1993; Elster 1985:455). Though Marx would object to the view that the 'good society can be built entirely around private property and market mechanisms' (Miller 1990:3), there is no intrinsic objection to the market as a decentralised mechanism of coordination operating within a regulatory social infrastructure. Bison's socialisation of the market through regulatory institutions (Elson 1988:33 3/44) and Hodgson's 'market collectivism' in which necessary planning, state control and markets are based upon a community of producer cooperatives and a 'higher degree of popular participation' (Hodgson 1984:175 177 179), make precisely this point. Embedding the market system within a network of non-market coordinative and regulatory civil institutions offers a means of ensuring social provision without the expansion of state power (see Hirst's defence of associative democracy in these terms (Hirst 1994:12).
The conception of social control replacing the state and capital as non-associative collective powers (chapter 6), of proletarian associationalism and commune democracy (this chapter) as forming the content of an associative public (chapter 4), establishes the social fabric which ensures that the market operates for the common good.
And Marx does conceive markets as capable of functioning independently of capitalism, emphasising the alteration of the social structure as changing the character of social and work relations (Marx 1983:285/6). Though Arnold considers that Marx rejects the market as an inherently alienating institution beyond conscious control (Arnold 1990:284 285), the real problem is the autonomy of relations and alienated labour (chapters 5 6). Marx penetrates beneath the surface phenomena of the market-price form, money and circulation to grasp the fundamental source of the problem (Marx 1983:ChVI) - a capitalist mode of production whose central dynamic of accumulation imposes 'inherent laws' as 'apparently lawless irregularities' (Marx 1983:104). Markets are a secondary phenomenon to the problem of commodity production (1983 Ch I Sect 2).
[2]
That Marx attempted to push the workers towards a political mode of thought, action and orientation see (Draper 1977:105/8; 1990:108/111).
[3]
The idea is discussed further in Bookchin 1980:217 and
Aronowitz 1981:302/2).
[4]
This was a basic idea in council communism (e.g. Pannekoek
in Bricianer ed 1978:129 143/4 261/2 264 265/6).
[5]
On the development of subjective capacities see Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:29 39/40 41/3; 1973:75 and 1975:16 227/8; Wright 1978:101 105; Post 1996:170; Levine and Wright in Callinicos ed 1989:43.
[6]
On parties as instruments of administrative control see Aronowitz 1981:43/4 57
[7]
Edgley in McLellan ed. 1983:290/1; Edgley in Mepham and
Ruben ed. vol III 1979:27
[8]
On its emergence as a new phase in proletarian activity see Morton and Tate 1979:107/10 117/9; Cole and Postgate 1961:378/84 385/8; Hobsbawm 1962:109/10 114/5
[9]
On contract theory see Raphael 1970:85/93; Boucher and
Kelly ed 1994.
[10]
On this see Draper 1990: ch 5 ch 6 119/20 128; Hunt
1984:231/46; Avineri 1968:238/9; Thomas 1985).


CHAPTER 9 - NOTES
[1]
This suggests the way that Aristotle makes familial and economic arrangements a necessary condition for the functioning of the polis (Arendt 1958:30f 79-135). It also suggests Marx's distinction between the realms of freedom and necessity.
[2]
Discussions of this point can be found in Walzer (1983 1987).
[3]
On the centrality of work to self-fulfilment see Argyle (1992:ch 4).
[4]
Connolly ed 1984; Bernstein 1985; Arendt 1958 Dallmayr 1984).

CHAPTER 10 - NOTES
[1]
For a critical view of this liberal turn (Callinicos ISJ 66, 1995:86).
[2]
One can refer here to Cohen and Rogers (1983), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Hindess and Hirst (1977), Keane (1988 CSS, 1988 DCS), Held (1984, 1987 1995), and Bobbio (1988 WS 1988 FD), Pelczynski (1985), Pierson (1986) Dunn (1984), Bowles and Gintis (1986), Offe (1984), Schwartz (1996).
[3]
The Budapest School of Heller, Feher, Vajda et al and its call for the radicalisation of 'formal democracy' as against 'true' democracy (Brown 1988:ch6; Heller in Keane ed CSS 1988:129/45).
[4]
On this separation as the central characteristic of modernity (Dunleavy and 0 Leary 1987 ch2; McLennan 1989:124/5).
[5]
On the recovery of social power as undermining state politics see Viano and Binetti in Makdisi et al 1996:244/5; Lukacs 1971:136/7; Hirst 1989:13/4; Miliband 59/60 60; Jameson 1992:35/6 378/9; Bowles and Gintis 1987:13/4).
[6]
On the tension between capitalism and democracy see Sherman 1995:186/90. 
See also Rosanvallon on the growth of invisible forms of power and the decomposition of democracy (in Keane ed CSS 1988:212/3). Also Keane (in McLellan and Savers 1991:10/1).
[8]
Rawls's Anglophone reading of Kant may be challenged (see Psychopedis in Bonefeld et al ed vol I 1992:1/54; see also Daniels ed. 1975; Barry 1973; Wolff 1977).
[9]




See also Rawls on 'the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and principles' 1993:8).
[12]
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